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UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PLANS OFFICE

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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7 JULY 2007

HEADQARTERS, MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes  
provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] This is [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]  
3 the Historian for Multinational-Iraq. Today is Saturday, the  
4 7th of July 2007 at approximately 1600. I am here at the  
5 Headquarters of Multinational Corps-Iraq at Al Faw Palace,  
6 Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and I am here  
7 interviewing [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ], who is the Chief  
8 of War Plans in the C-3 Section.

9 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] can you go ahead  
10 and introduce yourself to the listener with your rank, first  
11 name, middle initial, last name, spell those out, and also if  
12 you would give your branch and component.

13 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

14 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

17 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] Your branch and component ?

18 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

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(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Okay, great. Did I get your title right, Chief of War Plans?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Yes, sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Okay, super. Can you take a few minutes or so and give me the highlights of your career thus far?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(6)

12 [redacted] Great. When did you arrive in  
13 Iraq on this tour?

14 [redacted] On this tour I arrived --  
15 It was about the 7th of November of 2006.

16 [redacted] Okay, great. You're kind of one  
17 of the unique members of the staff in that there's only a  
18 couple of folks who were here during III Corps' previous  
19 deployment into theater.

20 Any quick thoughts in your mind about, when you  
21 look at your previous experience, especially your present  
22 thoughts on the plans arena? What's different about this

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1 deployment compared to that previous one?

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) I guess the thing that --  
3 The one thing that you always find is, as soon as you have  
4 left Iraq for more than two weeks, it seems that the  
5 conditions change enough that you have to re-green yourself  
6 to actually what is going on.

7 So the conditions changed dramatically when we  
8 left Iraq in February of 2005. We were just coming off the  
9 high of the first elections here, and we've come back to  
10 something that was very different where we had a clear -- it  
11 seemed like insurgency, to now we come back to where it's  
12 insurgency coupled with a power struggle, sectarian violence,  
13 ethnic religious sectarian fighting as everybody tries to  
14 provide for the people and win the people's loyalty and  
15 allegiance to gain that power.

16 So it's a very -- It's a different environment.  
17 Although I got off the airplane, and it was like being home  
18 on R&R for a few weeks, then coming right back to it, Camp  
19 Victory hadn't changed all that much. It was the same  
20 trailers. I used the same shower trailer that I used, in  
21 fact, the last time I was here.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Are you working in the same

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1 office area that you were working?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) I actually moved three desks down from where I  
3 worked previously, with a bigger office but same area.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Anything different about the  
5 character or the working style of this III Corps staff  
6 compared to the last III Corps staff that's worth noting?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) No. I think I've found  
8 that the Corps as a whole in its deployment -- it always  
9 picks up a number of members, the WYS (Phonetic) and the  
10 joint bills that are part of the joint manning document.

11 I have really been proud, I guess, of III Corps,  
12 because I feel like we've been open and willing to accept  
13 those members in and use them and not treat them as  
14 outsiders. At least I hope so. So I've been very happy that  
15 that has always followed through.

16 It seemed -- It was that way when I got here as a  
17 new member to the Corps, being I deployed almost five months  
18 after they had begun their first tour. I kind of feel the  
19 same now, where we very quickly are able to acclimate other  
20 folks, especially the Coalition. We have really been  
21 fortunate with some great Coalition members in the back  
22 offices.

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1           So that's the one thing that I've really noticed  
2 has been the same.

3           There's been some differences, but not -- just in  
4 style, I think, of the way that the command group and the C-3  
5 run things, but for the most part it's -- they have been very  
6 trusting, and I've been, I guess, honored with the  
7 responsibility that they give me. You know, you always hope  
8 that you're up to that task to the advice that they ask me.  
9 So it's really been interesting both times. I've been happy  
10 in it. I found that in both command groups.

11           [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Can you kind of think  
12 back in your mind to when you arrived here for this tour.  
13 Can you kind of synopsise where you saw the fight, from a  
14 planner's seat, in particular from your Chief of War Plans  
15 seat? How did you specifically see where we were at in terms  
16 of as you were trying to assess what your role was going to  
17 be, how that would affect your job as the Chief of War Plans?  
18 Where were we at with the fight, and what were the key  
19 issues?

20           [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I arrived just at the  
21 beginning of November, and the Corps didn't transfer  
22 authority from V Corps or the V Corps staff and General

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1 Corelli until mid to late December.

2 So what happened was I deployed early as part of  
3 an LNO team to try to get some situation awareness and try to  
4 understand what was going on so we could transition to the  
5 new leadership fairly seamlessly.

6 During that time, it was clear that the approach  
7 that was moving forward -- that was, how do we transition  
8 responsibility for security to the Iraqi security forces, and  
9 that was apparent with a concept that was emerging and just  
10 short of being published before they departed that was called  
11 the Transition Bridging Strategy.

12 That was clearly to have the Iraqis step forward,  
13 transfer responsibility for the security of Baghdad and their  
14 cities to the Iraqis and allow the Coalition to back out from  
15 some of those security responsibilities and partner.

