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## MNC-I C3 PLANS AND POLICY NOTES (#35)

As of 30 August 2007

### WARPLANS:

**1. TOPIC:** Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. Operations Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, Operation Marne Torch in Arab Jabour, Operation Hardh Al-Amin in the Lake Thar Thar region and Operations Dragon Fire and Gates of Freedom in the Rashid and Mansour Security Districts respectively have already made significant strides in securing the Iraqi populace and reducing AQI and Shia extremists freedom of movement.

MNC-I remains on the offensive with MND-B conducting Operations Dragon Hammer and Dragon Anvil clearing and defeating AQIZ in Rashid and Arab Jabour and Operation Iron Blitz to clearing West of Taji. MND-N will continue to attack AQI in the Diyala River Valley with the continuation of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, and prevent them from gaining sanctuary elsewhere by defeating AQI in the Kirkuk/Tuz area as part of Operation Bronco Ripper. MND-C continues to clear the Southern Baghdad Belts with Operations Avalanche, Operation Husky, and Operation Marne Torch II. MNF-W continues to clear remaining AQI elements in MNF-W with Operation Black Diamond in Karmah, and Operation Pegasus Bridge along their Eastern Boundary, and prepares Fallujah for IP control with Operation Alljah.

While the focus of plus-up forces is Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I continues to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the breadth of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps' main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are currently the Corps' top priorities for corps assets followed by the Arab Jabour region of MND-C. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF has traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**2. TOPIC:** MNC-I Shia Engagement Strategy (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Plans **continues to evolve** a comprehensive Shia engagement strategy that encompasses the spectrum of Shia entities: militias, irreconcilables, as well as those favorable to CF/ GOI. This strategy will provide clarity for MSCs in their lethal and nonlethal engagement with the Shia nested within an integrated Corps strategy.

**NEXT ACTION:** Mission received from CG 06 Aug 07; Mission Analysis briefed to CG & additional planning guidance received 16 Aug; **COA Development Azimuth Check and further guidance received from CG 23 Aug. Next briefing to CG 27 Aug 07.**

**KEY DATES:** 27 Aug IPR to CG.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**3. TOPIC:** Conducting significant operations against EFP and Advanced Weapon Networks (New)

**DISCUSSION:** Following Commander's guidance, planning is in progress to conduct strike operations against the networks responsible for the ingress, distribution and use of EFPs and Advanced Weapons against CF within Iraq. A mission analysis has been prepared which seeks further guidance from the Commander.

**NEXT ACTION:** Brief initial mission analysis to the CG on 30 Aug and request guidance.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**4. TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** AQI is expected to attempt a surge in activities during the latter half of August and the first half of September as part of a historical pattern associated with Ramadan, and as an attempt to influence CF governments and publics in advance of GEN Petraeus's September Assessment to Congress.

MNC-I conducts focused operations to disrupt or prevent AQI from carrying out planned attacks. The term "Phantom Strike" which previously referred specifically to MNC-I operations against networks emplacing deep buried IEDs, has been expanded to an umbrella term for all operations which disrupt AQI and JAM Special Group's ability to conduct operations from 15 August to 15 September. While Clear, Contain, and Control efforts continue, Phantom Strike is characterized by an increase of raids and other short term operations designed to disrupt extremist networks during this critical timeframe. Operations may target AQI or JAM SG IED networks, Sanctuary/Staging Areas, HVIs, or other targets which will disrupt AQI/JAM SG's ability to increase their level of attacks prior to Ramadan.

MSCs briefed their concepts for Phantom Strike to the MNC-I Commander on 3 August during the Commander's conference. MNC-I will prioritize Corps level enabler support to these operations, and assist in coordinating operations across or adjacent to MSC boundaries.

WAY AHEAD: C3 FUOPS coordinates with the MSCs to synchronize the timing and assist in any required boundary changes for Phantom Strike Objectives which cross or are adjacent to MSC boundaries.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**5. TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Hammer (Clear Diwaniya) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Operation PHANTOM HAMMER is a four-phased operation designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to Temporary Area of Operations Thunderbird IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. Tentatively, the forces to be employed in this operation include the equivalent of 1.4a one US Infantry Battalion, two IA Battalions from 8IA DIV, and corps enablers. Phase II, set the conditions, will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will clear Diwaniya north of the Hilla River. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya,

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returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities. BPT execute Phase III, Stage A NET 22 September 2007.

**WAY AHEAD:** MNC-I CG visits MND-CS on 1 September. Phantom Hammer will be a topic in the CG's planner huddle on 30 August. PLANORD ready for release when C3 deems conditions are set. Operation is BPT; will take place when conditions are set.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**6. TOPIC:** Transition of IA Divisions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The transition of the ten IA Divisions (developed under the COIN force program) to Iraqi Security Forces control remains at 80% complete:

- MNC-I-IGFC Diyala Operations Command TOA MOU staffing complete. IGFC staff concurs with document. MOU to be signed by CGs MNC-I and IGFC on 04 Sep 07. MNC-I battlespace management FRAGO hung for staffing.

**NEXT ACTIONS:** Publish FRAGO. Conduct DOC TOA Ceremony at the DOC 041400-1500D Sep 07.

- 7IA TOA programmed for 01 Nov 07. MNC-I FRAGO directing 7IA TOA to IGFC published 02 Aug 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Staff draft MOU and prepare battlespace management FRAGO.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** Request to GOI to employ 34<sup>th</sup> BDE (Peshmerga) ISO MND-N ops (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** CG MNF-I's letter to the PM GoI requesting formal GOI-KRG approval to employ the 34<sup>th</sup> BDE in support of MND-N operations in vicinity of the Diyala River Valley (DRV) has been submitted. The concept for 34<sup>th</sup> BDE is to conduct limited operations, under command of 5IA Div, from four (4) battalion-sized operating bases to the north of the DRV. These forces will augment and capitalize on recent MNC-I achievements.

**NEXT ACTION:** Awaiting response from GoI.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**8. TOPIC:** Establishment of Judicial Complexes (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** During the conduct of the MNC-I OPORD 07-01 Brief, the CG MNC-I directed the MNC-I SJA to assume responsibility for the establishment of safe, secure judicial complexes throughout Iraq, modeled after the Rule of Law Complex in the Rusafa District of Baghdad. Additionally, the CG MNC-I provided guidance to establish the first site in the city of Ramadi. Initial planning began with the development of a Concept Brief, which was briefed to the MNC-I C3. Upon briefing the C3, the MNC-I SJA section published WARNO 008 to provide notice to the major subordinate commands about this initiative and to assemble the Corps Judicial Complex Working Group (JCWG). Members of the JCWG include representatives from the Corps SJA, C4, C6, C7, C8, C9, and AT-FP sections as well as a representative from the Joint Contracting Command.

