CJSOTF-AP conducted an assessment of the Iraqi Theater of Operations to determine “where we are and where we need to go.” The assessment was guided by MNC-I’s Key Tasks, Near-Term Objectives, and Lines of Operation (LOO), and consists of an assessment summary, and supporting assessments by each of the three Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs). The assessment focused only on the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units that CJSOTF-AP is partnered with and does not address the Legitimate and Capable GOI line or its objectives, because CJSOTF-AP only plays a supporting role.

Line of Operations #1: Secure Environment

Key Tasks: Defeat Al Qaida and Extremists; Facilitate Reconciliation.

Objectives:
- Population Secured, Violence Reduced, Violent Enemy Actors Defeated, Neutralized, or Disrupted
- To engage key communicators across the tribal, religious, and political spectrum in order to cause the Iraqis to actively resist and fight Al Qaida, to work with the ISF, become part of the political process, reduce violence, neutralize the insurgency, and connect Iraq’s national government to provinces, cities, and villages throughout the country.

Line of Operations #2: Capable and Credible ISF

Key Tasks: Protect the Population; Continue to Develop ISF Capacity.

Objectives: ISF Capability Enhanced, Sectarian Behavior in the ISF Reduced, and Security Responsibilities Transferred to the Iraqis

The security of the Iraqi environment – its population and physical terrain – with an acceptable level of violence is the key measure of progress in the theater and the factor upon which all other measures depend. Security in this case is governed by the interplay of internal and external actors and must address the threats from terrorism, insurgency, sectarian warfare, and intra-ethnic conflict. The Iraqi people and ISF play the dominant role in securing the nation, but require substantial support from coalition forces.

Terrorism in Iraq is the product predominantly of Sunni extremist groups: Al Qaida in Iraq (Islamic State of Iraq) and Ansar Al Sunna. Al Qaida in Iraq desires to establish a caliphate in Iraq by expelling coalition forces and overthrowing what it considers to be an apostate government. They rely upon popular support based on the perception of their forces as defenders of true Islam and the Sunni population. They are also supported in some measure by external actors directly and indirectly linked to Al Qaida senior leadership. In the last six months, coalition forces have severely decimated the leadership, communications, and logistical infrastructure of Al Qaida.

The most active front for Al Qaida is in Diyala Province. Al Qaida’s sanctuary has been reduced through the combined efforts of coalition forces, Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade (1920 RB), and ISF to an area east and north of Muqdadiyah, beyond the Hamrin Ridge. Al Qaida continues to

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1 Certain elements of Jaysh al Mahdi use terrorist tactics in the conduct of their operations, but will be addressed separately.
2 The sectarian nature of some of this conflict will be addressed separately.
attempt attacks back into the Diyala River valley to regain lost territory, but is unlikely to return in any significant strength. Through Salah al Din, Ninewah, and At Tamin Provinces, Al Qaida is attempting to conduct spectacular attacks in hopes of provoking greater sectarian violence and demonstrating the inability of ISF to secure the population. These attacks will be most effective in Mosul and Kirkuk, where Al Qaida maintains sufficient numbers to execute attacks without coherent leadership. Additionally, in those areas lacking a CF or ISF presence, such as small towns in Jazira Desert, Al Qaida will continue to intimidate the population and support larger Al Qaida operations elsewhere. In Al Anbar province, Al Qaida has been pushed from the urban population centers and is reliant upon decreasing rural sanctuaries. They maintain some support through the use of fear, intimidation and murder and are struggling to maintain lines of communication to Syria and Jordan through Al Anbar Province.