16 Almost immediately, mid to late December,  
17 General Odierno came in and said, this doesn't seem to be  
18 working; they are not quite ready for this, we need to move  
19 back in instead of letting -- and it was put very well by  
20 General Keane (Phonetic) when he came over to visit after we  
21 had gone through this, and we had discussions with him, that  
22 transition is not able to lead security. We are going to

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1 have to go back in and secure the population.

2 By securing the population, partnering and  
3 working with the Iraqis, mentoring them, developing their  
4 capabilities, that security will lead transition. So it was  
5 almost a reverse in the way that we were going to develop the  
6 ISF.

7 We weren't going to sink or swim. We were going  
8 to coach them along and work with them. So it became this  
9 focus on the secure situation or secure environment will  
10 create the space that will allow the Iraqis to transition,  
11 not just the security forces, but through the other lines of  
12 operation that the Force has established, which is the  
13 government supporting security, economics, the  
14 infrastructure, the communications and the like.

15 So that was the immediate change that we saw.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6): Let me ask you one or two finer  
17 details about that.

18 If I understood you properly, you were -- You had  
19 said the transition bridging strategy was just getting ready  
20 to be launched by V Corps?

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) They were developing the  
22 concept. It was never published in an order.

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1 [redacted] Okay.

2 [redacted] However, I would say  
3 that, because the concept was worked and briefed and it was,  
4 I guess, socialized at the General Officer level, I think  
5 that at some places it would have been probably begun.

6 [redacted] So even though nothing had been  
7 published, that's what people were --

8 [redacted] Right. And that was the  
9 case, too, with our [redacted] (Phonetic). Things were  
10 already starting to work in the background, because General  
11 Odierno was able to put his vision out to commanders in  
12 discussions with them. So they knew what his vision was and  
13 where he wanted to go.

14 You know, the [redacted] op order really just  
15 documented that vision.

16 [redacted] You mentioned General Keane  
17 (PHonetic). I just want to capture his role in the scheme of  
18 things a little bit better.

19 Was he part of an assessment team that came over?

20 [redacted] General Keane came over  
21 on an assessment team, and I -- I don't remember -- I don't  
22 know if I have it in my notes or not -- remember exactly.

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1 But he came over -- He's been over a couple of times as an  
2 assessment team. I think assessment 4 might have been  
3 General Petraeus himself, just to kind of say, you know,  
4 where can this go, what are the visions that you are seeing,  
5 and visiting with -- giving a brief back to him.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Did you interact with the  
7 assessment team or were in the room when they were briefing?  
8 How would you describe your knowledge of what transpired with  
9 their recommendations?

10 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was the  
11 escort officer. He asked -- He really wanted to have an  
12 explanation from the Corps on what was going on. Even though  
13 it seemed like General Keane was in -- He was there, I guess,  
14 to assess a little bit of both the Corps and Force to get  
15 back to General Petraeus.

16 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm sorry. Was his presence  
17 here still during V Corps' presence or --

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) No. It was after TOA.  
19 This was after TOA.

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think it was even after  
22 General Casey had left and General Petraeus had --

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1 [REDACTED] I just wasn't totally clear.  
2 I've heard his name. I heard about the assessment piece. I  
3 guess I wasn't exactly sure how it fit into the timeline of  
4 things.

5 [REDACTED] And I'll have to look up  
6 the dates. But he came over a couple of times. What  
7 happened was that he sat down for two or three hours with us,  
8 and we had the C-2 planners really lay down -- the  
9 intelligence planners lay down exactly what they thought was  
10 going on with the extremists, Al Qaeda and the like, and then  
11 from that it went into kind of discussion on how we thought  
12 that -- General Odierno's concept and his vision to go at  
13 that.

14 It was a fairly small group. It was only about  
15 six of us in the room. So, you know, [REDACTED] I  
16 think, was the senior. He kind of wanted an O&I, so  
17 Operations and Intelligence brief from us to know where it  
18 was going.

19 Then we went over -- He actually invited us over  
20 to the Visitor's Bureau where he was staying, and we had  
21 another couple of hours of discussion with him that night.

22 [REDACTED] Talk to me more about -- You

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1 were starting to talk about [redacted] (b)(6) (Phonetic). So as  
2 this transition is happening between, wait a minute, we've  
3 got it backwards, we really need to shift to the idea of  
4 security first and move in that direction -- talk to me how  
5 then General Odierno's plan unfolded. How did that interact  
6 with your role? How did he convey that? How did you see it  
7 evolve, and what was sort of the timeline of that, if you  
8 will?

9 Was that the genesis of [redacted] (b)(6) (Phonetic),  
10 was the shift to the strategy of security first?

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't know if it was  
12 ever -- It probably was that clear in General Odierno's head.  
13 But he  
14 never --

15 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And don't let me put words in  
16 your mouth.

17 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) You know, it was never --  
18 Until we really discussed with General Keane, it was never  
19 really as clear in words that way. But looking back on it, I  
20 think it was that clear in General Odierno's head that that's  
21 what he wanted to do, is that he had to get the security.

22 He saw that, and I don't know what all the --

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1 because even during the time when -- before the RIP and when  
2 V Corps was still here with [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] who was the  
3 Chief of War Plans for V Corps, and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] who  
4 was the C-3 at that time, there were requests for information  
5 coming down on how would we use additional forces.

