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UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C-3 FUTURE OPERATIONS CHIEF

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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5 JUNE 2007

HEADQUARTERS MULTINATIONAL CORPS- IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

This transcript was produced from tapes  
provided by the U.S. Center of Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 [ (b)(6) ] This is [ (b)(6) ] writing a  
3 story on Multinational Corps - Iraq in the U.S. Center of  
4 Military History. Today is 5 June, and I am about to enter  
5 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] C-3 Chief of Future Operations,  
6 Multinational Corps - Iraq, at the Headquarters,  
7 Multinational Corps - Iraq, Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory,  
8 Baghdad, Iraq.

9 With me in conducting the interview is [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]  
10 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] who is the Multinational Corps Command  
11 Historian. So the third voice you hear in this interview  
12 will be that of [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

13 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] could you briefly describe your  
14 background and experience that prepared you for your current  
15 position?

16 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] Okay. Predominantly, I am an  
17 aviator. I've been in tactical aviation through about the  
18 first 19 years of service, and then following that I served  
19 as a battalion commander, then did an ROTC assignment as  
20 Professor of Military Science at the University of  
21 Washington, then went to the War College and then from the  
22 War College came out to Fort Lewis for a few months as Chief

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1 of Plans there, and then was asked if I would deploy to Iraq  
2 with III Corps, which I agreed to do.

3 [redacted] (b)(6) Did you command an aviation  
4 battalion?

5 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I did not.

6 [redacted] (b)(6) What type of battalion?

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) It was a recruiting battalion.

8 [redacted] (b)(6) Recruiting battalion. Okay. As I  
9 understand it, you were augmented to III Corps from Fort  
10 Lewis. Can you talk a little bit about that, when you came,  
11 how many people you brought with you, and what types of plans  
12 you worked on with III Corps before you deployed?

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. First, we came with a team  
14 of about [redacted] 1.4a folks from I Corps, and we trained briefly for  
15 about 10 days with III Corps before we deployed with them in  
16 preparation. We didn't do the MRX portion, but we had a  
17 small exercise geared directly toward preparation for those  
18 that were coming from I Corps.

19 [redacted] (b)(6): So you actually came to Fort Hood in  
20 November then. Is that right?

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's -- Actually, end of  
22 October.

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1 [redacted] (b)(6) End of October?

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) End of October, I think somewhere  
3 around the 26th, actually, is when we conducted our initial  
4 training and then departed in early November.

5 [redacted] (b)(6) So were you -- Did you know the staff  
6 very well at III Corps? I mean, in the 3, did you know  
7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) for example?

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I had not met [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
9 previously. I had served with General Odierno previously  
10 when he was with Task Force [redacted] 1.4a. At that time I was the XO  
11 for --

12 [redacted] (b)(6) In 1999?

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I was the XO for the Aviation  
14 Regiment.

15 [redacted] (b)(6) All right. So you didn't get a  
16 chance to work on any plans with III Corps much before you  
17 deployed?

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, not with III Corps, no. We  
19 did some planning with I Corps, obviously, but we really had  
20 no planning with III Corps.

21 [redacted] (b)(6) When did you know you were going to  
22 be augmented to III Corps?

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1            (b)(3), (b)(6)    I think we had -- I think it was  
2 right around the first of October, late September, early  
3 October of '06.

4            (b)(6)            Now (b)(3), (b)(6)    the C-3,  
5 described FUOPS, which is Future Operations, as the "key  
6 planning cell" in MNCI-I, quote/unquote.

7            Along those lines, please describe a little bit  
8 about what you and your section does, and how does your  
9 section differentiate between Plans and Policy Section under

10 (b)(3), (b)(6)

11            (b)(3), (b)(6)    That's always the interesting  
12 question. We focus typically on the shorter range plans.  
13 You know, doctrinally, I think they will tell you we ought to  
14 be looking out maybe three days to six weeks, and then Plans  
15 picks up at the six-week point and, of course, Current Ops  
16 would handle anything from now until three days. But I think  
17 the way that we come to look at how we approach our work is  
18 the Current Ops Chief works hours -- or minutes to hours.  
19 FUOPS works hours to days, and the Plans and Policy works  
20 days to weeks.

