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**MNC-I C3 PLANS AND POLICY NOTES (#32)**

**As of 9 August 2007**

**WARPLANS:**

**1. TOPIC:** MNC-I Shia Engagement Strategy (**NEW**)

**DISCUSSION:** Plans has been tasked to develop a mission analysis pursuant to developing a comprehensive Shia engagement strategy that encompasses the spectrum of Shia entities: militias, irreconcilables, as well as those that might favor reconciliation utilizing lethal and nonlethal means. The purpose of this strategy is to provide clarity for subordinate commands in their engagement with the Shia.

**NEXT ACTION:** Mission received from CG 06 Aug 07; Conducted initial OPT meeting 08 Aug 07; Daily 2 x hour planning sessions are planned Thursday through Sunday in order to brief the results of mission analysis to the CG on Monday, 13 August.

**KEY DATES:** 13 August Mission Analysis brief to CG.

**POC:** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**2. TOPIC:** Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 07 Review (**NEW**)

**DISCUSSION:** Leading an extended MNC-I staff planning reviewing of the final, signed MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 2007. Point papers (written for previous versions of the JCP) are being updated to reflect issues with the final edition.

**NEXT ACTION:** Forward compiled point papers for CG review.

**KEY DATES:** None at this time.

**POC:** [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. Operations Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, Operation Marne Torch in Arab Jabour, Operation Hardh Al-Amin in the Lake Thar Thar region and Operations Dragon Fire and Gates of Freedom in the Rashid and Mansour Security Districts respectively have already made significant strides in securing the Iraqi populace and reducing AQI and Shia extremists freedom of movement.

MNC-I remains on the offensive with MND-B conducting Operations Dragon Hammer and Dragon Anvil clearing and defeating AQIZ in Rashid and Arab Jabour and Operation Iron Blitz to clearing West of Taji. MND-N will continue to attack AQI in the Diyala River Valley with the continuation of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, and prevent them from gaining sanctuary elsewhere by defeating AQI in the Kirkuk/Tuz area as part of Operation Bronco Ripper. MND-C continues to clear the Southern Baghdad Belts with Operations Avalanche, Operation Husky, and Operation Marne Torch II. MNF-W

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continues to clear remaining AQI elements in MNF-W with Operation Black Diamond in Karmah, and Operation Pegasus Bridge along their Eastern Boundary, and prepares Fallujah for IP control with Operation Alljah.

While the focus of plus-up forces is Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I continues to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the breadth of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps' main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are currently the Corps' top priorities for corps assets. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF has traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** AQI is expected to attempt a surge in activities during the latter half of August and the first half of September both as part of a historical pattern associated with Ramadan, and as an attempt to influence CF governments and publics in advance of the scheduled September Assessment from GEN Petraeus to Congress.

MNC-I will conduct focused operations to disrupt or prevent AQI from carrying out planned attacks. The term "Phantom Strike" which previously referred specifically to MNC-I operations against networks emplacing deep buried IEDs, has now been expanded to an umbrella term for all operations which disrupt AQI's ability to conduct operations from 15 August to 15 September. Operations may target AQI IED networks, AQI Sanctuary/Staging Areas, AQI HVIs, or other targets which will disrupt AQI's ability to increase their level of attacks prior to Ramadan.

MSCs briefed their concepts for conducting Phantom Strike to the MNC-I Commander on 3 August during the Commander's conference. MNC-I will prioritize Corps level enabler support to these operations, and assist in coordinating operations across or adjacent to MSC boundaries.

WAY AHEAD: C3 FUOPS coordinates with the MSCs to synchronize the timing and assist in any required boundary changes for Phantom Strike Objectives which cross or are adjacent to MSC boundaries.

POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** Establishment of Judicial Complexes (New)

**DISCUSSION:** During the conduct of the MNC-I OPORD 07-01 Brief, the CG MNC-I directed the MNC-I SJA to assume responsibility for the establishment of safe, secure judicial complexes throughout Iraq, modeled after the Rule of Law Green Zone in the Rusafa District of Baghdad. Additionally, the CG MNC-I provided guidance to establish the first site in the city of Ramadi. Initial planning began with the development of a Concept Brief, which was briefed to the MNC-I C3. Upon briefing the C3, the MNC-I SJA section published WARNO 008 to provide notice to the major subordinate commands about this initiative and to assemble the Corps Judicial Complex Working Group (JCWG). Members of the JCWG include representatives from the Corps SJA, C4, C6, C7, C8, C9, and AT-FP sections as well as a representative from the Joint Contracting Command.

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**NEXT ACTION:** Site visit to Ramadi scheduled for 12 August.

**KEY DATES:**

12 August – Site visit to Ramadi

**POC:**

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**5. TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya)  
(Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Operation PHANTOM HAMMER is a four-phased operation designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to Temporary Area of Operations Thunderbird IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. Tentatively, the forces to be employed in this operation include the equivalent of 1.4b, 1.4d one US Infantry Battalion, two IA Battalions from 8IA DIV, and corps enablers. Phase II, set the conditions, will begin upon approval of CONOP, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will clear Diwaniya north of the Hilla River. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya, returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities. MNC-I planners, IGFC representatives, MND-C planners went to Diwaniyah on 21 July 2007 and again on 30 July to conduct combined and joint planning session with MND-CS, 8IA DIV, IGFC, and MND-C to confirm the concept of operations for operation PHANTOM HAMMER. A scheme of maneuver was agreed upon at the 30 July planning session, and graphics to portray that scheme of maneuver will be posted to the C3 plans and policy webpage on SIPR under Named Operations; Phantom Hammer.

**WAY AHEAD:** PLANORD released for second staffing 8 AUG 2007; published for execution NLT 11 AUG 2007. Phase III of PHANTOM HAMMER will begin NET 15 September 2007.

**POC:**

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**6. TOPIC:** Request to GOI to employ 34<sup>th</sup> BDE (Peshmerga) ISO MND-N ops  
(Update)

**DISCUSSION:** CG MNF-I's letter to the PM Gol requesting formal GOI-KRG approval to employ the 34<sup>th</sup> BDE in support of MND-N operations in vicinity of the Diyala River Valley (DRV) has been submitted. The concept for 34<sup>th</sup> BDE is to conduct limited operations, under command of 5IA Div, from four (4) battalion-sized operating bases to the north of the DRV. These forces will augment and capitalize on recent MNC-I achievements.

**NEXT ACTION:** Awaiting action from Gol.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** Diyala River Valley (DRV) Operation (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans has commenced planning for an operation to clear the DRV. Desktop Mission Analysis has commenced. Planning requires additional intelligence products.

