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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE OLYMPIA
MULTINATIONAL BRIGADE NORTHWEST
MOSUL, IRAQ
APO AE 09334

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MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Multinational Corps – Iraq, APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Security Situation in Mosul

"The point of collapse is very near."

*Durayd Kashmoula
Governor of Ninewa Province
October 14, 2004*

~~(S/NF)~~ Bottomline: Mosul, the leading city in the north, is in jeopardy of being lost to Anti-Iraqi Forces' control due to neglect by the Interim Iraqi Government.

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), notably resurgent Ba'athists and religious extremists, are employing threats, intimidation and effective information operations to build momentum in/around Mosul. This effort, coupled with an ineffective and largely corrupt police force and a Provisional Government that feels abandoned by the Interim Iraqi Government, has led to a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Iraq's second largest city. Some indicators of concern:

a. ~~(S/NF)~~ The Ninewa Chief of Police is, at best, wholly ineffective. Over 40 murders of individuals with some relationship to Coalition Forces, to include the former Provincial Governor and the son of the current governor, are unsolved and there is not a single active investigation into any of these murders. Police rarely operate aggressively or effectively. Police checkpoints do not stop or inspect vehicles. During almost every attack in Mosul, police have withdrawn to stations or abandoned posts. There are numerous incidents of police refusing to respond to reports of criminal or AIF activity. Numerous reports of corruption indicate that he has motives other than service to Iraq. More troubling is sensitive reporting that links him with known/suspected AIF. Separate report to follow.

b. ~~(S/NF)~~ Mosul University, once a shining example of academic freedom and ethnic diversity, is now strictly controlled by a zealous group of fundamental Islamists. Where only months ago, men and women attended the same classes, all colleges are now segregated by sex. Women, regardless of personal desire, ethnic background or religion are required to be covered. Those who refuse to comply are barred from the campus. US forces, after having expended in excess of \$3M to improve the university, are no longer allowed to visit the campus. Sensitive reporting reveals close relations of the university chancellor with the Ba'ath Party.

c. ~~(S/RBL MCFI)~~ Christians, once fully integrated into all aspects of life in Mosul,

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
are increasingly threatened and urged to leave the city -- a version of "religious cleansing" through intimidation. Christian women who appear in public uncovered are increasingly threatened and harassed.

- d. ~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi Security Forces are under duress. One Iraqi National Guard battalion commander quit under threat. The battalion in western Mosul, the most critical area, has experienced more than 100% turnover in the past two months as soldiers quit under threat. Worrying indicators exist that other ING battalions are scaling-back operations or purposefully avoiding certain areas to avoid conflict with AIF. Facilities Protection Service guards have walked-off numerous sites. The soldiers and many officers at the nearby Iraqi Army facility at al Kasik have been threatened and advised to quit. AWOL rates are high. Notably, police do not appear to be suffering the same intensity of threats as the other ISF.
- e. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Several Ninewa Province Council members have resigned or have simply not attended meetings. One prominent member was recently murdered and several have been attacked.
- f. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ The Ba'ath Party (operating under many other names) has formed a "shadow" government and is issuing instructions to government agencies. For example, the food distribution office is in receipt of a directive to hire/fire certain individuals less the director "suffer severe consequences."
- g. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Locally hired employees of MNF are being routinely threatened. At most MNB-NW FOBs, less than 50% of the workforce still reports for work. Contractors who provide goods or services for MNF or MNF-related activities are increasingly reluctant to be associated with MNF despite the loss of income.
- h. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Reduction of MNF combat power has resulted in the Syrian border being essentially uncovered except for unattended sensors, many of which have are now missing or inoperative. In Mosul, having fewer forces has caused a significant reduction in offensive operations and reduced number and frequency of patrols.
- i. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Both the Governor and Vice Governor are seriously considering resignation.

2. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Despite the gravity of the situation in Mosul at present, the downward trend can be reversed and we can achieve local control by 31 December 2004. Specific actions are required:

- a. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ The IIG must be seen to support the provincial government and to visibly demonstrate concern for Mosul. Since the transfer of sovereignty, only Vice President Shaways (one visit) and Minister of Interior Falah (2 visits -- one a condolence call), have visited Mosul. Neither the President, who resides near Mosul, nor the Prime Minister have visited. The Governor feels abandoned. Senior IIG leaders need to come to Mosul, be seen publicly and provide unequivocal support against the insurgency in the city. The MOD needs to come inspect the ING and the Army and make it clear to them that he will support them. The absence of any significant IIG involvement in Mosul paves the way for the Ba'athists and others to gain influence.
- b. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ MOI needs to follow-through on promises to provide special police units to support the Governor. Claims of targetable intelligence need to be followed-through to delivery.
- c. ~~(S/NF)~~ The Chief of Police must be moved, dismissed or detained.
- d. ~~(S/NF)~~ The Chancellor of Mosul University must be removed or detained.

- e. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ IIG pressure is required to replace religious leaders in Mosul who continue to call for opposition to the local government and to the ISF.
- f. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Ministries must be responsive to requirements addressed by Mosul Directors General.
- g. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ MOI must take action to install effective customs management at the Rabiya border crossing with Syria. Wholesale change of leadership and workforce is required.
- h. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Compensate for reduced MNF ground maneuver forces by provision of increased ISR along Syrian border, higher prioritization of ISF in MNB-NW sector, additional fixed and rotary wing aviation support and increased funding to support projects where we have little presence.
- i. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ IIG must provide funding for salaries and expenses for provincial and district governments.
- j. ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ IIG must continue to seek ways to reach out to former officers, both monetarily and in some substantive manner of engagement.
3. ~~(S/NI)~~ I am more concerned about the security situation in Mosul than at any time since my arrival here in January 2004. There is a palpable difference now – people are scared. The solution must be an Iraqi one. In a city of nearly 2 million, it is the perception of control that matters. Right now, the perception is that AIF, not legitimate Iraqi government, are increasingly in control of the city. The IIG must act now and act definitively to reverse the downward trend in security. I am confident that if the IIG acts decisively, Mosul will be fine. However, if the IIG does not act, no amount of MNF effort will prove effective and the loss of Mosul will have significant repercussions throughout the Kurdish and Sunni areas.


CARTER F. HAM
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding