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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(USA)

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Building 58, Allgood Hall, Victory Base Camp

By (b)(3), (b)(6)

MNFI Historian

## Abstract

(b)(3), (b)(6) had a standard logistics career. Logistics has seen vast organizational changes from the old J-series MTOE. (b)(6) and with industry. He was a (b)(6) Right now, we are operating in an environment of unconstrained resources. As a result, young officers and the system itself are losing any sense of supply and fiscal discipline. Modularity will pose professional challenges due to the loss of the DISCOMs and COSCOMs. The CSS community and TRADOC have not adjusted to the reality of the COIN environment. We need to provide better organizational or material help to the war fighter in the JSS. III Corps and XVIII Corps have struggled terrible with material management. From '03 to '06, the Army had an accountability waiver. In Kosovo, MG Casey ensured we did things right. In '04, 1AD's extension in theater had very bad effects on accountability. When they returned, I had big challenges with excess. In 2007, we surged BCTs without surging logistics support. Logcap covered it, but it took months to catch up. Then, beginning in November, with surge logistics requirements in hand, we shifted our focus to strategic COIN, building up the ministries and their capacity. Our specific projects included the Iraqi Trucking Network, scrap metal, and Umm Qasr. 1:21:07.

## Interview

*Could you describe your background?*

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***How has logistics changed over the course of your career?***

5:00. If I were to summarize it . . . I first entered in a separate support battalion, as a truck platoon leader. It was a separate infantry brigade in Wiesbaden, Germany. It was pretty self-contained, had our own organic capabilities, and we could operate autonomously outside of a division. And that includes all the functional backdrops that a division support command in a J-series MTOE had at the time. I experienced that transformation from functional battalions in the 8<sup>th</sup> ID to FSBs, that was my second job, my first job was as a platoon leader and battalion S-3 in a separate support battalion, BCT like we are today, went to a FSB where there used to be functionally aligned battalions in divisions, and we created a much leaner FSB, and that replaced the old FASCO, which was sort of a task-organized for every event for a brigade.

6:45. The next opportunity that I had was through training with industry in the Marriott Corporation. I saw resource management at a different level. Then I became a Brigade 3 in a training brigade during Desert Storm. I got a taste for TRADOC sort of lagging behind in everything from publication to POI, from units were transforming to. I still see that as a lesson learned today as TTPs are occurring on the battlefield, especially with COIN operations. Then I went to 1<sup>st</sup> CAV, as a support ops officer and then a Bn XO for the MSB . And again, it was based on personalities of command on how well a brigade performed at the NTC, what the relationship was with the FSB and its ties back to the DISCOM, what was task organized for that specific event out of the MSB, so it was still a personality driven organization. In the microcosm of Ft. Hood you could see kind of the difference at the time with 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Division becoming 4<sup>th</sup> ID, and then 1<sup>st</sup> CAV. From there I went to the Canadian Army where I figured out, in the global sense, that even with some of the warts that we had in the Army of Excellence MTOEs and the way we operated, that we were far ahead of our common wealth allies. I got a lot of exposure as the G4

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and they again were about a decade behind us, just having separate autonomous brigades.

9:00. Then I went to be a (b)(6) for General Hartzog at TRADOC, and we were just standing up the result of Task Force 1.4a We were just getting ready to do the Division Warfighter Experiment (DAWE) with Force 1.4a and I saw we had the same challenges we had when we created the FSB with the brigade commander, that we were forming at the forward support company level in support of the maneuver battalion. And there were personality and cultural barriers that had to be overcome. Then we see the transition after that year with General Hartzog, I went to become the G4 of 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, and obviously back to the Army staff for the start of the war. The Strykers and the IBCTs were just coming on, and then as the war rolled on, went to ICAF, came back to DISCOM command just as we were transforming to the BCT-centric type organization. I was very lucky to be on a team with the Army

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G4, to travel around with LTG Lovelace at the time, and go visit those organizations that were re-organizing before they deployed to OIF 1/2 . So, I saw kind of the same cultural barriers of generations past, and this time it was shaded more by the logistics community than by the combat arms community, because they basically lost the senior logistician out of the division footprint. All the Material Management either went outside the division or down to a BCT. So all of the fiscal controls that the division had through its Material Management Center, they basically have lost, in both execution of Class IX expenditure, and really in readiness visibility. And we haven't seen, I don't think, the true effect of that. I think we'll see it in a professional development perspective and in a readiness perspective and also in a financial perspective.