- On 12 Aug, the SJA Rule of Law attorney accompanied a group consisting of DoS, GRD, LAOTF, and MNF-I personnel to Ramadi to visit proposed sites for the Ramadi Judicial Complex. The short-term solution, approved by Chief Judge Medhat of the

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Higher Juridical Council, is to renovate the Ramadi Government Center to house Anbar Criminal Court (ACC) #18. That way, the ACC can begin trying terrorism cases arising within Anbar Province. The long-term solution is to locate a Judicial Complex on FOB Blue Diamond.

**NEXT ACTION:** The next JCWG meeting is scheduled for Sunday, 18 Aug @ 1600 in the SJA Conference Room

**KEY DATES:**

18 August – JCWG Meeting

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Elections (Update) -- **ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED** --

**DISCUSSION:** On 21 August, (b)(6) advisor to the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) gave a briefing on lessons learned from the 2005 electoral process in Iraq. Topics included command and control, security, logistics, communications, and areas of special interest. Notes are still being compiled and will be posted, along with slides from the presentation, on the MNC-I NIPR site, C3,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ELECTIONS. They will also be posted on the MNC-I Elections web portal, managed by (b)(6)

On 26 June 2007, the Elections Working Group reviewed the following items:

**Provincial Powers Law:** This legislation has not progressed beyond the second reading. USM-I believes that there are two different drafts of this legislation, implying that it still being discussed in committee. This legislation is not required prior to provincial elections.

**Elections Law:** This legislation has not been drafted and is needed prior to Provincial Elections. It will provide the legal framework for Provincial Elections in Iraq. There has been a suggestion that the 2005 Elections Law will be redrafted; USM-I cannot confirm at this time. USM-I is pushing for the Elections Law to be passed by the Council of Representatives by 15 September 2007.

IHEC received training on scope of duties by UNAMI and the Indian Electoral Commission over the past two weeks. The next step for the IHEC is to confirm the heads of the 19 Governmental Electoral Offices (GEO) (one per province and two in Baghdad). The process for this is that each Governor submits 5 candidates for the post of Director in their Province, and the IHEC will choose the most qualified candidate. Following the selection of the Directors of the 19 GEO, the IHEC will begin to set the conditions for voter registration. Voter registration will be covered in future Elections updates.

Provincial elections cannot proceed until all related legislation is resolved, making elections unlikely before February 2008. Provincial elections have the potential to pull more Sunnis into the political process and improve governance in some provinces, such as Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Ninewa. When the elections occur, it is likely that politically organized Sunni Arabs and Sadrists, neither of whom participated in the last

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round of provincial elections, are positioned to make significant gains, however, Sunni insurgents who oppose elections will likely intimidate neutral or pro-GOI Sunnis from going to the polls. Elections by themselves will not reduce violence; the critical factor in the reduction of sectarian violence continues to be improving the security conditions for the citizens of Iraq.

Presently, sub-provincial elections cannot legally occur; if sub-provincial elections are held, perhaps in a city or a district, the "elected officials" would have no legal status and control neither levers of legitimate power nor a legal financial stream. The concept of a "tribal council", whereby leaders of several tribes might come together to form an informal council, is encouraged as a stabilizing force to augment and support the efforts of the Provincial Governors and the legitimate Provincial Council, as long as it does not attempt to usurp or wrest legitimate power away from the Provincial Governor.

A copy of the Provincial Powers draft legislation posted on the C3 plans and policy NIPR homepage, under (b)(3), (b)(6) ELECTIONS.

**-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --**

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**10. TOPIC:** Major Cultural / Religious Events (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:**

1 Ramadan 1428 or 13 Sep 2007: Beginning of the month of fasting  
Ramadan is the time of the lunar year when Muslims actively practice fasting during the daylight hours. Fasting is one of the 5 pillars of Islam (the others are praying 5 times a day, partaking in the Hajj (holy pilgrimage), giving alms to the poor, and declaring that Allah is the one true God and that Muhammad is his prophet). The period just preceding Ramadan tends to have more enemy activity, and the time of Ramadan generally has less activity during the day, since Muslims are not supposed to eat or drink. It is said that any Muslim who is martyred (killed) during Ramadan is assured to go to heaven, so anticipate a greater than usual amount of activity in the hours of darkness. Several times in the month of Ramadan there are days of particular importance: The first four important days are called the "Nights of Glory and Power"; Muslims don't know exactly which day the Quran was revealed to Muhammad, but they believe it was one of the odd numbered days in the last third of Ramadan. This year they fall on 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 October 2007. On this day, every act that man does is magnified a thousand-fold. So, to be sure they celebrate the right day, most Muslims pray all night long on each of those nights. After the month of fasting is complete, Muslims celebrate what is known as "Eid al Fitr" or the "festival of breaking the fast". During this time, Muslims wear their best clothing and cover their houses in the finest decorations to celebrate breaking their month-long daylight fast.

The following lists the months of the Lunar Calendar for 1428-9 (2007-8):

<u>Lunar Month</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Gregorian Month</u>
1 Shaban 1428	To Distribute	14 August 2007

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1 Ramadan 1428	Parched Thirst	13 September 2007
1 Shawwal 1428	Vigorous	13 October 2007
1 <b>DHUAL QADA</b> 1428	Month of Rest	11 November 2007
1 <b>DHUAL HAJJ</b> 1428	Month of Hajj	11 December 2007
1 <b>MUHARRAM</b> 1429	Forbidden	10 January 2008
1 Safar 1429	Empty	9 February 2008
1 Rabi I 1429	First Spring	9 March 2008
1 Rabi II 1429	Second Spring	8 April 2008
1 Jumada I 1429	First Freeze	8 May 2008
1 Jumada II 1429	Second Freeze	7 June 2008
1 <b>RAJAB</b> 1429	To Respect	7 July 2008

\* Muhammad decreed the 4 months in **GOTHIC TEXT** as holy months. During holy months, it is forbidden for good Muslims to wage war or fight.

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS:** Moderate threat; large crowds may entice insurgents to attempt a high-profile attack.

**WAY AHEAD:** Presented Ramadan briefing to LTG Odierno on 16 August 2007. MNC-I Ramadan FRAGO finished staffing 19 August 2007; will be released to MNC-I on 22 August 2007.

