Enclosure 8 - MND-C Assessment

Protect the population

Where we are: MND-C has been able to protect the population and significantly reduce sectarian violence across the entire AO through establishing 29 patrol bases and COPs and by focusing lethal and non-lethal efforts on the population centers. We in MND-C treat every line of operation with equal vigor. We have also made progress, but to a lesser extent, in protecting the population from militia influence and corruption within the GoI and local governments. There is a measurable and significant decrease in the number of extra judicial killings, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians. The concerned citizens groups emerging throughout our AO are only partially filling the gap in the ISF within MND-C. Their relationship is very tenuous, as they wait for the GoI to fulfill the promises of legitimacy from the both the MoI and MoD. My assessment is if they don’t seem some progress in gaining legitimacy over the next 6 months the concerned citizens effort could collapse. The availability of ISR resources, security equipment, and the increased MITT presence, has limited the effectiveness of large-scale attacks against the population due to the increased actionable intelligence gained from these programs. In the absence of IA forces in Madain and Narhwan, CF are partnered with the NP, training them to secure their neighborhoods and the critical LOCs through those qadas. There is significant problems in 1/1 NP (corruption, sectarianism) but we are seeing better capabilities in 3/1 NP based on their “rebluing” at Numaniyah. As presently manned, trained, organized, and equipped, the IPs cannot adequately protect the population in contested areas. Leaders lead according to sectarian agendas, and will never make the kinds of changes to security needed to independently secure the population. We continue to focus on securing the infrastructure within our battlespace. We are prepared to secure whatever repair teams are required. We use 3CAB to routinely inspect infrastructure security over and around critical power lines, pipelines, and power generation facilities. Displaced citizens are returning to their homes in both Sunni and Shia areas of the AO for the first time in years.

Where we need to be: In the future, we need to empower concerned citizens by coordinating through the GoI to accelerate their legitimacy and to build the capacity of the ISF using locally recruited citizens interested in ensuring the security for their local population. IPs, with notable exception, do not have the intelligence, firepower, protection, or sustainment capabilities to deal with the insurgency. Only through positive leadership and accountability can we make progress with the ISF. We must continue to do whatever we can to improve the capability of the local police. With sectarian violence decreasing, we need to refocus our efforts on defeating extreme militia groups that are controlling the population such as the Hezbollah militia model and JAM Special Groups. Despite the 29 JSS/COPs in MND-C, we plan on emplacing at least 3 additional patrol bases and 4 additional JSSs over the coming 6 months. This will enhance our ability to protect the population. We need at least one addition US battalion in the near term to continue to hold the gains we have made in Arab Jabour.

The Georgian Brigade arrival gives us a complementary “surge” of forces to block the flow of personnel and equipment from Iraq. This will help cut the logistical tail of the Shia insurgency. We look to continue to develop the checkpoints in Wasit to influence...
the major infiltration routes into MND-C as well as the POE. Our aviation units will help expand critical infrastructure patrols further south into Najaf and Karbala as well as increasing MEDEVAC opportunities to protect the population and gain a goodwill foothold.

Facilitate reconciliation

Where we are: The GoI’s incremental change is too slow to take advantage of the Surge; we are faced with an Iraq slowly growing into three regions, two of which manifest themselves within the MND-C AO. The concerned citizens are creating a short term balance, but this window will soon close if the GoI does not acknowledge their legitimacy. Brigades are reaching out on local government, tribal, and religious levels; rewards programs are helping to facilitate not only these engagements, but local desire to assist the CF. We are making increased us of CERP dollars to improve the living conditions in those areas when the local citizens have become part of the solution as opposed to part of the problem. Our added presence to Wasit is helping hinder the smuggling activities through the border; however, there is a friction between the Badrah City Government and the DBE because both sides accuse each other of enabling the smuggling. The formation of the North Babil Tribal Council was the first step towards giving the tribal leaders an opportunity in organizing themselves as a group of citizens with a variety of concerns, in an area that directly influences Baghdad.

