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SPA Information Paper
CDR, MNF-I Response to (b)(6)
As of: 4 Dec 06

(U) **SUBJECT:** Transferring Security Responsibility

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Purpose.** Provide a response to the National Security Team Meeting memo by (b)(6) dated 2 Dec 06

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Background information:**

- It is important to appreciate enduring strategic success will only be achieved by Iraqis.
- The fundamental conflict is about the division of political and economic power among ethnic and sectarian groups.
- Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to accomplishing our strategic objectives.
 - Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and illegal armed groups the greatest sectarian violence accelerants.
- The tolerance of both the GoI and Iraqi people for Coalition authority is diminishing.
- The GoI has already expressed its desire to assume accelerated security responsibilities.
- Accelerated transition supports GoI wish to acquire security responsibilities and provides impetus to Iraqi Security Forces (SF) capability; but it comes at increased risk.
- Increased risk can, and will be, mitigated with embedded transition teams, Coalition Force (CF) security forces in overwatch, and a reconciliation program initiated.
- At the end of 2007, the Coalition will be in a transformed relationship; having adapted to its new role in support of the GoI with the UNSCR mandate complete.

3. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Discussion / Analysis:**

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Assessment of likely consequences of transferring the mission of quelling sectarian violence to the Iraqis.**

(1). ~~(S//REL)~~ **Likely outcomes:**

- Embedded transition teams will raise ~~key~~ ~~requirements~~ ~~from~~ ~~current~~ ~~partnership~~ ~~arrangements:~~
- The move of CF to overwatch decreases our footprint and presence.
- There is the potential for a reduction in violence ~~due~~ ^{requirements from} to Iraqi-led solutions being developed.
- There is a very real potential for increased violence in the short term as ISF are moved into positions of security responsibility calling for heretofore unpracticed operations.
- Withdrawal of CF from the cities creates greater reliance on, and capacity development of, Iraqi C2 and logistics systems.
- Adversary groups (both Shi'a and Sunni) will attempt to gain information operations advantage both during and immediately following transition.

(2). ~~(S//REL)~~ **Risk:**

- Sectarian loyalties override professional obligations; while most likely in some Iraqi Police (IP) units, a concern in Iraqi Army (IA) units as well.
- Increased intimidation and murders leading to neighborhood sectarian clearing programs.
- Open and extended confrontation with irreconcilable illegal armed groups by both ISF and CF.
- Shi'a provocation drives Sunni moderates to AQI.
- Inadequate GoI logistics prevents ISF deployments potentially creating dependency on CF.

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b. ~~(S//REL)~~ Proposals of how we might mitigate the risks of the approach.

- Resource requirements specified by the High Level Working Group for Acceleration
- Implement plan to accelerate transition of security responsibility.
 - Enhance ISF by increased number and size of robust transition teams; still maintain CF focus on strike capability for intelligence-led operations.
- Fully resource both Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Ministerial Assistance Teams while maximizing reconstruction and development funding.
- Develop and implement a national reconciliation program.
- Support the safe execution of provincial elections and constitutional referendum.
- Increase and/or initiate regional engagement with both 1.4b
- Mitigate the effects of transitioning Coalition missions by deploying a "Covering Force" during the transition period (approximately Jan - Apr 07).
- "Surge" operations a mixed blessing; if GoI asked for breathing space, might be useful.
 - Strategic deployment timelines delay CF arrival until March/April however.
 - ISF deployments heretofore problematic.

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ what are the central elements of and key resources required to execute a fully-resourced contingency strategy in the Sunni majority provinces?

- Fully resourced transition teams (military, provincial, and ministerial).
- Implementation of a national reconciliation program.
 - Associated National Compact (de-Ba'athification reform, amnesty, etc) would assist.
- Successful completion of provincial elections and constitutional referendum.
- Support the passing of key legislation providing for basic rights and power sharing.

4. Conclusions. None. For Information.

RELEASED BY: Maj Gen Kurt A. Cichowski
MNF-I/DCS-SPA Director
Chief of Strategy

(b)(6)

PREPARED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNF-I/DCS-SPA

(b)(6)



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