Enclosure 5 - MND-B Assessment

Security in Baghdad has significantly improved through Operation “Fardh Al-Qanoon,” and contributed sustainable progress to the MNC-I near and long-term end state. Made possible by the surge of forces and the “Disrupt, Clear, Control, Retain, Transfer” strategy associated with Fardh Al-Qanoon, MND-B capitalized on the baseline that the Ma’am Ila-Amam (Together Forward) strategy provided, and moved Baghdad closer to a visible, self-reliant future. The surge is working. Ma’am Ila-Amam did not generate the necessary troop levels to control problematic neighborhoods once the were cleared. Compound with fighting AQI and the

JAM facilitated Shia expansion, the lower than necessary troop levels drove Ma’am Ila-Amam progress to an early maturity date. The new strategy in MND-B picked up where Ma’am Ila-Amam left off.

The progress since February is very visible, and the foundation to build on the Governance, Economics, and Transition Lines of Operation have been made possible from the strides of the surge and new strategy. Neighborhoods that were gained and lost to insurgents and militias are now controlled by first disrupting, clearing, building (Joint Security Stations) JSSs and Coalition Outposts (COPs), and operating directly from the new, forwardly deployed structures. Over 75% of Coalition Forces that previously traveled into the zones from larger FOBs, now live in zone. This constant security presence also provides an accelerant to the growth of Iraqi Security Force (ISF) professionalism. The partnership with Iraqi Army and National Police units and U.S. Soldiers in the JSSs and COPs produced a residual benefit: constant interaction during joint operations with coalition units exposed the ISF to American Soldier professionalism. This rubbed off. The ISF, in some cases, are now in the lead and capable of conducting independent operations. In other cases, they are far from taking the lead, but are demonstrating continuous improvement. This set the stage for the building of “safe neighborhoods” and “safe markets.” Under the practice of “safe neighborhoods” and “safe markets,” sectarian-based, large scale attacks have been deterred, markets are flourishing, and the conditions for urban renewal and revitalization exist. Finally, across all lines of operation, the present glide-path is promising, but there is a long fight ahead in the path towards Federal Iraqi Control.

Protect the Population

Where we are: Lying in the wake of the remaining contested fault lines, declining pockets of AQI resistance, and stalled JAM expansion, is the simple fact that Baghdad bore witness to a steady decline of sectarian violence since the beginning of Fardh Al-Qanoon. This trend is amply supported by the November through July Attack Statistics, and since November, attacks against civilians decreased by 47%. Attacks against ISF decreased 28%. What is especially convincing and equally explainable is that the total number of attacks increased by 22%. The reason – attacks on the coalition have increased due to the surge and pressure on the enemy. The primary objective of Fardh Al-Qanoon is being met: sectarian violence has steadily declined, and the local population is feeling more comfortable when they see ISF in their defense.

The 31 JSSs and 38 COPs form the linchpin to the partnered success of the ISF and coalition surge. The constant presence in previously contested regions allowed MND-B to accomplish what it was unable to do in Ma’am Ila-Amam – control and retain neighborhoods that were deemed clear. In February, over 90% of the security districts
in MND-B were assessed to be in a “disrupt” or “clear” phase. Currently, over 50% are in a “control” or “retain” phase.

Local security contracts comprised of reconciled locals, and temporary concrete barriers serving to define and defend newly formed “gated” communities, are the bedrock of the MND-B safe neighborhood and markets initiatives. This has certainly limited the number of easily accessible large crowds that VBIED used to target. To date, 11 safe neighborhoods (comprised of 24 Muhallahs) are complete, nine are in progress, and 14 more are planned. Finally, the use of Biometrics and the National Identification Card System reinforced the security measures for local recruiting drives and at controlled access points.

Where we need to be: The proven success of the “safe neighborhood” initiative warrants its continuance. The remaining 23 neighborhoods programmed, either planned or in progress, should remain on course. Additionally, MND-B will need another 4 JSSs, 6 COPs, and non-sectarian forces to sustain the momentum. GOI must recognize and account for the lack of an Iraqi Police footprint in the Sunni neighborhoods of Ameriyah and East Rashid.

Facilitate Reconciliation

Where we are: Considered an end-state rather than an immediate objective, reconciliation has manifested itself in MND-B. Previously disenchanted Sunni populations that distanced themselves from a GOI that ignored them, and consequently harbored insurgent groups (JAI, 1920th Revolutionary Brigade, and TWJ), have joined in the fight against AQI. In most cases, reconciled insurgents want to be recognized as legitimate, paid, GOI employees. Their involvement in the fight produced measurable localized decreases in AQI activity, which included captures of battalion and brigade High Value Individuals. Each district employs their reconcilables in a manner best tailored for the region; however, with the exception of Abu Ghuraib, security contracts and local security forces paid with CERP have been the preferred method. In Abu Ghuraib, 1,738 locally recruited, reconciled Iraqis have been approved by the IFCNR and MOI to start IP training. These same local hires worked for free while waiting for GOI approval. During their volunteer service, violence dropped significantly each week in Abu Ghuraib.