**POC:**

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**11. TOPIC:** Coalition Participation (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The following is a list of recent and anticipated significant changes in the coalition during the remainder of 2007.

1.4b, 1.4d

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1.4b, 1.4d

**POC:**

For issues regarding the

1.4b, 1.4d

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**12. TOPIC:** Base Consolidation and Closure (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** in the ongoing efforts to turn over battle space to the ISF, MSC closes or transfers bases to a GOI approved receiver (MOD, MOI, MOF) under a “condition based” approach. Base transfer / closures are a conditions based approach driven by three major considerations: stability in the AO, ISF ability/capability to assume & hold battle space, and funding for base consolidation. The current methodology is bottom-up driven with MSC nominating bases for transfer / closure, gaining approval, and following a 100 day notional timeline, which serves as a guide to accomplish necessary steps in the transfer / closure process.

**Next Action:** All base transfers/closure nominations have to be approved by CG. No further action required for 3ID CAB at Stryker, and 1.4b, 1.4d + BNs at Camp Delta and 2/3 HBCT (Brigade #20) at LSAA, Taji, Liberty, Falcon, and Kalsu.

**Future Actions:** IZ Transition is back on the table which entails the consolidation of MNF-I presence in the IZ from 13 to 3 locations; with two being MND-B bases (Union III and Prosperity). The transition also requires the transfer of Base Union I (Oct08), Freedom Rest (Jul08), the relocation of CSH to VBC (Sep08) and the relocation of GRD to VBC (June08). As part of the consolidation, MND-B will have to relocate from Union III NLT Jan 08 and transfer the base to JASG, which begins construction and renovations to relocate MNF-I FWD by Oct 08. MND-B is currently assessing capacity

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at Prosperity to absorb forces from Union III. The Executive Base Management Board with COS has been suspended until further notice. Base Working Group meetings are conducted twice a month. As part of future basing plans, we are conducting analysis of current capacity at long term COB IOT build required additional capacity to support RIP/TOA and consolidation efforts.

**Bases transferring / closing in the next:**

**30 days:** Basrah Palace / MND-SE (14AUG07)

**60 days:** 0

**90 days:** Cedar II /13<sup>th</sup> SC-E (31 OCT 07)

**Key dates:** Next BMWG 11 AUG 07 @ Phantom CR / 1300

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**13. TOPIC:** IA Legal Advisor Partnership Program (IALAPP) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The MNC-I OSJA IALAPP stated priorities are: (1) Oversee IGFC Legal Advisor training; (2) Provide assistance in implementation of revised IA military justice system; (3) Encourage centralized IGFC Detainee procedures and policies; and (4) Coordinate providing equipment, materials, and training to increase effectiveness of IA legal advisors.

**NEXT ACTION:** Ongoing projects include:

- Continue training on IA ROE including an information paper, PowerPoint training slides, and ROE Cards;
- Working with MNSTC-I on formulating proper Detainee SOPs and policies;
- Currently working on agreements with DOJ, DOS, and GOI for all future Judicial Review Teams of investigative judges in MND-B, MND-N, and MNF-W, and working on internal MNC-I SOP for conducting the operations;
- Tracking status of IA military justice procedures that are awaiting publication so that the system can be fully implemented;
- BG Adnan Hamudi, IGFC Legal Advisor, as well as [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) IGFC Deputy Legal Advisor, now meeting on a biweekly basis with MNC-I OSJA IALAPP attorney;
- BG Adnan planning Legal Advisor Training in anticipation of publication of IA Military Justice System procedures; requested IALAPP attorney make presentation at the training.

**KEY DATES:** None.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**ISF:**

**1. TOPIC:** Transition of IA Divisions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The transition of the ten IA Divisions (developed under the COIN force program) to Iraqi Security Forces control remains at 80% complete:

MNC-I-IGFC Diyala Operations Command TOA MOU staffing complete. IGFC staff concurs with document. MOU to be signed by CGs MNC-I and IGFC on 04 Sep 07. MNC-I battlespace management FRAGO hung for staffing.

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**NEXT ACTIONS:** Publish FRAGO. Conduct DOC TOA Ceremony at the DOC 041400-1500D Sep 07.

7IA TOA programmed for 01 Nov 07. MNC-I FRAGO directing 7IA TOA to IGFC published 02 Aug 07. Staff draft MOU and prepare battlespace management FRAGO.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**2. TOPIC:** Build POE Capability - Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Current MNF-I planning efforts for border security include revising the current National Border Control Strategy-Iraq. MNF-I FRAGO (Securing the Borders Strategy) went out for staffing last week. The modification of the strategy serves to reinvigorate and refocus MNF-I's efforts with the GOI on borders enforcement. The strategy will serve as the basis for all ongoing border planning efforts to include interdicting the flow of foreign fighters, building POE capability and seaport / airport strategy. MNC-I FRAGO (Reinforcement of key Ports of Entry) went out for staffing this week. The FRAGO focuses efforts to establish a permanent presence at designated POEs IOT disrupt foreign terrorists and facilitators cross-border movement, illegal munitions smuggling and other nefarious cross-border activities. Additionally, the Corps continues to focus on building / enhancing POE capability in conjunction with MNF-I planning efforts. Current BAT / HIDE / VSAT systems that were deployed on 09 Aug are in place and operational ISO the Rabiya POE. This effort will continue with follow-on implementation of same systems out at the other major POE's.

**NEXT ACTION:**

- Publish Corps Frago Operation Silver Raven (Reinforcement of Key Ports of Entry)
- MNF-I publish modification to the National Border Control Strategy
- Continue Corps planning efforts to building POE capability

**KEY DATES:**

- TBA VTC with MNF-I STRATOPs to synch border planning efforts
- 06 Sep 07 Joint Border Enforcement Workgroup time/location TBA
- 10-12 Sep 07 (Tentative) Border Enforcement Conf with neighboring countries at the US Embassy (DHS Host).

**POCs:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Seaport Security (Update)

**DISCUSSION:**

MNF -I planning efforts for seaports began 29 Mar and included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports. Recent seaport conference at MNF-I, 24-25 Jul 07, identified significant gaps in coastal security coverage, both procedural and physical; it transpires that a 10km stretch at the southern end of the Shatt Al Arab Waterway (SAA) is currently not patrolled by Iraqi Navy, CG or CTF [redacted] 1.4a Leaders from the Iraqi Navy, Coast Guard and CF focused on the development of a Memorandum of Understanding for combined maritime operations. The DBE held a recent meeting at Tehran to discuss coastal security, especially Shat Al Arab. The Way ahead for planning includes setting up [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d Iraqi coast guard. LNO's between countries will help coordinate efforts to stop smuggling.

