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INTRODUCTION

OF

MAJ. GENERAL PETER DEVLIN
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (CANADIAN)
MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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PROCEEDINGS

This is the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian. Today is Monday, the 18th of June 2007. I am here at the Al Faw Palace, Headquarters for Multinational Corps-Iraq outside of Baghdad, Iraq; and I am here interviewing Major General Peter Devlin, who is the -- from the Canadian Army, who is the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition Issues.

Sir, could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sure. My name is Major General Peter Devlin. I am on exchange from the Canadian Army to III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas, and as a result of that exchange program, I am fortunate enough to be here in Iraq with Multinational Corps-Iraq which is currently led by III Corps.

As you know, there are three Deputy Commanding Generals for MNIC, Multinational Corps-Iraq: General Berragan, who is responsible for the operations; General Simmons, U.S., responsible for Title 10, the separates, which is aviation and support issues; and myself, Coalition and Infrastructure with dividing half my time
between Coalition issues and the other half with critical Iraqi infrastructure, mainly centered on oil and electricity.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thank you, sir. Just to get some background, can you tell me a little bit about the piece in terms of your normal billet as the Exchange Officer with III Corps back at Fort Hood? When were you first assigned there?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I arrived in Fort Hood in the summer of 2005. So it will be two years this summer, two years now actually, that I have been with III Corps, and a great opportunity professionally, personally, to soldier as part of a Corps and part of a U.S. Corps.

My duties in Fort Hood are mainly centered on being forward with the TAC on exercises such as Ultra Focus Lens (Phonetic) in Korea and the RSOI exercise. Full Eagle, I think it's called. And so I would deploy forward with the Corps HQ in support of those exercises, as an example, and I also have a lot to do with the community, the uniformed and the civilian communities in Fort Hood. I have a wonderful place to live and wonderful place to be with my family, as I am there with my family as well.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Sir, to look at that
split in duties, I wonder first, if I could, kind of ask some questions about the Coalition piece as background to the structure piece.

Can you give me a picture as to when you first arrived here, what was the situation with the array of our Coalition partners, and has that changed so far during the course of III Corps' assignment as the command element for Multinational Corps?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I've been here for seven months now, and I think that the major change -- I don't think there's been any big change from a Coalition part. There's been the evolution or the growth and the continued progress of the mission that has caused some adjustment on behalf of the Coalition partners.

So I arrived with a Coalition population on the boat, 15,000, and over the seven, eight months that I have been here, it's dropped to about 13,000.

That drop, though, is the result of nations adjusting the contribution based on the national -- their own national interest as well as support for Iraq back home, and the biggest adjustments have been on the part of the British and the Koreans.
So I would tell you that, in my opinion, support for the mission from a military point of view is strong, but from a political point of view it is somewhat fragile. So these nations, the 26 nations that are part of the Coalition here, have a challenge in balancing the support for the mission domestically with their efforts here, and for most of them, their efforts in Afghanistan where there is much more and a much broader level of support back in their home nations than there is for the effort here in Iraq.

So some of the adjustments in numbers have been not so much a loss for the bigger effort. They have been a loss for the effort here in Iraq, because these nations have decided to concentrate their efforts in Afghanistan.

You mentioned the U.K. and the ROK. Just to capture that, what have we seen in terms of reduction in their strength?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: The British have gone down -- or will have gone down by the end of the summer about 2,000. So they are still in the midst of dropping their numbers.

Now some of that, I have to emphasize, is based on their own consolidation efforts. So they have closed some
of the FOBs that they have operated and consolidated some of their functions. So there's been some efficiencies that they have been able to gain, as well as reducing the number of combat troops. So it is important to emphasize that.

The Koreans, the ROK forces have gone down roughly 700 or 800 over this past eight months, and again that is by the end of the summer here as to where they will be at.

(b)(3), (b)(6) We also have some plus-ups coming in some Coalition partners, though, if I'm not mistaken.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) What is on the -- What is in the process there, and what do we see as far as new players?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: The Georgians would be the one that I would highlight. Georgia has committed to the contribution of a Georgian brigade, brigade minus, 2000 soldiers, which is very significant, given Georgia is a country with a three-brigade army, and they have committed one of their brigades -- I should say that they have committed 2,000 soldiers for a year here in Iraq.

