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SIMULTANEOUS
Premier*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MNF-I CMD GRP XO

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Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 12:01 PM
To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
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Subject: ~~(S)~~ CG's Questions
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Sir:

DIVA NYA
Our answer to your two questions.
MG Fastabend

4-6 Bede

#1 Taking Care of JAM – what does that mean militarily?

CAVEAT: A purely military approach to “taking care of JAM” is **NOT RECOMMENDED**. Political conditions must be set to make “taking care of JAM” a feasible operation.

Potential Actions:

TF 1.4a

*Coalition
2-3/*

*4-25/17
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1+*

- **Denial of Safe Haven (Standing Start):**
 - o TF 1.4a be directed to remove known JAM leaders and organizers as a preliminary to clearing Sadr City
 - o Subsequently, contain Sadr City and conduct a deliberate clearance operation
 1. Generate a 2-3 BCT clearing force from the 7 BCTs available in Baghdad
 2. Accept high risk west of the Tigris River in Baghdad
 3. Standing Start could begin NET 15 Jan 07
- **Denial of Safe Haven (w/ political condition setting):**
 - o Set political conditions: road to reconciliation, reintegration plan, provincial elections agreement, build activities in place
 - o TF 1.4a be directed to remove known JAM leaders and organizers as a preliminary to clearing Sadr City Generate a 2 BCT clearing force from the 7 BCTs available in Baghdad
 - o Accept moderate risk west of the Tigris River in Baghdad
 - o Political Conditions start could begin NET 1 Feb 07

- **Unrestrained targeting of EJK activity and its perpetrators**
 - o Redirect TF 1.4a to balanced approach on AQIZ / EJK targets
 - o Refocused targeting could begin 1 Jan 07 to allow time for target development
- **Aggressive suppression of unauthorized display of weapons by JAM members**

Risk

- **Risks of engaging JAM**
 - o Catalyst for large-scale JAM mobilization that evolves into violent confrontation with ISF / CF and opens a "Shi'a flank;" ultimately destabilizes the Gol.
 1. LOC interdiction from Baghdad to Basrah
 2. JAM uprisings in south: Diwaniyah, Amarah, Samawah, Najaf, Karbala, Basra
 - o JAM perceives Badr Organization / SCIRI instigating ISF move against JAM and OMS as part of broader power struggle, initiates hostilities against Badr / SCIRI.
 - o Low-level splintering of some ISF units.
 - o May cause second-order effect of worsening the relations between the MoD and the Mol.
 - o [redacted] 1.4b support to JAM / OMS.
 - o Reprisal attacks against Sunni populace.
 - o Sadrist movement departs government
- **Risks of Not Engaging JAM**
 - o JAM violence sustains spiraling cycle of sectarian violence, disrupting Gol effectiveness. Cycle of violence moves Iraq closer to self-sustaining sectarian violence and increases risk of a sectarian civil war.
 - o JAM activity adds "drag" to Gol's ability to effectively govern and institute necessary programs.
 - o Populace sees JAM as their protector, instead of the ISF.
 - o JAM continues to strengthen and becomes more difficult to deal with over time.

#2 If the Prime Minister asks for help in Baghdad, what would it look like and where would it come from? What is a medium risk and high risk solution?

Assumption: no additional forces to Iraq in the timeframe under discussion.
Additional help to Baghdad must come from within Iraq / Kuwait – and MEU is already committed.

Potential Solutions:

- No moderate risk solution is available. Moderate risk already accepted in reallocation of forces to Baghdad
- High risk solution by moving following forces (only one of each of these options would be feasible, and each is high risk)
 - o 3/82 from Salah ad Din. → *T.M.D.A.*
 - o 5 RCT and 1/1 IA from ~~Fallujah/Ramadi.~~

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- o 4- 25 from Najaf.
- IA units currently planned for Baghdad:
 - o **Planned Extra Commitments.** The IA Deployability Plan. 3/1/3 due to arrive in Baghdad by 15 Dec. 4/1 Bde of two bns arrived by 22 Dec. 1/2 Bde and two bns by mid Jan TBD. 3/4 Bde and two bns by end Jan TBD. Then rotation to replace each of the units every 90 days. This plan is ambitious and has some risks. It is bigger and faster than originally planned. Backfilling of some battlespace is required by CF and there are some limitations imposed by life support facilities. Not practical to increase the size or speed of this deployment, as failure would occur. Also, requirement to identify other Iraqi units for future rotation.

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