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UNITED STATES ARMY
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

BRIG. GENERAL JOE ANDERSON
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (CANADIAN)

MULTINATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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13 JUNE 2007

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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(This transcript was produced from
tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of
Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6) Good morning,
this is (b)(3), (b)(6) the
Multinational Corps Historian. Today is
Wednesday, the 13th of June 2007. We are
here at the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory
outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and this is --

(b)(6) U.S.
Army Center of Military History.

(b)(6) And we are here
interviewing the Chief of Staff, Brigadier
General Anderson.

Sir, good morning. I really just
wanted to ask a question going back to the
transfer of authority back in December.

As you look back on it now, what
was your assessment of the situation at that
time in Iraq, the military situation?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The
military situation was one where they were --
our predecessors were attempting to draw
down, accelerate the transition plan

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1 throughout the country, both at the
2 governance level, provincial Iraqi control,
3 and Iraqi security forces in the lead with
4 the Coalition forces in operational control,
5 enhanced MIT (Phonetic) teams, VIT
6 (Phonetic) teams, SPIT (Phonetic) teams, FIT
7 (Phonetic) teams.

8 All that acceleration, all that
9 direction was clearly at a timeline, although
10 the conditions or metrics to achieve those
11 conditions really were not in place.

12 So when we came in here, it was
13 clear that we were on that glide path. Yet
14 the reality on the ground wasn't quite the
15 same as achieving (Several words missing.)
16 That's kind of the condition we walked into.

17 The guidance pretty much stayed on
18 that path, you know, as you (Several words
19 missing).

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: (Several
21 words missing) in a drawdown to allow us to
22 meet the conditions and timelines of those

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1 unit transfers.

2 b 3 b 6 Was there any
3 additional guidance that came into play while
4 General Casey was still in command of MNFI
5 that offered that initial guidance defined by
6 (Inaudible)? Was there any reassessment?

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Not at
8 the Force level, but I think at the Corps
9 level there was a reassessment, because the
10 reality was security forces just weren't
11 ready to take the lead. Conditions weren't
12 set for Iraqi -- provincial Iraqi control.

13 Again, each province is different.
14 So you can't put them in all one lump sum.
15 Threats were different each place.
16 Governance challenges based on who the
17 players were, based on the status of what the
18 predominance was of forces in any particular
19 region, how all that was playing together,
20 what was happening on the borders -- It was
21 clear the borders -- The border transition
22 teams and the border -- Department of Border

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1 Enforcement clearly was not functional. It
2 was cause for all the port shutdown in the
3 wintertime.

4 A whole bunch of those things were
5 just making it pretty clear that a lot of
6 these situations weren't as viable as one
7 would think, or like to think.

8 b 3 b 6 I was looking
9 back at when the announcement that General
10 Petraeus would take command of Multinational
11 Force Iraq. Do you recall what the initial
12 communication was with General Petraeus? Was
13 there a formal communication at all prior to
14 his taking command or --

15 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, not
16 formal, because that's -- Typically, before a
17 guy takes over, the formal piece is not --
18 (a) The question was when it became official
19 based on a standard confirmation in that
20 piece; and then (b) is when you come over
21 here and you actually just like everybody
22 else. There is a transition period when he

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1 comes in and gets all of his briefs in the
2 formal approach. typically, that doesn't
3 occur, you know, across the pond.

4 In the case of General Petraeus,
5 there were numerous, numerous, numerous e-
6 mails, contacts, dialogues between the
7 Commanding General and he, myself and he,
8 obviously, the commander from a commander's
9 perspective because that was the Corps
10 Commander brand new, looking for the
11 assessment of a guy like me, because I was a
12 former brigade commander for whom my position
13 was here looking for constant feedback on
14 what things were going on.

15 So there was a large and formal
16 network at work which started as early as
17 December and became much more frequent in
18 January.

19 [b 3, b 6]

(b)(6)

20 [b 6]

20 : Yes, sir. You've been
21 in Iraq now for over six months as the Corps
22 Chief of Staff. The surge is complete or

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1 will be tomorrow, I believe.

2 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Yep.

3 [b 6]: How do you think, in a
4 general sense -- and that's how you think as
5 the Corps Chief of Staff -- the Corps
6 operations have gone since the surge in
7 February, the beginning of the surge?

8 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Very
9 well, but the challenges that we well
10 expected are still out there. So what do I
11 mean by that? What I mean by that is, you
12 look at this morning's update, number of
13 incidents in Baghdad almost insignificant.

14 [b 6] Right.

15 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Now
16 again, the danger is it only takes one
17 vehicle, and it only takes 15 civilian
18 casualties, five Coalition casualties. Those
19 are never good days.

20 So will it go away overnight? No,
21 which is what we always said. We always said
22 of the surge, just because our boots are on

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1 the grounds by 15 June, everything from
2 (Inaudible) out west to the final fully
3 operational capability of 2-3, we never said
4 that that day you could turn a light switch
5 on and everything is going to change.

6 b 6: Right.

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: So the
8 effect we are trying to achieve is being
9 achieved. However, the challenges are still
10 out there, because as we always knew, the
11 more pressure applied within Baghdad was
12 going to cause bleed-over to the provinces,
13 the belt as we call it around Baghdad. We
14 knew that was not going to be an easy thing
15 at all to clean up.

16 We knew there were still going to
17 be boots to ground, troop to task, not boots
18 on the ground challenges in terms of Baghdad.
19 You still can't be everywhere.

20 So from a Coalition perspective,
21 everything from what's happened in southeast,
22 what's happened in north, through a

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1 combination of (Inaudible), other special ops
2 assets and all Coalition force as well, the
3 challenge still remains the Iraqi security
4 forces who continue to get better every day.

