

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

HEADQUARTERS MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ
Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342
20 Nov 05

ANNEX B TO MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 05-03 (U)

(U) INTELLIGENCE

(U) References:

- a. (U) Maps and Charts – US DOD Iraq-Support Study dated Jun 03.
- b. ~~(S//REL USA, MCFI)~~ MNC-I Mission Analysis SEP05.
- c. ~~(S//REL USA, MCFI)~~ MNF-I Campaign Plan: Operation Iraqi Freedom, dated 5 August 2004.

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ Situation.

- a. **At the strategic level, the GOI's failure to provide effective governance and economic opportunities to Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis remains the most significant threat to the Coalition endstate.** Despite an expected surge in attacks, Iraq's insurgent groups failed to disrupt the Iraqi Constitutional Referendum, as most eligible Iraqis, including Sunni Arabs, participated in the political process. During the referendum period Sunni based insurgents were incapable of operational level coordination across the ITO. However, the Sunni Arab rejection of the successful constitution will fuel continued resistance to the Government of Iraq (GOI), Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces (CF) through 2006. Recent Coalition operations in Ninewah, (OPERATION RESTORING RIGHTS), and Al Anbar, OPERATION SAYAID), have disrupted insurgent networks and foreign fighter flow within these provinces. These two operations targeted the most important safe-havens available to Terrorists & Foreign Fighters (T&FF) and Sunni Iraqi Rejectionists (Sunni-IZR). Despite these setbacks, however, T&FF and Sunni-IZR retain the ability to conduct operations along the Euphrates, the Tigris and in Baghdad. More important than MNF operations has been the miscalculation by Abu Musab Zarqawi (AMZ) in declaring war on Iraqi Shi'a. As a result, many Iraqis, including some Sunni-IZR tribes and Ansar al-Sunnah cells, have rejected his call to arms against Shi'a, leading to increased division among Sunni insurgent groups. In the central and southern Shi'a areas of Iraq, Shi'a groups compete for political dominance which includes low-level violence between party militias. The weeks leading up to the December 15 election will see more political, sectarian and ethnic related violence across Iraq as political parties campaign for votes.
- b. The T&FF will remain the most lethal force among the AIF. They will continue their attacks against the Coalition Forces and ISF in Al Qaim, Ramadi, Mosul, Samarra, Baqubah and Baghdad. After regrouping and assessing the election results, T&FF will attempt to create greater uncertainty through attacks in Baghdad to challenge the GOI. Although their ability to infiltrate foreign fighters will be degraded during CF operations in the ERV, they will maintain Sunni extremist support in areas where there is no GOI presence. Using IO and economic incentives, they will recruit disaffected Iraqis in order to sustain their ability to wage spectacular attacks. The SDM will continue a dual track

B-1

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

strategy of gaining political influence and providing support to militant efforts. The Saddam trials may polarize the population by generating Sunni anger against perceived oppression while opening wounds for Shi'a and Kurds who see this event as justice for Saddam's crimes. De-Ba'athification programs will be interpreted by Sunnis as Shi'a and Kurdish repression, and could provoke ethno-sectarian violence in cities like Baghdad, Baqubah, Mosul, N. Babil area, and Hillah. For IZR Sunni, the prospects are similar to SDM in their desire to support Sunni political advancement. Their use of violence will be further tempered by political progress. Groups like the 1920 BDE may moderate their violence in order to allow Sunni political leaders to advance their goals. For IZR Shi'a, leaders like Muqtada Al Sadr will continue to play both ends by mobilizing militants privately while publicly calling for restraint in order to portray an ineffective GOI and gain new constituents. Kurds represent a potential adversary to the new GOI. This is the best organized group within Iraq, and they maintain the aim of a federal and secular Iraq with control of natural resources. The potential for violence along the green line, as well as in cities like Kirkuk is possible but unlikely. If the political process breaks down or ethnic violence increases, a Kurdish force could be used to secure territory or key infrastructure in the vicinity of Kirkuk or Mosul.

c. (U) Weather.

