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(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Al Faw Palace, VBC, Baghdad

by (b)(3), (b)(6)  
MNFI Historian

### *Interviewer's Comments*

A good overview of the growth of document exploitation in military intelligence.  
Transcription priority: Medium.

(b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in Iraq in January '07 and will leave in March. He is not married.

~~(S/REL US MCFI)~~ I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) about a document presented in the BUA on 17 January. It was a very discouraged letter written by an AQI manager in 2007 on AQI's increasing difficulties in Anbar province. TB(1)1 found this document among volumes of others on Objective Fritz. It initially went to the National Media Exploitation Center in the US. What they found, they made available to the (b)(3) 10 USC 424. A blurb made it into the weekly, The Wire. It was on Anbar morale and was similar to documents found in Diyala. Showed decline morale and locals siding with CF against AQI. We are trying to be careful to determine the best ways to use these without jeopardizing them.

In '06, I was working with (b)(3), (b)(6) Objective Massey produced 5 terabytes of data on foreign terrorist flow. Most of that stuff is quickly made U/FOUO to get word out quickly to partners (EU, law enforcement, coalition forces) and gave copies of [hit?] lists to GoI. What we do with a find depends on its apparent importance.

This was (b)(3), (b)(6) first deployment to Iraq. In battalion command, he pushed out fillers, and came out of the California guard, with 20 years of service. He was an MP his first five years.

The learning curve on Iraq has been steep. Our weakness is trying to get more information without putting people in harms way. We're trying to improve 1.4c but you don't do that overnight. You have to develop it, and constant rotations and personnel turnover make it worse. It is hard for the population to trust people undergoing constant rotation. We're now engaging the sheiks, and that has made a tremendous difference. The Iraqi people want CF, they trust us now.


The early 1.4c effort after Saddam fell all went into looking for the WMD, that was the whole ISG focus, but there was no overarching structure for how to organize, collate,

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and digest the massive volumes of information. At some point, they realized the mass of data was too much to handle without an orchestrated structure.


Appendix I of \_\_\_ laid out a plan for [1.4c] collection and Joint Documentation. Two years ago, there was an attempt to create a DOCEX. They made RFFs for [1.4c] person teams, centrally located, but intended to go out to conduct tactical site exploitation. Many problems arose with tactics, techniques, and procedures, and it took time to figure out best structure.



90% of our teams are collocated with internment facilities. Given the turnover timeline for holding a detainee (within a certain period, you have to release him or process him for reasonable detention) there is a clock running in which we have to exploit documents quickly to determine if there are grounds for holding a guy longer. It creates a rush.

~~(S/NF)~~ As an example, there was a Turk in Kirkuk. 4/1 at Falcon had detained him and suspected him of making IEDs. They found some electronics he had (like an external hard drive) and found it full of classified documents from the brigade headquarters, which raised serious OPSEC and Force Protection issues. A team went up to exploit the documents. In searching the material and looking at it, they realized it came from the brigade S1 shop and that it had somehow been stolen and sold in the local market, but that no one else had accessed the material.

~~(S/ACGU)~~ Operation Blue Man Group concerned the Toifor waste company. It discovered that a number of suspected IED spotters were working for the company at Camp Cropper, but couldn't prove it. DOCEX figured out the links and got the guys.



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1.4c

Six months ago, a lot of energy went into repairing what was here. BG David Lacquement, the G2, did not get access to everything. The [redacted] would hit an objective, get stuff, send it up to McChrystal, McChrystal would show it to Petraeus, and Petraeus would then ask Lacquement about it, and Lacquement had never seen it. One thing that made this harder was that SOF did not use SIPR. They were on their own system called [redacted] 1.4a We worked very hard to establish better communications with point to point emails between their G2 and MNFI C2. [redacted] 1.4c

48:37. BG L wanted local capability, a Theater Exploitation DB (TED). Analysts don't always search information immediately. We made a screening process. The Corps Analysis and Collection Element (CACE) has a report writing capability. [redacted] 1.4c

[redacted] 1.4c

(S) Yusifiya DUSTWUN cases. Exploited some media to identify some guys involved, but still haven't found bodies.

(S/ACGU) Operation Salty. Found media showing the bombing of a mosque and masked insurgents celebrating somewhere. We made pictures of the background and distributed it in the BCT. Somebody recognized the location. They scouted it out and found signs insurgents did gather there. They staked it out, bad guys came back, and were rounded up. Some pocket litter included a name or contact that The [redacted] was then able to roll up and identified as behind the Samarra mosque bombing.

We are turning DOCEX into a big intelligence enterprise, a fast-growing field.

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