The only active insurgency is on the part of Sunni rejectionist groups: the Islamic Army of Iraq, 1920RB, Mujahadin Army, New Ba’ath Party, and others. All of these organizations have in common a belief in their legitimate right to rule Iraq, strong ties to the Sunni populace, and strengths in organization, leadership, intelligence, and business remaining from their dominance during the Saddam Hussein era. They are in the fight to secure concessions from the Government of Iraq (GOI) and regain lost power. In all of these organizations, considerable numbers of personnel have turned away from cooperation with Al Qaida and splits have occurred. They will continue to strive for political dominance, beginning locally and looking toward national power. With continued engagement on the part of CF and sincere attempts at reconciliation from the GOI, the majority of these Sunnis will use the legitimate processes to achieve their goals. Portions of all these organizations, elements of some tribes, and some whole tribes are likely to maintain a hard-line approach towards CF and the GOI. They will continue to fight and are likely to shift through temporary alliances with al Qaida and other Sunni insurgent groups.

Tribal reconciliation is farthest along amongst the Sunni tribes of Al Anbar Province where the Sahawa al Anbar (SAA) has achieved legitimate political power and plays a key role in denying Al Qaida sanctuary. In Diyala, the 1920RB and Sunni tribal elements have engaged in combat with al Qaida and in many cases are entering the ISF or securing the Sunni population alongside them³. In Salah al Din, Ninewah, and At Tamin Provinces, some Sunni tribes are working with CF and ISF to identify and target Al Qaida. Other tribes continue to aid al Qaida for a variety of reasons; primarily due to lack of security or economic incentives.

Sectarian violence is the most pernicious of the security threats which continue to threaten security in Iraq. It is most common in those areas where there is a significant confluence of Shi’a and Sunni populations, northern Babil Province, Baghdad, and Diyala; but also extends into urban areas of the northern Sunni-dominant provinces. The primary causes of this violence are a Shi’a desire for power and retribution and a Sunni desire to regain power or protect the status quo. In many areas, al Qaida conducts spectacular attacks, aids Sunni groups in both defensive and offensive operations, or uses information operations to accelerate the violence between Sunni and Shi’a.

Sectarian violence is most pervasive and most damaging to the overall security environment in the greater Baghdad area. The primary motivating factor is the Shi’a desire to reverse Saddam Hussein’s settlement of Sunni populations in previously Shia held areas and remove a perceived Ba’athist/al Qaida threat. Al Qaida effectively interjects violence through spectacular attacks and executions. JAM and especially JAM Special Groups (SG) are conducting a deliberate cleansing campaign to homogenize the Baghdad “Beladiyahs” and northern Babil. Al Qaida uses this Shi’a aggression to recruit the Sunni population into at least tacit support if not outright cooptation. This is most prevalent in the southern and western Baghdad belts.

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³ There is still considerable sectarian violence and the potential for more, as will be addressed below.
Intra-ethnic conflict between Sunni entities in Iraq falls into one of two general categories: Al Qaida-related (discussed above) or economic/criminal. The conflicts between Sunni tribal groups will increase over time as security is established and they take advantage of their indigenous security forces to establish dominance over other tribes. This conflict will not rise to a level sufficient to threaten national security. However, it may provide some increased opportunities for Al Qaida as they leverage weaker tribes through promises of security.

Intra-ethnic conflict for the Shi’a will be mainly between Jaysh al Mahdi and forces aligned with Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), whether those forces are Badr Corps or ISF. Recent fighting in An Nasariyah, Ad Diwaniyah, and Suq as Shuyakh provide a template that will be repeated in the five southern provinces as both sides vie for political dominance of the Shi’a. Conflict in Diwaniyah will worsen over the next two months and conflict will flare up in Al Kut. Al Kut represents a primary logistical and facilitation hub for Jaysh al Mahdi and therefore will be heavily contested. The battles between Jaysh al Mahdi and their political rivals probably present the greatest long term threat to a stable GOI by fracturing the Shi’a majority.

**Engagement and Iraqi Security Forces**

**Al Anbar Assessment**

CJSOTF-AP conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with 28 ISF units in Al Anbar and has trained over 733 Iraqi police officers and Iraqi soldiers since 01 April 2007. Although CJSOTF-AP trains both Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army, our recent focus has been on developing Iraqi Police numbers and capacity. CJSOTF-AP FID partners in Al Anbar are limited in their capability to expand and excel by some common factors. Neither the IP SWAT/SWAT-like units nor the IA Scouts are officially recognized by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) or Ministry of Defense (MOD) respectively. There is very little incentive for these men to put forth the extra effort required, other than their own personal professionalism. Logistical systems are hampered throughout Al Anbar and results in a shortage of equipment, vehicles, fuel, weapons, and ammunition. [Despite these challenges, CJSOTF-AP has been able to identify the required personnel to place these elements in positions where they can affect the future of Al Anbar.]