CEN
SIP

(b)(6)

d. (U) Terrain.

CEN
SIPR

(b)(6)

e. (U) Most Likely and Most Dangerous COAs. For further information, See Intelligence Estimate, See Appendix 1.

(1) (~~S//REL~~) MLCOA. The most likely course of action between December 2005 and July 2006 is the maintenance of the status quo. Attacks will average 60-70 per day. These attacks will be concentrated in the Euphrates River Valley, the Tigris River Valley cities and Baghdad. Possible flashpoints of violence include the southern urban centers, intra-Shi'a violence, and south of the Kurdish Green line, as Kurds attempt to regain land lost during Saddam Hussein's regime. The ISF will gain some capability, but will continue to require CF enablers to conduct COIN operations. The new GOI will be mired in political infighting, at the expense of administering the country. Most Iraqis will continue to maintain faith in the ability of the GOI to eventually provide relief from economic privation and political violence.

(2) (~~S//REL~~) MDCOA. The most dangerous course of action is that the people quickly lose faith in the new GOI because it fails to provide the services that Iraqis expect: security, food, power, water and economic opportunity. This is likely to happen at the beginning of the summer after a long and bitter GOI formation period. Iraqis will turn to alternative support networks embedded within their ethnic and religious communities to solve their problems and ignore the Baghdad government. This will

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

lead to an effective partition of Iraq. The Kurds will use their Peshmerga to fortify behind a line that includes Kirkuk and its oilfields. The Shi'a will pull back to Baghdad and points south leaving Sunni Arabs with Al Anbar, parts of Salah Din and Ninewah.

- f. (U) **Provincial and City Threat Assessment.** See MNC-I CACE Provincial Assessments and Key Cities Assessments.

2. (U) **Mission**

- a. ~~(S//REL)~~ MISSION. MNC-I builds capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and conducts counter-insurgency operations to neutralize AIF in order to transition the security lead for defeating the insurgency to ISF and the Government of Iraq.
- b. ~~(S//REL)~~ C2 INTENT. Provide actionable intelligence to support all aspects of MNC-I COIN operations. Provide intelligence support to a growing ISF, as they begin to assume a greater role within the Coalition battlespace. Capitalize on indigenous intelligence developed by host nation security forces to further this effort. Maintain both near and mid-term assessments to support MNC-I decision making. Provide assessments on the overall strength and disposition of the insurgency, and ensure proper warning to avoid strategic and operational surprise. Synchronize intelligence operations among all elements through collaboration and dissemination in order to ensure proper weighting of assets and analytic efforts against Corps priorities. Endstate is an integrated Corps IBOS focused on supporting all MNC-I efforts.

3. (U) **Execution**

- a. ~~(S//REL)~~ **Concept of Intelligence Operations.** The MNC-I C2 will direct and synchronize intelligence operations of the staff, subordinate intelligence units, and national agency activities in support of the MNC-I commander's intelligence requirements. MNC-I will employ collection assets as resourced by US and Coalition Partners and will coordinate theater, national, and multi-national collection coverage in order to collect, report, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence products. **Recognizing that assets are limited, they will be allocated based on the mission and weighted to support the MNC-I Commander's priorities. To further support operations, every effort will be made to synchronize multi-disciplined collection.**

(1) (U) **Intelligence Tasks**

- (a) ~~(S//REL)~~ Provide intelligence support to coalition operations, including:

- 1 Partnership, Military Transition Teams, and other Partnership Initiatives (See Appendix 10, MiTT Intelligence Guidance).
- 2 HVT/HVI Tracking and Assessment.
- 3 Security and Stability Operations (SASO).
- 4 Counter-insurgency (COIN) Operations.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

- 5 Counter-terrorism (CT).
- 6 Force Protection.
- 7 Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAO).
- 8 Civil Affairs (CA).
- 9 Information Operations (IO).
- 10 Analyzing popular support and public opinion.
- 11 Border Security.
- 12 Detainee Operations.
- 13 Civilian contractor services.
- 14 Coalition POWs and MIAs.
- 15 Infrastructure security.
- 16 Protection of Iraqi government leaders.
- 17 Analyzing the effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal fires.
- 18 Analyzing the political reconstruction process.
- 19 Analyzing economic progress.
- 20 WMD identification and tracking as necessary.