5 But again, by our standards, by our metrics,
6 by our expectations, not there yet. And that
7 is because of everything from the leadership,
8 the structure between joint headquarters,
9 Minister of Defense, Iraqi Armed Forces
10 Command, all the way down to the Baghdad
11 Operations Command, down to the Division
12 leadership, all the way down to battalion
13 commanders in the Iraqi Army, and the police
14 still lag behind the Army significantly.

15 The end stage is going to have to
16 be a police force that's capable of securing
17 neighborhoods, not Army, Police. So the
18 local police versus the national police,
19 which are still a challenged organization,
20 both in terms of motive and in terms of
21 capability.

22 b 6:

Yes, sir. Now you

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1 mentioned the bleed-over into the other
2 provinces, and I think that was particularly
3 evident over the last three months in the
4 northern provinces or north of Baghdad, those
5 Baghdad belts.

6 One thing I've noticed: In March,
7 MNDB or Multinational Division Baghdad had
8 about nine maneuver brigades. Now they have
9 -- and MND North had like three, I believe,
10 in March, at the beginning of March.

11 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Right.

12 b b And General Mixon, I
13 know, over the last two months, the Commander
14 of MND North, has requested more
15 reinforcements, and when I come back here in
16 June of '07 I see that all of a sudden he has
17 those reinforcements. He has like six
18 brigades, and MNDB has less.

19 That's clearly an indication where
20 the Corps has shifted some combat power. Is
21 it having an effect up there in the north,
22 your assessment as the Chief?

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1 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Oh, it
2 is. I mean (Several minutes missing) --
3 between 1st Cav and MND North (Several words
4 missing) -- clearly successful. (Several
5 words missing) -- but more successfully to
6 the east, Diyala where you throw in 32
7 Stryker with 31 Cav.

8 Now things like this weekend are
9 incredibly significant, the find we've
10 discovered with the (Inaudible) material,
11 video material, computer hardware, software,
12 a lot of electronic exploitation going on.
13 Great raid, great finds.

14 All that has gone very well. I
15 think, once 32 gets fully operational -- now
16 again, 32 as being -- What I would say is you
17 really got to take a look at what type of
18 brigades we are talking about and, of course,
19 the Stryker is very popular because of their
20 mobility, firepower, flexibility. We are
21 almost asking them to be too flexible in how
22 much they have been moved around the battle

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1 space. However, the difference they are
2 making there is huge, cleaning up, getting
3 involved in some of these networks.

4 The formation of the Diyala
5 Operations Command is yet to be seen, how
6 effective that will be; and of course, the
7 integration of the 5th Iraqi Army, which has
8 delayed from the Iraqi ground forces control
9 now from 31 March to 31 May to indefinitely
10 because of leadership changes, capabilities,
11 sectarian motives, getting that all cleaned
12 up, are yet to be seen. But the success up
13 there -- we've stirred the pot.

14 This is one thing in a COIN you
15 have to do. You got to keep people off
16 balance. And if you become predictable, they
17 figure out how to defeat you quicker than you
18 figure out how to defeat them.

19 So I think we are making a good --
20 a significant difference there.

21 b 6: Sir, talking about
22 COIN, as the Corps came into theater again,

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1 looking back at those early relationships and
2 then that knowledge fairly on that at least
3 General Petraeus was being considered and
4 awaiting Congressional approval to take over,
5 to what degree was there a very close look at
6 then the new counterinsurgency manual that
7 was available at that time? How heavily did
8 the Corps staff look at that and use that as
9 a document to start focusing in that
10 direction?

11 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Not so
12 much. There was enough things being floated
13 around with all the beginnings, the inklings
14 of reconciliation way back then and how you
15 engage with locals, and population control
16 probably being, if you were lucky, and one
17 component of COIN that really got ramped up
18 was population control -- a lot of time spent
19 on population control. But besides that,
20 there's, you know, the commanders here, many
21 of which are on multiple tours here, didn't
22 need a lot of time looking at a manual.

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1 They knew what to do, and they
2 were doing it. So the new doctrine, for most
3 of us who have done this, wasn't anything
4 new.

5 (b)(6) You touched upon
6 another point which I wanted to ask you
7 about, which was: There's certainly a lot of
8 previous working relationships amongst the
9 staff. Many of the key staff officers have
10 been here before, have been in command
11 positions, starting with yourself and on down
12 the line, which has created a sense of
13 commonality and experience.

14 What is your overview of how that
15 has created a working environment that is
16 unique to what III Corps brought to the table
17 here?

18 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, I
19 think it's critical. In an idea world, there
20 would be nobody to take (Inaudible) who had
21 not experienced something on the street
22 before they came here, because I think -- I

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1 think what you will find from all the groups
2 I get debriefed by, not to be critical of
3 predecessors, but the difference is this was
4 not an ad hoc corps like the previous corps
5 based on all the situations that caused that
6 -- you know, everything from the guy who got
7 put in command who was not really the corps
8 commander and how that got built.

9 The biggest challenge we have
10 here, as we talked about before, it's still a
11 JMD, heavy (Inaudible) cell. So the core, c-
12 o-r-e, of the c-o-r-p-s is still III Corps,
13 which went through all the training last
14 summer, everything from the academics to the
15 BCD ramp-up to the JIFFYCOM (Phonetic)
16 Exercise to the BDSS (Phonetic), you know, to
17 all the stuff we did back at home station
18 before we came over here, and the dialogue
19 with our predecessors. That formed the basis
20 of how we operate, but the fact of the
21 matter, what you're talking about, how you
22 build a team and the core of that team, the

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1 base of that team stays the same is hugely
2 significant.

3 Primarily, what we have
4 experienced this past month and a half, two
5 months with all the people going on leave,
6 there's been absolutely zero degradation in
7 staff functionality when all the staff
8 principals and, in many cases, the deputies
9 went on leave at the same time, because it
10 happened to be graduation season.

11 So all that happened so
12 seamlessly, transparently, it just shows the
13 strength of these staff sections. But the
14 experience you are talking about, the value
15 of having experience that hasn't been out
16 there before in almost all cases is that our
17 focus is on the MNDs.

18 This is not about what Corps
19 wants. Obviously, our commander is very well
20 in tune from being a former division
21 commander. He himself is very well in tune.
22 He's a commander's commander, which gives us

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1 very clear priorities and focus, which
2 rarely, if ever, contradicts what the MNDs
3 want to accomplish; and we enable them, and
4 we are not here to be a roadblock,
5 impediment, you know, bureaucratic
6 headquarters. But everybody has a great
7 appreciation for what's going on out there,
8 and no one is trying to (Inaudible).

9 (Several sentences inaudible) --
10 and no one will ever second guess the
11 commander.

12 Now, obviously, we got to look at
13 resources and priorities, and obviously
14 everything from ISR to route clearance,
15 equipment. There are huge challenges in
16 terms of there's only so much to do. So it's
17 not a matter, if you could just wave your
18 hand over the battlefield and say, you know,
19 yea, here you go, you got it. It sure would
20 be nice, but we don't have that luxury.

21 So that is the biggest challenge,
22 but again what they ask for gets acted upon

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1 almost within hours, in some cases less than
2 an hour, and we move out, and that's what we
3 are all about here, not having a bunch of
4 meetings to talk about things. We obviously
5 have our forums, but to make them the most
6 productive so we are not wasting people's
7 time, and then get on with making stuff
8 happen.

9 It's all about supporting them,
10 enabling them, and that's why this
11 headquarters exists.

12 b6 A follow-on to that:
13 Just intangible relationships: You get into
14 this transition process as General Petraeus
15 was coming in. Given that you had been one
16 of his brigade commanders when he was a
17 division commander, was there a value added
18 piece to that that allowed a comfort level
19 between this communication between this
20 command and --

21 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Knowing
22 people you deal with, no matter at what level

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1 you are dealing, but everything from being
2 here and knowing who some of the brigade
3 commanders are because you served with them
4 before, to the flip side, to the guy above
5 you, but knowing what his expectations are
6 and knowing how he operates -- clearly, an
7 advantage.

8 Of course, anytime you have a
9 formal relationship, it helps out through all
10 the figuring out who's who. There is no
11 sizing people, if you will, because you've
12 already gotten through all that.

13 So that's very -- Just like the
14 inner core here, the inner circle -- In
15 essence, he's got his inner circle, guys who
16 he is going to go to for the insights,
17 guidance, advice, counsel or bitching,
18 whatever the case may be. Everybody needs
19 that.

20 So then again, as we have gone
21 through everything from what a red team is to
22 what an issues group is, how do you game some

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1 of those capabilities in the staff which are
2 above and beyond a J&B (Phonetic), so to
3 speak, to give you some of those
4 capabilities, which is something you all need
5 to look at, is that as we are dialoguing with
6 Fort Leavenworth now is what is the
7 difference between those two organizations?
8 What does a red team do? What should it do?
9 What's it look like? What's it consist of?
10 What's their capabilities, and then what is
11 the value/benefit of an issues group such as
12 happened -- We are on round number two here.

13 Of course, General Petraeus had a
14 whole team come in, a Joint Strategic
15 Assessment Team. So a JSAT equivalent to a
16 state to put it in common terminology. You
17 all need to take a look at that, the value of
18 those, who comprises them, why you do it, how
19 you do it, where they come from, what their
20 expertise is, how long should they come,
21 what's their focus, campaign plan,
22 reconciliation, etcetera -- some heavy stuff.

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1 [b 6]: Actually, I've had
2 some time to talk to the red team piece, not
3 the --

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes. You
5 ought to see the article we've written --
6 well, we've given feedback to Leavenworth on
7 what their roles are, as well as the
8 (Inaudible). You might need to talk to the
9 (Inaudible) guys.

10 [b 6]: The last little piece
11 to that relationship part, sir, which is:
12 Given that you have that relationship coming
13 in here, was that something that you were
14 able to share with the commander? Was that
15 an open consultation?

16 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: With this
17 commander?

18 [b 6]: Yes.

19 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Oh, he
20 was very aware. He is very well aware of
21 them, and I have to be very sensitive to it.
22 So I could not, and I only work for one guy,

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1 which is General Odierno. So you know,
2 loyalties and, you know -- which put me in an
3 unenviable situation, as every time reporters
4 come over here and they want to get -- a lot
5 of questions will be asked of me along your
6 line of questioning, is you know, how do you
7 compare the two? How do the two of them get
8 along? You know, what's the differences?
9 What's the similarities?

10 You know, after a while you get
11 tired of that. But being in the middle of
12 that is not a situation that I like to be.
13 It's not. And the guy downstairs is very
14 sensitive to that as well.

15 So I mean, we do have a chain of
16 command here. I don't speak for the
17 Commander. He speaks for himself, and my job
18 is to support him. So you got to keep it all
19 -- It would be very easy to be pumping stuff,
20 you know, subversively. I'm not doing that.

21 b 6 A last little piece to
22 that, which is just a broad description,

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1 taking yourself back out of this discussion,
2 but how do you describe the nature of the
3 working relationship between these two
4 significant commands or combatant piece,
5 Multinational Corps, and Multinational Force?

6 What is that working relationship?

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON:

8 Phenomenal. Very healthy, because both of
9 them are very experienced leaders, soldiers,
10 commanders, and the dialogue between them --
11 they are -- I wouldn't it's the ying and yang
12 effect, but I would say they are very
13 complementary of each other, and that's --
14 That's healthy. So they listen. They
15 dialogue. They talk, and they share. It's
16 open.

17 You know, there will always be
18 points of difference, points of contention,
19 but by and large, very well synch'ed, fairly
20 well (Inaudible), and the key thing is
21 keeping the staff that way.

22 You know, that's another big

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1 difference between us and our -- and I think
2 (b)(6) made reference to this the other day, is
3 in some of the (Inaudible) of the V Corps AR
4 is the dysfunctional, dis-synchronization,
5 disharmony between the higher and the lower
6 headquarters.

7 That is never going to work in any
8 organization. That has to be a very healthy
9 linkage to move the ball forward. I think we
10 have that, very healthy dialogue between all
11 counterparts on the Force/Corps staff, Chief
12 to Chief, Commander to Commander, staff to
13 staff.

14 (b)(6) Sir, let me follow up
15 a little bit on that. You know, I've looked
16 at the Corps Operational Concept 6 March, and
17 then you just came out with your Operations
18 Order 0701, and they are, in my view, very
19 sophisticated in their understanding of the
20 situation and your understanding of what
21 needs to be done, and in particular, when you
22 compare it to your predecessor's Operations

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1 Order that was written in --

2 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Six-
3 three.

4 [b 6] Yes, 6-3 in November
5 of '06. But I don't see much coming out of
6 Force, and now I know we did an interview
7 with [b 3 b 6], the planner, the Chief
8 Planner, and he indicates a lot of
9 interaction with the Force, which reinforces
10 what you said, their planners up there in
11 writing the Operations Order here at 0701 and
12 in figuring that out. But it seems from an
13 outsider or from a periodic visitor here
14 coming in, looking at the documents, just the
15 documents, that you guys are way out ahead.
16 That is, you guys, the Corps, is way out
17 ahead on the problem here in Iraq, and what
18 to do about it.

19 I don't see that coming out of the
20 Force. Now sitting in the (Inaudible) every
21 morning, General Petraeus clearly has an
22 understanding and he clearly supports what

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1 the Corps is doing, but I simply don't --
2 There is not a lot of guidance out there, at
3 least formal guidance, from the Force.

4 Is that coming forth anytime soon?

5 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I don't
6 know how much we need. I will tell you, I
7 think when you have an organization that is
8 rolling, we don't need a lot of guidance.

9 [b 6]: Right.

10 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Now the
11 issue is whose lane is whose lane, but I
12 would say it's a classic example of a
13 battalion publishing an order before a
14 brigade, a brigade before a division. Well,
15 you know, our lane is operational.

16 [b 6]: Right. Yes.

17 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: We have
18 been in dialogue with both playing teams and
19 all the input, and the Corps had to get its
20 order out, because the Corps has to execute
21 the operational (Inaudible). And there has
22 been dialogue. There have been -- You know,

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1 I've sat through it for the CG, and the CG
2 has done the same and all the Force --
3 assessments with the Ambassador of how the
4 campaign plan for the Force is coming along.

5 But that being said, at the operational
6 level we got to move out.

7 [b 6]: Right.

8 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Their
9 bigger challenges are the government of Iraq
10 and the shaping of all that at their level,
11 which is much more difficult than ours. But
12 the beauty of it is, because of the
13 connection between our two staffs, just
14 because we don't have a piece of paper,
15 document, that says do this, do that -- It's
16 happening.

17 [b 6]: Right.

18 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: So in
19 this healthy, focused, driven, aggressive
20 approach, things are going on. The question
21 will be in the end, is any of that disruptive
22 because there is no hard piece of paper, but

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1 I think you will find that that's not the
2 case.

3 [b 6]: I haven't seen --

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: My
5 assessment. Like you said, you can tell
6 (several words inaudible) that we are all on
7 the same sheet of music. So the question
8 becomes at this point how much does that
9 piece of paper matter, as long as we are
10 moving out and everybody is focused; and the
11 Corps plan is in sync with the Force plan,
12 even the Force plan is not --

13 [b 6]: Not out there.

14 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: -- yet
15 published. But I think that just shows good
16 cross-talk harmony between the two is pretty
17 healthy, because we are able to do that.

18 [b 6]: Going back to my first
19 question on, your know, your first six months
20 here and the beginning of Faradel Kanoun
21 (Phonetic) and the beginning of the surge
22 with the forces coming in, U.S. casualties,

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1 Coalition force casualties, have increased in
2 April and May as the operational tempo has
3 increased.

4 What I specifically want to find
5 out from your perspective is: Do you think
6 this is a result of our increased tempo,
7 operational tempo, or a shift in the focus of
8 our adversaries, the insurgents, particularly
9 AQI, or both?

10 You know, if we go out there and
11 man the JSSs, we are more vulnerable.

12 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Right.

13 b6: And we are more of a
14 target. So that gives the AQI -- But do you
15 see any interplay -- What I'm specifically
16 asking, I guess, is: Do you see the attempt
17 of AQI and our adversaries to inflict more
18 damage from perhaps a public opinion --
19 influence public opinion in the states?

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, AQI
21 is obviously a sensational attack group. So
22 let me answer that a couple of ways.

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1 The direct proportion to why we
2 have more casualties is because we have more
3 operations going on the ground. There are
4 more boots on the ground. Then number two is
5 we are operating in places that people really
6 haven't started to buy.