In Ameriyah, the volunteers have been able to pinpoint AQI sanctuaries and cache sites. The local coalition commanders in Ameriyah solemnly attest to their effectiveness as combat multipliers and feel their contributions made the difference in forcing the AQI to displace south. Similar security contracts have been established in Ghazaliya, Taji, Rabi, Adhamiyah, and Basateen. Thus far, 13 security contracts have been approved for 64 sites and 1866 reconciled Iraqis. There are currently 6326 reconciled Iraqis that fill the ranks of the local security forces.

Where we need to be: There are tribal leader engagements still occurring. East and West Rashid have a lot to contribute to the fight against AQI. In addition, reconciling with highly populated Shia communities is a way-ahead to promote GOI and dislodge the JAM influence. Most importantly, the Shia-dominated GOI must act faster. Locally-recruited Sunni IPs must be emplaced in Sunni dominated neighborhoods that are devoid of police presence. The CERP-funded security contracts are an adequate tool for employing and providing hope to the reconcilables; however, it is merely buying
time. GOI must officially recognize and start paying for the contracts. GOI must also follow through with alternative employment initiatives and the improvement of essential services in the affected districts.

**Defeat AQI and Extremists**

*Where we are:* Through intelligence driven combat operations, MND-B significantly disrupted the AQI networks operating in and around the MND-B AO. In early August, joint operations with 4/1 ID, 2/11D, and 2/1 CD detained 10 senior members of the AQI network operating in South Karkh and dealt a severe blow to their VBIED capability.

Previous to the operations, the South Karkh network was the most active AQI network in Baghdad and had been operating at the highest tempo since November 2006. As a measure of effective use for targeting, between 1 and 14 July, there were 15 VBIEDs that exploded in the Baghdad security districts, whereas between 1 and 14 August, only 3 VBIEDs exploded in the security districts—all of which occurred prior to the detainment of the VBIED cell—and MND-B units found 6 VBIEDs before they could be detonated.

In addition, MND-B continues to apply pressure to the leadership of Shia extremist groups operating in the MND-B AO. Recent operations resulted in the detainment of 6 of 9 Ja sh al Mahdi bri ade-level commanders operating in western Ba' hdad. The 1.4c 1.4c (b)(6)

Successful detainment of JAM and JAM Special Group leaders disrupts their ability to consolidate power and exacerbates infighting between elements of each organization. The MND-B Targeting Team also actively targets key facilitators of the supply and financial networks.

*Where we need to be:* In order to continue to deny AQI the ability to reassert itself in the security districts of East Rashid, Ameriyah, and areas south of Baghdad, MND-B needs to continue aggressively targeting the South Karkh VBIED cell in order to detain the 4 remaining Tier I and Tier II leadership. Simultaneously, MND-B needs to aggressively target the Rusafa AQI network in order to prevent the re-emergence of sensational attacks in eastern Ba' hdad. The kinetic operations in East Rashid, Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah, and Adhamiyah.

MND-B efforts against JAM and the must focus on disrupting their ability to consolidate power and unify their support base. The Jaysh al Mahdi organization has been resilient in spite of MND-B successful operations to detain their leadership. Further efforts must work to de-legitimize their influence over the Iraqi populace. MND-B will accomplish this by targeting corruption within the Iraqi Security Forces.

**Continue to develop ISF Capacity**

*Where we are:* Over 2/3 of the 31 Iraqi Army (IA) combat battalions operating in MND-B's AOR have achieved or exceeded the ORA level 2 threshold, meaning they are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with coalition support. On the other hand, less than 1/3 of our National Police (NP)
battalions are assessed at ORA-2. Most are at ORA-3, or capable of COIN operations only in conjunction with coalition units. The principal challenges facing both IA and NP can be summarized in three areas: 1) Personnel - specifically officer and NCO manning, 2) Leadership – quantity, quality, and loyalty of commanders, and 3) Sustain(Logistics – responsiveness, accountability, and transparency of the system. Finally, there is a troop to task problem with IA units in Baghdad. The current estimate is that MND-B is short 17 IA battalions.

For Iraqi Police (IP), the current focus is on quantity. Today, there are 15,347 local and patrol police within the province of Baghdad. MND-B assesses that 12,641 additional police are needed within the next 180 days. To support this influx of IPs, 30 additional stations are needed. Beyond quantity, problems with sustainment and sectarianism persist within the IP.