**NEXT ACTION:** Submit additional RFIs from Mission Analysis, brief C3 Plans and receive requested planning products.

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**8. TOPIC:** ISF Endstate for Baghdad (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Since the last update, the ISF Endstate for Baghdad presentation was presented to the C3 for further guidance. In addition to the suggestions discussed in the last update, the C3 recommended an expansion of Baghdad's rural Security Districts to include Hussiniyah and Khan Bani Saad.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to conduct integrated staff planning with the BOC planners, MNSTC-I, the MNDs, and IAG. Work together with MND-N and MND-B to develop a concept for expanding the rural Security District of Khan Bani Saad. It is still anticipated that at some further future date the plan will be socialized with the BOC leadership. When the Corps Commander returns from leave it is anticipated this brief will go to him for his guidance.

**KEY DATES:** N/A

POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Integration of SIBs into the regular IA (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Closely linked with the Infrastructure Security Strategy is the issue of developing capability with the Iraqi Army to effectively secure energy infrastructure. The forces currently assigned to this task are the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, (SIBs), whose performance was below that required to provide effective protection to critical energy infrastructure. The SIBs are to be fully incorporated into the Iraqi Army through a training and equipping process led by MNSTC-I. MNC-I is responsible for subsequent partnering and sustainment training. ICW IAG, C3 Plans are looking harvest MiTTs from more capable IA units to help develop the "less" capable IA units produced through SIB integration or scheduled IA growth.

**NEXT ACTION:** Following direction received from the C3, develop detailed courses of action for harvesting MiTTs.

POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**10. TOPIC:** Infrastructure Security Strategy (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I has begun parallel planning with MNF-I as we attempt to address the security issues and concerns of oil and electrical infrastructure in Iraq. A review, being led by EFC (Fwd), will consider the energy infrastructure priorities of the Iraqi ministries (the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Ministry of Defence). On completion, the review will be compared to an analysis of threats to energy infrastructure. The vastness of energy infrastructure prevents total security but the combination of the infrastructure review and the threat analysis will enable security to be focused in areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high. Once we have confirmed our focus for energy infrastructure security, the Iraqi Ministries, (Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Defence) will be engaged to ensure coherence of effort. The IA is responsible for the security of infrastructure.

**NEXT ACTION:** Combine infrastructure review and threat analysis to identify areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high.

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**11. TOPIC:** Border Security (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Appendix 10 (Border Security Operations) to Annex C to OPORD 07-01 was published on 1 June. The order details a border strategy involving a four prong approach to border operations to create security in depth. The four areas of emphasis; POEs, borders, smuggling routes within Iraq, and smuggling networks; are complementary with operations in one helping to set the conditions for increased effectiveness in others. These operations will be accompanied by a coordinated IO effort at all echelons to convince Iraqis that they benefit collectively and individually by observing and enforcing GOI border laws and regulations. While none of these areas of emphasis are new this strategy seeks increased effectiveness as more forces are committed to border security, more intelligence collection and analysis is dedicated to target lethal smuggling, and a coordinated effort is made to create synergy between the four areas of emphasis. MNC-I is currently prioritizing the Southern Iraq/Iran border (Diyala, Wassit, Maysan, and Basrah Provinces) where the primary EFP and advanced weaponry support to extremists is assessed to enter Iraq. The framework of the border strategy, however, will be applicable to the overall mission to include TFF networks on the Syrian border which is currently an area of emphasis for MNF-I planning.

Due to poor security, corruption, and divided loyalties of border security personnel; it is assessed that much of the external support to extremists within Iraq passes directly through the Land POEs. Given this assessment, establishing continuous coalition force presence at key POEs has become a top priority for both MNF-I and MNC-I. MNC-I is willing to pull BTTs from other DBE organizations and consolidate them at POEs if required to achieve this continuous coverage. MNC-I WARNO\_010 (Operation Silver Raven) directs appropriate MSCs to establish continuous BTT coverage at Rabiah, Muntheria, Zurbatiyah, Al Sheeb, Shalamshah, Waleed, Trebil, and (upon opening) Al Qaim.

**NEXT ACTION:**

MND-C continues to pursue forward basing options for BTTs at Badra vic Zurbatiyah, and is planning to develop a series of checkpoints inside the border once the full Georgain contingent is established in Wassit Province.

Al Qaim POE in Al Anbar province was scheduled to open in the first half of August, but opening has been delayed pending resolution of international agreements between Iraq and Syria. MNF-W will remission a BTT to cover this POE once it is opened.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**12. TOPIC:** ISF Development (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Since the last update, Plans in coordination with IAG, has been tasked to develop a mission analysis to develop the mission of the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role (formerly known as the Advisory/Assistance Brigade). This planning effort is designed to flesh out the requirements for the BCT. MNC-I and IAG will continue to attend MNF-I FUOPs planning efforts to assist them in developing the requirements for the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to develop a mission analysis to include an IPB and other associated requirements in anticipation of presentation.

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**KEY DATES:** No meetings scheduled at this time.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**13. TOPIC:** Elections (Update)

**DISCUSSION: -- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --**

On 26 June 2007, the Elections Working Group reviewed the the following action items:  
Provincial Powers Law: This legislation has not progressed beyond the second reading. USM-I believes that there are two different drafts of this legislation, implying that it still being discussed in committee. This legislation is not required prior to provincial elections.

Elections Law: This legislation has not been drafted and is needed prior to Provincial Elections. It will provide the legal framework for Provincial Elections in Iraq. There has been a suggestion that the 2005 Elections Law will be redrafted; USM-I cannot confirm at this time. USM-I is pushing for the Elections Law to be passed by the Council of Representatives by 15 September 2007.

IHEC received training on scope of duties by UNAMI and the Indian Electoral Commission over the past two weeks. The next step for the IHEC is to confirm the heads of the 19 Governmental Electoral Offices (GEO) (one per province and two in Baghdad). The process for this is that each Governor submits 5 candidates for the post of Director in their Province, and the IHEC will choose the most qualified candidate. Following the selection of the Directors of the 19 GEO, the IHEC will begin to set the conditions for voter registration. Voter registration will be covered in future Elections updates.