CJSOTF-AP forces in Al Anbar also played a key role in the expansion of the Provincial Security Units (PSUs) in AO RALEIGH and AO DENVER. As the requirement for IP forces continued to grow in Al Anbar, the need for immediate forces could not be matched with the output of IP through recognized and validated IP academies. PSUs were approved by the MOI as a measure to put security forces on the streets in Al Anbar until the IP academies could produce the required force. Working with MNF-W, CJSOTF-AP forces created an 80-hour Program of Instruction (POI) to train volunteers from local tribes in the basics of security operations, and trained more than 250 of the first PSU members for AO RALEIGH and 200 for AO DENVER. The impact was immediate as this allowed trained PSU personnel to provide security for the region in which they lived.

**Ninewa Province.**

ODAs have been engaged with a number of the Shammari sheikhs, whose sub-tribes straddle the border area, and have noted that there is an ongoing internal power struggle among the sheikhs. In general, they are pro or neutral toward the CF in the cities/populated areas (Rabiah, Mosul, Tal Afar, Sinjar), but are supportive of Al Qaida the farther west from the Tigris River Valley, roads, and in rural areas. The geographically remote villages and tribes assist Al Qaida in smuggling weapons and Foreign Fighters.
(FF) because it provides basic life sustainment for these villages that have little or no local industry, infrastructure or commercial potential.

CJSTOF-AP conducts FID regularly with 14 ISF units and has trained over 300 police officers and soldiers in Ninewa Province since 01 April 2007. Within the province, the Ninewa and Tal Afar SWATs are two specialized FID partners with whom we have conducted advanced skills training and combined operations throughout Ninewa Province. Although they are capable of executing platoon-sized independent operations, they suffer from a lack of MTO&E and are without an adequate supply system.

The Ninewa SWAT is a very capable organization that represents what the IP could be with proper guidance. The SWAT members' ethnic and sectarian composition reflects the mixed nature of Mosul, with groups represented proportionately. In the past two years they have executed over 140 tactical missions with CJSTOF-AP and conventional forces. They are experienced in urban structure takedowns and have successfully executed missions independently. Although the unit has had success in its AOR, increasing its size from 50 to 180 officers would allow it to action larger targets, source an internal QRF, fill gaps in their administration section, and allow more time for sustainment training.

Like most ISF units, the Ninewa SWAT has chronic supply problems. Currently Ninewa SWAT is being supplied through the iPLOs and the 4/1 CAV. Most equipment such as flashlights, weapon parts, uniforms, have come from the iPLOs acting as a part of the PiTT or from the SWAT spending personal funds for their equipment. Higher IP headquarters does not adequately provide the SWAT with fuel, equipment, or ammunition.

Members of the Tal Afar SWAT are considered heroes by the local population for aggressively fighting Al Qaida networks throughout the Ninewa province. It is capable of conducting platoon-sized operations, independent of CF/CJSTOF-AP C2. Tal Afar SWAT has established good relationships with the Tal Afar Crime Prevention Unit, which allows for protection of witnesses and due process of law through the Iraqi system. Tal Afar SWAT also suffers from pay and logistic issues, which negatively affects its ability to conduct operations. Tal Afar SWAT does not have a MTO&E; lacks a supply and maintenance system, is short or without ammunition, basic equipment, vehicles, AK-47s, pistols, TAC-lights for assaults during limited visibility, uniforms, body armor, eye protection, CQB sights, etc., nor do its members receive incentive or hazardous duty pay.

Diya Province.