6 So we started to hear the background, maybe the  
7 test balloons from Washington -- I don't know -- on how we  
8 would use additional forces if they came in.

9 So that some of that work was already being done  
10 before General Petraeus and V Corps left. So I was never  
11 sure, you know, how that was worked above me. So I don't  
12 want to speculate. But part of the being able to secure the  
13 populous was clearly the fact that it would take some  
14 additional forces to do that.

15 While we saw that there was a need for us to  
16 protect the populous of Baghdad as our main effort, we also  
17 saw that there was a number of what we called accelerants to  
18 sectarian violence entering the city from the Baghdad belts  
19 and Baghdad support zones.

20 The Baghdad belts were -- The way I understand  
21 it, is in the time of Saddam there was a belt around Baghdad  
22 that would protect the city from the outside, and now it is

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1 really the belt that had the city under seize, and through  
2 the belts and support zones would come car bombs and high  
3 profile attacks, typically Al Qaeda driven against Shia,  
4 which would then in turn cause the Shia to retaliate against  
5 the Sunnis, because typically the Al Qaeda was working out of  
6 the Sunni area, which would in turn make the Sunnis -- with  
7 the MERS (Phoenician) and some of the cleansing and the like  
8 would have the Sunnis become more apt and more willing to  
9 allow Al Qaeda to operate out of their areas to produce more  
10 spectacular attacks, cause more sectarian killings. So it  
11 was called the Cycle of Violence.

12 So these were -- These car bombs, suicide vest  
13 bombs and high profile attack explosives that would come in  
14 were the accelerants that we would call coming in from the  
15 support zones.

16 So while we had to try to stop the violence and  
17 stop the actual bombings in Baghdad, we also saw that we  
18 needed to cut off the ability for those to come into Baghdad,  
19 which always calls the question, you know: If you are  
20 already in Baghdad, by sealing the city how would that -- Is  
21 that going to help? So we have, you know, a number  
22 of courses in the city, and we have really a security zone

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1 around the city that pushes out and tries to really push Al  
2 Qaeda and extremists groups away from the city and their  
3 operating areas, support areas, away from the cities.

4 And General Odierno, with that, envisioned how to  
5 command and control, where he would focus Baghdad, MND  
6 Baghdad on Baghdad, and then wrap it to the north with MND-  
7 North assets, and then with the extra Division Headquarters  
8 that we had to the south and with the MNF-West to the west to  
9 try to set up over the support zones as Baghdad focused on  
10 inside the 10 security districts.

11 Now (b)(6) (Phonetic) was -- This whole  
12 concept linked into what I saw as the Iraqis stepping forward  
13 through, I think, discussions with General Casey on how they  
14 could establish Baghdad and clearly have -- Instead of just  
15 kind of units floating around Baghdad as kind of how it  
16 seemed before, he clearly chopped it up into what we call 10  
17 security districts, and then each side of the 10 security  
18 districts had a clear commander.

19 General Casey was concerned that he couldn't --  
20 When he saw it originally, he said I want to be able to point  
21 on the ground, and I want to know, you know, whose chest am I  
22 tapping that is responsible for that.

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1           So inside the Baghdad security districts, it was  
2 the Baghdad Operations Command. The west side of the river  
3 and east side of the river, which were kind of the 6th and  
4 the 9th, kind of a combination between MOI and MOD. So it  
5 wasn't any singular ministry controlling that.

6           So we'll kind of break it down. It's the feeling  
7 that the MOI, a little bit more Shia, the MOD a little bit  
8 more even handed maybe, and then each of those having, I  
9 think 6 and 4 -- have to go back to a map and look at the  
10 security districts, and then -- So inside each of those there  
11 would be a Iraqi brigade -- at least a Iraqi brigade  
12 headquarters that would be in charge of that security  
13 district, and then coupled with that would be at least a U.S.  
14 battalion who would partner with that Iraqi brigade inside of  
15 that.

16           So there was a whole concept of really organizing  
17 Baghdad, so that you could clearly know what the command and  
18 control structure was for both the Iraqis and -- and it was  
19 never there was so much a question.

20           (b)(3), (b)(6) So when we look at a map and we  
21 see the Iraqi Security Zones as we see them now, which you  
22 see everywhere as you come in, that was a recent development,

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1 so to speak?

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That was, yes, at the  
3 beginning of this year.

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And that still happened under V  
5 Corps or was that --

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) It was right on the  
7 cusp. I think that the continuity there was the Iraqis and  
8 General Casey.

9 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. Let me ask the real  
10 piggyback stuff. Let me ask you a very broad-brushed  
11 question, and then we'll dig deep on this. So just give me a  
12 pretty short answer on this, if you would.

13 Just as you look back, can you identify this  
14 bullet by bullet? What are the key plans, war plans, that  
15 you've focused your time, your team's attention on in the  
16 tour so far?

17 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Obviously, we started out  
18 with [redacted] (b)(6) (Phonetic), and that was a plan that we --  
19 and as I said, I think General Odierno had it in his head.  
20 He had been thinking about it for a while. So we had to  
21 publish that plan, I want to say, within two weeks after the  
22 transfer of authority.