Elections Working Group  
26 JUN 07

- **WHEN:** Monthly meeting; last Tuesday of the month
- **WHO:** UN, USM-I POLOFF, USAID, OPA, SPA (plans, strategy), MNC-I C3 Plans, MNC-I C9, PRT
- **TOPIC:**
  - Legislative Framework
    - Provincial Powers Law (should be passed prior to elections, but not required)
    - Elections Law (target date SEP)
      - Not entirely sure what it says
      - Public Policy Group (DC Think Tank) is writing a draft
      - Key is the criteria to establish residency (who votes and where do they vote?)
      - May push “rolling elections” to “re-do” the low voter turnout provinces (Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din)
  - IHEC is in charge, not US, not UN
    - 9 election commissioners
    - 2 weeks training by UN in India
    - Permanent staff of 700
    - Independent funding (not under a ministry)
  - Biggest Challenge
    - Voter Registration (target date SEP/OCT)
      - Biometric approach will take 12-18 months (might do for National Elections in Dec 2009)
      - 543 food distribution centers would become voter registration centers (security)
      - Will be open for 1-3 weeks in order to register voters
    - Provincial Elections (120 days after registration is complete (FEB 08))
    - MNC-I Challenge: Support ISF Security (voter registration, ballots, PSD, polling sites)

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**-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --**

Provincial elections cannot proceed until all related legislation is resolved, making elections unlikely before February 2008. Provincial elections have the potential to pull more Sunnis into the political process and improve governance in some provinces, such as Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Ninewa. When the elections occur, it is likely that politically organized Sunni Arabs and Sadrists, neither of whom participated in the last round of provincial elections, are positioned to make significant gains, however, Sunni insurgents who oppose elections will likely intimidate neutral or pro-GOI Sunnis from going to the polls. Elections by themselves will not reduce violence; the critical factor in the reduction of sectarian violence continues to be improving the security conditions for the citizens of Iraq.

It is reasonable to assume that there are some in the GOI who stand to lose power when an election occurs, and will attempt to postpone the Provincial Elections until January 2009 when the National Elections are next scheduled to occur. Presently, sub-provincial elections cannot legally occur; if sub-provincial elections are held, perhaps in a city or a district, the "elected officials" would have no legal status and control neither levers of legitimate power nor a legal financial stream.

The concept of a "tribal council", whereby leaders of several tribes might come together to form an informal council, is encouraged as a stabilizing force to augment and support the efforts of the Provincial Governors and the legitimate Provincial Council, as long as it does not attempt to usurp or wrest legitimate power away from the Provincial Governor.

Copy of the Provincial Powers draft legislation posted on the C3 plans and policy NIPR homepage.

**-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --**

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

**14. TOPIC:** Transition of IA Divisions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The transition of the ten IA Divisions (developed under the COIN force program) to Iraqi Security Forces control remains at 80% complete:

- 1-2 IA BDE Transition of Authority (TOA) FRAGO was executed on 08 Aug 07. MNC-I ISF TOA tracking now formally recognizes 1-2 IA BDE's existing operating status which resulted from the MND-N – 2 IA Div MOU WEF 15 Jan 07.

**ACTION COMPLETE**

- The Diyala Operations Command (including 5IA) TOA draft program is being finalized for a 01 Sep 07 TOA (pending staffing lead times). MNF-I, MNC-I and MND-N (with equivalent Iraqi agencies) conducted two OPTs to coordinate strategic and tactical planning for the Diyala region. TOA requirements are being reviewed following PM Al-Maliki's placement of 5IA Div under the Diyala Operations Center as at 18 Apr 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Staff MNC-I FRAGO directing DOC TOA to IGFC.

- 7IA TOA programmed for 01 Nov 07. MNC-I FRAGO directing 7IA TOA to IGFC published 02 Aug 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Staff draft MOU and prepare battlespace management FRAGO.

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**15. TOPIC:** Coalition Participation (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The following is a list of recent and anticipated significant changes in the coalition during the remainder of 2007.



**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
For issues regarding the [redacted] 1.4b BDE contact [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**16. TOPIC:** Base Consolidation and Closure (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** in the ongoing efforts to turn over battle space to the ISF, MSC closes or transfers bases to a GOI approved receiver (MOD, MOI, MOF) under a “condition based” approach. Base transfer / closures is a conditions based approach driven by three major considerations: stability in the AO, ISF ability/capability to assume & hold battle space, and funding for base consolidation. The current methodology is bottom-up driven with MSC nominating bases for transfer / closure, gaining approval, and following a 100 day notional timeline, which serves as a guide to accomplish necessary steps in the transfer / closure process.

**Next Action:** All base transfers/closure nominations have to be approved by CG. No further action required for 3ID CAB at Stryker, and [1.4b, 1.4d] + BNs at Camp Delta and 2/3 HBCT (Brigade #20) at LSAA, Taji, Liberty, Falcon, and Kalsu.

**Future Actions:** IZ Transition is back on the table which entails the consolidation of MNF-I presence in the IZ from 13 to 3 locations; with two being MND-B bases (Union III and Prosperity). The transition also requires the transfer of Base Union I (Oct08), Freedom Rest (Jul08), the relocation of CSH to VBC (Sep08) and the relocation of GRD to VBC (June08). As part of the consolidation, MND-B will have to relocate from Union III NLT Jan 08 and transfer the base to JASG, which begins construction and renovations to relocate MNF-I FWD by Oct 08. MND-B is currently assessing capacity at Prosperity to absorb forces from Union III. The Executive Base Management Board with COS has been suspended until further notice. Base Working Group meetings are conducted twice a month. As part of future basing plans, we are conducting analysis of current capacity at long term COB IOT build required additional capacity to support RIP/TOA and consolidation efforts.

**Bases transferring / closing in the next:**

**30 days:** Basrah Palace / MND-SE (14AUG07)

**60 days:** 0

**90 days:** Cedar II / 13<sup>th</sup> SC-E (31 OCT 07)

**Key dates:** Next BMWG 11 AUG 07 @ Phantom CR / 1300

**POC:** [redacted]  
[redacted]

**17. TOPIC:** Major Cultural / Religious Events (Update)

**DISCUSSION:**

25 Rajab 1428 or 9 Aug 2007: Death of 7<sup>th</sup> Imam (buried in Kadamiyah)

The 7<sup>th</sup> Imam, Musa al Kazim (the Patient One) died as a result of poisoning after suffering 14 years in prison. According to Islamic histories, he was generous, brave, and possessed great self-control over his anger. Two years ago, in 2005, insurgents in the massive crowd of people that gathered to commemorate the death of the 7<sup>th</sup> Imam screamed words to the effect of “bomb” caused the crowd to panic. A stampede ensued and resulted in the collapse of a nearby bridge in Northern Baghdad. The bridge collapsing caused the death and injury of hundreds of predominately Shi’a worshipers. The commemoration of the death of the 7<sup>th</sup> Imam and the commemoration of the stampede at the Kadamiyah Bridge will likely draw huge crowds in Northern Baghdad, however Iraqi police and Iraqi army forces in the crowd will likely dissuade all

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but the most resourceful insurgents from inciting another riot. FUOPS has the lead on the plan to protect the population during this event.