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**NEXT ACTION:**

-Continue to monitor actions / developments on Memorandum of Understanding

**KEY DATES:**

- 06 Sep 07: Joint Border Enforcement Workgroup location/time TBA

**POCs**

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** Seaport-Airport Transfer of Authority (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The supervision of seaports / airports now fall under the Mol / DBE effective 24 Jul 07. Key ministerial negotiations and administrative requirements associated with this action must now occur to facilitate / complete the transfer process. IAW with the DBE, the MoT will now be required to officially notify the current port leadership / personnel on the transfer of authority. The DBE plans to relocate leaders of the militia dominated personnel in order to remove influence in the area. Completion of the transfer will further facilitate key planning tied to current efforts on seaport security and future border operations. Additionally, the transfer will further increase funding and sustainment requirements for the DBE and exacerbate existing support shortfalls if actions are not complete to ensure that the proper funding and other existing support packages remain in place as the transfer occurs.

**NEXT ACTION:**

-Continue to monitor actions / developments of seaport/airport strategy & seaport transfer of authority to MOI

**KEY DATES:**

- 06 Sep 07: Joint Border Enforcement Workgroup location/time TBA

-14 Sep MNF-I VTC on Airport Security

**POCs:**

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

**5. TOPIC:** IA Future FAQ Rotations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. MG Berragan concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. FUOPS currently working COA for replacement of 4<sup>th</sup> rotation with permanent IA units. 3/3/2 and 3/2/2 were told by IGFC that they will extend. No written order yet. MND-B prefers that the units rotate. Units scheduled to replace them are ORA 4.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to track

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**6. TOPIC:** IP Expansion Plan (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Training for the Abu Ghraib IP candidates shifted to Monday the 27<sup>th</sup> to begin their 4 week training program. Difficulties with FOB India prompted the shift. The main difficultie was an IA compound for the training. The life support for the recruits is being worked to include a food contract, sanitation contract fuel, electricity, bedding and

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sun shades. The use of FOB India increased the amount of candidates which can be trained at one time from 500 to 1000. This will allow the district to increase the police numbers in the district from 450 to 1738 in a 4 week period. The additional IPs will be used at existing stations, COPs and JSSs, while additional stations are built for the police by MNSTC-I

**NEXT ACTION:** MG Barrigan, BG Campbell and BG Abdullah of IGFC will travel to FOB India to ensure the use of the grounds for the IPs.

**KEY DATES:** 23 AUG, accountability formation of 1000 recruits at FOB India  
26 Aug, report for training at FOB India  
27 Aug, Training commences at FOB India

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** 11 IA HQ Force Generation and Deployment for FAQ (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** 11 IA is a PMI unit currently undergoing force generation at Old MOD. 18 AUG, MNC-I planning meeting was conducted to provide LTG Abud a draft concept brief that his staff can further develop into workable COAs with the help, as required, from BOCAT/MND-B. The concept needs be a time phased / conditions based approach. The arrival of soldiers for the 3/11<sup>th</sup> IA BDE is beginning now, plan to base at FOB Hope. Recommendation is that rotational units will be back filled by the following units: 4/1 IA BDE (propose re-flag as 2/11 IA BDE), 3/11<sup>th</sup> IA BDE (Force Generation), and X/6 IA BDE). Determination of real FOC will be based on CF assessments (ORA) with great input from ISF. We recommend that MOD approves re-flagging 4/1 IA BDE to 2/11 IA BDE NLT SEP07, and that 3/4/1 IA BN relocates to Baghdad and relieves 3/1/3 IA BN.

**NEXT ACTION:** 22 AUG07- LTG Abud/Staff provide guidance at the Baghdad Plans and OPS meeting.

**KEY DATES:**

JUN – AUG 07 staff training  
SEP 07 validation exercise (proposed)  
1 OCT 07 FOC

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**8. TOPIC:** Al Askariyah Brigade and 6-2 NP BDE (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** 1 AA BN is partnered with 6/2 (-) NP BDE in Samarra under command of the SOC. 6/2 and AA NP appear in high spirits, display an Iraqi level of proactiveness, and maintain an obvious presence. Operations are coordinated over unsecured single channel Motorola hand held radios. Operations consist of static checkpoints, small intelligence driven actions, and repairs to an unobserved blocking obstacle (berm) along the parameter of the city. SOC senior staff and NP BDE commanders believe three brigades are required for security and consider 6/2 remaining as a COA. MG Rashid's deputy reported the SOC consists of six senior staff officers and a conference room. CPATT LNO reported SOC radio base station is operational and in contact with IGFC. GOI support for Samarra operations is significantly lacking. C3 ISF requests CPATT report of GOI's ISF support of Samarra. Mol and MoD fails to place urgency for support. IAG will analyze the SOC's need for an operations advisory team. NPTTs assigned to AA and 6-2 BDEs stated the urgent need

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for a Backscatter to inspect large trucks entering the Mosque reconstruction site, and a VSAT is required for secure digital communication.

**NEXT ACTIONS:** Coordinate Backscatter and VSAT requisitions with IAG and MNCI Staff. Request and review GOI support from MNFI/MNSTCI.

**KEY DATES:**

2<sup>nd</sup> AA BN arrives Samarra not earlier than (NET) 15 September

3<sup>rd</sup> AA BN arrives NET 15 October

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** National Police (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** PM Maliki and MG Hussein (NP Commander) reportedly abolished initiatives of four specialty 'Unity' battalions; this is no longer true. PM Maliki directed the battalions continue training and assume Shia protection security mission. PM Maliki authorized two more special mission battalions to guard the Basrah palace. Both battalions are manned with trained NPs. Mol formally requested CPATT provide the equipment. LTG Dubik authorized a limited support. The battalions are as follows:

-Unity BN (935 on hand) secures Shia pilgrimage route between Baghdad and Karbala. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Seyafeah BN (750 Authorized) secures Shia pilgrimage route between Baghdad and Kut. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Al Hurriyah City Personal Security Detachment (700 authorized) provides security of Shia holy sites. Basic recruit training is ongoing.

-Karbala Province Emergency BN. (750-unconfirmed) Mission undisclosed.

-Basrah Palace Protection Battalions (two-350 man battalions)

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to monitor and report.