For them, what that will mean is two of their
three brigades will have been cycled through the theater, and
their other brigade having more of a peacekeeping emphasis
has been a force that has been providing a battalion, which
provides middle-ring security for the U.N. in the
International Zone, and they have had a battalion that has
operated in Multinational Division-North area based out of
Fad Warhorse (Phonetic) for the past several (Inaudible).

So it is a significant commitment on behalf of
Georgia, but the U.S. does absolutely remarkable things at
supporting countries like Georgia.

So you have a military that will undergo some
great training, will undergo some -- a modernization program
in terms of kitting, will have training both in Georgia and
in Europe and in Kuwait before they move up into the Wasit
area and will operate out of Camp Delta, will operate as part
of Multinational Division-Center, and when they reach their
full operational capability, which is tentatively scheduled
for September of this year, there will have been a tremendous
amount of growth in the Georgian Army in terms of their PPPs,
in terms of their equipment, in terms of their capability to
operate in a COIN environment.

So it's a good thing for the Coalition, but I
would also argue it's a great thing for Georgia.

It's a great thing for many of the other countries that participate here at the battalion and company level, in that they are able to make contributions to the transformation of their militaries from a conventional force to a more modern, a more versatile, a more flexible force, which is better able to deal with the threats today, and these are international threats as well as threats that they deal with domestically.

So a great deal for the U.S., a great deal for the Coalition, and I would submit a good deal for these countries that participate as well.

How many Coalition partners are there, all told, right now? Do you know?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Twenty-six.

I know I have that in the statistics somewhere, but it's always good to get that.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: And roughly 13,000 soldiers.

You talked about the training and equipment piece. Is that relationship worked out differently for every Coalition partner? Is there a
negotiation process, if you are privy to that? If you are not, then that's fine. We'll skip over that. I'm just wondering, if a country says, hey, we'd like to do this, but we are going to need X, how is that process driven?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I don't know all the inter-notes about that. It's done through CENTCOM, but yes, there is -- Country X approaches the U.S. or the U.S. approaches Country X and says, hey, have you thought about - have you thought about contributing some forces to the effort in Iraq, and they go, yeah, except for we have some challenges, whether those be financial or they be lift, whether they be equipping or they be uniforms and personal protective gear.

All those things are talked about between the U.S. government and Government X. They come to an agreement, and Georgia would be a great example. So it's U.S. strategic lift. It's U.S. personal protective equipment, including things like gas masks. It is U.S. vehicles. It's U.S. purchased counter-IED and electronic warfare gear, U.S. purchased radios.

So it is a remarkable commitment on behalf of the U.S. to support a partner like Georgia, and I salute Georgia, too, for having the strength and the courage and the
commitment to combat terror here in Iraq, and they have their
own challenges domestically as well that they are dealing
with.

Do you know, sir, is there a --
You may or may not have visibility on this. Realizing some
of these things are intangibles and transportation, training
-- I guess we start to get in a gray area with regard to
personal protective gear, vehicles, radio equipment.

Are these things that we are providing them with
in theater, and they leave in theater or is there -- Do you
have visibility on whether those agreements are, okay, yes,
we are going to give you personal protective gear, and you
get to keep that, or is there -- Is that something you have
visibility on?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I'm not certain with my
answer here. I do believe that the major bits of kit,
vehicles and radios stay in theater. It would be the
clothing and next-to-skin type items which would go back to
Georgia or would go back to Country X with the soldiers.

Taking over your duties both as
the Coalition and infrastructure roles, did General Odierno
have some unique guidance for you, especially in terms of you
having already been a member of the staff and then coming over here? Just can you reflect back on when he looked at you said, okay, I need you to take charge of this piece? Did he have some initial guidance for you on what he was hoping to have you provide the most emphasis on or what his thoughts were?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: General Odiero is a marvelous commander who is here at the right time, the right guy, and is tremendously operationally focused. So General O. fights the fight at the operational and tactical level and essentially said, Devlin, just go forth and manage the Coalition. And that's what I do, and that's the overall guidance that he provided to me, and I respect the fact that he has a focus, certainly at the operational and strategic level, tactically as well, and his energy and his drive is focused operationally, and he also has great confidence in his Division Commanders, all the Division Commanders who have Coalition elements as part of their formations. So he allows all that to take place based on whether you are a Division Commander or whether you are a Deputy looking after the Coalition from a Corps point of view.
commander, given that relationship, with you, with the other Deputy Commanding Generals? How often does he like to meet with you? What's the methodology of that? Is it more formal or informal? How do you find -- What's the methodology of you providing him feedback on the issues that you have responsibility for, and how does he like to have that happen?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: He has a huddle every single day. So any thoughts that he has or any thoughts that the Deputies have is shared in that forum.