1 Ramadan 1428 or 13 Sep 2007: Beginning of the month of fasting

Ramadan is the time of the lunar year when Muslims actively practice fasting during the daylight hours. Fasting is one of the 5 pillars of Islam (the others are praying 5 times a day, partaking in the Hajj (holy pilgrimage), giving alms to the poor, and declaring that Allah is the one true God and that Muhammad is his prophet). The period just preceding Ramadan tends to have more enemy activity, and the time of Ramadan generally has less activity during the day, since Muslims are not supposed to eat or drink. It is said that any Muslim who is martyred (killed) during Ramadan is assured to go to heaven, so anticipate a greater than usual amount of activity in the hours of darkness. Several times in the month of Ramadan there are days of particular importance: The first four important days are called the "Nights of Glory"; this year they call on 2, 4, 6, and 10 October 2007. The 28 Ramadan or the 10<sup>th</sup> of October is especially holy, as it was on this day that Allah revealed the Koran to Muhammad. After the month of fasting is complete, Muslims celebrate what is known as "Eid al Fitr" or the "festival of breaking the fast". During this time, Muslims wear their best clothing and cover their houses in the finest decorations to celebrate breaking their month-long daylight fast.

The following lists the months of the Lunar Calendar for 2008:

<u>Lunar Month</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Gregorian Month</u>
1 <b>Rajab</b> 1428	To Respect	15 July 2007
1 <b>Shaban</b> 1428	To Distribute	14 August 2007
1 <b>Ramadan</b> 1428	Parched Thirst	13 September 2007
1 <b>Shawwal</b> 1428	Vigorous	13 October 2007
1 <b>Dhu al Qada</b> 1428	Month of Rest	11 November 2007
1 <b>Dhu al Hajj</b> 1428	Month of Hajj	11 December 2007
1 <b>Muharram</b> 1429	Forbidden	10 January 2008
1 <b>Safar</b> 1429	Empty	9 February 2008
1 <b>Rabi I</b> 1429	First Spring	9 March 2008
1 <b>Rabi II</b> 1429	Second Spring	8 April 2008
1 <b>Jumada I</b> 1429	First Freeze	8 May 2008
1 <b>Jumada II</b> 1429	Second Freeze	7 June 2008

\* Muhammad decreed the 4 months in GREEN as holy months. During holy months, it is forbidden for good Muslims to wage war or fight.

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS:** Moderate threat; large crowds may entice insurgents to attempt a high-profile attack.

**WAY AHEAD:** Continue to prepare the briefing that will cover MNC-I plan to support ISF efforts during Ramadan. Draft copy of that plan located on MNC-I SIPR page; Staff Sections; C3 Plans and Policy; Lead Planners; (b)(3), (b)(6)

**POC:** \_\_\_\_\_ (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**18. TOPIC:** IA Legal Advisor Partnership Program (IALAPP) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The MNC-I OSJA IALAPP stated priorities are: (1) Oversee IGFC Legal Advisor training; (2) Provide assistance in implementation of revised IA military justice system; (3) Encourage centralized IGFC Detainee procedures and policies; and (4) Coordinate providing equipment, materials, and training to increase effectiveness of IA legal advisors.

**NEXT ACTION:** Ongoing projects include:

- Continue training on IA ROE including an information paper, PowerPoint training slides, and ROE Cards;
- Working with MNSTC-I on formulating proper Detainee SOPs and policies;
- Currently working on agreements with DOJ, DOS, and GOI for all future Judicial Review Teams of investigative judges in MND-B, MND-N, and MNF-W, and working on internal MNC-I SOP for conducting the operations;
- Tracking status of IA military justice procedures that are awaiting publication so that the system can be fully implemented.
- BG Adnan Hamudi, IGFC Legal Advisor, as well as (b)(3), (b)(6) IGFC Deputy Legal Advisor, now meeting on a bimonthly basis with MNC-I OSJA IALAPP attorney.
- BG Adnan's has focused much attention on IA martyr payment program and feels system is now working well.
- In May, BG Adnan Hamudi visited all IGFC divisions, met with legal advisors, provided training on the new IA military justice system, and reviewed procedures. Upon his return to IGFC, BG Adnan provided guidance to the division legal advisors on areas to be worked on and improved.

**KEY DATES:** None.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**ISF:**

**1. TOPIC:** IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. MG Berragan concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. 4/7 IA has been replaced by 4/11 IA as a priority on the FORCEGEN Tracker. It is forecasted to be FOC on 1 APR 08. 1 AUG, IGFC announced that 1/4/10 and 2/2/10 were once again extended. FUOPS currently working COA for replacing 4<sup>th</sup> rotation with permanent IA units.

**NEXT ACTION:** Discuss COA with IGFC

**KEY DATES:** IGFC discussion this week

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**2. TOPIC:** Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The Iraqi Army is looking into the concept of putting their own cafeterias in to feed the soldiers. These cafeterias will be operated by cooks employed by the IA.

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This is a concept they are looking into so that they can eliminate food service contracts. One test facility is already constructed and operating. FMS HMMWVs are now arriving and being distributed. Those divisions who have used the Iraqi Army Code Out Procedure will receive replacements for unrepairable vehicles. Many of the divisions neglected using this process because it would diminish the amount of fuel and oil in the divisions allowance from MoO. The IA is still having trouble finding personnel to fill mechanic positions. Uniforms for the divisions are ready for pick up at the MoD warehouse in the IZ. The MoD does not have transportation arranged for delivery of uniforms, so the divisions will have to pick them up. The IA divisions in the north have not come to pick up uniforms yet, due to the distance of travel.

**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units and especially those supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** None

**POC:**

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. TOPIC: Build POE Capability - Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction – (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Current MNF-I planning efforts for key land POEs include building POE capability. As part of this effort the Corps will push an initial 4 station BAT system w/ supporting VSAT and required equipment out to the Rabiya POE within the week. The purpose is to determine the feasibility & serviceability of these systems at a POE. This effort will serve to be the basis of planning for follow-on implementation of same systems out at the other major POE's. Personnel & equipment deployed this week and will be in place by 09 Aug 07. Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operation. The goal is to reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad. Current MOD1 to MNF Frago - Interdiction of FF & F is out for staffing and under review by Corps Staff.

**NEXT ACTION:**

-Continue Corps planning efforts to building POE capability

**KEY DATES:**

09 Aug – MNF- I Staff conduct formal brief on the Border – POE Update to MNF-I Cdr.  
10-12 Sep 07 (Tentative) Border Enforcement Conf with neighboring countries at the US Embassy (DHS Host).