(b) ~~(S//REL)~~ Perform coalition intelligence functions, including:

- 1 ISR integration of intelligence disciplines.
- 2 Linkage of intelligence cycle with lethal and non-lethal targeting.
- 3 All source strategic/operational assessments.
- 4 Detection and tracking of trans-national movement of money, people, contraband and weapons.
- 5 Document and media exploitation (DOMEX).
- 6 Interrogations.
- 7 Counterintelligence (CI).
- 8 HUMINT collection operations (clandestine and overt).
- 9 Foreign disclosure and intelligence sharing with coalition.
- 10 Nodal analysis of infrastructures and installations.

(c) ~~(S//REL)~~ Support Iraqi entities with intelligence, as required, in areas such as providing:

- 1 Evaluation and analysis of threats to key or protected personnel, such as tribunal witnesses, clerics, and senior government figures.
- 2 ISR collections support.
- 3 CI support to neutralizing sabotage and subversion and initial vetting and screening.
- 4 All source analytical assessments, especially trans-national issues.

(d) ~~(S//REL)~~ Essential Intelligence Tasks.

- 1 Support Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN).
- 2 Support HVT/HVI Tracking and Assessment.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

- 3 Train, coach, and mentor Iraqi Security Forces through Partnership and Military Transition Teams.
- 4 Support Force Protection (FP).
- 5 Integrate US/UK defense intelligence with national structures by establishing procedures/mechanisms that afford shared collaboration and dissemination on key issues and timelines.
- 6 Share intelligence.

(2) (U) Intelligence Activities.

- (a) (U) **Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Information Requirements (IR), See Appendix 2.**
- (b) (~~S//REL~~) MNC-I intelligence operations in support of this plan are used to satisfy intelligence requirements in response to the MNC-I Commander's PIR and IR. The PIR and IR are developed by the MNC-I C2 in conjunction with the other principal staff in order to support the MNC-I commander's decision-making process. Once approved by the MNC-I Commander, the PIR comprise ordered priorities to focus the intelligence effort.
- (c) (~~S//REL~~) MNC-I developed and will maintain a list of PIR, which are updated continuously. All subordinate units will maintain the current PIR and Intelligence Requirements (IR), and rapidly and accurately report all combat information pertaining thereto to the MNC-I C2 Operations and ACE.
- (d) (~~S//REL~~) Subordinate units are required to submit PIR to the MNC-I Collection Management and & Dissemination (CM&D). MNC-I CM&D will crosswalk subordinate unit PIR with MNC-I PIR and IR to ensure that MNC-I and subordinate unit intelligence requirements are nested. After validation and prioritization, these requirements will be incorporated to the maximum extent possible into the MNC-I collection, analysis, and dissemination process.

(3) (U) New Requirements.

- (a) (~~S//REL~~) **It is imperative that any intelligence requirement be communicated to the appropriate collection manager so that ISR managers can allocate assets to support requirements. The collection manager will determine which asset will collect against a particular requirement. Therefore, subordinate units will request particular information or effects not assets.** MNC-I and subordinate units will submit new intelligence requirements as the situation dictates via the Intelligence Collection Synchronization Working Group. Additionally, new Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements will be forwarded to MNC-I CM&D via RMS or PRISM (CENTRIXS for Coalition). US units will use COLISEUM or RWS RFI homepage as a backup. MNC-I CM&D will validate, deconflict, and consolidate

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

requirements and forward as required to the MNF-I and CENTCOM collection manager for action.