**KEY DATES:**

- 9 AUG: 203 shurta graduated Solidarity NPA

- 9 AUG: 402 shurta graduated Najaf Police Academy

- 18 OCT: 605 shurta graduate Solidarity NPA

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**10. TOPIC:** DBE Leadership and C2 (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE appointed a new National Director, MG Ali. MG Ali will be the ninth National Director within the past 24 months responsible for subordinate POE Directors of each Region. The assignment of the new POE National Director is a step in the right direction toward progress in accountability of regional POE directors and operating standards abroad. Key responsibilities for POE Directors include supervision of POE operations and assess performance of POE staff (to include personnel from other ministries at the POE) and report violations to the DBE chain of command for action.

**NEXT ACTION:**

Action complete. Disseminate to all Division ISF Cell & POE BTTs

**KEY DATES:**

None

**POCs:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**11. TOPIC:** National Police Budget Required (No Change)


**DISCUSSION:** From creation in 2005, the National Police do not have a budget in any form. The NP requires an independent budget recognized by Parliament as a Directory under MoI. The MoI budget contains no NP line items for funding or resources. MG Hussein requested an independent budget due to complete failure of MoI support. The question of successful salary funding is answered through MoI HRC filing hiring orders with the Ministry of Finance. To establish a NP budget the PM Council, Parliament, Central Ministry, and MOF must process and approve the budget based on the NP TOE. MG Hussein (NP CDR) stated he hand carried his written request for a budget line to the Minister of Interior and sent the Prime Minister a request for establishing the NP as a directorate under the MoI. NPTT HQ reports all assets, durable and expendable, are courtesy of CPATT, MNDs, and CPATT executed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to monitor and report.

**KEY DATES:** N/A

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**13. TOPIC:** Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The Iraqi Army is looking into the concept of putting their own cafeterias in to feed the soldiers. These cafeterias will be operated by cooks employed by the IA. This is a concept they are looking into so that they can eliminate food service contracts. One test facility is already constructed and operating. FMS HMMWVs are now arriving and being distributed. Those divisions who have used the Iraqi Army Code Out Procedure will receive replacements for unrepairable vehicles. Many of the divisions neglected using this process because it would diminish the amount of fuel and oil in the divisions allowance from MoO. The IA is still having trouble finding personnel to fill mechanic positions. Uniforms for the divisions are ready for pick up at the MoD warehouse in the IZ. The MoD does not have transportation arranged for delivery of uniforms, so the divisions will

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have to pick them up. The IA divisions in the north have not come to pick up uniforms yet, due to the distance of travel.

**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units and especially those supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** None

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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### **FORCE GENERATION:**

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#### **1. TOPIC:** MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requested Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W), directed CENTCOM to source internally. ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06, disapproved 8 JAN 07. Joint Capabilities Board review of JUONS had no significant results. The Riverine JUONS topic removed from Joint Coordination Board,. JFCOM developing an in-lieu-of solution and engaging the global force management process, Global Force Management Board projected for 6 Sep 07. USJFCOM Sourcing Recommendation is deployment of MESF (3 x Armored RHIBs) to augment RIVRON by providing dam security to relieve Riverine assets to support dedicated Riverine requirements. MNC-1 Concurred with comment that additional assets are needed but MNC-I need the ability to disperse RIVERON forces across its area of operation. **Removed from SDOB by Navy.**

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response. MND-SE no longer conducts river patrols.

Iraqi Navy Commander signed MOU, boats were identified and inspected. Six FABs will be repaired and configured at Umm Qasir Port in the Naval Transition Team area **or by the 10<sup>th</sup> Trans Bn in Kuwait.** Boat utilization will be by MND-B, **engine configuration/testing ongoing**, shipment NLT 4 Sep.

FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. DA LNO has located 11 Coast Guard watercraft, first six **shipped 28 Aug.**

RFF for Transportation Corps assets will RFF will be submitted if Joint Staff does not provide a solution.

Coast Guard in theater training capability identified, coordination continues.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research options to provide the capability. Finalize repair contracts and component delivery to the contractor for FAB repair. See Riverine Research and Actions Folder, Deputy folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:** 6 Sep, GFMB

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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1.4a

POC:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** MNCI Request for Forces # 143 - Engineer Assets for MND-C (Update)  
Discussion: This RFF includes: 1 X Engineer Brigade Headquarters, 2 X Multifunctional Engineer Battalion Headquarters, 2 X Clearance Companies, 1 X Engineer Support Company, 1 X Survey and Design Detachment, 1 X Concrete Section, 1 X Horizontal Construction Company, and 1 X Vertical Construction Company to support combat and construction operations in Multi-National Division Center Area of Operations. This RFF requests the validation of the Echelon Above Division (EAD) engineer assets required to support combat and construction operations in the MND-C AO. Planning assumptions during the initial support estimate for surge operations included a timeline that predicted surge operations to be complete by 1 August 2007. This assumption has not been validated, and MND-C cannot sustain combat operations without appropriate EAD engineer assets in line with doctrine and those allocated to other Multi-National Divisions. Assets assigned to the Corps Engineer Brigade are tasked at capacity, and utilization rates are not predicted to decrease in the next 12 months. To maintain the momentum and tempo of current operations, assets within the Iraqi theater cannot be reallocated to support MND-C. To MNF-I 6 AUG 07. Withdrawn from MNF-I 14 AUG 07. Two rewrites at C3 for approval. **Both rewrites, MNC-I RFF #149 and #150 were canceled 29 AUG 07.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond as required.

**KEY DATES:** LADs from 15-30 SEP 07.

POC:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) MNC-I #145 for Exchange of Security Force (SECFOR) Battalions (No Change)

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**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I requires adjustment of SECFOR battalions to maximize deployment time and utilization of SECFOR trained units. It is MNC-I's understanding that 1-321 FA has a Warning Order (WARNORD) to deploy as a SECFOR battalion. MNC-I desires to deploy 1-321 FA to join 1/82<sup>nd</sup> ABN Theater Security Brigade (TSB), and replace 1-9 FA as part of that brigade. 1-321 FA would remain with 1/82<sup>nd</sup> ABN as part of the TSB until the TSB BOGs 8 SEP 08. This exchange of forces would allow 1-9 FA to be reattached to 2/3 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and BOG out with 2/3 BCT and to be utilized as a full spectrum battalion. This exchange of units allows greater continuity of effort within MNC-I. A unit doing a SECFOR mission is replaced by a SECFOR trained unit. Brigade units from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and the 3<sup>d</sup> Infantry Division are reunited, and these BCT units are able to redeploy to home station together. To MNF-I 7 AUG 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 18 AUG 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 20 OCT 07.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1.4a