12:10. Right now we're kind of unconstrained, both at the division level and at the corps level. The fiscal capability is there, which normally drives the command supply discipline part of it. I went through a little bit of this in Germany as the DISCOM commander when we had brigades for the first time really, that had a pause-ex before they came out on a pre-deployment order, and what I saw from a command supply discipline perspective, and from a fiscal responsibility perspective, was wanting. We . . . I literally had to have my Material Management Center set the Management Review File in the DMMC to zero, which meant no requisition would penetrate past the division boundary unless it was looked at again, because we ran out of money. And the kids on the ULLS boxes and the chain of command associated with that, were basically, those generations were trained here, and it wasn't really a big concern. There were no constraints, no fiscal constraints, or no resource constraints. So you can kind of tell that it was on auto-pilot, and we had to take some draconian measures to, one, exist within our budget, and then to apply that budget to where it needed to be to get the readiness level that you had to have. So I think there is going to be a big learning curve as units come back, and now it is up to that brigade commander to be the fiscally responsible entity, with that BSB battalion commander and then his units at the forward support company level, at how they are being fiscally responsible in what they purchase, and 8% of an operational budget winds up being Class IX. So it is going to be new to them. There are going to be some steep learning curves, because it is not really taking place here in a combat environment, in some respects rightfully so. But we've trained a few generations now that are going to have a little rude awakening when they are in a constrained environment, and they are going to have to get value for what fiscal responsibility they've been given, and they're going to have to turn it into readiness.

14:50. So that is kind of what I've seen. The other thing that bothers me a little bit is that for the first time, 60 to 70% of all field grade logisticians will be senior rated by a combined arms brigade commander. Before, the DISCOM commander sort of senior rated all the field grades in the forward support battalions, or in the aviation support battalion, so there was kind of an equitable distribution of how these folks were doing against folks in like units. Now they will be compared to the BCT's combat arms guys. I'm not sure we'll get what we need to get among our senior leaders. Now, I believe BCT commanders should be sitting on battalion command boards, instead of pure logisticians. The senior logistician, who is now operating in an expeditionary support command, removed from the Corps or division footprint, they will create the future in light of themselves, and I fear we will lose generational

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experience of what it was like down in the BCT. Because the logisticians will not bear the load of the rating against the maneuver guys, and I think they will likely not fare well.

17:40. The other piece that I think we've lost here, and I've seen it in the last year, the CSS community has not put its arms around COIN operations at the tactical level. We designed the BCT and the forward support company to support, maybe not a linear battle, but it was a battle of mass, instead of one that is not, which is what COIN operations is. So you've got a junior company commander out there that is worried about more than just a couple of JSSs and COPs. And then a force that sits back on a larger FOB, and the CSS community has not looked at either an organizational solution or a material solution to help that forward support company commander to deal with COIN operations. It seems like they're waiting for this to be over so they can go back and do what's comfortable. And it goes back to the heavy force/light force dilemma. This is something that is really in between, because we've got heavy forces doing COIN operations, that you can't ignore some of the institutional material solutions that could occur. An example would be to create a container, that within it has within it potable water, black water, a toilet, a shower, a microwave open, a satellite dish, refrigeration, and a small washer and drying that all fits onto a PLS, that would support a 10- to 20-man team at a JSS, that you could take to a JSS, drop one that has been reset back at the battalion, pick up the one that they just left, which would be a material solution that would help that JSS be self-sufficient. Right now we're trying to use K-clips and mobile kitchen trailers and first sergeants, and we're caught somewhere in between forward support companies and the old combat trains. I think everybody is supporting it differently. So its, kind of . . . quite frankly,