**POCs:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. TOPIC: Seaport Security - (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:**

MNF -I planning efforts for seaports began 29 Mar and included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports. Recent seaport conference at MNF-I, 24-25 Jul 07, identified significant gaps in coastal security coverage, both procedural and physical; it transpires that a 10km stretch at the southern end of the Shatt Al Arab Waterway (SAA) is currently not patrolled by Iraqi Navy, CG or CTF<sup>1.4a</sup> Leaders from

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the Iraqi Navy, Coast Guard and CF focused on the development of a Memorandum of Understanding for combined maritime operations. Additionally, within the past week, DBE Commander announced the transfer of control for Iraqi Air and Seaport from the MoT to Mol. DHS is working to gain a copy of the official letter / order for this action and will distribute upon receipt. This transfer will facilitate key planning tied to current efforts on seaport security and future border operations.

**NEXT ACTION:**

- Continue to monitor developments of Seaport Strategy & Memorandum of Understanding
- Track MNC-I tasks in support of the Foreign Fighters effort
- Receive copy of the official order / letter for sea / air port transfer

**KEY DATES:**

- NLT 13 AUG 07 – Follow on seaport MTG between CTF<sup>1.4a</sup> Iraqi Navy and CG in order to ensure that seamless coastal security can be achieved.

**POCs:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**5. TOPIC:** DBE Leadership and C2 (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE remains without a dedicated POE Director, since the assassination of MG Emad Mohsen Al Shaheen. BG Farhoud is now the acting National POE Director. A permanent POE Director is needed to make lasting change IAW CF objectives across all POEs in Iraq. If appointed soon, a new POE director will be the ninth in the last 24 months. Lack of a National Director degrades accountability of regional POE directors resulting in poor operating standards abroad.

**NEXT ACTION:**

Continue to follow up at Joint Border Work Group

**KEY DATES:**

TBD – new or current POE Director assigned with permanent orders.

**POCs:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**6. TOPIC:** Borders Poe Roles and Responsibilities (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE remains without a dedicated POE Director, since the assassination of MG Emad Mohsen Al Shaheen. BG Farhoud is now the acting National POE Director. A permanent POE Director is needed to make lasting change IAW CF objectives across all POEs in Iraq. If appointed soon, a new POE director will be the ninth in the last 24 months. Lack of a National Director degrades accountability of regional POE directors resulting in poor operating standards abroad

**NEXT ACTION:**

1. Plan orientation and deployment for remaining 5 Regional advisors.

**KEY DATES:**

TBD – new or current POE Director assigned with permanent orders.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** 11 IA HQ Force Generation and Deployment for FAQ (Update)

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**DISCUSSION:** 11 IA is a PMI unit currently undergoing force generation at Old MOD. It will be composed of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> of the 6<sup>th</sup> IA, and an additionally generated BDE. It is expected to eventually replace 9 IA forces within Baghdad. On 20 May 07, 2/6 IA was re-designated as 1/11 IA. The BDE remains OPCON to 9 IA until further notice. Received 1<sup>st</sup> ORA report (ORA 4). IOC initially announced as 6 JUN, but as of JUL, we awaiting M7 to write order to make official. Currently; the 11 IA DIV HQ is manned at 143% strength. (29 JUL 07): MND-B, MND-C, MNC-I, and the BOCAT discussed five COAs – including the BOC COA – for the deployment of the 11<sup>th</sup> IA Division. No decision. **Decision will be linked to FAQ rotation COAs currently being worked by FUOPS.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to track.

**KEY DATES:**

JUN – AUG 07 staff training

SEP 07 validation exercise (proposed)

1 OCT 07 FOC

**POC:**

**8. TOPIC: National Police Budget Required (Update)**

**DISCUSSION:** Since 2005, the National Police do not have a budget in any form. The NP requires an independent budget recognized by Parliament as a Directory under MOI. The NP contains no line items under MOI's budget for funding or resources. MG Hussein requested an independent budget due to complete failure of MOI support. The question of successful salary funding is answered through MOI HRC filing hiring orders with the Ministry of Finance. To establish a NP budget the PM Council, Parliament, Central Ministry, and MOF must process and approve the budget based on the NP TOE.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to monitor and report.

**KEY DATES:** N/A

**POC:**

1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**KEY DATES:** 11 AUG 07, Training Coordination Meeting at CPATT.

**POC:**

**10. TOPIC: NATIONAL POLICE (Unity Battalions) (No Change)**

**DISCUSSION:** PM Maliki and MG Hussein (NP Commander) reportedly abolished initiatives of four specialty 'Unity' battalions; this is no longer true. PM Maliki directed the battalions continue training and assume Shia protection security mission. The battalions are as follows:

-Unity BN (935 on hand) secures Shia pilgrimage route between Baghdad and Karbala. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Seyafeah BN (750 Authorized) secures Shia pilgrimage route between Baghdad and Kut. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Al Hurriyah City Personal Security Detachment (700 authorized) provides security of Shia holy sites. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Karbala Province Emergency BN. (750-unconfirmed) Mission undisclosed.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to monitor and report.

**KEY DATES:**

- 9 AUG: 203 shurta graduate Solidarity NPA and

- 9 AUG: 402 shurta graduate Najaf Police Academy

- 18 OCT: 605 shurta graduate Solidarity NPA

**POC:**

**11. TOPIC: Al Askariyah Brigade (No Change)**

**DISCUSSION:** MG Hussein directed the Al Askariyah BDE to complete training to standard as soon as possible. 1 AA BN is currently in Samarra partnered with 6/2 (-) NP BDE. Samarra citizens responded favorably to the AA BN. 2 AA BN is scheduled to complete training 31 August, 3 AA BN is expected to complete training 30 September. The AA BDE will replace 6/2 NP BDE allowing 6/2 to possibly reposition in Basrah. Based on movement estimates and leave, the AA brigade should RIP/TOA mid October.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to monitor and report.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:**

**FORCE GENERATION:**

**1. TOPIC:** MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requested Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W), directed CENTCOM to source internally. ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06, disapproved 8 JAN 07. Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results. At the request of VADM Morgan (N3/N5), the DJ8 removed the Riverine JUONS topic from discussion at the 6 Jul 07 Joint Coordination Board. The JS J3 directed JFCOM to develop a joint in-lieu-of solution and get the global force management process moving, Global Force

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Management Board projected for 6 Sep 07. Updated response to RFF 656 provided to MNF-I to provide additional information regarding this planning. .