- (b) ~~(S//REL)~~ Collection requirements are identified as PIR and IR. MSC Commanders will make maximum use of assigned resources to support their own and MNC-I intelligence requirements. Forward requests for information (RFI) to MNC-I CM&D via CENTRIXS, the COLISEUM system on SIPRNET, or JDISS. If the RFI cannot be answered at MNC-I, CM&D will validate the request and forward it to MNF-I and the USCENTCOM JACE via COLISEUM. CM&D will continue to monitor the status of subordinate unit RFI until they are closed. Subordinate units to MNC-I are required to provide timely feedback to MNC-I CM&D upon receipt of products that answer their RFI to complete the closure process.
- (4) (U) **CM&D Concept.** This Annex and supporting appendices provide a summary of collection management and dissemination guidelines, collection emphasis, collection priorities and collection assets scheme of maneuver. Collection plans will be consolidated, validated, and disseminated prior to each operation. A Corps level collection plan will be developed, distributed and updated as necessary, **See Appendix 3, Corps Collection Plan.**
- (5) (U) **Sustaining Functions.**
- (a) ~~(S//REL)~~ The primary emphasis for collection management will be to answer the Commander's Intelligence Requirements and then other intelligence users of MNC-I in order. In addition, collection management will validate, task or request assets for collection against intelligence requirements generated from the MNC-I targeting process in support of projected courses of action.
- (b) ~~(S//REL)~~ Tasking and collection nominations will be formatted in accordance with the appropriate DIAMS and disseminated through designated validation and approval channels. To the utmost extent possible, MNC-I units will use theater-automated applications to submit their collection nominations and requests for information needs. For US national imagery collection, the requirements management system (RMS) will be the primary application used. For national signals intelligence collection, AMHS DSSCS Message Traffic will be used for Amplification (AMP) and Time Sensitive Requirements (TSR) collection requirements. PRISM will be the application for all theater and tactical intelligence collectors and the COLISEUM application on SIPR and JWICS for requirements management. For coalition partners who do not have access to COLISEUM, a web-based format will be available on CENTRIXS. Email is the least preferred method due to the lack of a tracking mechanism of user requirements, but is acceptable if no other means is available.
- (c) (U) Dissemination of requested intelligence products will range from direct emailing via JWICS, SIPR, and/or CENTRIXS to postings on the MNC-I ACE

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

homepages and servers. The method selected will be based upon user preference, capability and/or most expedient method available.

- (d) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Counterintelligence Operations (CI).** CI assets will focus on supporting force protection of critical nodes within the MNC-I AOR. MNC-I CI assets will be controlled by the TFCICA. Security will be stressed during all operations the necessary measures taken to minimize disclosure of information pertaining to the operation.
 - (e) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Analysis and Production.** MNC-I analysis and production activities will be conducted between the MNC-I ACE, the CIOC, and other deployed forces. Additional analysis and production support will be provided through reach back to national agencies.
 - (f) (U) To the maximum extent possible, intelligence production should be addressed through organic resources and releasable at the collateral level.
 - (g) (U) Intelligence production responsibilities in support of operations will be “federated” among national, theater, and other units.
 - (h) ~~(S//REL)~~ The MNC-I ACE is the Corps focal point for all-source intelligence analysis and reporting. The MNC-I ACE will fuse reports and develop products that provide MSCs with actionable intelligence. The MNC-I ACE will ensure intelligence production is focused on the CDR, MNC-I PIR.
- (6) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Dissemination and Integration.** CENTRIXS is the primary intelligence dissemination system for the MNC-I, with SIPRNET being the alternate and JDISS tertiary for US units. MNC-I will use “pull” dissemination architecture. All products will be posted to the MNC-I web pages on both CENTRIXS and SIPRNET. Dissemination will also occur via electronic mail.
- (a) ~~(S//REL)~~ Intelligence reports will be posted to the MNC-I web page on SIPRNET and CENTRIXS to support intelligence operations throughout the AOR.
 - (b) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Requirements for Secondary Imagery Dissemination.** Imagery will be disseminated primarily via the CENTRIXS ITS (Imagery Transfer System) for coalition and SIPRNET IPL (Imagery Production Library) for US only.
 - (c) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Requirements for Foreign Disclosure.** The dissemination function must include sanitizing, de-compartmentalization, and release mechanisms IAW standard national bilateral agreements. It is critical to understand the difference between disclosure (display or show) and release (give away) to ensure that intelligence sources and methods, sensitive military operations, and capabilities/weaknesses are not compromised. The MNF-I C2 is the Foreign Disclosure Authority. The MNF-I Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) is the