We recognize the bottom-up approach is faster and more successful than the top-down approach. The use of rewards needs continual support to foster reconciliation. We are working to conduct aggressive IO to create fear with the Shia extremists groups and influencing the fence sitters as well as take advantage of the goodwill and momentum of the concerned citizens’ movement to expand to areas outside major population centers. We also want to launch an aggressive women’s outreach program to focus on families and the discouragement of militia involvement.

Where we need to be: Reconciliation needs to be trilateral, letting the GoI take the lead while the CF support the program. CF cannot be leaned on as the enduring guarantors. If we can dislocate the insurgents from the general population, we can create an environment in which Iraqis can come together to refuse to tolerate insurgent and extremist activities. This includes Iraqi leadership, such as IP chiefs, willing to secure critical infrastructure in their communities and advocated concerned citizens training. Gradually we need to transfer control of governance and economics into their communities.

Defeat AQI and extremists

Where we are: We are continually taking the fight to the enemy and successfully disrupting Sunni and Shia extremist activity. While 1.4b, 1.4d is growing, so is the backlash to 1.4c. The GoI is making sectarian decisions that favor Shia extremists, but Iraqis are beginning to speak up. Our targeting for HVIs begins with 1.4c and then transitions to 1.4c to specifically target individual members of greater networks. We have been able to successfully kill or capture 12 of the 15 Division High Value Targets over the past 2 months. The effort is significantly enabled
by concerned citizens providing actionable intelligence. The elimination of key members of militia and insurgent groups has caused disorder, resulting in the expulsion of additional network members for kill or capture. In Wasit, artillery fires, the Raid Aerostat, air weapon teams, USAF show-of-force missions coupled with raids by ODA, IA scouts, and IP SWAT has caused JAM to be off balance as well as our engagements with GoI leaders to include the governor, PC chairmen, PJCC commander, and IA and IP commanders. This will be critical in defeating 1.4b, 1.4d

We are beginning to focus our operations with more emphasis on extreme Shia extremist groups as well as more mobile forces to eliminate sanctuaries. Through stronger partnerships we are becoming more aggressive with 1.4c, MARNE HUSKY will allow us to mature our TTP’s on integration of a ground force with the 3CAB. This will give us a continual disrupt capability across our battlespace.

We work to block 1.4b, 1.4d the best we can given available resources. The arrival of the 3d Georgian Brigade will help place more emphasis on the border. TF 1.4a is working to improve BTT and the PEO Staff technical screening capability and search efficiency. We are working on a contract to hire workers to download cargo vehicles, and we are in the process of building a 50 foot tower to gain observation of the cargo truck transload area on the 1.4b side of the border.

Where we need to be: We must continue our attacks against Sunni extremists, but provide additional emphasis on attacking Shia extremists as well. 46% of the attacks in our battlespace are from Shis extremists. Further target development and precision attacks Shia extremist leaders and networks will disrupt their ability to conduct attacks against CF and ISF as well as reduce the flow of militia support into Baghdad. Once the leadership is sufficiently degraded and the flow of support is cut off, JAM will lose its ability to recruit and maintain the common militia. We have to recognize that a Shia government will continue to receive support from 1.4b and will be influenced by the Shia militias; our increased aggressive IO campaigns must constantly address this.

Continue to develop ISF capacity
Where we are: IA units are very capable at brigade level and below – they are largely in the lead and getting better every day. The problem is there just aren’t enough of them. We need at least 5 more IA battalions in our battlespace to provide for a sustained security presence. The IPs are not showing much progress; for the most part they have good leadership at the higher levels, but significant sectarian bias and corruption at the lower levels. They do not have all the necessary weapons, vehicles, radios, or funds to be successful. Kinetically, ERUs and SWAT teams are the only effective IP forces we have. All ISF suffer from logistics issues, maintenance, and personnel Manning. Our most challenging issue is the development of non-sectarian ISF to assume the roles currently filled by CF, especially holding areas cleared by CF. The sectarian nature of the NP leadership is a real challenge, especially in Salman Pak, where the locals consider the NP to be a militia. The 3d DBE could easily meet ORA II within the next six months, especially with the arrival of the 3d Georgian Brigade, but the success of both units is completely dependent on CF financial and logistical support. Border forces are growing in capability and the strategic infrastructure units vary in
effectiveness and capability. Partnered operations, collective training, and collaborative planning are the most successful efforts across the ISF spectrum.