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response. (b)(6) (DASD) office distributed to coalition representatives MNC-I CG letter of need with MNF-I CG concurrence and Riverine briefing. Message of need sent by OSD sent to possible Coalition partners, 11 July

Iraqi boat manufacturer HEESCO will produce boats(6-9mon) or repair/upgrade boats.(60-90 days) MND-B will be first customer. Boat design and FAB repair are first order followed by repainting of Coast Guard transfers and then actual production. Intent is production of two watercraft to confirm capabilities then additional based on mission load. Big concern is that ISF forces are not going to local companies to get this type of specialty equipment and MOD failure to accept an already produced in country produced sea vessel is hurting this company.

Iraqi Navy capabilities are available, Iraqi Navy Commander has concurred and will release the six FABs, MOU is with him for signature. Engine requisition and boat utilization will be by MND-B, engine PR&C submitted, Contracting.

FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. DA LNO has located 11 Coast Guard watercraft, **6 LNT 19 AUG.**

Feasibility of Transportation Corps Medium Boat or Harbormaster Detachments serving as watercraft operators, maintainers and trainers via RFF being researched. Will be submitted if Navy/Joint Staff does not provide a solution. Units are qualified to operate the watercraft but lack watercraft, sufficient weapon systems, and sufficient unit level maintenance capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research options to provide the capability within funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints. Project Officer prepared to assist MNDs with commercial requests. See Riverine Research and Actions Folder, Deputy folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

1.4a

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1.4a

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to MNF-I RFIs.

**KEY DATES:** LADs between 18 NOV and 7 DEC 07.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Request For Forces MNC-I # (RFF) 146 Executive Police Advisors (**New**).

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests a total of five Executive Police Advisors to provide expertise in senior law enforcement planning, policy, and political skill. MNC-I requires the skill in law enforcement administration and political awareness that only a seasoned Executive Police Advisor can provide to the senior leadership of the Corps. This RFF requests a senior Executive Police advisor for the Multinational Corps and Multinational Division Commanders. The Corps and Division Commanders have incredible police and training skills within the Military Police leaders and staff officers of the Corps, but as military professionals may not have the breadth of knowledge that a Chief of Police, Police Superintendent, or Federal Deputy Director may possess. As the Coalition reestablishes the rule of law at all levels, these senior Executive Police Advisors will be a vital element in establishing the supervisory and national level police expertise, and the interface with political leaders. More junior police will lack the law enforcement administration experience to assist the Iraqi government at the highest levels. Experienced senior police executives will be able to coach senior Iraqi police as well as to advise the Corps and Division Commanders. This RFF is based on a recommendation for this capability by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. To **MNF-I 6 AUG 07**.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 15 DEC 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** REQUEST FOR FORCES MNC-I #147 Executive Summary for RFF Engineer Request For Baghdad Utilities. (**New**)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF includes: 1 X Command and Control Element, 1 X Oil Pipeline Repair Capability, 1 X Power Line Repair Capability to repair of the national infrastructure of Baghdad and Iraq. This RFF addresses the validation of the assets required to repair critical infrastructure facilitating the deliberate rebuilding of GOI capacity to provide quality of life to its citizens. Contractors have been unreliable in conducting repairs to the oil pipeline and power line infrastructure. This capability does not currently exist in theater and is a new requirement. Providing the required capability will greatly enhance Coalition Forces' efforts to build and improve GOI capacity. Focusing on essential services and sustainable economic development is inextricably linked to providing leverage in political efforts. To **MNF-I 6 AUG 07**.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LAD 15 DEC 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**5. TOPIC:** MNCI Request for Forces # 143 - Engineer Assets for MND-C. (**New**)

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Discussion: This RFF includes: 1 X Engineer Brigade Headquarters, 2 X Multifunctional Engineer Battalion Headquarters, 2 X Clearance Companies, 1 X Engineer Support Company, 1 X Survey and Design Detachment, 1 X Concrete Section, 1 X Horizontal Construction Company, and 1 X Vertical Construction Company to support combat and construction operations in Multi-National Division Center Area of Operations. This RFF requests the validation of the Echelon Above Division (EAD) engineer assets required to support combat and construction operations in the MND-C AO. Planning assumptions during the initial support estimate for surge operations included a timeline that predicted surge operations to be complete by 1 August 2007. This assumption has not been validated, and MND-C cannot sustain combat operations without appropriate EAD engineer assets in line with doctrine and those allocated to other Multi-National Divisions. Assets assigned to the Corps Engineer Brigade are tasked at capacity, and utilization rates are not predicted to decrease in the next 12 months. To maintain the momentum and tempo of current operations, assets within the Iraqi theater cannot be reallocated to support MND-C. **To MNF-I 6 AUG 07.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs as required.

**KEY DATES:** LADs from 15-30 SEP 07.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

1.4a

**NEXT ACTION:** Follow staffing progress through CENTCOM.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 1 OCT 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** REQUEST FOR FORCES (RFF) MNC-I #145 for Exchange of Security Force (SECFOR) Battalions. (New)

**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I requires adjustment of SECFOR battalions to maximize deployment time and utilization of SECFOR trained units. It is MNC-I's understanding that 1-321 FA has a Warning Order (WARNORD) to deploy as a SECFOR battalion. MNC-I desires to deploy 1-321 FA to join 1/82<sup>nd</sup> ABN Theater Security Brigade (TSB),

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and replace 1-9 FA as part of that brigade. 1-321 FA would remain with 1/82<sup>nd</sup> ABN as part of the TSB until the TSB BOGs 8 SEP 08. This exchange of forces would allow 1-9 FA to be reattached to 2/3 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and BOG out with 2/3 BCT and to be utilized as a full spectrum battalion. This exchange of units allows greater continuity of effort within MNC-I. A unit doing a SECFOR mission is replaced by a SECFOR trained unit. Brigade units from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and the 3<sup>d</sup> Infantry Division are reunited in MND-C battlespace, and these BCT units are able to redeploy to home station together. **To MNF-I 7 AUG 07**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 20 OCT 07.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**8. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) 780 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the development and deployment of Combat Tracking Dogs to the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). CTD are an emerging capability within the Department of Defense and exist at the moment only within the United States Marine Corps. A training program must be initiated to provide a renewable, enduring base for CTD until the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability will provide a vital resource for Coalition Forces deployed theater wide. Currently there are

[REDACTED] 1.4a

in the ITO, with only [REDACTED] 1.4a in the DOD inventory. MNC-I requires the fielding of [REDACTED] 1.4a CTD Teams for a total of [REDACTED] 1.4a teams. Transmitted to Force 23 MAY 07.

