

Casey George GEN MNF-I CG

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 10:23 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I CMD GRP XO
Subject: FW: additional feedback

Pls make sure this gets to cjcs!!

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 10:23 PM
To: 'Pace, Peter, Gen, CJCS'; Abizaid, John P GEN (USA)
Subject: additional feedback

Pete/John,

Some additional input for the mix:

What does taking care of JAM in Baghdad mean? *Sadr City*

--Heavy political work up front to ensure that we "start together, stay together, finish together". There is a real risk of a strong start that is spoiled by political pressure. IG must buy in and commit to seeing a Sadr City operation or militia confrontation to conclusion.

--Iraqi Government will want to have an Iraqi lead in dealing with militia. They want to avoid another "US attack against the Shia" confrontation. This will impact their willingness to apply US troops to the challenge.

--JAM would be expected to react country-wide simultaneously as they have in the past. The difference will be the presence of the Iraqi Army with coalition teams supported by CF. The reliability of the forces, especially in the south, is not assured.

Sadr City
--In Baghdad, we think it will take 4-6 brigades of Iraqi and CF to deal with Sadr City. In the past it has taken 2 CF Brigades. We believe that we have the forces in Baghdad to deal with it by shifting them from within the city for a limited period. We have already brought in a few hundred additional CF to augment our efforts and we will have the Stryker Bde back in a few days. I would want to have the PTDO force in Kuwait and another, mechanized, force ready to fall in on prepositioned equipment before we started. We also have the possibility of moving forces from the Sunni areas, but we would wait and see their reaction. We don't see a major need for external forces to do this at this time. Reserves would cover failures of allies in southern provinces. *2050*

no need for ext. forces
--We would expect a tough fight for a week or two, but we would prevail if the government held tough.

What can we do if the PM asks for more assistance in Baghdad? *?*

--This is where we would need outside help. As I said yesterday, I wouldn't want to do this with CF unless there was Iraqi commitment to reconcile and they asked for our support.

--We are working with the Iraqis to bring in 3 brigades to Baghdad by the end of JAN—one every two weeks starting mid-December. This will allow us to continue with focus area expansion, but would be insufficient to "guarantee" a significant improvement in the Baghdad security situation.

--I'd ask for up to 3 CF brigades if the requirement was to affect and sustain a substantial improvement in Baghdad security. There would be basing and equipment issues that we would work with the services to address.

12/8/2006

--Whether the Iraqis would do this is an open question, and I think they currently are in the mode they can do it themselves with our support. I will discuss with PM before I talk to POTUS.

george

Approved for Release