**Where we need to be:** We must continue to focus on resourcing capable transition teams of all types...they are the key to building capable ISF. We are short two BTTs out on the border, with no projected backfill. The majority of MTTs in MND-C battlespace are out of hide, but we will continue to resource them the best we can. They are that important. Unit focus on IP partnership and mentoring while the PTT is consumed with ERU training will sustain the IP proficiency until the PTT are freed up to resume traditional IP training and Crucible operations.

We will continue to develop the capability of the concerned citizens groups. The Local Citizen Advisory and Training Team (LCATT) is currently training the second class of 28 citizens on human rights, use of force, basic first aid, basic reactions to contact, and basic principles of security. This will be the initial phase in the path towards IP recruitment and eventual IP integration. A National Police FOB out in the Madain Qada where the NP could establish barracks, headquarters, motor pools, and training areas would be the single most important improvement to the NP. This would allow them to have a place to train and live and eliminate their current practice of occupying nearby houses, gas stations, and government buildings.

**Assist efforts to build and improve GOI capacity**

**Where we are:** GOL progress at all levels is slow and very leader centric and unfortunately sectarian biased. The need for economic construction cannot meet the demand. On the other hand, local governments in MND-C AO are strong, and the civil affairs teams have been working successfully with local leaders and local agriculture unions. The ePRT model has provided essential services to the local populace and is working on linking local organizations to larger agencies and the GOL. CERP projects are constantly being submitted and funded. We provide a lot of financial and security support to include the air movement of governors and key leaders. MG Rasheed, CG 3d Region, has effectively worked through several GOI ministries to answer charges that an Iraqi Border Fort is within sovereign territory.

**Where we need to be:** We must work with the US embassy to resource the PRT’s in Karbala and Najaf. They currently do not exist for all practical purposes. More agencies and diplomats needs to be involved in helping to build the GOL’s capacity. Provincial plans need to follow the 100-day plans and include a comprehensive executable economic reconstruction plan. Working to provide jobs to the locals offers an alternative to aiding insurgent activities. Further developing the rule of law facilitates establishing the legitimacy of the local government. We need the ePRTs to be properly resourced. They are only partially filled to 3 of our BCT’s, and non existent in the other two. We will provide additional CMO support will help supplement the ePRTs.

**Protect the Force**

**Where we are:**
We continue to make safety and security our first priority, without being risk adverse. We currently lack long range surveillance capabilities at 22 of our 29 bases. These “cameras on a stick” are essential not only for force protection but for long range detection of IED emplacement and other enemy activity. Air weapons teams are protecting our CLPs and providing MEDEVAC escorts, as well as our patrols and air
assaults. Our IED-defeat programs share information across the force while integrating ISR assets to protect Soldiers and act as reconnaissance enablers. Communication between ground elements, especially while traveling through other units’ battlespace, is helping reduce fratricide. The lack of engineer assets to assist with vertical and horizontal construction limits further force protection to our FOBs, JSSs, COPs, etc.; however, the “COP in a box” preparation has assisted us in constructing patrol bases in a timely manner to keep Soldiers protected. Weapons training, training on IED lanes, HEAT trainers, and continued focus on risk assessment and safety training have also contributed to reducing the risk faced by our Soldiers and increasing their combat effectiveness.

**Where we need to be:** We must acquire additional engineer assets to augment our force protection capability. We need engineers to build bridges to allow us to alter our routes, to construct our patrol bases, and to clear and sanitize our routes. We will continue to make force protection upgrades. Our Soldiers will continue to rehearse reaction drills. We will continue to aggressively disseminate lessons learned and TTP’s across the force. We will continue to emphasize ROE and EOF procedures. Force protection is an area where we are never good enough.