CJSTOF-AP conducts training and combat advises all three battalions of 1/5 IA BDE, and two battalions of 3/5 IA BDE and has trained nearly 350 IA soldiers in advanced skills throughout Diyala since 01 April 2007. All of these elements have been used in combat operations and have shown new levels of confidence and competence that has made these training events well supported by both IA and IP Commanders.

AOB [1.4] works closely with 3-1 HBCT to conduct tribal engagement with the Al Nidah (Sunni), Shammar (Shi’a), and Bani Saad (Sunni) Tribes. For the past two months, the AOB has conducted lethal operations against the Nidah tribe’s Al Qaida facilitators, including removing the sheikh, while non-lethally engaging other tribal leaders to get the tribe to deny Al Qaida influence in the area. The AOB is also working with the Shammar tribe to gain intelligence on Al Qaida in and around Kanaan and help facilitate 3-1 HBCT ‘guarantor’ program for tribal individuals released from detention. The Bani Saad tribe is one of the last tribes in Diyala that are still fully supportive of Al Qaida. Recent reporting suggests this tribe provides support to Al Qaida elements that are beginning to congregate in the Kanaan-Balad Ruz area.
The AOB is attempting to partner with predominantly Shi’a IP SWAT elements but this has not proven successful due to the heavy JAM influence. Increased reporting that JAM, and CJSOTF-AP forces in Diyala, will make partnerships with these units even more dangerous.

The possible introduction of the 34th BDE KRG into the Hamrin Ridge/Lake, Diyala River Valley, and the Nidah areas will likely lead to the further disruption of Al Qaida and will be an important stabilizing force. Although the political sensitivities of this introduction are serious, the effectiveness of the Kurdish forces will allow areas that were once Al Qaida sanctuaries to be cleared and denied to Al Qaida.

Salah ad Din (SaD) and At Tamin

CJSOTF-AP conducts FID regularly with 11 ISF units and has trained over 570 police officers and soldiers in SaD and At Tamin Provinces since TOA. These select units have received advanced training and have been combat advised on complex, precision, raids; but they all face significant logistical constraints, the most significant of which is the lack of armored vehicles. The overall success of CJSOTF-AP FID efforts in SaD / At Tamin have resulted from the continual oversight and vetting of volunteer forces that pass rigorous selection and assessment courses and remain permanently combat advised by CJSOTF.

The major tribal populations in SaD are concentrated along the main LOC north from Baghdad. The economic center of gravity of the province is Bayji and the oil refinery located there. Tribal competition for local, and provincial economic prosperity derived from the hydrocarbon industry and associated support industries is the driving motivation for power, control, and influence in SaD. Two dominant motivations pervade in CJSOTF-AP’s tribal engagements: the tribes’ desires for security and for economic prosperity. Security is most often associated with removing the threat of Al Qaida and coequally, significant strength to resist the perceived Persian threat. Economic prosperity runs the gamut from jobs for the tribes’ members to having, holding, and controlling true wealth from the oil industry.

Al Qaida is being displaced from prior strongholds in southern Samarra into northern Samarra and Tikrit by successful CF combat operations driven by intelligence gained from Al Bazi Tribe and Islamic Army of Iraq. Collectively these movements have increased Al Qaida presence in the Tuz area, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and in the Za’ab Triangle, where Terrorist/FF can refit and plan future attacks. In Bayji, Siniyah, Mezera, and Al Botomah, tribes have already begun conducting unilateral operations against Al Qaida and are requesting support from CF to continue operations. MND-N and CJSOTF-AP have assessed that recognition and support of a ‘Tribal Security Force’ would significantly aid the effort to remove Al Qaida influence from the AO and reinforce a larger trend seen across the operational environment against religious extremism.

SOTF-Central

Babil, Wasit and Qadisiyah Province

The majority of the tribes in Qadisiyah and Wasit are involved in smuggling for economic gain and survival. The tribes have historically supported CF’s endeavors to create a more unified and peaceful Iraq, but still do not trust the GOI. In Babil, Al Qaida has been trying to intimidate the local tribesmen, but the sheikhs have stated that they will continue with plans to confront Al Qaida.
Most tribes in these provinces are looking for economic assistance, Civil Affairs projects, and security from terrorists and insurgents. The sheikhs claim that unemployment is the primary problem in the provinces and is the underlying reason for the lack of security: “The man who does not have bread for his family will cooperate with the devil.”

