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General Keane and MNSTCI.

Brigadier Spense and Maj Gen Jones (DoIA)

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Abstract

Ministerial development is beginning. MNSTCI is vital to the future of the mission. Iraqis are developing but there are huge challenges. They lack a unified plan on how many divisions they need. Some want 9, 21, or 30. We have to break paradigms and do proper analysis. There is or is not a future threat of Sunni resistance. Hussein, National Police, is good; Bolani, MoD, faces many challenges.

A couple of times before we reached MNSTCI, General Keane told individuals (b 3 b 6) and Brigadier Spense) to tell LTG Helmick that this was Keane's first trip to Iraq in which a senior commander (Helmick) had not set aside time to see him.

Discussion

Spense: We are starting to see ministerial development. The challenges are becoming increasingly complex. The IAG is our fundamental link to the Corps. The new JMD is coming in 3 -4 months. Personnel resources are modestly increasing, but we anticipate getting less money.

Keane: As we make operational progress, this will gradually reduce, but you gradually will be the supported command, and this headquarters is critical to the long-term relationship. This is an enduring command. This kind of command will be here a long time. But it is hard to justify [MNSTCI in the states] when the Gol ministries are not spending their budgets. We keep fighting this war one year at a time. This is, and must be, a long-term security relationship, but very few politicians have internalized that.

Spense: The Iraqis are spending more than we are.

Keane: People are not getting that message back in the states.

Jones: The Iraqis are doing better.

Keane: We have to remind people this government is only two years old, and this is not the A-Team.

Jones: This is the keystone cops if ever there was one.

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Spense: Until three months ago, the focus was on building forces.

Keane: Where did the idea of 30 divisions come from?

Brigadier S. Dunn: One JHQ plan is for 9 divisions. The Ministry of Defense plan is for 21 divisions. This¹ would include four armored division, six mechanized divisions, and the rest infantry divisions. General Babiqr and the Prime Minister have a different view.

Keane: We have an opportunity with these guys to break the old socialist paradigm of quantity. We need to stress quality and integration. Some of these guys believe only in quantity. Well, in 2003 we took down the regime with just two divisions.

[b 6] JHQ agrees, but the Minister of Defense wants another route.

Jones: He is not alone. There is the generation of the Iran-Iraq war who believe mass is everything.

[b 6] The 21 division idea is about garrisoning the country.

Kagan: The next problem is how to transition to external defense.

Jones: We are seeing growing Mol/MoD tension in the division of responsibility.

Keane: Stay focused on beating down the insurgency. What got us in trouble was the previous mission was transition, not to defeat the insurgency. That was wrong. . . . Now, we don't want these guys spending all their money on a 30-division army and letting Basra rot [socio-economically].

Spense: I agree, but there is a strong constituency in the MoD for a big Army.

Keane: These guys need a threat-based analysis of what is around them to consider what they really need. They don't need to spend money on more divisions, but on enablers, ISR, and precision capabilities.

[b 6] There is also the unemployment pressure that feeds the large-force mentality.

DoIA Brief - Jones: It is not strictly quantity vs. quality. There is a shift in skills from counterinsurgency to Rule of Law that requires other skills. Police suffer higher casualties. Last year, they created martyr's roles to move off the ghost positions they were using for families of the dead and wounded. The National Police are growing rapidly, and Zerivani helps bind Kurds to Baghdad.

Keane: What is the Gol commitment to this force?

¹ Keane appeals to 2003 as authority, of two divisions the proof of what can be done. False analogy, and clearly two divisions failed to accomplish anything more than a highly successful raid.

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The Gol does not trust the Sol and it does not want to have them inside the tent. I think there is a risk some of the Sol could go back to the insurgency.

Keane: There is economic destitution out there. I think we've . . .

Jones: In Anbar, the rumor that the Gol was going to stop paying hazardous duty pay led to an immediate rise in IEDs. Hazardous duty pay was two-thirds of what they were making, and if the Gol thought things were safe, the Sol decided to show things weren't safe in order to force the Gol to keep paying more.

Keane: These guys lost. The Sunni insurgency is over. If they make trouble, have a Come-to-Jesus meeting. Many of them are always on the edge of criminality.

Jones: I think most of all it was economic. Officer development is lagging. We are overbuilding capacity in the training base.

Keane: Do they train five hours a day?

Jones: They do PT in the AM, begin work . . .

Jones: Related institutional change . .

Jones: Working to institute personal accountability, with courts and judges. They will start trying cases for internal affairs, and they're starting up a forensics system. They are moving away from a confessional-based judicial system to an evidentiary based system.

Keane: Is there a plan for UAVs?

b 6 It is in the ISR plan for a company per division, next year, along with signals capability. Plan is . .

Keane: Do you still have confidence in Hussein?

Jones: He is the best single military guy I've seen.

Keane: The good news is there are others too.

Jones: Yes, but we do still struggle with hiring orders for provinces with substantial Sunnis.

Kagan: Is Bolani in control of his ministry?

Jones: He's done well, but he faces many challenges. Is sectarianism in control? I think that has been exaggerated. [I don't know if he means sectarianism is exaggerated or that it is in control is exaggerated].