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1           Then from that, it immediately went into -- The  
2 planning efforts that went into that were how do we enable  
3 that plan by employment of the additional five brigades,  
4 plus-up brigades that got the U.S. brigade count to 20; and  
5 as that moved out through that, I want to say employment of  
6 the MEU was a significant step for us, and then --

7           [REDACTED] Sorry. MEU is?

8           [REDACTED] Marine Expeditionary  
9 Unit.

10           I think -- I have to go back and look, but I  
11 think we employed that twice. I think we out-shopped one,  
12 and then we just pulled the 13th in for 60 days. It's still  
13 on the ground now.

14           So there is all the employment pieces for that.

15           [REDACTED]: What form in terms of plans did  
16 the [REDACTED] pieces take place? Igt wasn't an Op plan,  
17 if I'm not mistaken? How was it published?

18           [REDACTED] Well, how we publish it,  
19 we published -- Only rarely do we publish an Op plan. Most  
20 of our plans are just "fragulous" to an overarching -- it's  
21 almost campaign plan-like, although hard to say that it truly  
22 is a campaign plan with having higher headquarters who

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1 publishes a campaign plan. This is really our operations  
2 plan to operationalize that campaign plan.

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) So [redacted] (b)(6) was really a  
4 "frago"?

5 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): Frag material order.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) So the first mention fo [redacted] (b)(6)  
7 [redacted] (b)(6) was probably in a frago then? Okay.

8 In my mind, I'm piecing what your efforts are in  
9 fragos. Another was the operational concept that came out in  
10 early March of 2007, and then recently, most recently, we see  
11 the first full operations plan.

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): Right. And all the  
13 operations concept really did was it -- That was, I want to  
14 think, us helping General Odierno organize and communicate  
15 his vision. So the concept would continue to emerge until it  
16 was something close to what he wanted to publish, and then  
17 that quickly became O. plan 0701.

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Like I say, I want to make sure  
19 I don't put words in your mouth. So [redacted] (b)(6) Series  
20 of fragos that outlined various missions in terms of how to  
21 accomplish this issue of security of Baghdad, the belts, the  
22 --

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1 [redacted] Well, no, because [redacted]

2 [redacted] really was the overarching document that kind of laid  
3 that out, what -- And as a corps, what we really do is we  
4 provide priorities, provide resources and forces.

5 So we are really almost the theater force  
6 provider or allocator of those resources. So that the Corps  
7 Commander will sometimes say I need to conduct a tactical  
8 task in one area, will more often than not -- What he says he  
9 needs, hey, we've got to take it and we've got to focus on  
10 this area, and on that area I'm going to give you these these  
11 additional forces.

12 So the fragmentary orders were the orders that  
13 would give those forces then to Baghdad or West or North or  
14 Center when we sliced out a piece for Center.

15 That being said, he clearly has -- I think he  
16 clearly has a vision that he wants some force to go and work  
17 in the Abi Jabour (Phonetic) area, which is south. He has a  
18 vision that Baqubah needs to be secured. The populous needs  
19 to be secured. Of course, knowing that, you know, he  
20 still has to maintain some focus on Baghdad, how much can he  
21 balance the two; and then once Baqubah continues to develop,  
22 he wants to go out and work on some areas around Lake Farfah

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1 (Phonetic) and the quarries that, really, he is not certain  
2 what's there. So he would like to go in and find out, make  
3 sure taht it is not being sued as a training and transit  
4 area.

5 While all that was going on, we saw great  
6 successes beginning to develop out west in Anbar where my  
7 feeling is that the tribes and the local populous became  
8 tired of Al Qaeda and the effects that they were having, the  
9 war and the fight itself, and started to reject them and  
10 begin some of these, you know, what at one time were called  
11 travel security forces, then provincial security forces.

12 Now I think they are local security units that  
13 our attempts are going to be that, if that's the case, what  
14 we will do is we will integrate those into the Iraqi Security  
15 Force, but that's going to take, I think, some time and  
16 effort on the government; because the government is going to  
17 have to figure out how to reconcile with them to get them to  
18 come to the table.

19 It's easy for them to reconcile with us. It's, I  
20 think, a much more difficult thing for the government to get  
21 them to reconcile. The fact is that them reconciling with us  
22 is not -- It doesn't necessarily help the government of Iraq

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1 or the Iraqi -- Iraq as a whole.

2           Then that kind of falls back to General  
3 Odierno's whole premise of this whole thing as he thought  
4 about this thing on the way over and at the beginning. He  
5 sees this clearly as the people of Iraq have a set of needs,  
6 and the people of Iraq are looking for someone to fulfill  
7 those needs; and the question becomes: We would like to see  
8 the government of Iraq fulfill those needs, the needs of the  
9 people to be a -- to continue on what we would probably  
10 consider a legitimate government, a viable government or  
11 whatever the words you might like to use.

12           The piece right now is that there is a gap  
13 between the needs that are being provided and the needs that  
14 are desired by the people, until if there is a gap in between  
15 those, somebody will take and fill that gap. So if it's not  
16 the government, it will be somebody else; and if it's us or  
17 if it's AQI or if it's a tribal leader, that will -- you  
18 know, that then assumes some power from the government over  
19 the people, you know, in the whole structure of things, I  
20 guess.