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

approving authority for products not covered by current standing agreements. Coordination between FDOs at all echelons is encouraged prior to release.

- (d) (U) Information regarding US Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and missions will be controlled within the guidelines of US intelligence community regulations and national disclosure policy. CENTCOM will continue to ensure US ISR support is provided in concert with the ISR resources of allied nations. All efforts should be made to integrate authorized resources of allied/coalition partners.
 - (e) (U) Subordinate commands will provide ISR units/forces in support of MNC-I as specified in this plan and subsequent tasking messages.
- (7) (U) **Intelligence Systems**. The MNC-I will operate primarily on CENTRIXS with SIPR backup.
- (a) (~~S//REL~~) **Collection**. The MNC-I C2 is the proponent for requirements management and will provide collection tasking and emphasis for all organic and supporting agency ISR systems (mission and asset managers) in support of MNC-I intelligence requirements.
 - (b) (~~S//REL~~) **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)**. MNC-I employs organic SIGINT collection capabilities, and leverages the CSG and CENTCOM for national / theater and theater support. SIGINT requirements are forwarded via SIPR or CENTRIXS to the MNC-I CMO or via JDISS. TACREPS and TEARLINES will satisfy coalition requirements. MNC-I exercises Specific Orders Tasking Authority (SOTA) over all ground based collection systems. MNC-I Collection Management (CM) is the validating authority of subordinate requests for SIGINT collection. SIGINT emphasis requests should immediately be forwarded to MNC-I CM for dynamic re-tasking of available assets.
 - (c) (~~S//REL~~) **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)**. MNC-I CM is the validating authority of subordinate requests for imagery collection. Imagery products are provided primarily through the SIPR IPL, CENTRIXS ITS, theater ISR, NTM, and organic UAV FMV. Imagery requirements and targets are incorporated into the collection plan in support of PIR and MSC nominations.
 - (d) (~~S//REL~~) **Counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT)**. HUMINT collection is provided by CI/HUMINT teams and other elements in direct support to MSCs and general support to MNC-I. **In order to ensure effective and safe HUMINT collection operations are conducted, Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) will be incorporated into MSC patrols. This should be viewed as a supported and supporting relationship based on the specific mission. In some instances, maneuver forces will support THTs so they can gain actionable intelligence for further exploitation. In others, maneuver forces will be supported by the language and tactical questioning capabilities**

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

of the THTs. Regardless, all THTs will be employed IAW a collection plan and will not conduct operations without appropriate security measures in place.

