

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

Major General Michael D. Jones (USA)

MNSTCI, Directorate of Interior Affairs, Director General
9 July 2008
Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

By (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNFI Historian

Abstract

Jones has been directly influenced by Generals Shinseki and Abizaid. He works with and describes Bolani, al Asadi, Aiden, and Hussein al Awadi. In formal terms, removing a provincial police chief is a straightforward. Informally, it follows delicate negotiations. The situation with the Anbar police chief is caught up in Iraqi provincial issues. Prior relationships with Iraqi leaders have been very valuable and important to my work. Before 23 March, General Mohan was working with IFCNR and LTG Dubik for a deliberate effort to resolve the situation. IDF from Sadr City into the IZ caused some casualties, but the mission continued. General Petraeus' approach to IO begins with his cultural sensitivity. Regarding the invasion, we knew nothing before we came in. Whether it was ignorance or arrogance, I don't know. 1st CAV focused on operational COIN, but it was a struggle to convince higher levels we had to engage this mission fully. Petraeus led us to do what we had to do. Army historians need to examine the evolution of the command plan and structure. They need to examine what 1st CAV did. They need to record the stories of soldiers' heroism, discuss how we've evolved, and examine how we rebuilt the MoI and MoD.

This is a good interview, and the recording would be well worth listening to. My questions could have been better. Jones would make a great follow up interview, but I need to better prepare the questions.

Interview

What individuals have played a key role in your career?

My first company commander and my (b)(3), (b)(6). Strategically, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) my commander in Bosnia, as well as (b)(3), (b)(6). General Abizaid when he was the J5 and General Shinseki as the CSA taught me about strategic thinking. When Shinseki made a decision, he was smart enough and selfless enough to make it terms of what was the best decision for the CSA after next. He was thinking ahead. That doesn't mean he was always getting or seeking the optimal decision now, but the decision that would create leeway. Abizaid was a strategic thinker who thought on a global basis.

What institutions have been important to your career?

IOBC and the Armor School.

What is your mission?

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

My mission is to help Iraqis generate sufficient forces, to develop ministerial capacity, and to transition the situation to normal governance.

What Iraqis do you work with and how would you describe them?

At the Ministry of Interior, I deal with Minister Bolani. He is warm and thoughtful. He is as close to a strategic thinker as I've seen among the Iraqis, although that is not necessarily a strong suit. [It can be dangerous to be so sharp?]

I deal with al Asadi. He is very calculating. He has a façade as a strategist. He has a political agenda. He is the Senior Deputy of the MoI. I deal with Deputy Minister Aiden, a police professional. He is thoughtful, has a legalistic way. He is not a visionary; he is focused on the here and now.

Hussein al Awadi, the commander of the National Police. He is a student of history and a good military commander, a good strategist, and a man of action.

There has been some controversy lately over removing provincial police chiefs. How is that supposed to work and where is it currently creating problems?

In theory, the provincial council or the PM with CoR approval is supposed to be able to remove the police chief. The way it does work is there is a process of negotiation and dialogue between all the people involved. The council should be able to vote a guy out, but the key is the MoI, because the MoI controls the money. The police chief is only really out when the MoI stops paying him.

The situation in Anbar is that the previous PDoP was not doing well and the MoI got rid of him. Over MNF-W objections, the MoI appointed the deputy as the interim PDoP. Then, MNF-W requested the interim be made permanent. The MCNS did not like . . . The Iraqi Islamic Party controls the provincial council. When the governor left town, the council voted to fire the PDoP. The MoI has chosen to ignore the provincial council. Hashimi and the Deputy Ministers position is they are trying to professionalize the force. They oppose recognizing his . . . reassigned. The ADCM . . . 1st CI

How have you learned to work with them?

I knew some of these guys from before. The guy with _____ . . . You did a lot of interface. I knew Aiden already, al Asadi and Bolani. Getting to know them personally was important. I learned to respect Bolani because bureaucratically he has learned to do a lot.

What was the situation before Basra?

Before Basrah, General Mohan was discussing an offensive to gain more GoI control over the city. He was working to reinforce the police. Abdul Emir as logistics and equipment to bring the police up to a higher level. There was a working group put together to figure out how to bolster Mohan. This included LTG Dubik and the head of IFCNR. A lot of stuff was shipped down. We had another dinner, and Rubaie told Petraeus that instead of Mohan's deliberate pace, we're going to go down tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

Most of our focus was then on facilitating listening to needs. We helped on the logistics end. I went down a few weeks later. I went down with LTG Austin to start sorting out the training academy, to figure out what we could do to help. The Corps was then standing up a police transition team.

Did the IDF coming from Sadr City into the IZ at that time have any operational effect?

It did not affect us operationally. It was unpleasant and there were casualties, but it had no operational effect.

Did it degrade operations elsewhere in the IZ?