21            (b)(6)            : Okay.

22            (b)(3), (b)(6)    That seems to be a little bit more

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1 accurate.

2 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay.

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) But we typically take the shorter,  
4 you know, battery changes, short fuse missions, and some of  
5 the special projects, operations and intelligence briefs,  
6 sniper defeat program, biometrics program, and work some of  
7 those as well.

8 So it's not just plans and orders, but we also  
9 have some specialty areas.

10 One of the areas that really started to grow is  
11 infrastructure security, and I had what I call two parts to  
12 the FUOPS Section. One is the Frago battery which is  
13 upstairs behind the JOC, and then we have the  
14 Effects/Infrastructure Cell which is down here in what we  
15 affectionately call the "blue box" just outside the JOC.

16 They work on infrastructure security plans, which  
17 is really a growing area right now, as well as helping  
18 integrate Effects into our operational plan.

19 [redacted] (b)(6) Do they work for you?

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's correct.

21 [redacted] (b)(6): So what does Effects do?

22 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Effects essentially -- The way it

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1 was originally planned is we have an Effects Group -- Let me  
2 make sure I'm clear. Effects don't work for me. I have an  
3 Effects piece within my cell.

4 (b)(6) Okay.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Effects work for the E Corps,  
6 General McDonald, who is on the third floor. But  
7 essentially, the way this was designed to work, and it works  
8 pretty much along those lines, is that the Effects Group  
9 monitors the lines of operations, governance, economics. We,  
10 FUOPS, watch the security line, and then there is a  
11 transition line operation.

12 Essentially, it is projects or programs developed  
13 along the non-security line of operations. When they get  
14 ready to hit the street as a plan, quite often that plan will  
15 come to FUOPS to integrate all the pieces, get the security  
16 integrated in the plan, and then we publish the order.

17 So the idea was to try and get Effects integrated  
18 into the operational planning of the Corps, and it has worked  
19 pretty well so far.

20 One of the things that we really try to focus on,  
21 what has been different from previous Corps Commands here, is  
22 that we want to make sure that, once we decide something, we

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1 generate action, and that action is generated through a Corps  
2 Frago that comes from the C-3.

3 In previous Corps, often the Effects team would  
4 write a separate effects order, and it wasn't written by the  
5 3, so to speak. It was published through the 3, but it was  
6 written by the Effects folks. Quite often, it was reading  
7 material, but it generated no action.

8 So we wanted to avoid that pitfall and get it  
9 integrated into the Future Operations planning so that we  
10 could pull all the correct enablings to it, get it out, and  
11 then make sure action resulted from those efforts. And for  
12 the most part, that's been working pretty well.

13  I have a couple of follow-ups with  
14 that.

15 You mentioned you have a -- I believe you said a  
16 Frago --

17  Factory.

18  Factory? So your guys are actually  
19 writing the Fragos. Is that right?

20  A good part of them. We don't  
21 write every Frago.

22  Right.

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1                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            But we write a good part of the  
2 Fragos.

3                    (b)(6)                    Okay.            The other thing is:            I  
4 understand that V Corps, who was the Multinational Corps  
5 before you, only had a very small FUOPS cell, like five, and  
6 yours is (b)(6) I think you said.

7                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            Right.

8                    (b)(6)                    Can you comment?            Was that a lesson  
9 learned from V Corps or did III Corps just kind of think that  
10 that's the way they wanted to use their --

11                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            We came with (b)(6) people from Fort  
12 Lewis, but our (b)(6) didn't come to FUOPS.            So the FUOP Section,  
13 actually, the full-timers, as we say, is probably -- I think  
14 that's somewhere in the neighborhood of (b)(6) or so that are  
15 full time under my control.