21           (b)(3), (b)(6): I did want to talk to you  
22 more specifically about Plan 0701, because it is certainly

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1 the first full seminal document, I guess, looking at from the  
2 historian, under III Corps' role being MNCI.

3 Can you just kind of talk me back through the  
4 genesis of that? And I'm assuming -- stop me if I'm wrong --  
5 that you had the lead on this. Your section had the lead on  
6 this, at least.

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I'd say, really, the CG  
8 had the lead on it.

9 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. When did he involve  
10 you?

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think that some of the  
12 concepts that he was working through he was thinking about  
13 well before the deployment. He was thinking about it  
14 June/July/August time frame as we prepared to deploy the  
15 Corps, on how we were getting to this, and some of the  
16 concepts we were working with him back at Fort Hood.

17 It just -- The four or five months here gave him  
18 the situational awareness that allowed him to enhance, refine  
19 his vision to make sure that, you know, he clearly understood  
20 or understood the best that anybody could the operational  
21 environment as opposed to trying to look at it from afar.

22 So a lot of what we saw in [redacted] (b)(6) was

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1 carried forward into 0701. For a short time -- I want to say  
2 four to six weeks -- he had a commander's initiative group  
3 come in, and it was a little bit -- I'll say, from the plans  
4 perspective, it was a little bit dicey at that time, because  
5 what happened was that he had this group of four or five O6s  
6 begin to work -- help him advance both his understanding and  
7 his vision, but then they elft, and we had to pick it back  
8 up. So there was a short time of disconnect.

9 It wasn't that we -- You know, we felt bad,  
10 because we didn't want him to think that we were going  
11 against the boss, but we just didn't understand, because we  
12 hadn't been part -- We hadn't, you know, watched -- been  
13 along the road to see the sights to know what had driven him  
14 to these decisions.

15 So it took a couple of weeks for us to get back  
16 into the field, and even afterward, you know, he said, yeah,  
17 we should have had planners in here while we were doing this,  
18 because it would have kept it, you know, nested better as  
19 they would continue.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) There was an executive group  
21 that he worked with to develop the plan, and then --

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, it kind of went

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1 back and forth. He started it. Then it went over to the  
2 Executive Group, and then it got handed back to us. And it  
3 was a little shaky there at the handoffs, because he had --  
4 You know, he basically had to explain the vision and concepts  
5 again to us, which I'm sure was frustrating to him.

6 Then we picked it up and continued to develop it.  
7 I'm very fortunate that we have -- I have some great planners  
8 that work for me, and between -- The lead, really, for the  
9 campaign plan, what we call O plan, 0701, was (b)(3), (b)(6)  
10 (b)(3), (b)(6) and he worked with (b)(3), (b)(6)  
11 (Phonetic).

12 I was able to let those guys really focus on some  
13 of the thoughts and try to develop concepts and show them to  
14 General Odierno so he could explain, and that they really --  
15 they really meshed well.

16 I think the dialogue -- Trying to put it on paper  
17 and let him look at it and then just the dialogue built a  
18 common understanding between those planners and the  
19 Commander, the Commander and the command group and the C-2,  
20 the C-3, the Effects Coordinator, who would basically -- We  
21 get to go see the CG about an hour twice a week, and so as we  
22 prepare these documents and show him, he will say what were

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1 you thinking here; no, this isn't what I meant. And it  
2 became a very frank discussion between Lieutenant Colonels  
3 and Majors and a three-star General.

4 So it's -- As I said to begin with, it's quite an  
5 honor to be able to try to help or try to understand maybe  
6 how someone at that level thinks.

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) So you would go in there with a  
8 planning group, yourself, the C-2 rep, so on and so forth, to  
9 try and -- And would he review it in advance or he would sit  
10 there and go page by page with you guys while you were --

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) We would try to put some  
12 of the thoughts on slides and how we conceptually saw them.  
13 He would look at them, and we would talk him through what we  
14 thought that that concept was. It would be him then  
15 explaining where we were off on a vision, where it would be  
16 better articulated. So it was a -- It was a way to help us,  
17 as I said before, document his vision, document his guidance  
18 and guidance and document his priorities.

19 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) How long did the process in  
20 terms of days, weeks, months -- When did you guys sort of  
21 start these small groups? How long did it take you to go  
22 through this process until you got to a point where you were

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1 close to the Commander saying, yeah, yeah, you got it?

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) We started -- We started  
3 when we first got here. When I was here last time, we had  
4 what we called senior plans meetings. Senior plans meetings  
5 at that time was a meeting of about [redacted] 1.4a folks that would  
6 get together and just do that, talk concepts with General  
7 Metz at the time.

8 That was carried over into 18th Airborne Corps  
9 who followed III Corps, and then V Corps. But by the time we  
10 came back, somehow it had merged into almost a command and  
11 staff of -- and I believe the head count was [redacted] 1.4a people.

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That was in the process of  
13 reviewing an order, that sort of thing?

