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(b)(3), (b)(6)

Perfume Palace, Camp Slayer, Baghdad
Arrived 4 August 2007 - -

By (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNFI Historian

(U) Interviewer Comments: I conducted the interview in the Coalition Intelligence and Operations Center (CIOC). One of the CIOC's rules is they do not allow recording devices. Therefore, I was not able to make a recording of the interview. This report is based on my handwritten notes on Mayo's responses to my questions. We talked about her career, service in Mosul in 2004, intelligence, and Sadr's freeze of August 2007.

(b)(6)

(U) Her previous deployment was for Joint Task Force Provide Promise for Bosnian peacekeeping.

(U) Before this deployment, the one thing that most shaped her was the 2004 deployment with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team under (b)(3), (b)(6) was a teacher, coach, and a mentor. It was her first combat arms assignment. She was anxious about the assignment, concerned that the infantry would not accept her. That was not even remotely true. They took her in and made her one of them. The assignment and the experience transcended gender relations. (b)(3), (b)(6) allowed her to grow. He trusted her as the CI advisor, and she became the go to person for CI. It was empowering.

(U) (b)(3), (b)(6) feels that, contrary to popular perceptions, the military has always dealt fairly with her and her gender and ethnicity have never stood in the way of getting a fair chance to succeed. Everything that she has competed for in the military, she has had a fair chance to succeed. (b)(6)

(b)(6) He was her first mentor, and he encouraged her to go aviation. She got to go to flight school. She washed out, and it was devastating, but the military let her branch transfer to intelligence. She has gotten all the schools she wanted, and has two company commands. The Army is a reflection of society, and it has evolved. I asked whether the experience of failure had left her

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somewhat humbled. Not at all, she said. Before the military, she was shy and quiet. Thanks to the military, she became confident and bold. The military transformed her. If anything, failure taught her to strive harder.

(U) I asked her to explain what it is that people outside of MI don't appreciate about the limits and possibilities of intelligence.

(U) Intelligence gets blamed for assessments made honestly with the best information available. It is a best guess. They piece the puzzle together, but they don't have all the pieces, so there are intelligence gaps. When things go wrong, people like to blame it on an "intelligence failure." Sometimes, intelligence is politicized. Sometimes the intel isn't there to support the preferred course of action. It is not an exact science. It is based on the best reporting. Regarding the buildup to the 2003 invasion, (b)(3), (b)(6) believes that Saddam was moving to comply with disarmament requirements, but she also agreed with my point that deception was crucial to Saddam's strategy to hold off Iran. Therefore, he could not afford to come completely clean and lift the veil, showing in fact that he really did not have WMD.

(U) I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to identify the enemy. This was based on my October 2003 perception that U.S. forces did not know who it was we were fighting.

(U) The better term to use is not "enemy," but "irreconcilable." They are those who obstruct GOI stabilization and normalization. Those who are attacking us are obstacles to peace and stabilization. They oppose GOI sovereignty. There are obvious enemies, including AQI and the JAM Special Groups. They are attacking us because we facilitate GOI stabilization. We are trying to provide security to facilitate peace.

(U) The JAM SG are rogue elements. Sadr announced his freeze on 29 August. Some people did not believe it. (b)(3), (b)(6) was optimistic. Two weeks into the freeze, others still doubted. They remembered that he had announced freezes three times before, and broke each one when it suited his purposes. (b)(3), (b)(6) believed this time was different.

(U) Why was this different?

(U) Because Sadr came to realize that attacking CF was not helping him or his image among the Shia population. It was counterproductive. To legitimize his role and move toward a more credible position within society and the government, he had to call off the attacks. His senior officials have been happy with the outcome of the freeze because it has exposed rogue elements, who have wanted to keep fighting. Sadr has begun to purge those he calls criminals. That shows that this time is different.

~~(S//REL US MCFI)~~ Sadr will not directly engage CF representatives, but he may negotiate through proxies. The problem is that some will view this as treachery. He is in Iran right now. He has to be very careful.

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(U) We finished by talking a few minutes about [redacted] (b)(6) who in [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) view is a strong and influential woman whom Iraqi men fear/are jealous of/hate because they have never seen a woman wield so much influence.

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