7 You mentioned (Inaudible), as you
8 talk more now with MND Center being formed,
9 (Inaudible), all the -- We've always been in
10 the theaters, but there have not been enough
11 footprints in there to make that much of a
12 difference, and now, again, we have increased
13 presence in there and more soldiers.

14 So those two factors are why we
15 are having more casualties, which we
16 expected. That was part of the -- one of the
17 expectations of Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic):
18 Well, it's going to be painful;
19 unfortunately, we are going to lose soldiers,
20 sailors, Marines in that process, but that's
21 what the plan calls for, to move it out now.

22 The other issue is what the enemy

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1 wants based on where you are. So the enemy
2 is still a very varied -- The enemy consists
3 of many components. You focused on two. AQI
4 is, obviously, the sensational attackers.
5 They are still Coalition -- well, I would say
6 they probably shifted here lately to the ISF
7 versus the Coalition, personally. But they
8 are still the sensational suicide, truck
9 borne, vehicle borne, catastrophic,
10 sensational attack to cause, really, schisms
11 and rifts between sectarian Sunni, Shia
12 groups to inflame them.

13 The mistakes they are making is
14 they are starting to kill more Sunnis in that
15 process, which is causing Sunnis to say we've
16 had enough of you guys, because you're
17 killing your own, and you're impeding our
18 quality of life.

19 So direct implication: Shia
20 militias are still primarily anti-Coalition,
21 trying to again get us out of here so they
22 can maintain their stronghold position of

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1 power. Again, they are the majority.
2 Anything that threatens them, they don't
3 want, and we are easier -- It goes back to
4 where we are being attacked.

5 Obviously, JSSs, COPs are
6 predictable, known points on the ground that
7 you have a big target, which enables them to
8 do what they want to do.

9 b 6 Has the CG received
10 any kind of outside pressure -- I'm speaking
11 mostly from the States -- to do more to
12 decrease CF casualties?

13 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Not
14 directly. Not directly. None of us want any
15 casualties. Now so we are -- How we do
16 business, he has been very focused on, not
17 because somebody told him to, because he
18 obviously has.

19 When you look at all this history,
20 you've really got to look at each of the MNDs
21 and saying it's all asset management, every
22 asset in the fight, making sure that it is a

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1 coordinated, synchronized, effective
2 approach.

3 MND North, very effective air
4 weapons teams, ISR, being able -- sensor to
5 shooter, take out teams that are putting IEDs
6 in before the IEDs every go off, again left
7 of the boom focus. Very successful.

8 Baghdad, not as successful.
9 Baghdad, much more complicated. Huge urban
10 fight, much more difficult battle space,
11 urban terrain. Much more difficult to
12 accomplish everything from IDF into the IV
13 strategic impact, minimum casualties by and
14 large, but strategic impact. You know,
15 incoming brown, PM, very coincidental -- not
16 coincidental; I'm being sarcastic. But every
17 time these guys come in the IV, seven or ten
18 rounds come falling on top of them.

19 So how do you link all that data
20 to being effective, and he is very, very,
21 very driven on making sure that we are --
22 making sure our assets are doing exactly what

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1 they are capable of doing to ensure that we
2 are much more effective in denying the enemy
3 the ability to do that, and then from the
4 force protection standpoint everything from
5 how do we enhance ground clearance teams.

6 We are now using engineers in the
7 IED clearance business, as we have all done
8 before as commanders. Instead of just EOD
9 1.4a assets, it's now engineer Zappers
10 (Phonetic) out there clearing IED.

11 Right now it's 130 millimeter and
12 below. He's got paperwork in his desk right
13 now to go up to 155 and below. Multiple
14 daisy chain IEDs versus single; remote
15 control as well as command detonated, and
16 then allowing a single engineer to do it
17 versus a team of two.

18 We have to -- Everything from that
19 to asking for enhanced armaments, everything
20 from an MRAD barrier now to an up-armored
21 Humvee to give our soldiers enhanced force
22 protection.

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1 He is focused on every component
2 of that, and that's not anybody telling him
3 to do that. That is his desire, to not have
4 our soldiers, sailors and airmen, Marines,
5 killed out there because they don't have the
6 kit to do their job.

7 So everything from the individual,
8 collective, to how we fight are being looked
9 at. But, no, there is not an overwhelming
10 pressure from anybody saying casualties are
11 too high, knock it off.

12 (b)(6): When he gets visits
13 from CODLs (Phonetic), no pressure like that?

14 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No. Very
15 open. Every single CODL that's come, and
16 every single one of them from some of the
17 ones you would have expected to some of the
18 ones that have voted on pullouts, timelines,
19 no funding, to the ones who are certainly
20 staunch supporters -- I sit through 90
21 percent of them with him. When you lay this
22 stuff out and people understand the

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1 complexity of what this business is all
2 about, it is tough.

3 So everything from how to you
4 shape an IO campaign, which is something,
5 again, we minimalize that -- What does IO do
6 to help shape this, both locally,
7 internationally and at home? -- to force
8 protection to what Fardel Kanoun is all about
9 and what the end state is going to look like
10 over here and all of the lines of operation,
11 be it economics, be it the governance, be it
12 security. But they get it most of the time
13 and walk out there and say, I understand
14 more, you know, [REDACTED] whatever,
15 what's going on out there.

16 [REDACTED]: I'll take you in
17 a different direction, sir. You had
18 mentioned in a previous interview concern
19 about the logistic support as we went through
20 the rest of the plus-up. Now that we are the
21 end of that, you had mentioned comments
22 about, at that time it looked as if the

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1 sustainment element was going to actually be
2 decreasing inside while we were increasing.

3 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Right.

4 (b)(6): Is that an issue
5 that's still out there or has that been
6 resolved?