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, it was putting  
15 concepts in front of the Commanding General. That was the  
16 planners' time to see the Commanding General.

17 So we would go up, and in front of [redacted] 1.4a people put  
18 concepts in front of him, and usually we obscured. And part  
19 of it was just that the Commander can't be as open or as  
20 frank with his discussions in a large group like that as he  
21 can with a small, trusted few.

22 So we went away from that, and we started to just

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1 go -- We go to his office now twice a week for an hour, and  
2 we put soem concepts in front of him, and we are able to talk  
3 to him about that and get a feel for what he wants to do with  
4 that.

5 Like I said, we've got de-sync'ed when the  
6 Commander's initiative group came in, but when the initiative  
7 group left, the Commander said we've got to get this into a  
8 documented order. And at that time, it took us a couple of  
9 weeks to get re-sync'ed with the Commander, and then we went  
10 for about a 30-day where we went and we, with rapid  
11 succession, would go back to him, and all we did was focus on  
12 refining his thoughts on the concepts, the writing process,  
13 the reviewing process, and then really the briefing process  
14 where we were able to publish this to everybody.

15 Like I said, by the time that we actually did  
16 publish, I think that all the commanders were well aware of  
17 what was being published, had heard the Commander talk, knew  
18 what hsi guidance was. This was simply something that  
19 published it.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) So it's because of the Commander  
21 and his communication with his subordinate planners that  
22 there were no surprises or did you guys take separate action

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1 to communicate what the Commander was thinking out to the  
2 subordinate commanders?

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, but we wouldn't talk  
4 directly to the commanders. We talked to either their  
5 liaisons on the staff or -- and probably not as well as we  
6 should, but to the planning and the G-3s, I guess, of the  
7 Divisions.

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) You were helping pass that  
9 information as it was being developed out so that everybody  
10 would be up to speed on what the General was thinking?

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think so.

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) You mentioned the process and  
13 the lag, the commander's issues group, and then picking back  
14 up. Was that General Keane's group?

15 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) No. It was a small  
16 group. This is a small group that was --

17 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I just lost track of the gaming.  
18 That was a small group of people who helped him piece  
19 together the --

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic),

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) He has another one now that he has  
22 reestablished, and I'm not sure how long they will be here,

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1 but they are looking at some other things.

2 I've taken some of my guys, my strategy guys, and  
3 really tried to link them in with that group so that they are  
4 -- so we won't have any surprises for the next time.

5 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) You talked about this intense  
6 30-day period of really going back and forth a lot, of  
7 getting in sync with the --

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Focusing -- The only  
9 thing we really would take him in that 30 days, those, I  
10 guess, eight sessions or so, was things that were focused on  
11 O plan 0701.

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And every once in a  
14 while, we would get 15 minutes at the end about, hey, the  
15 boss has still got to remember his decision point here, and  
16 how are you going to deploy your fourth plus-up brigade; and  
17 we would walk him through what we thought the concept was,  
18 where the risks would be, where the threat was the greatest  
19 on those projects.

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) When did that 30 days roughly --  
21 Knowing that ultimately -- It was published first or second  
22 of June, I think?

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) First of June.

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) First of June. When was that  
3 30-day block? Was that -- Could we backtrack from there,  
4 and were you working right up until the day before the first  
5 of June on this 30-days?

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) We were working right up  
7 until the 1st of June.

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) So roughly the month of May, the  
9 high intensity period, really, finishing up.

10 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. Were there any parts of  
12 Op Plan 0701 that you got pushed back? Even though you were  
13 feeding out the information, did any of the MNDs or MNS say  
14 anything about any surprises when it ultimately did hit the  
15 table, and everybody, you know, left the room? Was there  
16 anything that was missed in terms of, hey, wait a minute,  
17 what about this?

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think so. I  
19 think, because the top cover, the commander's conferences  
20 that he had and some of the slides that were actually part of  
21 the brief were briefed at commander's conferences or small  
22 groups that he had with the commanders, that there weren't

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1 very many surprises.

2 I think always the bigger surprise had been -- I  
3 shouldn't say surprise, but the struggle is always allocation  
4 of forces, which it always will be, and that's what I call,  
5 you know, cognitive attention; and I think it's a good thing  
6 that, you know, I have someone over here saying that I need  
7 forces, and I have someone over here saying I need forces,  
8 and them arguing to the boss, just to make sure that the boss  
9 is aware of the risks that are involved with each not getting  
10 those forces, so that he can best make a decision on where  
11 they need to be allocated, so he's aware of the risk.

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) Is there a point in this process  
13 -- You've kind of discussed this methodology of working with  
14 the CG in this way. You know, in some ways I kind of think  
15 back to the old school process of, you know, you put three  
16 courses of action in front of the boss, and you know, he kind  
17 of picks one or he says I like this one but make it more like  
18 this, or take this and --

19 Does any of this process sort of approximate  
20 that? We talked about decision points, that you had to  
21 remind him periodically of that. How did he come to those  
22 decisions? Say, yes, we're going to put that force over here

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1 or we are going to --

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, we would always try  
3 to go in. We would say here's how the environment has  
4 changed based upon your last application of force. And,  
5 clearly, he is very comfortable -- and I truly believe it is  
6 a very sound process for the military decision making  
7 process that we go through.