Where we need to be: The mid-term goal should be all IA and NP battalions to be at ORA level 2 as quickly as possible. The four IA battalions currently assessed at ORA-3 require filling key leadership positions with competent and loyal leaders and the removal of current leaders suspected of sectarian or criminal behavior. In the case of five IA battalions assessed at ORA-4, their progression to ORA-2 will come about by, in addition to addressing leadership problems, the completion of the ongoing equipping and manning process. As leadership and equipping/manning problems are addressed and more battalions reach ORA-2, a general progression to ORA level 1 will follow as the units grow a larger pool of experienced officers/NCOs and the establish more robust systems for sustaining and logistically supporting the IA. Finally, although it’s not realistic to expect the current shortfall of 17 IA battalions to be completely filled, the current plans for permanently adding two IA Brigades and six IA Battalions to the Baghdad AOR must be executed as quickly as possible.

For the National Police, where all fifteen of the ORA-3 battalions share the same deficiency of inadequate officer/NCO manning, the quantitative problem will be resolved with ongoing recruiting and training initiatives. MND-B and MOI must continue to address the qualitative problems of leadership competence and commanders’ loyalty. In addition, the role of the National Police within the ISF must be determined very soon.

For the IP, the overarching problem of an insufficiently sized police force is exacerbated by the reality that the IP struggles to sustain itself in Baghdad. IP must be capable of executing and maintaining a budget in order to resource both personnel and equipment requirements. Lastly, the impact of sectarianism and militia influence must be mitigated.

Assist Efforts to Improve GOI Capacity

Where We Are: Basic governmental capacity of the GOI is marginally functional. The governing bodies above the beladiyah Directors General are hindered in the execution of their civic duties and responsibilities by a combination of benign ignorance of political and budgetary process, predominance of sectarian issues, and pseudo sectarian agendas by political parties and formal/informal leaders. The uncertainty of the Baghdad Governor’s security responsibilities has not been resolved, and his relationship with the Baghdad Operations Center has yet to be clearly defined. He has taken the initiative to help establish his roles and responsibilities. The governor has reached out to the reconcilable individuals and groups in the Qadas. At a grass roots level where the civil populace has its greatest focus and concerns, Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NAC)
and District Advisory Councils (DAC) have, in isolated cases, moved considerably forward, while others have yet to begin progress in earnest. The New Baghdad DAC exists marginally more than name only and only makes progress both in the provision of Essential Services (ESS) and Local Governance when the land owning Brigade Combat Team (BCT) for that battlespace performs those functions. By far the worst performing, malevolent, and most dysfunctional DAC is that of Sadr City. The DAC Chairman communicates through proxy by the 8/2 NP Commander and the land-owning BCT is unable to confirm the provision of ESS to the most heavily populated beladiyah of Baghdad (+2.5M). The Adhamiyah NACs and DAC are challenged with sectarian issues and meet in separate Hayy’s for the security of their council members; however, they are working together to resolve their secular issues and, more importantly, to provide for the civil populace they represent. The most promising sign is the rebirth and growth of basic governmental functions and the provision of ESS and economic stimulation in Abu Ghuraib and Taji as well as very well organized and functional councils operating in Karadah.

