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(b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4a

USA)

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### ***Abstract***

Apo explained the challenges of sourcing the task force and relying on ILO guard companies, the significance of Taiji and Ramadi TIFs, and the significance of the 2008 SOFA in bridging the gap between UNSCR detention authority and building up the Iraqi rule of law.

I posed the following scenario to (b)(3), (b)(6) she is redeploying today. I am her successor. She has thirty minutes to explain to me the top three challenges I have to deal with immediately. The following points are her responses.

#### ***1) Sourcing for the Task Force.***

Guarding the current detainee population requires 33 guard companies, and it is getting more and more challenging to source these units. They are using ILO (in lieu of) companies from National Guard Brigade Combat Teams. They're peeling off companies from non-MP units and assigning these to MP battalions, so MP battalion and brigade headquarters are providing the command and control for ILO guard companies. The guard force will undergo a 50% rotation in February, so it will be very turbulent, and it will be an "in-stride" RIP TOA (Relief-in-place/transfer of authority). We have to execute it efficiently to mitigate risk.

I asked a background question about MP deployment planning for OIF.

In 2002 (b)(3), (b)(6) was the S3 for a CID Brigade and then the USAREUR MP planner. Doctrinally, they always plan to go in heavy in the initial planning, and (b)(3), (b)(6) suggested they initially planned for way too many MPs.

The fact is there are not enough MPs for a three-year force generation cycle (one year in preparation, one year deployed, one year in recovery). They have no operational reserve of MPs. They only have enough for what is in theater, and those recovering, and those two must then trade places. ILOs have mostly been combat arms units (armor, field artillery). In '09, they will start using some CS and CSS from the 488th CSB. They use 8 MP battalions (with these ILO companies). They have three battalions at the Bucca TIF, one does convoy operations, and one each at Cropper, Ashraf, Ramadi, and Taji.

According to (b)(3), (b)(6) the Army has 12 Internment battalions and 43 CS MP Battalions (16 AC, 24 NG, and 4 AR).

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## **2) Build Out of Taiji and Ramadi**

TF [1.4a] is going from the two facilities (Bucca and Cropper) to four. We are integrating "in-services concept." Bucca was always meant to be a very temporary facility, so it is not appropriate for enduring utilization. Cropper is more developed. It has the votech school, including a brick factory. Taiji and Ramadi give us more flexibility.

## **3) What is the End State?**

Chapter 7 of the UNSCR runs out in December 2008. We do not anticipate a new resolution. That means that our authority to detain people runs out with the UNSCR. The UNSCR definition of an "imperative security threat" helps bridge the gap between the Law of Armed Conflict and the Iraqi rule of law that is our objective. But with UNSCR expiring, we need another bridging mechanism, because Iraqi rule of law has a long way to go. The 2008 SOFA, a bilateral agreement, is supposed to resolve this issue, but TF [1.4a] has to stand by for the right people to make the decisions. It is all very problematic because most of our detainees are not subject to criminal prosecution, just security detention. At some point, we have to reconcile the issues.

To understand this situation, realize that this is a gang fight, like any prison in the United States. Our population has unique challenges, such as US policy will to leave. In US prisons, they have adjudicated sentences. We don't want recruitment into extreme groups. Ideology makes these guys much more dangerous. It is an unconventional fight, but prison TTPs are much like ours.

Apo thinks we have a very good grasp of who we are fighting and how to fight them. The previous TF [1.4a] practice of warehousing has given way to engaging the population. Apo has been very impressed by the CG's construct. It is not how we have traditionally thought of this kind of operation.

It has been very hard to wrap our arms around this non-traditional conflict. What we are doing is impressive on a day-to-day basis, and we need to keep it going.

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