16                    We have folks from other sections that are dual-  
17 hatted. They work for Sections Chief, but they serve as a  
18 representative to FUOPS.            So by the time you have the full-  
19 timers and the dual-hatters, you've probably got somewhere in  
20 the neighborhood of, I don't know, (b)(6) folks there.

21                    The idea with the larger FUOPS cell gets back to  
22 exactly what I was talking about.            The purpose was to make it

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1 a little bigger so that we could do the effects integration.

2 For example, the Effects Cell has manned part of  
3 FUOPS. I have an Information Ops rep from Effects. So he's  
4 that link back to Effects. Then I have about, let's see,  
5 one, two, three -- three other officers that come out of the  
6 Effects area that represent various aspects, but they  
7 maintain that link so that we stay tied in with what the  
8 Effects folks are doing.

9 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay. As the FUOPS Chief, what  
10 typically occupies your time; and if you could, please walk  
11 me through one of your typical days, not today because you  
12 are the chops guy.

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) A typical day for FUOPS would  
14 begin with the BUA (Phonetic) in the morning. We usually  
15 come in a little bit earlier to prep, and then we often get  
16 key guidance from General Petraeus as well as the CG as we  
17 listen to the BUA, observe what occurs. A lot of times that  
18 is a heads up as to what we might expect.

19 For example, they show the structure security  
20 slides. If there is a problem with repair teams getting to  
21 certain locations to repair electrical power, for example,  
22 that may generate some action for us to get with the Iraqis

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1 to determine what it is we need to do to help resolve that.

2 So it starts typically with the BUA. Then me  
3 personally, I do spend a lot of time in meetings. Given that  
4 I do have the responsibility to do the security line of  
5 operation assessment for the C-3, I really need to stay  
6 abreast of where the CG's head is, so to speak.

7 So key meetings that I try to attend include the  
8 O&I briefings, the Defeat Extremists briefings where we  
9 address the activities of the terrorist or extremist factions  
10 that we are working against in detail.

11  How often are they held?

12  Those are once every two weeks.

13 Then on the alternate week would be the   
14 (Phonetic) assessment, which gives a general assessment of  
15 activities in Baghdad and the overall plans, as well as some  
16 of the economic information ops, CIOPS (Phonetic) things they  
17 are doing. It's kind of a broader perspective.

18 Then I attend the Intel Fusion brief, which  
19 occurs usually about twice a week, and those presentations  
20 there -- and one more is the COEC (Phonetic) update, which  
21 occurs weekly on Sunday. If I stay tuned into those, I  
22 usually have a pretty good sense of what the CG is thinking.

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1           So as I step back and do the assessment of how  
2 security operation is progressing, that gives me the  
3 background to shape my assessment and recommendations for the  
4 CG.

5           (b)(6)           Okay. Give me a sense -- So you  
6 start a little bit before the MNF BUA in the morning.

7           (b)(3), (b)(6)       Right.

8           (b)(6)           You know, by the end of the day, what  
9 time do you call it a day?

10          (b)(3), (b)(6)       Well, we usually do a lot of our  
11 order writing. We finish up that in the evening. We want to  
12 try and get those to the CHOPS before he goes to see the C-3,  
13 typically somewhere by about 2000 in the evening, we try to  
14 get our orders out.

15          (b)(6)           Who are your key order writers?

16          (b)(3), (b)(6)       I've got (b)(3), (b)(6)

17          (b)(3), (b)(6)       Really, just about  
18 everybody in FUOPS writes orders. So -- But if you want the  
19 key ones, it's probably (b)(3), (b)(6)

20          (b)(6)           What's his rank?

21          (b)(3), (b)(6)       .

22          (b)(6)           But those are your key guys?

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Then probably a guy that's going  
2 to leave here shortly, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) and  
3 probably say [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) But I mean, everybody writes.

4 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay. Your MNCI Coalition campaign  
5 operational concept dated 6 March, very thorough, well  
6 written campaign narrative. Do you know who the primary  
7 author was of it? Did that come out of your section, or not?