The monetary and budget development and resourcing system is lethargic. Budget management and execution by the GOI is slow and inefficient in revenue management and disbursement to stimulate economic growth. MND-B has contacted regional American Embassy Economic Sections in an effort to work with other CENTCOM countries to develop regional markets for Iraqi goods and services. Additional assistance from the US Department of State could bolster the growth of Iraqi industry and commerce, which at the present time is stagnant. Within its defined limits, MND-B continues to engage in the stimulation of the local economy with USAID and Task Force Business Stabilization Operation (TFBSO) partners. Private and State Owned enterprises are targeted to both increase their own employment numbers as well as stimulate host nation lines of supply which in turn increase employment and stimulate the economy. Between coordination for host nation loans, TFBSO funding, and MND-B CERP projects, over $27.3M has been earmarked for 23 Private and State owned enterprises (GOI: $10,845,000/ TFBSO: $13,298,000/ MND-B: $3,186,000). CF micro-grants are successfully providing a quick burst of economic energy at a local level to disadvantaged and battle-damaged businesses; however, micro-grants are in direct competition with GOI loans because they are easier to secure and are not repaid. Banking is challenged because the population sees banks primarily as a source for cashing pensions. Citizens do not trust banks and frequently do not deposit large sums of money. Banks have a limited but expanding electronic capability with minimal automation. MND-B is pressing for more CF to Host Nation (HN) funding transactions to be by either of two means, Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) or HN currency. These methods of payment prevent the disruption of the local economy by eliminating the infusion of United States Dollars (USD) and therefore also removes an internationally accepted and traded currency that finds its way outside the HN borders and into the hands of external actors that actively support Anti-Iraqi Forces and undermining of the growth of democracy. Baghdad BCTs all have one military Civil Affairs Company which is comprised of one Civil Affairs Team BRAVO (CAT-B), and four Civil Affairs Team-ALPHA (CAT-A). EPRTs (embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams) are a welcomed DOS addition to the DOD combat proven Civil Affairs units. The ePRTs continue to connect to the NAC and DAC formations and teach, coach and mentor local governance, stimulate the provision of ESS and economic/urban development and expansion.
**Where we need to be**: The future of the BOC and the role of the Governor / Provincial Council and the Mayor / Amanant must be defined. The GOI must provide all essential services expeditiously, universally, and without regard to sect or political affiliation. Baghdad has provided micro-loans and other forms of access to capital and must continue to provide resources for small businesses and SOEs while weaning itself off the US/CF funding stream. Urban renewal and revitalization, such as the Doura and Shorja Markets, provide an example of latent economic opportunity. Safe and secure commercial zones must be expanded to increase employment and economic opportunities. ESS systems projects, such as sewage and water along with electrical capacity, must continue to be improved and targeted not just for the local residential populaces, but also markets and commercial zones which will enable sustainable economic growth. The economy must be infused with opportunities for HN micro-grants and loans; local, regional and international markets must be developed and exploited to showcase Iraqi goods and services; commerce and trade infrastructure development, repair and expansion must be made a priority for the GOI. Businesses that can provide sustainable economic security, stability and employment opportunities must be expanded. Citizen confidence and trust in the banking industry must be re-established while bringing HN banking services into the 21st century. The GOI must make sustained efforts to identify and remove corruption and sectarianism from its ranks in order to be recognized as a full and contributing member of a global community and a free and open market place supporting international trade.

**Protect the Force**

**Where we are**: MND-B places a high priority on precision offensive operations to defeat enemy indirect fire and improvised explosive devices (IED) in order to protect our Soldiers, the International Zone, and the citizens of Baghdad. This effort predated the current Coalition Surge but has improved as a result of the added brigades. The Division’s primary reconnaissance effort focuses on surveillance of areas where terrorists routinely place IEDs. The number two priority is coverage of the sites that the enemy frequently uses to launch rocket and mortar attacks. Other intelligence collection efforts identify enemy leaders and fighters that contribute to IED and indirect fire attacks. As a result of successful intelligence gathering, all brigades execute operations to capture or kill key enemy personnel. This has severely disrupted the operations of many enemy IED and indirect fire cells – especially AQI – in the city of Baghdad.

The surge of Coalition forces added two combat brigades plus five Stryker battalions to MND-B. Additionally, the Division received one additional Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Recon Platoon to support these new forces. Because of the increased number of Coalition Forces and, just as significantly, the continuous projection of those forces into the neighborhoods, the Division receives much of its tactical information from ordinary Iraqis. This allows the Division to focus its assets more precisely. Iraqi security forces also improved the coordination and intensity of their offensive operations as a direct effect of having more Coalition Forces operating inside the city all the time. Overall, these complementary effects have led to an impressive reduction in IEDs and forced the enemy to constantly change sites from which to fire mortars and rockets.

The Division also improved its route clearance operations to find and remove IEDs. Added equipment – Buffalos, Huskies, RG-31s, improved cameras, and optics – and increased experience of our Soldiers were a large part of this enhanced capability but
the surge was also responsible. Once again, the local citizens, feeling more secure, are stepping forward to provide information to our forces about cache locations for IED munitions as well as the locations of some IEDs and the buried wires used in some instances to command detonate them. We have also continued to benefit from the success of our counter-remote electronic warfare (CREW) devices, which force the enemy to depend upon victim operated and command detonated IEDs. The former are more difficult to build and install, requiring specialized personnel that are not easily replaced when our offensive operations successfully target them. The command detonated IEDs force the enemy to remain on site near the IED, which has made it easier to find and eliminate them as a threat. Overall, MND-B has seen the beginning of a reversal in IED trends for the first time in years. The combined efforts of the surge also impacted the supply of munitions available to the enemy, and forces him to search for new sources of explosives to conduct attacks.

Where we need to be: Current successful operations have disrupted enemy operations; however, more Electronic Close Targeting Reconnaissance (ECTR) equipment would greatly enhance the MND-B targeting effort. The enemy’s use of EFPs continues to increase with support from foreign governments and remains the most lethal threat to Coalition forces. Improved armor systems for our vehicles, EFP detection systems, route clearing equipment, and exploitation support are critical to overcoming this threat. Finally, additional Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination System of Systems (PSDS2) capability would allow MND-B to survey and detect threats to more of the fixed sites and routes.