20:10. Over the last year, I have watched two Corps—the III Corps and the XVIII—struggle with trying to manage equipment because we've lost the Corps Material Management Centers and the Division Material Management Centers. They're trying to do property disposition with a handful of folks on a JMD at the Corps level, and it's ten times as complex as what the modular CSS force structure has been designed for. And what I mean by that is these kids are coming in, these company commanders, and they're signing for theater provided equipment, they're bringing their own equipment, and then they're receiving equipment at the same time. So a lot of these kids have at least three, and some of them five different hand receipts, and multiple different property books and multiple levels to try to balance the books and do inventories and do all the things we ask them in policy that hasn't really changed to help the process. Now, before I came here, as the (b)(6), I was still dealing with the division as they returned from the first rotation. Out of all the companies in the two FSBs, the MSB, and the Aviation Support Battalion, there was only one that had an expendable hand receipt that was registered with the property book office. That whole hand over was done within weeks upon arrival from a company commander that was very hungry to take command, who had been waiting on these guys to get back, with a company commander that had been in command for a long, long time. If you recall, 1<sup>st</sup> AD was the first division to get extended, for three long months, half of them were half-way back. So this kaleidoscope of events, caused the incoming company commanders to have faith that stuff was coming, when the outgoing company commander said "I loaded it, it is going to be on this

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container, don't worry." Well, even once they figured out they didn't have what they were supposed to have, they didn't go through the process to register that loss or that shortage with the property book, and I'm not sure there were leaders at the time that understood all that. I literally had to stop change of commands because of the early change of command inventories that these kids thought were correct. And it was the battalion commanders also. So if that is any indication of the future, we've got a lot of training to do, once these kids are out of combat, on what is supposed to be done to be good stewards of what the taxpayers have given us.

***Because the combat environment is not conducive to stewardship?***

23:30. Exactly. Now I'll be honest with you, when I was General Hartzog's [redacted] (b)(6) I asked him one day when we were at Leavenworth, he took command in a hot LZ in Vietnam from another first lieutenant who was being relieved. I said, sir, how did you do your change of command inventory? He kind of chuckled and he said "We were under fire, a Huey just dropped us down, the guy didn't even know he was leaving, so he brought him over, and he said 'where are your 113s?' And he pointed to the 113s. And he said how many folks he had, and that was the change of command inventory. And that kid got on the helicopter and he flew off. And he said that was the standard back then when you were in combat. So that kind of led me down the road. I was in the G4 when the war kicked off. I was initially in the Army operations center, with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and then I moved upstairs, to the Army G4, and I was in supply policy at the time, and that is when we went to . . . this was when Secretary White was told to resign . . . or he resigned of his own accord, depending on who you talk to . . . and Mr. Brownlee was the Acting Secretary. I was part of the team that went into Secretary Brownlee, and of course he had his own Vietnam experience, to sign that first waiver of accountability, which allowed you to do what General Hartzog described, and that is to account for CAT I ammunition, and that is what you had to inventory, and major end items. That was in the summer or early spring of '03, but the problem was that that policy remained in effect for three years. It probably should have been pulled sometime in '04, when the escalation of conflict was about where it is now. In '04 it was down to that level, and we probably should have said start counting your stuff.

26:20. When I was in Kosovo, MG Casey was my division commander. In a 14-day RIP/TOA, my company commander did a 100% inventory of the stuff they brought, the stuff that they were handing over that was going to stay in Kosovo, and installation property. MG Casey came down, and he said he was going to look at one of our companies, and he said he wanted to look at their shortage annexes and their RIP/TOA plan and when they were going to look at what/when. And he did. The division commander made sure that, even though we were in Kosovo, that that property was changing hands down to BII, COEI, and ALL type activity. And those were 24-hour days during the RIP/TOA, because you still had to be oriented to all the routes and where all your . . . your JSSs and COPs where, though we didn't call them that.