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) No. That came out of the Plans  
9 Section, and there was about three or four guys writing.

10 [redacted] (b)(6) What's your relationship with that?  
11 Did you guys -- Did you have any input into that plan?

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) We always have a chance to review  
13 it anytime it is briefed or there's updates. Sometimes when  
14 they go up to the CG, I'll go in and sit in on the plans  
15 briefing, and anytime I see something, I'm always providing  
16 feedback to the 3.

17 So although not my direct responsibility, I  
18 certainly look at it and particularly since I do the security  
19 update, a lot of that information is fed into the process. I  
20 don't know how much is used, but it certainly goes back in  
21 and, I'm sure, has an impact on what things are done.

22 [redacted] (b)(6) So would you say your section then is

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1 more concerned with trying to implement --

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's right.

3 [redacted] (b)(6) -- and execute that plan?

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

5 [redacted] (b)(6) Do you interface in the execution  
6 part with the CG's Initiatives Group at all?

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, I think they've just gotten  
8 here, as I understand it, unless we are talking another CG's  
9 Initiative Group.

10 [redacted] (b)(6) No. General Odierno's.

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I haven't done much to date. So -

12 -

13 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay. That's fine.

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And I think they just got here a  
15 few days ago.

16 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay. I want to take you back a  
17 little bit to when you first got here in December. Now you  
18 took over -- You TOA'ed on the 14th of December --

19 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

20 [redacted] (b)(6) -- and that's Transfer of Authority.

21 And you took over from General Corelli's (Phonetic) V Corps  
22 mission as the MNC.

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1 [redacted] Right.

2 [redacted] Can you describe briefly and kind of  
3 succinctly what the overall intent was? Was it just to  
4 continue on what V Corps was doing? That's what I'm trying  
5 to get at.

6 [redacted] I think initially it was. I think  
7 we had some ideas on what we wanted to do. Initially, we  
8 were moving toward a transition plan.

9 [redacted] Right. The bridging strategy.

10 [redacted] The bridging strategy. So we were  
11 moving down that road with plans, and that was the direction  
12 we were moving. Then that changed, and then the bridging  
13 strategy essentially was put on hold as we started to develop  
14 the [redacted] (Phonetic) concept and the [redacted] brigade surge  
15 came to life. So that essentially replaced those planning  
16 efforts.

17 [redacted] Right. Can you comment a little bit  
18 about the -- What I'm trying to do is capture the staff  
19 atmosphere in late December/early January before the  
20 President's announcement of the surge in mid-January.

21 Were you anticipating -- You probably already  
22 knew that the surge was coming. The President formally

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1 announced it in mid-January, but you had to know before that,  
2 that it was coming.

3           What was the atmosphere in the staff? Was it  
4 anticipatory? Was it simply to continue to execute what the  
5 V Corps had and General Casey MNF strategy or were you trying  
6 to shape and change it to fit a -- what would eventually  
7 evolve into (b)(6) and the new Corps strategy?

8           (b)(3), (b)(6) I think we were -- You know,  
9 looking back it was just -- To me, it was just a gradual  
10 transition. We looked at the bridging strategy, had thought  
11 through it, and developed a way to try and make that work,  
12 and as the surge started to come into play, obviously, we had  
13 to look at the situation differently.

14           So we just said, okay, this thought process is to  
15 going to apply now, because we've got to develop plans to  
16 manage and handle the surge. So we put it on the back  
17 burner, and let's start working through the surge  
18 requirements.

19           It was just a gradual transition, in my mind. It  
20 wasn't any excitement. It was just people looking at what  
21 needed to be done. We've not got a new set of assets and  
22 rules to play with: let's figure out how to use them, and

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1 let's think through it and come up with a good way to make it  
2 work and be successful.