Transmitted to CENTCOM 2 JUN 07. Released from CENTCOM 3 Jul 07. JUONS in-staffing at MNC-I. Anticipate ONS Board 8 Jul 07 then forward to MNF-I 10 Jul 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI as required, assist with JUONS as required. Sourcing recommendation sent to JS; recommend closing staffing and CENTCOM work towards contracting until Services develop capability. "USMC has 8 in theater. CENTCOM could redirect as needed." **JUONS with CENTCOM Chief of Staff for approval and release.**

**KEY DATES:** LAD 30 SEP 07

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #133 For 1 X Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Troop ([REDACTED] 1.4a PAX) to support MNC-I Asymmetric Warfare Operations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This is a request to formalize an existing and recurring requirement for forces in Iraq, not an addition of forces. AWG is internally sourced and conducts internal rotations. [REDACTED] 1.4a, 1.4g

[REDACTED] 1.4a, 1.4g

[REDACTED] 1.4a, 1.4g

Transmitted to Force 22 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 30 MAY 07. Draft GENADMIN returned to CENTCOM from staffing. Released from CENTCOM as RFF 777.


**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI's as appropriate.

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**KEY DATES:** No LAD: Ongoing requirement sourced by internal rotations.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



1.4b, 1.4d

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**11. TOPIC:** GFMAP 648 MoD 3 (IAG) (No Change)

**Discussion:** This RFF requests 1 X Division MiTT to support 11<sup>th</sup> IA Division, adds medics for the Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) and LOG BN MTTs. It adds EOD manning and MP manning for division MiTTs. It also adds 4 X BTTs to support current Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) force structure. Total increase of [redacted] X Pax. To CENTCOM 22 FEB 07. Release to Joint Staff and renamed GFMAP 648 Mod 3. TGT SDOB TBD. JFCOM Sourcing RFF Rollup 15 MAY shows Partial Solution Submitted [redacted] PAX) with Non-concur on remaining capability, TGT SDOB 17 MAY 07. In SDOB for 25 MAY. Have submitted RFI through MNF-I requesting status on remaining [redacted] PAX of the RFF. [redacted] in EXORD Mod 22. P4 Memo submitted by BG Pittard through GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon requesting assistance. AO Force Sourcing SVTC slides 19 Jun 07 state "Partial solution ordered ([redacted] PAX). Continue staffing remaining PAX (5 MiTTs). TGT SDOB: 26 JUL 07." Force Provider non-Concurs to remaining 5 MiTTs. Joint Staff recommends that RFF be closed.

**NEXT ACTION:** Have requested status through MNF-I. CENTCOM researching status of second P4 sent from GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon on this issue. No update at this date, no date of action forecast, although the RFF is still to remain open.

**KEY DATES:** None at this time.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**12. TOPIC:** GENADMIN 774 (RFF #MNC-I 130) Medical: Mental Health, Preventative Medicine, and Medical Logistics (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has [redacted] non-transformed Sustainment Brigades that provide daily care to the 164,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 (3) transformed Sustainment Brigades whose MTOEs do not contain Mental Health, Preventive Medicine and Medical Logistics are scheduled to deploy. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. Total of [redacted] Personnel. Transmitted to Force for staffing 24 MAR 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 5 APR 07.

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Presentation had been anticipated to ADM Fallon 8 MAY 07. GENADMIN 744 MNF-I Health SVC Augmentation released 12 JUN 07

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFIs.

**KEY DATES:** Various LADs.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**13. TOPIC:** FY 08 SECFOR ( No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** CC published modification 767 to the FY08 requirements submission establishing 2 BDE level URFs for MNC-I SECFOR requirements (URFs 13258, 13259). The intent is to utilize unit level sourcing at the BCT level for SECFOR across the CENTCOM AOR. ARNG has nominated 76<sup>th</sup> IBCT to source URF 13258 and 39<sup>th</sup> BCT to source URF 13259. These requirements are published in the JS GFMAP MOD 1. Planned MOB dates are 12 DEC 07 for 76<sup>th</sup> BCT and 27 DEC 07 for 39<sup>th</sup> BCT. Upcoming events requiring coordination are; Leader's Recon, Command and Control matrix, and TPE available by unit.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue Coordination with ALCON.

**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**14. TOPIC:** 07-09 SECFOR Requirements (Updated)

**DISCUSSION:** The 58TH AND 116TH BCTS were scheduled to mobilize based on a 60 day post mobilization training model. MOB dates were planned based on this model while 89 days are required for training. FORSCOM initiated a LAD shift request from 18 AUG to 30 AUG for C/3-116 IN which backfills 1041 EN. SECDEF approved a BOG extension for 1041 EN to 29 SEP 07 creating a 30 day LAD to BOG window. MNC-I will execute a 30 day compressed RSOI for this transition.

**NEXT ACTION:** Board 1041 EN

**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**15. TOPIC:** Request For Forces (RFF) MNC-I RFF #133 Multiple Requirement from 4<sup>TH</sup> ID (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Screening complete through staff on items requested by 4<sup>th</sup> ID. Memorandum for CG 4<sup>th</sup> ID signed by CG MNC-I and transmitted. Two potential items remain for an RFF; one area (Engineers) would be unlikely to be filled, the other (CA) is also unlikely fill.

**NEXT ACTION:** C7 in contact with 4<sup>th</sup> ID C7 planner.

**KEY DATES:** LAD of 1 DEC 07 for most elements.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**16. TOPIC:** ITO Finance Group C2 (no change)

**DISCUSSION:** Currently, the finance battalions in Iraq fall under the 13 Finance Group in Kuwait which falls under the 377<sup>th</sup> TSC, which falls under ARCENT, which falls under CENTCOM. Under the new Sustainment doctrine FM Ops, it falls in under the SB SPO which falls under the ESC. If the ESC is to take on this new relationship then CENTCOM needs to issue a FRAGO because it governs ARCENT and all the

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subordinate entities. (b)(3), (b)(6) brought issue to ARCENT attention apx 20 Jul with neg response. FRAGO chopped and returned from MNC-I. To be released from ARCENT to CENTOM week of 6 Aug.

**NEXT ACTION:** Bring to CENTCOM's attention at the next C3G3 SVTC.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**17. TOPIC:** 1.4a (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Upcoming conference schedule. Received the CC FY 09 PLANORD 19 JUL 07. Received DRAFT JS PLANORD 24 JUL 07. WFF coordinating CC conference. Met with C3 27 JUL and COS 30 JUL. BCT Realignment conference in progress. Travel plans in progress for FY09 Requirements Conference.