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***What was the effect, in the spring of '04, on the redeployment, then the turn-around and return to combat, and then the real redeployment?***

27:50. They actually left a lot of equipment with the units they'd RIP/TOAd with, they sent some back that they stopped in Kuwait, then there were redirected, and there were units that had already returned to Germany, forces that were getting ready to leave from Kuwait, and forces that had not yet left the battle space, and they had to draw additional APS. So it was . . . and it was for a 90-day period, and it was get to the battle now, get the equipment that you think you sent, the equipment that you left were going to provide out of what we were building up in APS-5 . . . so out of that calamity in the last 90 days, and then no closure once they got back to Europe, with that short time frame . . . they had, in most cases, 30 days, and on the eve of the 30 days there were a lot of changes of command, so it was the Perfect Storm for 1AD. My real disappointment is that they were back in October-November '04, and I didn't take command until June of '05. There was not much traction in those six months to kind of clean up the battle space. There were a lot of events. I think the president came to see them. There were a lot of terrain walks and staff rides, but no one kind of shook out the cobwebs. The other thing I did in my first year in command was there were shortages and there were excesses, and the excesses weren't accounted for.

*In the interest of time, I've stopped the verbatim transcript at this point, but I'm sure the rest is worth listening to for a more detailed account. The rest is direct from my notes of the interview.*

There had been many years of supplementals. What we were supposed to have, we had. 1AD would inactivate. We had Operation Free Chicken, which meant units could deposit all there excess in containers I placed in the motor pools for this purpose without have to go through the hassle of a normal turn in. I put two 871 trailers in each battalion motor pool. From all the stuff that got turned in, we built a 5,000 line SSA. We made \$150 million. From that, we figured out the system made it too hard to turn stuff in. We found a couple of M60A3 spotlights, for example, which had a material release order from 1989.

Here, we have Camp Trashcan, north of BIAP, behind the MRAP fielding facility, which is where people just dump excess stuff. We are getting control of that now. We have a problem of when units leave a base, they leave stuff, just walk away from it. We have rotational motor pools where units have left stuff in a connex off to the side and subsequent units have just not assumed responsibility for it. This is excess for which no one has assumed responsibility.

Since the CSS structure no longer exists at division level, the BCTs must deal with it.

For a BCT fighting here, (b)(6) operating in MNF-W, the Marines did not pay attention to the FSB, and the FSB fell through the cracks of the MNC-I. This is because divisions and sustainment brigades have lost their connections. It is a professional development issue.

I don't think we'll see the impact of modularity on CSS for a couple of years.

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Have we transformed? I understand the need for speed. The Division Army Warfighting Experiment in Force 1.4a plus. Before, there were endless discussions and councils.

*Below is back to verbatim, because I wanted to catch it correctly.*

48:30. All the changes associated with that were well vetted at the community. The way we got to where we're at, and I'll focus on CSS, I just don't feel that the division commanders that were out here in the field, like they were back in DAWE, had their voice, or Corps commanders had their voice, into what was changing in regard to division and corps-level logistics. I think that community was left out as to what their druthers were. They very well articulated the BCTs. But there echelons above BCTs, I don't think there was a loud vetting, or a loud vote, so it was kind of done to the forces, and now, we're figuring out whether it works or not, so the experiment is taken on as we go through this. And I know COSCOM has gone very far in doing an autopsy on every sustainment brigade commander that comes out of theater. I think they really need to do the autopsy on the BCT Deputy Commander or XO and the Brigade Support Battalion, because the discussions you get in the sustainment brigade outside the division influence, and the discussions you get out of the BSB commander and the deputy commander of the BSB are very different, and both of those need to be heard. And out of there has to be some reorganization. I don't feel, at least from what I've seen so far, that they're getting a good perspective at the BCT level. They're getting a great perspective at the sustainment brigade, but you really need to interview the customers.