3 (b)(6) It seems to me that it's quite an  
4 abrupt shift, looking kind of from the outside -- an abrupt  
5 shift in strategy when, under Corelli's V Corps and General  
6 Casey's MNF, it was kind of a commute to the fight, and all  
7 of a sudden, you know, you get new leadership in. III Corps  
8 comes in. The President announces the surge in mid-January,  
9 and General Petraeus comes in in the beginning of February,  
10 end of February, I think, and it almost completely is 180  
11 degrees different.

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm not sure if I agree with that.  
13 I think maybe it's a bulls in the (Inaudible). Eventually,  
14 you are going to have to transition. That won't go away.

15 So -- and I think that was kind of the umbrella  
16 thought. It was put the bridging strategy on hold, because  
17 before we transition now, we are going to go and get our arms  
18 around Baghdad. Let's clean up Baghdad, and then we will  
19 eventually transition.

20 As a part of the (b)(6) there was a  
21 transition strategy.

22 (b)(6) Right.

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1                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            And so I don't think it was that  
2 abrupt of a shift. It was simply transition to something we  
3 were eventually going to have to do. Don't forget about it,  
4 but, well, we've got forces here that are going to give us a  
5 better capability to try and reduce the violence that is  
6 occurring in Baghdad. So let's focus on that problem, and  
7 let's figure out how we can best solve it with the amount of  
8 forces that we're going to have.

9                    (b)(6)            Okay.

10                   (b)(3), (b)(6)            So, again, I didn't see it as a  
11 great shift. I saw it as a transition, bridging strategy on  
12 hold. We'll eventually come back to it. It might be a  
13 little bit different, but the general concept won't go away.

14                   (b)(6)            Would you care to assess the Corps --  
15 your predecessor Corps's operations, in particular their  
16 operations to secure Baghdad, Together Forward 1 and 2, and  
17 what key lessons did you take from those?

18                   (b)(3), (b)(6)            : I guess I didn't study that too  
19 close. I don't have a whole lot to say on that. I think I  
20 just focused as we got into theater what it is we were asked  
21 to do, think through the plans and the facts before us on the  
22 battlefield, and (Inaudible).

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1                    (b)(6)            Let me go back to the transition  
2 between the two Corps again.

3                    What was the handoff like? Did you talk to the  
4 FUOP predecessor?

5                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            I think we had a good handoff. I  
6 mean, they had a good system in place. We were able to fall  
7 in on it, and because we were a little bit more robust,  
8 there's a little bit more we could do.

9                    (b)(6)            : Right.

10                   (b)(3), (b)(6)            So I thought that we had a little  
11 bit more time to think through the Frago development process  
12 than they did, because given the amount of people that they  
13 had, they just simply had to crank stuff out very quickly,  
14 where again we had this capability to integrate Effects and  
15 to do a little more -- you know, if I've got a bigger cell to  
16 begin with that's cross-functional, I've already got some  
17 expertise internally that can provide a little bit better  
18 input into the Frago development process.

19                    The concept within our Corps was I as t he FUOPS  
20 could reach out to different sections. If I need that  
21 expertise, bring it in very quickly and work [problems. I  
22 think that's been a benefit. I think that has helped us

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1 quite a bit, and I'm hoping that the 18th Airborne comes in  
2 with a robust FUOPS or, if they don't, within their Plans  
3 shop they have a robust capability that can do that.

4 [ (b)(6) ] Have they already sent teams here to  
5 observe?

6 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] Well, they haven't sent teams yet.  
7 I think there's been key leader visits, but we are just  
8 starting to get into that process now.

9 [ (b)(6) ] Okay. As of this date, about four  
10 months into [ (b)(6) ] from about mid-February to about  
11 mid-June, how would you characterize the key indicators so  
12 far, as you see them as the FUOPS Chief?

13 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] I think we are making progress in  
14 Baghdad. I think that the violence is decreasing in a  
15 general trend. I think that's a positive trend. There are  
16 certainly spikes here and there that get captured in the news  
17 that make it difficult to get the overall message across that  
18 there is a positive trend occurring in Baghdad.