8 So as we lay out what we know is the way things  
9 are, we would try to lay out and say to him, sir, these are  
10 what you can do; you know, based upon that, if you think this  
11 is your largest threat, we can put the whole brigade there;  
12 we can take and split and give half of it here and half of it  
13 down here. You know, Baghdad is going not too well; you  
14 might want to think about putting another force there to help  
15 them move faster as they secure the populous there, because  
16 we are not -- So we would always lay out some courses of  
17 action for him on how you could do that.

18 Then he would always come back and say, and we  
19 would discuss it, and we would go back and we would make the  
20 changes. Then we would go back and bring them to him and let  
21 him look at it, and he would do that.

22 So he's comfortable with that process. I think

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1 the process does what it needs to do. It provides him the  
2 information. it tells him what task he has in front of him,  
3 lays out ways that he can get to that task by courses of  
4 action, and then it shows you what risks are involved with  
5 each of those courses of action so that he can make the best  
6 decision.

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) How did you find his decision  
8 style of decision making, in the sense that, if you were  
9 laying out alternatives to get to the end state that he  
10 wanted to get to? Is there a norm to the way he likes to  
11 make decisions? In other words, did you find that, hey, I  
12 laid out these options. He usually would look at them right  
13 then and there and say, yeah, we're going to do this one or  
14 does he like to think about them and catch you at the next  
15 meeting and say, okay, yeah, I've thought about what you told  
16 me last week, we are going to do this one?

17 Does he have a typical style?

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, the one big thing  
19 is he's a very -- He's a visual person. So if you put a map  
20 in front of him, he's drawn immediately to the map.

21 He also thinks much faster than your brief will  
22 ever go. So you'll start laying out the facts, and he has

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1 already formulated courses of action in his own head.

2 So you will be at the mission analysis portion of  
3 the MDMP, Military Decision Making Process, and he will  
4 already be giving guidance on the courses of action, and  
5 you'll get to the courses of action: Well, yes, that's what  
6 I meant to do or that's not what I meant to do.

7 So he clearly -- He is very decisive. So he can  
8 make -- And he will tell us, lay this one out, and he will  
9 often come back and say, okay, I want you to take two and  
10 develop that a little bit more, and then take two and add  
11 another battalion over here, and then have us come back and  
12 give him some more no that so he can look at the information  
13 again and see if that still makes sense to him.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) That's great. I think you were  
15 trying to convey that, and I just hadn't really -- That sort  
16 of caught it, I think, nicely.

17 You talked about the interaction with the major  
18 supporting commands. What was the relationship between you  
19 and planners at the MNFI level, especially given that we sort  
20 of have something of an awkward situation where MNCI has  
21 published its op plan, but we still haven't seen MNFI's plan?

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, in fact, they still

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1 have the draft out. So we are almost 30 days of ours being  
2 published, more than 30 days of ours being published, and  
3 they are still working through their plan.

4 Now theirs is a much more strategic plan, is  
5 complicated by the fact that it is as joint campaign plan,  
6 meaning that it will be signed by both the Ambassador and the  
7 Forces Commander. So there has to be some -- I think, some  
8 concessions that go on between State and Defense at that  
9 level.

10 I think that -- and we briefed this concept,  
11 because we were going -- You know, one of the things that we  
12 always -- that always -- I think (b)(3), (b)(6) said the  
13 Plans shop seems to be the oracle of the staff, because when  
14 everybody has a question, they always like to come to the  
15 Plans shop to get the answer.

16 So we end up doing a number of briefs. Jim  
17 Powell, Ken Strader, the strategists that are really working  
18 those plans, have briefed Joint Forces Commander, have  
19 briefed -- We do not brief Admiral Fallon, the CG. Reserve  
20 the right to brief him on the concept. He kind of stays in  
21 the chain of command.

22 He has briefed Forces Command. You know, General

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1 Campbell is here. The CG briefed that, but we were in the  
2 room, and we were able to participate in that discussion.

3 General Luck (Phonetic) -- We sat down with  
4 General Luck, the retired who is the advisor to Joint Forces  
5 Command, the Warfight Center, that comes over and does the  
6 mission rehearsal exercises with the Corps.

7 So all those briefs that we put together, we  
8 would pre-brief the boss, the CG. As he took a look at them,  
9 you know: Hey, make sure you talk about this. And it was  
10 another chance for us to get that information.

11 So all that was, I think, in line with and was  
12 continuously being vetted through General Petraeus, and I  
13 think that -- So I don't think -- There are not very many  
14 surprises in the tasks that are given to us in the Joint  
15 Campaign Plan or the Annex.

16 In fact, as I say, we are going through their  
17 draft 6 right now, and we are making sure that there aren't  
18 any inconsistencies from the way that we -- you know, General  
19 Odierno's vision, and I think that for the most part, with  
20 the exception of a few pieces, General Petraeus is fairly  
21 comfortable with General Odierno's vision of how the security  
22 piece should unfold.

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1 [redacted] Okay.