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**6. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I #144 for Replacement Division Headquarters for Multinational Division Center (MND-C) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** It is conceivable that MNC-I will sustain the current level of brigade combat teams through the summer of 2009. In addition to maintaining the current set of forces, Multinational Division-Center (MND-C) will assume responsibility for the current Multinational Division-Central South (MND-CS) on or about 1 MAY 08, increasing the division's geographical coverage area by at least one seventh (fourteen percent). In view of these facts, MNC-I believes it is necessary to request a replacement of the

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current Multinational Division-Center (MND-C) Division Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, in order to maintain the same level of command and span of control. As the headquarters is replaced, the package of enablers for the division must also be replaced. LAD for this replacement division headquarters is 12 MAY 08. Transmitted to MNF-I 14 AUG 07. **Continuing to respond to RFIs.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to requests from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LADS: 12 MAY 08

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**7. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I # (RFF) 146 Executive Police Advisors (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests a total of five Executive Police Advisors to provide expertise in senior law enforcement planning, policy, and political skill. MNC-I requires the skill in law enforcement administration and political awareness that only a seasoned Executive Police Advisor can provide to the senior leadership of the Corps. This RFF requests a senior Executive Police advisor for the Multinational Corps and Multinational Division Commanders. The Corps and Division Commanders have incredible police and training skills within the Military Police leaders and staff officers of the Corps, but as military professionals may not have the breadth of knowledge that a Chief of Police, Police Superintendent, or Federal Deputy Director may possess. As the Coalition reestablishes the rule of law at all levels, these senior Executive Police Advisors will be a vital element in establishing the supervisory and national level police expertise, and the interface with political leaders. More junior police will lack the law enforcement administration experience to assist the Iraqi government at the highest levels. Experienced senior police executives will be able to coach senior Iraqi police as well as to advise the Corps and Division Commanders. This RFF is based on a recommendation for this capability by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. To MNF-I 6 AUG 07. **Returned without action from MNF-I 13 AUG 07. PMO Lead.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 15 DEC 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**8. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I #147 Executive Summary for RFF Engineer Request for Baghdad Utilities (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF includes: 1 X Command and Control Element, 1 X Oil Pipeline Repair Capability, 1 X Power Line Repair Capability to repair of the national infrastructure of Baghdad and Iraq. This RFF addresses the validation of the assets required to repair critical infrastructure facilitating the deliberate rebuilding of GOI capacity to provide quality of life to its citizens. Contractors have been unreliable in conducting repairs to the oil pipeline and power line infrastructure. This capability does not currently exist in theater and is a new requirement. Providing the required capability will greatly enhance Coalition Forces' efforts to build and improve GOI capacity. Focusing on essential services and sustainable economic development is inextricably linked to providing leverage in political efforts. To MNF-I 6 AUG 07. **Returned without action from MNF-I 13 AUG 07. C7 Lead.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.

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**KEY DATES:** LAD 15 DEC 07

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #133 For 1 X Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Troop (1.4a) PAX) to support MNC-I Asymmetric Warfare Operations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This is a request to formalize an existing and recurring requirement for forces in Iraq, not an addition of forces. [redacted] 1.4a, 1.4g

[redacted] 1.4a, 1.4g

[redacted] 1.4a, 1.4g Transmitted to Force 22 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 30 MAY 07. Draft GENADMIN returned to CENTCOM from staffing. Released from CENTCOM as RFF 777. CENTCOM reported at 10 AUG FNF that Joint Staff was returning action to CENTCOM to be resubmitted in RFF format. **SDOB 30 AUG 07.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI's as appropriate.

**KEY DATES:** No LAD: Ongoing requirement sourced by internal rotations.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] 1.4a

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**11. TOPIC:** GFMAP 648 MoD 3 (IAG) (Update)

**Discussion:** This RFF requests 1 X Division MiTT to support 11<sup>th</sup> IA Division, adds medics for the Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) and LOG BN MTTs. It adds EOD manning and MP manning for division MiTTs. It also adds 4 X BTTs to support current Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) force structure. Total increase of (1.4a) X Pax. To CENTCOM 22 FEB 07. Release to Joint Staff and renamed GFMAP 648 Mod 3. TGT SDOB TBD. JFCOM Sourcing RFF Rollup 15 MAY shows Partial Solution Submitted ((1.4a) PAX) with Non-concur on remaining capability, TGT SDOB 17 MAY 07. In SDOB for 25 MAY. Have submitted RFI through MNF-I requesting status on

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remaining [1.4a] PAX of the RFF. [1.4a] in EXORD Mod 22. P4 Memo submitted by BG Pittard through GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon requesting assistance. AO Force Sourcing SVTC slides 19 Jun 07 state "Partial solution ordered [1.4a] PAX). Continue staffing remaining PAX (5 MiTTs). TGT SDOB: 26 JUL 07." Force Provider non-Concurs to remaining 5 MiTTs. Joint Staff recommends that RFF be closed. RFF to remain open with possibility of some Joint Sourcing. [1.4a] slots will be sourced by FY 08 sourcing; [1.4a] remain sourced, [1.4a] remain unsourced. **Joint solution being examined.**  
**NEXT ACTION:** Have requested status through MNF-I. CENTCOM researching status of second P4 sent from GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon on this issue. No update at this date, no date of action forecast, although the RFF is still to remain open.

**KEY DATES:** None at this time.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**12. TOPIC:** RFF 774 (RFF #MNC-I 130) Medical: Mental Health, Preventative Medicine, and Medical Logistics (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 3 non-transformed Sustainment Brigades that provide daily care to the 164,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 (3) transformed Sustainment Brigades whose MTOEs do not contain Mental Health, Preventive Medicine and Medical Logistics are scheduled to deploy. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. Total of [1.4a] Personnel. Transmitted to Force for staffing 24 MAR 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 5 APR 07. Presentation had been anticipated to ADM Fallon 8 MAY 07. GENADMIN 744 MNF-I Health SVC Augmentation released 12 JUN 07. Informed by CENTCOM on 10 AUG that Joint Staff was returning GENADMIN 774 to CENTCOM for resubmission as an RFF. Resubmitted to JS.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFIs.