CJSOTF-AP conducts FID and combat advises 6 ISF units, training over 2000 police officers and soldiers in Babil, Wasit and Qadisiyah Provinces since 01 April 2007. Hillah and Al Kut SWAT are the most proficient units and are capable of Battalion (-) size operations. The FID training includes advanced skills training, and tasks such as information collection, reconnaissance, and close quarters combat.

SWAT and other partner units face threats from JAM and suffer from lack of MOI support. Although they are some of the most capable units in southern Iraq, they do not receive any additional pay, are denied promotions, and are chronically short on ammunition and critical equipment. The lack of armored vehicles to protect against small arms fire and IEDs also places these units at great risk. SWAT operations have been aborted on several occasions because of ISF injuries sustained from IEDs on the way to the objective area.

Al Basrah, Maysan, Al Muthanna, and Dhi Qar Province Assessments

CJSOTF-AP conducts FID regularly with the Dhi Qar Police Commando BN Tactical Support Unit (TSU) and has trained over 300 police officers since 01 April 2007. The TSU has approximately 450 police officers, with the CJSOTF-AP actively training 53 to be a more advanced strike force. Even though the TSU is the best-supplied ISF unit in the area, they have major problems obtaining ammunition because of a MOI claimed shortage that is suppose to be resolved in December of 2007. CJSOTF-AP will continue to train and combat advise the TSU with an emphasis on company sized operations, advanced urban combat and information collection, and will develop a competent and autonomous staff with the TSU HQ.

There are four major confederations and a number of major tribes within MND-SE. These tribes are predominately Shi’a and the majority are fairly pro-CF. The Al-Tammimi tribe, which has a mixed Shi’a/Sunni population, is based in Az Zubayr and is one of the largest tribes in southern Iraq. In the past, JAM assassination squads have targeted the Tammimi tribe.

CJSOTF-AP Focus in Iraq for the Next 90-120

SOTF-W:

- Continue to focus targeting efforts on AQI leadership to disrupt their ability to re-establish cells in major cities, target infrastructure, and move equipment, VBIEDs and FF into Baghdad
- Continue to support MNF-W’s Provincial Security Units training
- Remain heavily engaged with Albu Nimr tribe to facilitate targeting
- Improve FID partner units’ capability to conduct company level operations
- Engage the Zobai to strengthen their pro CF/GOI attitude.

SOTF-N:

- Continue to focus on the development of high-payoff FID partners with the goal of improving their ability to conduct company level (90-man) operations
- Set the basis for expansion of ISOF into Mosul and Diyala
- Work with the Rabiah POE-TT and tribes to interdict the flow of Terrorist and FF from Syria

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- Surge lethal operations in the Za’ab triangle, western Ninewa, and in Mosul against AQI
- Complete the defeat of AQI in Diyala by leveraging former insurgents and community watches
- Target JAM, and JAM affiliated officials to deny JAM the ability to displace Sunni populations in the vacuum created by AQI’s defeat.
- Continue to target and interdict EFP networks and facilitators to reduce the threat of EFP and
  
  1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

- Target AQI in the Za’ab triangle, greater Samarra AO, and the Golden Hills region
- Target ISF and provincial officials who are corrupt or supportive of the insurgency.

SOTF-C:

- Conduct precision targeting of JAM/SG HVIs across the AO, IOT disrupt the JAM/SG targeting cycle.
- Continue engagement initiatives to influence the tribes and the local population to support CJSOTF’s efforts to disrupt JAM/SG operations, and interdict EFP flow and CII.
- Work closely with MNSTC-I to formalize and better resource CJSOTF-ARFID partner units to ensure their future survivability and self-sufficiency.
- Continue to support and combat advise ISOF’s expansion CDO Bn in Basrah