- 1 ~~(S//REL)~~ Due to the unconventional nature of COIN and SASO, several “non-standard” sources for information will be of value. These include open source and document exploitation. Civil Affairs reports and PSYOPS assessments as well as Country Team reporting will provide excellent insight into political, economic, and regional issues. Additionally, Special Forces and LRS can provide additional HUMINT reporting on remote/deep targets.
- 2 ~~(S//REL)~~ Every soldier is a sensor. Debriefings will be done at the lowest level with regard to convoys and patrols. The rule is, “if it moves, it reports.” It is not only an intelligence officer and analyst’s responsibility to conduct debriefings; platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, and company commanders must ensure debriefings are completed and the information reported up the chain of command. Debriefings should address not only enemy contact, but the lack of enemy contact and the atmospherics encountered during the mission (i.e. were the civilians friendly/hostile, were children playing, was trash being collected, etc.)
- (e) ~~(S//REL)~~ **Processing and Evaluation.** The MNC-I ACE will process all information received from MSCs. MNC-I will satisfy intelligence needs of all military forces operating in the AOR. All requirements in support of MNC-I forces will be coordinated with the MNC-I C2. As required, the ACE will provide other products, including intelligence summaries/briefings for the MNC-I C2. Classify all reports in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, DOD TS-5105.21-M-3, DDP Security Classification Guide and any procedures established by CENTCOM representatives under provisions of emergency disclosure authority.
- (8) (U) **Production.** The ACE will adjust analytical and production effort to support an asymmetric, COIN environment.
- (9) (U) **Reporting**
 - (a) ~~(S//REL)~~ All MNC-I intelligence products will also be posted on the C2 homepage on the SIPRNET and on CENTRIXS.
 - (b) (U) The principal intelligence report produced by subordinate and supporting commands is the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM).
- (10) (U) **Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units:** General Tasks.
 - (a) (U) Forward prioritized PIR, and requests for additional support to MNC-I CMD.
- 1 (U) **Collect and report IAW the Corps Collection Plan.**

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

- (b) (U) Plan and implement effective CI and information security plans for all forces, to include plans for the storage and security of intelligence materials in transit from other locations.
 - (c) (U) Ensure that forces maintain adequate stocks of maps and charts.
 - (d) (U) Submit intelligence reports to MNC-I C2 Operations Section per schedule listed in the MNC-I Reports Battle Rhythm.
 - (e) ~~(S//REL)~~ Coordinate all planning and use of organic intelligence collection systems with the MNC-I CMD.
 - (f) ~~(S//REL)~~ Be prepared to provide intelligence liaison teams.
 - (g) ~~(S//REL)~~ MNC-I HOC is the HUMINT authority for all MSCs, and all operations are to receive prior approval.
 - (h) ~~(S//REL)~~ Keep MNC-I C2 informed of the status of intelligence linguists (required/assigned or attached) during all phases of the operation.
 - (i) ~~(S//REL)~~ Conduct reconnaissance operations utilizing organic assets.
 - (j) ~~(S//REL)~~ Conduct screening of displaced persons in support of Civil Military Operations.
 - (k) ~~(S//REL)~~ Conduct initial interrogation of unlawful combatants and evacuate to MNC-I Designated Detention Facilities.
 - (l) ~~(S//REL)~~ BPT provide intelligence support to sensitive site exploitation.
 - ~~(m)~~~~(S//REL)~~ BPT to provide intelligence training to elements of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.
4. (U) **Coordinating Instructions**
- a. (U) Submit all reports via CENTRIXS, RWS, SIPRNET or JWICS.
 - b. (U) Submit intelligence reports to MNC-I C2 Operations Section per schedule listed in the MNC-I Reports Battle Rhythm.
 - c. (U) Ensure that forces maintain adequate planning stocks of maps and charts.
 - d. ~~(S//REL)~~ Coordinate all CI and HUMINT activities with the C2X, MNC-I.
 - (a) (U) Be prepared to provide intelligence liaison teams.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~

5. (U) **Administration and Logistics**. Refer to MNC-I OPORD 05-03 .
6. (U) **Command and Control**. Refer to MNC-I OPORD 05-03.

JOHN R. VINES
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commander, Multi-National CORPS – Iraq

APPENDIX:

- 1 Intelligence Estimate Corps Provincial and City Assessment
- 2 PIR and IR
- 3 Corps Collection Plan
- 4 1.4c Information Flow
- 5 1.4c Information Flow
- 6 Counter-Intelligence Information Flow
- 7 1.4c Information Flow
- 8 Detainee Information Flow
- 9 Targeting Intelligence
- 10 MiTT Intelligence Guidance

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20151120~~