**KEY DATES:** Various LADs.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**13. TOPIC:** FY 08 SECFOR (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** CC published modification 767 to the FY08 requirements submission establishing 2 BDE level URFs for MNC-I SECFOR requirements [1.4a]. The intent is to utilize unit level sourcing at the BCT level for SECFOR across the CENTCOM AOR. MOB Order 1330-07 was published 18 AUG 07 for 76 and 39 BCTs. 76 IBCT will mobilize at Camp Atterbury, IN 10 DEC 07 to source [1.4a] and 39 BCT will mobilize at Camp Shelby 2 JAN 08 to source [1.4a]. These requirements are published in the JS GFMAP MOD 1. 76 BCT is currently conducting its Leaders Recon with 316 ESC. MNC-I conducted a VTC with 316 ESC CG on 29 AUG 07. BG Couch is not comfortable with his level of understanding on the FY 08 SECFOR plan. 316 ESC planners are beginning a series of OPTs to plan the equipment, facilities and C2 relationships that will change due to the unit level sourcing. BG Couch stated the ADCON relationship was not the right direction for these units. MNC-I will provide additional information to assist in the planning effort by 316<sup>th</sup> ESC. The intent is for BG Couch to brief all of his subordinate commanders on this plan and its impacts on 19 SEP 07 in Balad.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue Coordination with ALCON.

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**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**14. TOPIC:** ITO Finance Group C2 (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Currently, the finance battalions in Iraq fall under the 13 Finance Group in Kuwait which falls under the 377<sup>th</sup> TSC, which falls under ARCENT, which falls under CENTCOM. Under the new Sustainment doctrine FM Ops, it falls in under the SB SPO which falls under the ESC. If the ESC is to take on this new relationship then CENTCOM needs to issue a FRAGO because it governs ARCENT and all the subordinate entities. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) brought issue to ARCENT attention apx 20 Jul with neg response. FRAGO chopped and returned from MNC-I. To be released from ARCENT to CENTOM week of 6 Aug.

**NEXT ACTION:** Bring to CENTCOM's attention at the next C3G3 SVTC.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**15. TOPIC:** [redacted] 1.4a (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Pressing remaining issues of 2/25 ID timeline and earlier arrival of 2/101 AA. Held meeting to discuss CC and JFCOM Business Rules for LAD shifts. FY09 Requirements Conference in progress.

**NEXT ACTION:** Complete FY09 Requirements GO/FO Conference

**KEY DATES:**

24-28 SEP 07	CC FY 09 Rqmts GO/FO Conf	MacDill AFB, Tampa
15-26 OCT 07	CC FY 08 Force Flow Conf	Scott AFB, IL

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**16. TOPIC:** LAD Shift for 2/25 ID (New)

**DISCUSSION:** 2/25 ID is a Stryker BCT requiring extra time in KU to complete remaining battle mods (all but SLAT armor, which will occur in CONUS after NTC completed). Current model for turnover is 32 days. Have requested 8 day LAD shifts to create a 40 day model, providing some mitigation, by exchanging the LAD dates of 2/25 ID and 1/4 ID, so 2/25 can RIP with 1/1 CD. Also pushing to have the Strykers shipped at the earliest date so an ADVON party and PM Stryker can start the mods early.

**NEXT ACTION:** LAD shifts are on 30 Aug SDOB for the next GFMAP release.

**KEY DATES:**

1-6 Oct: Stryker regeneration at NTC  
7 Oct: Stryker mods begin in San Diego (SPOE)  
16 Dec 07: Proposed LAD 2/25 ID  
24 Dec 07: Proposed LAD 1/4 ID  
25 Jan 08: Rotation date for 1/1 CD (SECDEF BOG is 27 Jan 08)

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**17. TOPIC:** Warfighter Function Rep (WFF) training proposal (New)

**DISCUSSION:** IRT rapid theater turnover, rapid changes in the FM process and general inexperience in force management, joint AO level proposal is being generated

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to conduct training on FM processes and organizational support ICW CENTCOM FM shop. Working to identify agenda and location based on simple cost/benefit analysis. This conference will include MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I and TF 1.4a WFFs, and 18<sup>th</sup> ABN Corps primary Force Gen Reps. Proposal also includes making this training agenda theater-wide to be repeated annually at the beginning of the Force Requirements conference and exported to the WFFs of the incoming Corps prior to deployment.

**NEXT ACTION:** Coordinate with CENTCOM FM to solidify proposed schedule and location for approval by ALCON.

**KEY DATES:**

Training (~2-4 days) will be conducted between mid-October and mid-November

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**18. TOPIC:** RFF 695 for 316TH ESC (Update) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** 316th ESC RFF requests 1.4a pax to provide staff augmentation, ISF support, and distribution management capability to this USAR unit that will deploy under a new Modular MTOE of 1.4a pax; reduction of 1.4a compared to the 13th SCE, and 1.4a compared to 3rd COSCOM. Additional personnel will enable 316th ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics support and sustainment operations across the ITO. Reduced manning based on transformation to Single Log C2 with 1st Theater Support Command (TSC) assuming portions of overall theater sustainment mission from the ESC. Timeline for 1st TSC to assume Single Log C2 is a minimum of 6 months into the 316th ESC rotation (~Jan 08). CENTCOM RFF 695 released 9 Nov 06. Sourced in 07-09 EXORD Mod 7. CENTCOM also states in EXORD that this enduring request will be sourced after 07-09 via a JMD. Since then, CCJ1 And CCJ4 have stated via e-mail that the JMD is not the correct method of sourcing this requirement and do not endorse the creation of a JMD to support this requirement. Discussed in detail with CENTCOM, JFCOM, and FORSCOM 21 Aug. Seeking short and long term solution. Short term solution is either a BOG extension (which CENTCOM vetted and believes is not feasible), or seeing volunteers and plugging with CONUS units. Long term solution is mod 2 to RFF 695 which will make the requirement enduring for the next ESC. 23 Aug: JFCOM AO is also researching the possibility of changing EXORD mod 7 to remove the JMD and make the requirement enduring by disconnecting the augmentation from single log C2 which will alleviate the need to an RFF mod.

**NEXT ACTION:**

- Back ESC decision for short term COA and work RFF mod.