19 I see that, as we are successful in Baghdad, some  
20 of the activity around Baghdad in the belts is increasing.  
21 As we expand in areas we haven't been before, we are running  
22 into -- I guess people call them sanctuaries; I don't know

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1 that sanctuary is the right term. I just think it's areas  
2 that we haven't cleared before.

3 So folks, where they have been able to operate  
4 unencumbered, are not able to do that anymore. So from that  
5 perspective, by the Effects indicators, we are not being  
6 successful, because violence is on the uptick.

7 Well, it's going to be that way until we get  
8 through some of these areas that we haven't cleared before.  
9 So I don't think we are off track, but I think we've got to  
10 clean up some of the previous uncleared areas before we are  
11 going to see a greater downward trend, particularly outside  
12 of Baghdad.

13  Okay.  would you  
14 like to jump in?

15  If I could. A couple of things.

16 I want to go back, if I could, and just -- Could  
17 you tell me about the sub-sections in terms of the structure  
18 of the FUOPS Cell? You mentioned some of the names, but do  
19 they have particular departmental assignments within FUOPS?

20  Well, it's really -- The general  
21 strength is the Frago factory, which is upstairs and the  
22 Infrastructure and Effects Cell, which is downstairs in the

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1 blue box.

2 The Infrastructure primarily focuses on oil and  
3 electric infrastructure. They also pick up some other Fragos  
4 -- for example, the MOH FPS replacing the Facilities  
5 Protection Services in Medical City. They have done the  
6 Mosul dam response con plan.

7 Some of the bigger projects that are not as time  
8 sensitive have been pushed to the Infrastructure folks, if I  
9 don't have enough manpower in the Frago factory, to work  
10 those.

11 So I really have, again -- For example, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
12 (b)(3), (b)(6) really works the short fused ones, because he's good  
13 at it. He can handle the distinguished visitors and get  
14 those cranked out very quickly. I mean, he did the Saddam  
15 Hussein security mission to get him over to the gallows,  
16 which we cranked out in a matter of five hours and got that  
17 done.

18 Then I've got (b)(3), (b)(6) who works Samarrah  
19 and Diyala areas -- so, really, MND-North missions. Then  
20 I've got (b)(3), (b)(6) who's working special  
21 ops related missions and kind of takes some of the harder  
22 special projects, simply because he's got the capability to

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1 knock down the top targets.

2 Then out on the back deck there in the JOC, we've  
3 got a number of folks: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) works  
4 transportation. [redacted] (b)(6) works the O&I briefings. He  
5 also picks up some of the other augments, tasking, Fragos.

6 [redacted] (b)(6) works counter-sniper, and also new  
7 equipment fielding, and I've got [redacted] (b)(6) that  
8 works transition, and he really kind of works for me and  
9 CHOPS. He kind of splits the middle. But he's got a group  
10 of folks that helps him out upstairs.

11 Then I've got [redacted] (b)(6) who is a U.K. officer  
12 that works a lot of the Iraqi Army issues, rotations in and  
13 out of Baghdad, M-16, M-4 training. Then he also liaises  
14 somewhat with Southeast and, of course, he's got a tie-in to  
15 the Brits there. And I've got [redacted] (b)(6) who also helps  
16 with the IA business and (Inaudible).

17 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Is the structure of  
18 having Future Ops as an entity within C-3 -- Is that the norm  
19 as opposed to having them in a C-5 Section? Was that a  
20 unique decision relative to how this Corps is structured?

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. I think it was a conscious  
22 decision by III Corps to have a FUOPS that was going to be an

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1 Effects integration function. I mean, I think we stayed  
2 pretty true to that, although I think, as we have developed  
3 here, Effects is kind of defining itself a little bit.

4 There is still interaction, but maybe not as much  
5 as they originally perceived. But I mean, we've got the ties  
6 already built into FUOPS.