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes, it
8 is. We are going to go through that this
9 summer. So the transition from 13
10 Sustainment Command Expeditionary to the 316
11 Expeditionary Sustainment Command, the 277th
12 Theater Sustainment Command to the 1st
13 Theater Sustainment Command in Kuwait -- all
14 that transition is going to occur.

15 The 13th is the only unit that did
16 not get extended to the 15 months of a major
17 element. Everybody else did. So it will be
18 -- I suspect it will be disruptive. The
19 question will be how well, again, we shape to
20 make sure of that, how our push system
21 continues to work. It works very well,
22 everything from Baqu in the south to Tallil

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1 all the way up to Mosul. How do we keep all
2 that stuff going with this change-up?

3 So it's yet to be seen.
4 Obviously, we are still on the same system
5 that we were last time we talked about this,
6 but the question is going to be when August
7 rolls around, September rolls around, having
8 the most number of boots on the ground ever
9 in Iraq and shrinking the size of the
10 sustainment element. The question will be
11 how much of a factor will that be?

12 Now, obviously, our goal is to
13 minimize that and make it as seamless as
14 possible.

15 b 3, b 6: But you have the
16 whole piece now. Given that the command came
17 into a situation where there was a track for
18 a downsizing and instead shifted into a plus-
19 up.

20 As you are looking back on being
21 two days away from that, those final forces
22 being here in theater, what has been the

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1 biggest challenge that was sort of an
2 unexpected, as the staff and yourself went
3 through this process of bringing on that --

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, the
5 biggest challenge is getting them all in.
6 But it wasn't unexpected. The challenges
7 were -- and again, from two perspectives.
8 One is the forward operating base, life
9 support piece of it, but more significantly
10 is giving them forward operating, you know,
11 posts, joint security stations, combat
12 outposts, getting all of these units into the
13 cities. That required a huge amount of
14 effort to figure out where, you know, how to
15 get all the materials to support that, all in
16 competition with gated communities, safe
17 communities, safe markets.

18 You know, what are the priorities
19 of effort here in terms of movement? And we
20 have flooded the roads with moving kit up
21 here as well as all the materials to build
22 everything from (Inaudible) to a detention

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1 detaining holding area (Inaudible) all the
2 way through everything I'm talking about
3 here, COPS, JSSs, traffic control points,
4 entry control points, safe markets, gated
5 communities, having to do all that throughout
6 the country.

7 So a big juggling act, many
8 competing resources, competing demands for
9 resources.

10 **[b 6]**: Yes, sir. You had
11 laid out earlier, I think last time and, of
12 course, you reinforced it this time, you
13 know, the (Inaudible) that MNF is focused on
14 GOI, but clearly, at the MND level, and
15 certainly also at the Corps level, you have a
16 large part of that also. I see it on the
17 staff, you know, with the 9 and the 7
18 interface. They have to interface.

19 Can you comment on how you think
20 how successful, in particular, the MNDs are
21 at pushing the provincial -- they really
22 don't have governments, I guess, but they

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1 have the tribal councils and what-not -- to
2 interface that part of the strategy to
3 transition to Iraqi control?

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, of
5 course, it's critical, but it's certainly
6 ones that we identified last time, MOI, MOD,
7 MOO, MOE. There's certain ones that are
8 clearly our lane, even, you know, now
9 involved in MOH, MOA, agriculture, health.

10 There are certain ones that we
11 have to play and, of course, there are guys
12 on our staff, for example, the surgeon, who
13 is both the Force surgeon and the Corps
14 surgeon.

15 So what we were trying to do is to
16 gain some economies and efficiencies that I
17 think we talked about last time. There has
18 to be some clear linkage there. It's
19 important that the Corps has input at that
20 level, because we do deal when it comes down
21 to security forces. The Corps in the
22 security loop is the lead as opposed to the

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1 governance economics loop.

2 So there has to be that linkage.
3 It can't be it's our lane, your lane. There
4 is clearly need for relationships,
5 engagements, to make that happen.

6 The MNDPs -- Now there are
7 provincial councils. The question is which
8 ones are functional or not. There,
9 obviously, are governors. There are actually
10 director generals, which are the equivalent
11 of the Ministers here in Baghdad in each of
12 those different categories: Agriculture,
13 health, education, you know, oil, energy,
14 etcetera.

15 So that has to occur, and each of
16 them are fair engagement. Before we started
17 getting into the reconciliation word,
18 engagement was a key factor, and we realized
19 that our engagement, who talked to who, both
20 legitimate authorities and then power brokers
21 who may or may not be the legitimate
22 authority -- you have to understand that in

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1 your backyard. So be that an Imam, be that a
2 political party, be that a sheikh, you have
3 to know in your ballpark who is calling the
4 shots and how you influence that, you know,
5 behind the scenes or visibly on the scenes
6 because that sheikh happens to be on the
7 council.

8 So each MND has worked very, very,
9 very hard to do that. I think, by and large,
10 they have all been very good at it. It's
11 difficult, because again there is always
12 agendas. There's always a person that is the
13 proclaimed power broker. There are those
14 that don't have the proclaimed power broker
15 who are the behind-the-scenes guys with the
16 public support, money, resources, to enable
17 somebody. You have to figure that out. But
18 I think our commanders do a phenomenal job in
19 doing that. But just like trying to figure
20 out what the enemy is going to do, it's a
21 24/7, ever evolving, ever changing
22 environment based on the realities on the

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1 ground.

2 [b 3 b 6]: Taking that in a
3 direction with, as an example, the Al Anbar
4 Province where we've continued to see a very
5 favorable turning away from Al Qaeda in Iraq,
6 and it seems as if there's -- in some
7 quarters, there's a concern that, okay, well,
8 that's great, but you know, will they arm and
9 become a militia in their own right? Is this
10 a long haul solution?