***All of this discussion, I think, could be had in Afghanistan or NTC or elsewhere. What is specific about the Iraq case today?***

51:00. Well, to understand where we're at, you have to go where we've been, and I'll concentrate on MNFI. When I got here 1 August of '07, you have to remember I had just re-organized and I was the rear detachment for Europe. In May, we had 126 KIA. Just in the Schweinfurt brigade, I was there every other day. Our biggest memorial service was six soldiers at once. So we were just beginning to feel the effects and the change of the surge, and MNFI . . . probably for the first time in the history of any conflict, we did a BCT surge without a like surge in logistics, with boots on the ground above the BCT level, so the addition of the BCTs was done without the addition of one more uniformed logistician above the BCT level, and it was all literally picked up by logcap. We were having meetings once a week with the PM for logcap, and we were still going over estimates and requests to increase capacity, and then closing the loop on all those capacities really through November. So we were still dealing with the aftermath of building up for the surge. So this headquarters, MNFI, and what we used to call R & S, was very much focused on some Title X capabilities that had to do with supporting the warfighter. About November, with MG McHale coming on board, we could tell that the Title X fight was done. They were supported, and we were actually looking at going down the other direction. Now with [the surge] came the increase in the security environment that GEN Petraeus, I don't know if he'd say it, but he gave us a change of mission, and it was to start looking at the Gol ministries and to start dealing with Gol capacity.

*End Verbatim*

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We started focusing on efforts to foster normalcy with programs like scrap metal, youth sports, swimming pools, and Umm Qasr. This was all strategic and economic initiatives. The security envelope created space for Iraqi business, so we started I-BIZ.

Iraqis were tired of seeing Third Country Nationals driving trucks across Iraq, so we started the Iraqi Trucking Network in Anbar province. This idea originated with the Secretary of the Air Force. We wondered about taking private and green security off of commercial trucking. Three federations of tribes and tens of sheiks set up a holding company, and through this third party we contracted commercial trucking in the ITN. On 17 June, the 1<sup>st</sup> truck delivered bottled water to VBC. We've now had 800 moves in western Iraq with no security requirements. We're now looking at expanding to MND-Center, although that will be more difficult because the tribes are more fractured. But it is happening. We are also starting to see some rail competition. GRD is the point for rail. There are 105 engines, but only 15 work.

Umm Qasr. Security is on track and management is on track. South Port has a 25-year lease. The north port is working with GRD. They are moving grain, rice, FMS, coalition cargo, and cargo from Kuwait Naval Base. Before, JAM had 10,000 employees on the books, with 200 reporting for work. It was the same thing at Iskanderiyah. The Minister of Industry and Minerals believes in international investment. Still, Iraqis are uneasy about de-centralization, and we're crawling in every area.

Scrap Collection. The Gol has invested \$25 million in 9 scrap sites. We flew around the senior Iraqi engineer. There is a Secretary General doing coordination. The US's largest export is scrap. This is a globalization requirement. Iraq has 200 million tons of it worth 8 to 10 billion dollars. Moreover, if you clean up the country, crime goes down, like Guilani did in New York City. Things get better when you clean things up.

We provide capacity to look long range. We flew in experts in the international scrap trade from Chicago. They provided the Iraqis a better view of the possibilities. The Iraqis have three old smelters.

This is COIN operations at the strategic level in logistics. I read a book, *The Tipping Point*, which is really about connecting with people, and that is what P4 wants. We have to connect people and then find the salesman.

Taking the big view.

P4 was spot on. MNCI did not need a Title X big brother. COIN operations, business, and public problems, industry, trucking, create a capability. ICAF needs to start these vignettes. We start to hone tools. ICAF. Agribusiness. Date Industry or Poultry.

We're better at this [stepping up] than the State Department or the CIA. The Army steps up where others shrink before problems. 1:21:07.

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