7 I mean, we've already got an Effects linkage. So  
8 we get that IO, PAO. Some of the non-connect things are  
9 always wrapped into our orders, where you might miss that if  
10 you didn't have that Effects linkage.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) You talked about one of the  
12 interesting pieces, which is this cross-functional teaming  
13 that's been successful.

14 You talked about some of the folks who are  
15 double-hatted who are coming to you from these other  
16 sections. Can you just kind of -- Well, I don't need the  
17 names per se, but can you give me the functional areas of  
18 some of those people that are sitting in?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. I mean, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
20 -- he works Plans and FUOPS. So he provides that support.

21 I've got (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) from the Chemical  
22 guys, our dual-hat. Our Intel folks are dual hatted,

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1 although I do have some resident, but they aren't rated by  
2 me, but they are in the chair.

3 Chaplain, a lawyer who is dual hatted.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Those are just a few.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Have you seen this cross-  
7 functional teaming work in some arrays in other commands  
8 you've been in or is this fairly unique to this scenario?

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) This -- It was different than the  
10 way we did it in I Corps. So naturally, from the Corps  
11 perspective, since I haven't worked on too many Corps staffs,  
12 I guess that's my only frame of reference.

13 I Corps was -- FUOPS and Plans were combined  
14 essentially, and then you had Current Ops. Intellectually,  
15 we worked the Effects, but I'm not sure that we did as good a  
16 job as integrating the different areas, since we are here.

17 A part of that is just  
18 I Corps. They get hit with a lot of taskings, and they  
19 support a lot of deployments, and they are always operating  
20 well below what they are authorized. So you're constantly  
21 just pulling things together to get the job done.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) You're kind of in a unique

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1 position as someone who was augmented to III Corps to kind of  
2 come in, and see things perhaps from a different perspective.

3 Can you share with us your thoughts about how you  
4 see the functionality of III Corps having come in here to  
5 take over as the MNCI element, just as a professional -- a  
6 career professional?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) Oh, I think the biggest comment I  
8 have is I think, particularly within the C-3 arena, work  
9 flows pretty smoothly, and there's not a whole lot of  
10 personality conflicts, where there's usually a lot of  
11 conflicts between CHOPS, Future Ops and Plans, because you're  
12 fighting over who owns what. You just don't see that here,  
13 and most of it just has to do with the personalities  
14 involved, and it works pretty smooth.

15 That's why I'm sitting in the CHOPS shop right  
16 now. I mean, CHOPS -- I mean, he comes in and sees my guys  
17 as orders are getting worked sometimes. He ends up being the  
18 final reviewer. So he may have questions, but it's fine. He  
19 can come in and, if there's any issues, I'll resolve. But  
20 same way, if there's things happening on the floor that I  
21 need to go check, I can go out there and check and not have  
22 to worry about talking with him. Just let him know. Same

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1 thing with working with Plans.

2 I just think there's a pretty good cross-talk.  
3 And of course, we all meet once every night. So there's a  
4 chance to communicate.

5 (b)(6) You seem almost like a natural,  
6 though, to fill in for the CHOPS, because you guys are  
7 involved in writing the Fragos.

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right, right. That's exactly  
9 right. Yes. That's one of the reasons I looked at the staff  
10 again, because I do the security loop. I'm one of the guys  
11 that sees everything, where some are more focused in a  
12 specialty, and so they don't know about certain things that  
13 are happening. So keeping a broad focus helps, too.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) I have one last one, if I can.  
15 As you look at your point in your tour right now, having  
16 joined the Corps, come into theater, worked through this  
17 transition of the previous bridging strategy into (b)(6)  
18 (b)(6) from your seat what has been the biggest challenge in  
19 making that come together?

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) I think the biggest challenge is  
21 trying to get Coalition staff leadership to be comfortable  
22 working with the Iraqis.

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1 We want to stay in our lane and do things within  
2 our comfort zone, and unless we get the Iraqis engaged, it  
3 ain't going to happen, because they don't care what we think.