11 Do you have a perspective on that,
12 and how the -- or at the same time, how the
13 Iraqi security forces we are trying to build
14 up -- how they are taking that, and what's
15 the next step in that process?

16 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well,
17 it's ultimately a government of Iraq issue.
18 So we may be able to enable in the near time.

19 The problem becomes again, is it a pseudo-
20 militia? Is it purely a tribe, or who are
21 you empowering? How do you declare them as a
22 provincial security force, provincial

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1 security unit, PSF, PSU, emergency response
2 unit, PRU. What do you call them? How do
3 you enable them? What authority do you give
4 them? How do you equip them, resource them,
5 and then for what task and purpose?

6 Then the question becomes: What's
7 the future? What time frame? So are they a
8 temporary -- Now again, the current construct
9 is to make these forces legitimate forces for
10 about 18 months. Of course, you got to have
11 some way of friendly force -- you know,
12 friend or foe identification. You got to
13 give them weapons. You got to give them
14 bullets.

15 They got to be able to function.
16 But now are they in direct competition with
17 the Iraqi security forces? Are they in
18 partnership with the Iraqi security forces,
19 and I'll use the word legitimate, because
20 they are part of the structure?

21 Then what's the end state for
22 these dudes? Are they guys that fall off the

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1 map here at 18 months? Do they become indeed
2 integrated into the Iraqi security forces,
3 because they get academy slots to be a
4 policeman? They get academy slots to become
5 a military man? What's the longer term
6 vision of these elements in society? Very
7 difficult issues.

8 In the short term, if they are
9 going to fight against al Qaeda, that's a
10 wonderful thing. The danger is there to
11 become again, what authorities, what battle
12 states, how they transit battle states, how
13 they dialogue, communicate with existing
14 security force apparatus, all short term.
15 Fine, if the government of Iraq buys into it.

16 And then what's the government of Iraq buy
17 into in the longer term? What will they
18 become? What will they do later?

19 b 6 Who is taking charge
20 in the short term, sir? Is it Coalition
21 forces or is it Iraqi security forces?

22 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Coalition

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1 forces, and that is the direct hole here.
2 The Iraqi security forces have to embrace
3 this concept as well. But in the end, if you
4 don't have weapons to give them, you know,
5 and then who is paying them? They're not
6 going to do it for free. So how do you
7 resource all this?

8 b 6: Changing gears in a
9 different direction, I wanted to go back.
10 We've been trying to track down and get a
11 closer handle on the actual naming of Fardel
12 Kanoun. I was just wondering what your
13 perspective is on when and how the actual
14 naming of Operation Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic)
15 occurred?

16 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I
17 remember it fairly well. I'm not sure I'm
18 going to get it all right.

19 There was Together Forward, and
20 then there was -- what did you call it? -- Al
21 Aman (Phonetic). Well, Al Aman was the next
22 guy. There was -- When General Casey went

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1 home -- Now this all happened at the end of
2 December. There was -- I forget the -- Al
3 Aman, Al Anan was Security Now.

4 b 6 Right, Security Now.

5 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That was
6 the name-- We floated some names, and we
7 decided that we wanted to have a slogan that
8 had -- It had to mean something to the
9 Iraqis, not us. We could call it, you know,
10 Overlord III, code for III. That wouldn't
11 mean anything to the Iraqis.

12 So the intent was what was the
13 purpose of it, which was protect the people,
14 secure the population. That was the theme
15 focus.

16 So we floated some words around
17 while he was gone, but Al Aman, Al Anan, I
18 think is how you said it, meant Security Now.

19 So we thought, hey, that's great. It's in
20 Arabic. It made sense. That's what it's all
21 about.

22 Well, he came back and said, who

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1 changed the name? It was in the (Inaudible)
2 one morning: Who changed that name? I don't
3 know. It's still called -- I can't remember
4 what the predecessor was to Al Aman, Al Anan.

5 There was another term for it that was
6 currently being used in November-December,
7 and I don't know.

8 [b 6]: Together Forward?

9 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, it
10 was not Together Forward, but it was some
11 other term. I can't remember what the term
12 was. And he said, no, who changed it? It's
13 staying this word.

14 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: And that was
15 General Casey?

16 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That was
17 Casey when he got back the first part of
18 January. Now he left here Christmas night
19 and came back around January 6th or whatever,
20 something like that.

21 So we all kind of said, okay,
22 that's that. But then as the operation -- As

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1 this thing got real here and it was clear
2 that the surge was going to pour on -- you
3 know, the SECDEF came over, the Chairman came
4 over, you know, the CINC came over, and
5 everything was rocking and rolling. It
6 became clear that we had to have another
7 name.

8 So once again, about five
9 different names got keyed up, just like we've
10 gone through.

11 (Several sentences missing.) --
12 mean something, but it really should have an
13 Iraqi face on it, because the Baghdad
14 Operations Command became part of this
15 evolution of what's going to happen here in
16 the command and control structure, Iraqi
17 police, Iraqi Army, Coalition forces
18 partnership. So what term is going to
19 coalesce all this, and Fardel Kanoun
20 (Phonetic) became the vote of the Iraqi camp.

21 b 6: But I understood that
22 that originated basically after General Casey

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1 left. Is that correct?

2 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Fardel
3 Kanoun -- It was getting brewed while Casey
4 was still here, because the surge was -- When
5 Casey was here, the surge was incrementally
6 growing. He was approving brigades
7 piecemeal, and then when he left, the flood
8 gates opened and, you know, then it became,
9 okay, it's (Inaudible), oh, by the way,
10 Division headquarters; oh, by the way, a
11 combat aviation brigade. All that -- The
12 pile-on factor came on, and we had all the
13 RFFs in the package.

