

Ideas... [~~SECRET~~, Non-Record]

Petraeus, David GEN MNF-I CMD GRP CG

From: Lute, Douglas E. (IA-NSC) [redacted] (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, September 01, 2007 4:52 PM
To: Petraeus, David GEN MNF-I CMD GRP CG
Subject: RE: [~~SECRET~~, Non-Record]

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Sir:

- JCS endorsed your recommendations. Pres mentioned specifically your mission statement and the bar chart that showed shifts over time.
- Based on what JCS reported about health of the force, Pres more concerned for now about winning in Iraq than the health of the force, although health of the force remains a concern
- worst that could happen to the force would be to lose in Iraq
- force calculus: to return to 1:1 we need to get CENTCOM demand for BCTs to 12-14. With 2 AC BCTs in AFG, that points to 10-12 in Iraq. To get to 1:2 (where the JCS believe we need to be for "full-spectrum" readiness) we need to get CENTCOM demand to 9-11, so 7-9 in Iraq. I know this is not your primary concern, but thought you'd find the math interesting. It will likely come up during testimony.
- CJCS: recommendations are "resource informed, not resource driven"
- success in Iraq is "inevitable," but that doesn't mean it will be quick
- need to define the long-term defense agreement. I've got this ball in the Interagency for now, and will look to get a team devoted to this task in support of Ryan.

Not part of the discussion, but related, is the need for us to define what we should do in the wake of the 9/13 address to the Nation to exploit the success of the mil surge; e.g., reinforce bottom-up progress, increase CERP, increase PRT manning and decentralized funding, ensure ISF resources are in place, press the Army to do more in preparing advisors (?), focus econ assistance to the provinces (micro loans, jobs, SOE, etc). There are clearly similar tasks on the regional diplomatic front as well as the top-down front. When you get a chance, I'd appreciate your thoughts.

Another thought. Two concepts have a lot of traction here as powerful examples of where we want to go:

- the Anbar case of security and politics coming together to produce dramatic results, even in the face of unsat progress at the central govt.
- the redeployment of the MEU to an off-shore, over-the-horizon force that remains in the region as part of our enduring commitment.

Doug

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