4 A good example is this reconciliation conference  
5 that's going on right now. It's our idea, and we're asking  
6 the Iraqis to help provide security, and they're saying,  
7 screw you, you guys want to do it, you provide your security,  
8 it's not our idea. You think it's good for us? Okay.  
9 Roger, noted. Have a nice day. That's kind of the way it  
10 is.

11  Let me ask two quick questions, and  
12 we'll wrap this up.

13 The new Operations Order, the base Op Order.  
14 What input did you have in your section on this?

15  Well, I guess that's -- Again, it  
16 gets back to the process.s

17  Right.

18  You know, direct influence? Did  
19 we review the product and the plans developed? Yes. Did I  
20 have a FUOPS rep that was directly involved in that? The  
21 answer is no, again because Plans kind of branches out in a  
22 similar fashion as I do, but yet all the input that we

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1 provide into the Effects process and to Assessments process  
2 is into what needs to be done, how things are going, what we  
3 need to focus on or feedback on the product itself -- those  
4 are all inputs that we provided.

5 So I think systemically, the answer to your  
6 question is systemically we supported it. Directly, we  
7 didn't.

8 (b)(6) Okay. Got it.

9 The next question is more of a broader question  
10 that I'm not sure you get involved in. But I noted when I  
11 was here in March and again in May General Mixon in  
12 Multinational Division-North requested or wanted more  
13 reinforcements up in his area.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

15 (b)(6) Because of the ongoing violence in  
16 the belts up there.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

18 (b)(6) The Corps didn't have a reserve to  
19 send them. So they had to essentially rob from Peter to pay  
20 Paul, take a battalion from MNDB and put it up there, a  
21 Stryker battalion.

22 Do you get involved in those kinds of decisions?

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1 For example, how do you create a Corps reserve? What do you  
2 do with a Corps reserve?

3 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] I don't get involved with the  
4 decision to do that, but I write the order to execute it.

5 [ (b)(6) ] Okay. Okay. That's good. That  
6 helps me understand a little bit about more what FUOPS does.

7 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] The planners are probably shaping  
8 that.

9 [ (b)(6) ] Right.

10 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] And then it says, okay, it's time  
11 to execute; FUOPS, you got to make it happen.

12 [ (b)(6) ] Okay. Got it.

13 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] have you got anything else?

14 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] I'm good. Thank you.

15 [ (b)(6) ] Well, [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] one last  
16 question.

17 You know, we've been asking you some questions  
18 here for the past 45 minutes or so. Do you have anything you  
19 would like to add that you think should go on the record  
20 here?

21 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] I guess I've got one thing.

22 [ (b)(6) ] Sure.

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1 [redacted] I do think the leadership here in  
2 III Corps, MNCI, is pretty solid. I think what I like is --  
3 I mean, to compare, in terms of when action is taken here, I  
4 think we are trying to do things that have a purpose, and if  
5 they don't have a purpose, we don't do them, even though they  
6 may have been done in the past where there was a requirement  
7 to have an Effects meeting that -- I mean, if it didn't  
8 generate something that needed to be done, we don't waste  
9 time doing it.

10 So I think, in terms of efficiently operating, I  
11 think III Corps has done pretty well. I don't see a lot of  
12 time wasted unnecessarily. And when it does start to get  
13 wasted, either a meeting is cut down, it's eliminated or it's  
14 just only a few key people join in on it.

15 So I think the command climate here is pretty  
16 good.

17 [redacted] Good. Okay.

18 [redacted] I mean, I come from -- I Corps has  
19 got some great leaders, too, but again they've got a  
20 different tug on them, but they do all of that as well. But  
21 I just think things have gone pretty smoothly.

22 [redacted] Well, good.

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1                    (b)(3), (b)(6)    In terms of how things are being  
2 run.

3                    (b)(6)            That, incidentally, echoes other  
4 comments I've heard around the Corps.

5                    Well, (b)(3), (b)(6)    thank you very much for your  
6 time.

7                    This concludes the interview. Thank you.

8                    - - -

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