14 It was being keyed up while he was
15 still here, but I would not be able to tell
16 you with clarity of memory if Fardel Kanoun
17 got decreed the day he walked out of here,
18 five days after he walked out of here, but it
19 was fairly -- It was not while he was here.

20 b 6: Right.

21 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: But it
22 was shortly thereafter when he left that it

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1 became Fardel Kanoun.

2 (b)(6): And that's what I see
3 in the documents. Right around the 10th --

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The 10th
5 was the change of command, if my memory
6 serves me right, and I want to say around the
7 15th it was Fardel Kanoun.

8 (b 6): That's what I see in
9 the documents.

10 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: It had
11 all been prepped, and it was being worked
12 through Caldwell, strat effects, getting the
13 naming convention. We all voted. Everybody
14 put their two cents in, but the Iraqis
15 embraced it. When the Baghdad Operational
16 Command became, you know, operational, that
17 was the name of the operation.

18 (b 6): I asked you -- My
19 initial question was to look back on the last
20 six months. But now this question: I would
21 like you to look forward a little bit,
22 actually until December of '07.

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1 The Operations Order clearly lays
2 out some goals there: To establish, improve
3 stability, and create the irreversible
4 momentum. It's very detailed. I mean, your
5 order goes into lays into laying the steps,
6 but what I am particularly interested in is
7 how you think the Corps can measure
8 accurately, if possible, improve stability
9 and irreversible momentum.

10 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, the
11 metric word, which is measure the
12 effectiveness, whatever word you want to use,
13 is not necessarily a popular reference.
14 However, there's got to be some way of saying
15 we are being more successful.

16 There are many (Inaudible). From
17 the security standpoint alone, everything
18 from the manning, training, equipping,
19 readiness, assessment of the Iraqi security
20 forces at large. Metrically speaking, in the
21 city the establishment of these communities,
22 markets that we talked about --

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1 **[b 6]**: Each having a key role
2 in the security of a given area.

3 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: -- IUD or
4 IED, suicide truck.

5 (Several sentences missing.)

6 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: --
7 operating sites we have, etcetera, to the
8 amount of oil flowing, to the amount of
9 electricity flowing, to how many provinces
10 are picked to what the TR levels are, to the
11 amount of budget flowing.

12 The Iraqi security forces are now
13 -- They call it operational readiness
14 assessments, ORA.

15 **[b 6]**: Right.

16 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: So
17 whatever you want to call it, and the metrics
18 can be (Several words missing) -- Dealing
19 with issues here in the country, be them
20 Sunni, be them Turkman, be them Shibati, be
21 them Sunni-Shia or be them Turk, etcetera,
22 etcetera.

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1 The question becomes which ones
2 are you going to go ahead and say here it is,
3 and here's what's happening in that
4 particular category.

5 **b 6** Just looking at it
6 (Inaudible) with the Force and GOI, I'd like
7 to ask the question of GOI, too.

8 (Several sentences missing.)

9 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Anybody
10 that tells you otherwise is not a realist.
11 It's difficult. So the question becomes:
12 What is a representative government of the
13 people (Several words missing) versus any
14 particular (Inaudible) --

15 So given the history, given where
16 we've come, given what we are trying to
17 accomplish (Several words inaudible)
18 challenges will continue to be made, which
19 are purely enclaves, if you will. There are
20 many things that are indicative of the
21 ability of the people here to give away
22 (Inaudible). But in the end, in mixed

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1 neighborhoods -- In the end as you
2 (Inaudible) this, and what balance there is
3 going to be in the country, which are purely
4 enclaves, if you will -- I don't know what
5 the end state will look like -- it's
6 federalism versus unity government.

7 You know, I just don't know, in
8 the end as you dice this country up, based on
9 demographics, based on where people sit,
10 based on where the neighbors stand, where the
11 borders are, what the end state will look
12 like based on what the mix in the resource
13 pool is -- (Several sentences missing) -- I
14 just think you have to be a little more
15 realistic about it based on where the people
16 sit and the ability of anybody, or lack
17 thereof -- (Several words missing).

18 So the good thing about the Corps
19 is that they don't want to leave and be
20 controlled by somebody they don't want to be
21 controlled by.

22 b 6:

But just from the

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1 Corps perspectives, though. I mean, just
2 sort of from the core operations.

3 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well,
4 since we are provincial focused, yes. so the
5 good thing about the Corps is, if there is
6 such a thing, we are provincially focused,
7 because of having to move forward.

8 Again, the South is easy at the
9 provincial level. The question is how does
10 that feed into a central government, and
11 vice versa. What's the impact to the central
12 government, the GOI and all the provinces?
13 But provincial influence, a JAM (Phonetic)
14 influence in Basra in terms of giving
15 themselves sufficiency and allowing them to
16 move forward.

17 Again, the south is kind of easy.
18 It's all Shia, versus what level the
19 government of Iraq. The question is who
20 influences that particular province. Right
21 now, it's 1.4b, 1.4d It's JAM
22 influence in Basra, but in the end are you

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1 going to be able to stop that? Probably not.

2 (Several sentences missing). So
3 those are the challenges.

4 [b 6]: That's a question
5 mark.

6 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That's a
7 big question mark, but independently, they
8 are going to (Inaudible) operations fine.

9 [b 6]: I'm kind of at the
10 end. Is there anything at this snapshot in
11 time since you were interviewed last time
12 that we haven't touched on that you think --

13 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No,
14 you're wearing me out.

15 (b)(6): All right, sir. Thank
16 you very much.

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