2 [redacted]: So I guess the answer is  
3 that awkward a little bit, but not too bad, because even  
4 though, in fact, I sent a planner to Force to help write the  
5 security end.

6 [redacted] Okay. So it sounds like there  
7 continues to be this communication kind of below the written  
8 formal level?

9 [redacted] Indeed.

10 [redacted] Okay. We've covered a fair  
11 amount of ground. I wanted to kind of ask you at this point,  
12 what haven't we talked about that you're thinking, hey, he's  
13 the historian, but he hasn't asked me about this?

14 What haven't we talked about relative to what  
15 you've been engaged in that you're thinking should be  
16 mentioned?

17 [redacted] I think the one thing  
18 that I've found that has been very interesting, and it's been  
19 both my times as planning, and this is a -- It was new to me  
20 when I was Division Planner with 1st Armor Division when  
21 there was some -- it wasn't the political influence that you  
22 worried about, but there was some in-house -- there's more

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1 Army, in-house Army as we were deploying to Bosnia.

2           There were the folks that were: I should remain  
3 relevant within the Army; so therefore, I need to have X  
4 capability to deploy to Bosnia, because this is the first big  
5 thing that we've had going for, you know, a couple of years.

6           Well, that is being carried over into this. It's  
7 interesting. General Odierno has, I think, done the right  
8 thing where he has laid out operationally the requirements as  
9 he sees them in theater, notwithstanding what the potential  
10 political constraints are from the world, the United States,  
11 that come back and say -- he will come and say, this is what  
12 I need to accomplish this mission that you have given me.  
13 But at the same time, we always maintain that in the back of  
14 our head, because what we plan for having the resources we  
15 need, we have to understand the real limitations.

16           So it's an interesting dynamic that you find  
17 yourself in as you say, you know, if I had, you know, 400,000  
18 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen, you know, we would  
19 knock this thing right out. But you know, where is the  
20 balance on what they can give and what -- But at the same  
21 time, he knows what line to go up to and say this is what I  
22 do need, and I can do -- I think that I can accomplish the

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1 mission with this. So that there is no question in anybody's  
2 mind that, without that, they are putting this whole mission  
3 at risk.

4 It's itnerestikngi to see where we've come in the  
5 last almost 30 days now that we've had the full plus-up on  
6 the ground, and we are -- I think that Al Qaeda is off its  
7 game, that we are making some ground against what's going on  
8 with it as it tries to influence the environment.

9 At the same time, you'll watch the news, and you  
10 don't necessarily see that in the media. So it's just an  
11 interesting dynamic. I'll never know how, you know, the  
12 General Officers balance that, but it's interesting to watch  
13 to see it be done.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Hey, I want to ask one detail  
15 question which I didn't take you through.

16 Can you just tell me: How big is your section?  
17 Is it broken down in a particular way? You mentioned one of  
18 your folks by name who was key to the planning process. I  
19 don't necessarily need the names of others, just in terms of  
20 who is in your section and how is it structured?

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) C-3 Plans consists of  
22 myself and really five Majors that work for me. Now that's

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1 what is on the Corps books. Along with that, I also have  
2 three Coalition planners, Australian, British, Ukrainian, and  
3 also am authorized -- however, they have been, I think,  
4 farmed out to help back up FUOP -- am authorized a Air Force  
5 planner and a Marine planner, and those should all work  
6 directly for me where I have rating authority over those  
7 folks.

8 Now with that, the Plans horizon really goes  
9 across all the staff sections. So I'm also charged with  
10 having to bring in planners from C-2 Plans and kind of have  
11 them work in conjunction with a bigger, what I call the Plans  
12 battle staff.

13 That comprises anywhere from 

1.4a
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14 folks that will get together, and we will have discussions  
15 with and interact with as we move forward on a given plan.

16 What I do is I have the C-3 planner then be the  
17 lead planner for that effort, and have them in charge of  
18 coordinating across that entire battle staff for that issue,  
19 and then I can kind of farm it out that way so I have four or  
20 five guys to work with.

21 A number of the folks are kind of contingency  
22 plans, a little bit more operational tactical, and then what

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1 I've tried to do is break out a couple of folks to stay at  
2 some of the conceptual, strategic, operational plans,  
3 campaign plan level.

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Of your five Majors --

5 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Of my five.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) -- some may handle--

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Five best Majors, and

8 we've become better. We are not always good about bringing  
9 in the Coalition folks, but I tell you that, you know, they  
10 are all very capable once you figure it out. Just, you know,  
11 the arrogance of American -- it takes usually about six  
12 months for us to figure that out, but some great, great work  
13 and very smart people.

14 I truly believe that the Coalition only sends  
15 their best to positions like this, especially last -- in 2004  
16 and '05 and seeing it again this time. The capabilities are  
17 just amazing.

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Anything else? Okay.

19 Shall we make mention -- You had mentioned you hadn't been  
20 interviewed during your previous tour here in Iraq?

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): The Corps Historian back  
22 at Fort Hood after we returned sat down with me back there,

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1 and we did -- It was primarily on Fallujah, the November  
2 Fallujah.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) I just wanted to mention that on  
4 this interview, in case anyone listening to this would want  
5 to refer back to that. Okay. That concludes this interview.

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