**KEY DATES:**

- ~25 Feb 07: RDD for replacements

-15 Jul 07: LAD for 316th ESC Personnel

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**19. TOPIC:** RFF 667 MoD 1, Increase in Forces for TF 1.4a (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** (Modification initially submitted for 1.4a X pax. Restudy of the issues resulted in a change to 1.4a X pax. Restaffing through MNC-I.) This Modification to RFF 667 requests 1.4a X additional personnel to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and

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information processing and analysis in support of technology developed aviation assets. Identified shortages in critical skills sets render headquarters unable to process volumes of data previously unforecast. Currently TF [1.4a] is operating only five of the twenty four Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms projected for deployment within the next six months. The [1.4a] X identified personnel will enable TF [1.4a] to conduct 24 hour operations and process technical information to assist in defeating the IED threat. Released to Joint Staff 12 FEB 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18. (Update) Sourcing of ARST element sourced by the USAF has raised concerns of not being able to meet their Joint Staff assigned LAD of 24 August 07. This will create a significant gap of capability for TF [1.4a] and severely limit its analytical element if these Pax do not meet LAD. **Still pursuing enduring solution.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor sourcing from USAF to ensure Pax meet assigned LAD in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18. (URF 10220)

**KEY DATES:** 24 August 07 is currently assigned LAD.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**20. TOPIC:** RFF 742: Military History Detachments (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 3 X Military History Detachments (total [1.4a] Pax) to fill identified shortfalls within the Corps. Units without Military History detachment coverage will be unable to contribute to Lessons Learned or to the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Released to CENTCOM 13 FEB 07. Released by CENTCOM to Joint Staffing 12 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18. Have requested status of 3<sup>rd</sup> team, sourced by USN. Military History OIC at Corps in contact with Navy detachment.

**NEXT ACTION:** Following deployment process of units through MRM.

**KEY DATES:** LAD is 31 AUG 07.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**21. TOPIC:** RFF 735 Requests for Optometry Support (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has [1.4a] Optometrists that provide daily care to the 133,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 this will be down to [1.4a] Optometrists to provide daily care to all U.S. personnel. The Sustainment Brigades currently in Iraq have organic Optometry teams. The Sustainment Brigades due in OIF 07-09 have undergone transformation and no longer have Optometry Teams. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. The one and only Optometry team scheduled to arrive for OIF 07-09 cannot support all 133,000 U.S. personnel. Transmitted to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF EXORD 07-09 Mod 17. One of three teams is on the ground; the other two were delayed due to 15/12. No gap in coverage.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor staffing through arrival of final teams.

**KEY DATES:** Original LADs: 1 JUN 07; 27 JUN 07; 14 JUL 07

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**22. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I #148 Non-Standard Brigade Headquarters (Update)

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**DISCUSSION:** Success in mission accomplishment is being realized in Al Anbar and Al Wasit provinces. As a result, military operations are giving way to political means as we continue to enable civil authority. As such, the commander has determined that conditions support the redeployment of the current US Army forces (1/3ID and 214 Fires BDE) on their present time lines and not replacing those capabilities. Given this fact, the Commander, MNC-I requests to replace the HBCT and 214 Fires BDE with Non-Standard (N/S) brigade-level headquarters capable of (1) commanding and controlling remaining US and Coalition Forces (i.e., GRF, MEDEVAC, Fire Support, Route Clearance Teams, etc.); and (2) conducting interface with the provincial and local governments (i.e., Governor, PJCC, PDOP, IA, IP, etc.) in order to provide the political-military headquarters interface necessary to continue the enduring process of enabling civil authority. This RFF requests headquarters based on a standard fires brigade; a model of 41<sup>st</sup> Fires BDE [1.4a] (AC) or 197<sup>th</sup> Fires BDE [1.4a] is acceptable with the addition of a one star commanding general.

**NEXT ACTION:** Staff draft through MNC-I C3

**KEY DATES:** LADs: 8 March and 7 July 08

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**23. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I RFF #151, USMC Infantry Battalions Extension (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the extension of 2 USMC battalion requirements from 1 OCT 07 until 30 APR 08 in Al Anbar, Iraq. SECDEF authorized the deployment of two additional reinforced Infantry Battalions to Al Anbar province until 1 OCT 07 in JS EXORD MOD 20. Approval of this request will maintain a total of 8 USMC Infantry Battalions in MNF-W until 30 APR 08. A graduated transfer, as envisioned in current MNF-W plan, would allow time for Iraqi Army units to complete their recruiting, equipping, and training and to further develop their Combat Service Support capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Verify that SECDEF Orders Book 30 AUG 07 approves RFF.

**KEY DATES:** Extended 8 BN capability through 30 APR 08

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**24. TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I #152 Facilities Engineer Detachments (**New**)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF includes: 2X Facility Engineer Detachments to support construction and maintenance at the Combat Support Centers (CSCs). RFF addresses the validation of requirements to support base management operations at the Combat Support Centers (CSCs). The lack of a FED has led to difficulty in the execution of MILCON construction and closure of CSC Cedar II. Previous work conducted by a TCN/LN electrical contract at a FOB supported by Q-West led to a CF soldier fatality. Assets assigned to the Corps Engineer Brigade are tasked to support other Contingency Operating Bases (COBs) or are being shifted to support Contingency Operating Bases. CSCs are expected to remain around for as long as the Contingency Operating Bases. Assets within the Iraqi theater cannot be reallocated to support the CSCs.

**NEXT ACTION:** Complete staffing within MNC-I

**KEY DATES:** LAD 15 JAN 08

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI//~~

25. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I # 153 Information Operations (New)

**DISCUSSION:** US adversaries operate on the internet with near-impunity, using it to recruit new members, spread extremist ideology and propaganda, and disseminate command and control messaging. Recent authorities grant DOD greater opportunity to contest the free use of the internet by Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). MNC-I is developing three capabilities to execute CNO and PSYOP based on those new authorities. MNC-I needs CNO capabilities to understand adversary use of the internet, develop targets, and make appropriate target nominations that reflect MNC-I requirements. MNC-I also needs the capability to counter extremist propaganda and messaging on the internet by providing an alternative voice and message.

1.4a, 1.4c

1.4a, 1.4c

**NEXT ACTION:** Complete staffing within MNC-I

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 31 DEC 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

26. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces MNC-I # 154 Horizontal Engineer Company for MNC-B (New)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF includes: 1 X Horizontal Construction Company to support combat and construction operations in Multi-National Division Baghdad Area of Operations. This RFF requests the validation of the Echelon above Division (EAD) engineer assets required to support combat and construction operations in the MND-B AO. The Construction Support Equipment (CSE) Company sourced to OIF 05-07 and OIF 06-08 was not included in the Multi-Functional Engineer Battalion requirement (1.4a) for OIF 07-09. Additionally, when the 642d Engineer Support Company redeploys on 11 NOV 2007, it will not be replaced. This will leave MND-B with a deficit of six horizontal platoons. Assets assigned to the Corps Engineer Brigade are tasked at capacity, and utilization rates are not predicted to decrease in the next 12 months. This RFF is submitted in accordance with a request by 4<sup>th</sup> ID prior to assuming MND-B.

**NEXT ACTION:** Complete staffing within MNC-I

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 15 JAN 08

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI//~~