I don't know.

I've been very impressed by General Petraeus' approach to information operations. What do you think he gets right?

There are several types of information operations. Public information is getting info out in many different ways. It is to overcome the enemy's IO. We don't need deceptive IO. That is fairly straightforward. He realizes how to keep his drumbeat up on the message, how to marshal an organization on the objective. Behind the scenes, to influence other folks. He operates with a sense of urgency.

I notice that two consistent rules of his IO are he always conveys personal respect and he never issues manhood challenges.

That reflects his understanding of the cultural environment. We can be critical of our own, but we get fired up if others criticize our country.

Were you surprised by Basra?

I was surprised at the movement to Basra and surprised at how quickly they moved forces. We'd have been hard pressed to do the same thing. You may not know, most things you read and know a little. Unanticipated turns of events. Anbar.

LTG Charelli was remarkable. BG Rob Wayhill. (b)(6) Hussein Awadi.

(b)(6) of the IAG. (b)(6) of the National Police Training Team. (b)(6) (b)(6) Balance and institutionalize. Year ago, we had no metrics. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the chief of logistics, marshalling log support for expansion. (b)(6)

We knew nothing. Unknowledgeable. Arrogance? Ignorance? We took no account of how much we did not know. Then, we implemented this desire to turn it over to civilian control. Was that ignorance or arrogance, or social dynamics? Then we let civilians try to run it without fielding sufficient capacity. The bureaucrats disenfranchised the power brokers. Bremer came out with "The Day of the Tribes is Over," but we lacked sufficient capacity and forces. The result was chaos and no services. Insurgency and terrorism (classic insurgency).

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

1st Cavalry Division knew we needed COIN. There were two sources of violence: terrorists and insurgents. We had to have security, politics, diplomacy, and economic. MG Charelli recognized that. There was a perception at higher levels that others need to do those jobs.

We saw the rise in sectarian violence. Terrorists thrive in an ungoverned state. Sectarian violence is different from insurgency. It spirals. You have to exert control to interdict the cycle. You have to have a different approach. Population control is vital. Casey tried to get other agencies to step up, but they could not or would not fulfill the need. The change that Petraeus brought was, ok, we will do it. The Energy Fusion Cell is a cover for who should be doing it. The decision that the DoD would take over forming the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior reflected that fact that nobody else was doing it. We needed to get it done. That was the sea change. We were aggressive about tackling the non-military issues. There has been some progress. The Ambassador gets it and has gained some progress.

What priorities would you set for Army historians in examining this conflict?

First, examine CJTF7 and the evolution of MNFI and the command plan. Second, sort out how the campaign plan evolved and with what guidance. How did the national campaign plan evolve. To what degree did any national plan drive the effort. Third, what were the adaptations?

1st Cavalry Division ran an effective train up program. We sent leaders to the Jordanian Peacekeeping Institute for cultural awareness. We sent leaders to Austin, Texas to learn how to run a city. Third, we sent engineers to work with municipal engineers to learn the infrastructure issues. We launched innovations with our reserve component augmentees, figuring out what special skills they brought and determining how best to employ them. One was from the ATF agent (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) and another was a CI (?) We turned them into CSI Baghdad to help all the investigations out.

I don't think we've adequately captured the stories of soldiers' heroism. For example, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) commander of 1-41 Infantry, won the Silver Star in a huge fight, grabbing a Bradley to rescue guys caught in Sadr City. We need the story of that battle. There's also the story of [redacted] (b)(6) in the Najaf grave yard fight. That was hard, close combat.

How did leaders adapt, change, and prepare?

How did counter fire evolve? The BCTP train-up for counterfire was ridiculous. It consisted of waiting for the militia to launch stuff at us and then launch stuff back. What we had to do was anticipatory counterfire [finding the Points of Origin, monitoring them, getting assets into position, and taking out the launch crews before they launched].

How did we rebuild an MoI or an MoD? We have never rebuilt institutions in contact. In June 2004, when P3 showed up. What we have done and not done.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~

I have two busts on my desk. This is why I keep them. I keep Lincoln. 29 August 1864. The next day the Union won the battle of Shiloh. He taught that perseverance is the first rule of warfare. I keep Washington because he was totally unprepared for what hit him. He had no formal military training before he took over the revolutionary army. When he became president, there was no precedent for what he was supposed to do. He had to figure it out day by day. We've had to learn how to do this in an Iraqi Arab culture. The talent of people has brought some measure of success. Capturing this would be instructive. Institution building and needs.

Who else should I interview?

BG John Thomas, (b)(3), (b)(6) P4, BG Phillips, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(6)
(b)(6) Lt Gen Hunzinger, LTG Joe Peterson. How we learned and adapted. The self-imaging system. When we changed our dynamics to help Iraqis develop this their way.

Approved for Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL/FOUO~~