**NEXT ACTION:** Attend the FY 09 Requirements Conference in Qatar.

**KEY DATES:**

6-10 AUG 07	BCT Realignment Conf	Ft McPherson, GA
13-24 AUG 07	CC FY 09 Rqmts AO Conf	Al Salayah, Qatar
24-28 SEP 07	CC FY 09 Rqmts GO/FO Conf	MacDill AFB, Tampa
15-26 OCT 07	CC FY 08 Force Flow Conf	Scott AFB, IL

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**18. TOPIC:** RFF 712, 4 x MP CO (CS) RFF (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 4 additional MP (CS) COs to support the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) development program. The CG, MNF-I directed an expanded IPS development program and designated 2006 as "The Year of the Police" which represented a tremendous capacity surge in which the first PTTs were fielded in Mar - Apr 06. RFF will provide increased PTT capability and will fill the total PTT requirement to over 90% (~215 of 235 PTTs). RFF submitted to MNF-I on 9 Dec 06. MNC-I Chop on MNF-I staffing provided 16 Dec 06. RFF submitted to CENTCOM on 24 Dec 06. CENTCOM draft MOD 1 to RFF 697 for the 4 MP COs sent out for chop. S: 3 Jan 07. Rolled into RFF 712 with six other MP Cos. Joint Staffing 19 JAN 07. Four new requirement companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12, 13, and Draft 14. LADs of 15 JUL and 1 SEP 07. Six ILO companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12 and 13. Various LADs.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor Joint staffing and provide any requested input.

**KEY DATES:** Requested LAD of 15 Jul 07.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**19. TOPIC:** RFF 695 for 316TH ESC (POC Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** 316th ESC RFF requests 1.4a pax to provide staff augmentation, ISF support, and distribution management capability to this USAR unit that will deploy under a new Modular MTOE of 1.4a pax; reduction of 1.4a compared to the 13th SCE, and 1.4a compared to 3rd COSCOM. Additional personnel will enable 316th ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics support and sustainment operations across the ITO. Reduced manning based on transformation to Single Log C2 with 1st Theater Support Command (TSC) assuming portions of overall

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theater sustainment mission from the ESC. Timeline for 1st TSC to assume Single Log C2 is a minimum of 6 months into the 316th ESC rotation (~Jan 08). CENTCOM RFF 695 released 9 Nov 06. Sourced in 07-09 EXORD Mod 7. CENTCOM also states in EXORD that this enduring request will be sourced after 07-09 via a JMD. Since then, CCJ1 And CCJ4 have stated via e-mail that the JMD is not the correct method of sourcing this requirement and do not endorse the creation of a JMD to support this requirement. MNC-I C4 is discussing with XVIII ABN Corps to discuss a way ahead and will provide a recommendation.

**NEXT ACTION:**

- Awaiting recommendation from MNC-I C4 and results of XVIII ABN Corps discussions

**KEY DATES:**

- 15 Jul 07: LAD for 316th ESC Personnel

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**20. TOPIC:** RFF 667 MoD 1, Increase in Forces for TF [redacted] 1.4a (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** (Modification initially submitted for [redacted] 1.4a pax. Restudy of the issues resulted in a change to [redacted] 1.4a pax. Restaffing through MNC-I.) This Modification to RFF 667 requests [redacted] 1.4a additional personnel to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and information processing and analysis in support of technology developed aviation assets. Identified shortages in critical skills sets render headquarters unable to process volumes of data previously unforecast. Currently TF [redacted] 1.4a is operating only five of the twenty four Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms projected for deployment within the next six months. The [redacted] 1.4a identified personnel will enable TF [redacted] 1.4a to conduct 24 hour operations and process technical information to assist in defeating the IED threat. Released to Joint Staff 12 FEB 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18. (Update) Sourcing of ARST element sourced by the USAF has raised concerns of not being able to meet their Joint Staff assigned LAD of 24 August 07. This will create a significant gap of capability for TF [redacted] 1.4a and severely limit its analytical element if these Pax do not meet LAD.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor sourcing from USAF to ensure Pax meet assigned LAD in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18. (URF 10220)

**KEY DATES:** 24 August 07 is currently assigned LAD.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**21. TOPIC:** RFF 733 for 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) to make up for an identified shortfall in MND-B and MND-N. Released to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Chops due back to JS: 11 APR 07. Sourced OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor progress of staffing within Joint Staff.

**KEY DATES:** LAD for MND-B: 11 AUG 08. LAD for MND-N: 12 MAY 08.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**22. TOPIC:** RFF742: Military History Detachments (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 3 X Military History Detachments (total 9 Pax) to fill identified shortfalls within the Corps. Units without Military History detachment

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coverage will be unable to contribute to Lessons Learned or to the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Released to CENTCOM 13 FEB 07. Released by CENTCOM to Joint Staffing 12 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18. Have requested status of 3<sup>rd</sup> team, sourced by USN.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor arrival of units.

**KEY DATES:** LAD is 31 AUG 07.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**23. TOPIC:** RFF 735 Requests for Optometry Support (No Change) *Monitor Only*  
**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 11 Optometrists that provide daily care to the 133,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 this will be down to 2 Optometrists to provide daily care to all U.S. personnel. The Sustainment Brigades currently in Iraq have organic Optometry teams. The Sustainment Brigades due in OIF 07-09 have undergone transformation and no longer have Optometry Teams. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. The one and only Optometry team scheduled to arrive for OIF 07-09 cannot support all 133,000 U.S. personnel. Transmitted to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF EXORD 07-09 Mod 17.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor staffing through DEPOD.

**KEY DATES:** LADs: 1 JUN 07; 27 JUN 07; 14 JUL 07

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**24. TOPIC:** REQUEST FOR FORCES MNC-I #144 For Replacement Division Headquarters for Multinational Division Center (MND-C). (NEW)

**DISCUSSION:** It is conceivable that MNC-I will sustain the current level of brigade combat teams through the summer of 2009. In addition to maintaining the current set of forces, Multinational Division-Center (MND-C) will assume responsibility for the current Multinational Division-Central South (MND-CS) on or about 1 MAY 08, increasing the division's geographical coverage area by at least one seventh (fourteen percent). In view of these facts, MNC-I believes it is necessary to request a replacement of the current Multinational Division-Center (MND-C) Division Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, in order to maintain the same level of command and span of control. As the headquarters is replaced, the package of enablers for the division must also be replaced. LAD for this replacement division headquarters is 12 MAY 08.

**NEXT ACTION:** Complete MNC-I Staffing

**KEY DATES:** LADS: 12 MAY 08

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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