He has also, in my opinion, the appropriate reliance on the staff to do what the staff is supposed to be doing, and so I think that there is the respect for the staff, a very appropriate respect for the staff, both by General O. as well as by his Deputies, not to become -- not to trounce on their efforts as well.

So within the C-3 world there is a couple of folks that work Coalition issues. So if there was something specific that he was after -- for instance, the most current timeline in support of a Georgian deployment -- he would not look at me and go, Devlin, what's the most current timeline. He would look at the 3 and say, I would like one of the current planners' updates to be given the most current update
of the timeline on the deployment of the Georgians.

So I think that there is a strong -- There is a strong relationship between General O. and his Deputies. I think it is -- There are formal aspects to it as well as informal aspects. I would also say that the staff are appropriately involved in all the discussions as well.

Looking to the other side on infrastructure, is there regular collaboration between your oversight role in that and issues that -- because I know the C-3 and C-9. There's several people that all have a lot of interest in things like electricity and the oil.

Is there a process by which there is a -- those members of the staff are interfacing with you per se, or how does that tend to happen?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Your term oversight is a great term, and that's probably the best -- a great term. So oversight over infrastructure stuff.

It is an extremely complex area, and the staffs do a great job at that, remembering that the Corps is in the position sandwiched between the Force that deals with the Ministries on a great or regular basis, and the Divisions that are the landowners deal with the Governors and have the
troops that are doing the marvelous work on the ground, not only the Coalition troops but also the strong relationships with the ISF, whether they are the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police and, in many cases, the FPS forces, the Facility Protection Services.

In the case of oil, the OPF, the Oil Protection Forces, and electricity, the EPSS, the Electricity Protection -- the Electrical Protection Security Services.

So the Corps is sandwiched in the middle. The C-7 Cell looks after the technical side of infrastructure, and it's the 3 side that looks after the security aspects, and there is strong cooperation there.

I meet regularly, and it's not only several times a week, but we have a more formal session once a week where those that are involved in infrastructure sit down with me and tell me what's happening. I give them my thoughts and my guidance.

I have good relationships with the Assistant Division Commanders that are involved in the infrastructure world. It's normally the ADCSs, so the Assistant Division Commanders for Support, with the Divisions that are tasked to look after infrastructure from the Divisions, and that's the
mechanism within the Corps and there are a number of 
biorhythm events with the Force and with the Ministry folks 
and with a recently created cell called Energy Fusion Cell 
that has LNOs from the Corps that work with this Force cell,
which is aimed at synchronizing the efforts of different 
Ministries to provide energy to the people of Iraq as well as 
facilitating the export of oil that is so critical to the GDP 
and the economy of Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Just so I understand that, sir, 
the Energy Fusion Cell, which I had heard about that, that is 
a Force element? We are players in that?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It is a Force cell 
commanded and led by MNF-IR. Supposed to have -- It is still 
finding its place. It's still growing.

The vision is that they are our Ministry 
representatives that are permanently part of the Energy 
Fusion Cell: Ministry of Electricity, Oil, Transportation, 
to name a few. And so it's all about synchronizing the 
efforts, because the way things are, there is sometimes 
competition between mainly oil and electricity.

An example would be oil providing fuel to service 
Ministry of Electricity generators. So it costs the Ministry
of Oil fuel, but Ministry of Electricity benefits; and those types of conflicts need to be managed with the assistance of the Coalition.

So it is definitely a Government of Iraq issue, but it is one that we help facilitate. We make recommendations, but it's much better when those recommendations have been developed from a team which includes Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Electricity folks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Very interesting. It's interesting to hear that comment, having watched the bureaus and seen that (Inaudible) -- oh, no electricity.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVlin: And it is a real dilemma here. Every single day, there are conflicts. I don't mean that word in terms of personal conflicts, but there is a conflict between the energy that's generated from oil and the energy that's generated from electricity and who is paying what to who, and how these Ministries are measured in the eyes of the Government of Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sir, changing gears back to the Coalition side, just in observing some of the operational things, the MND-Central-South seems to be having more challenges just in the last couple of months in terms of an
increase in the level of attacks they are seeing.

Any sense for how do we work with a Coalition partner in terms of helping manage expectations and results in a combat environment?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: That's a big question, an excellent question.

(Inaudible) challenges are the result of how they are manned and equipped, and they are the result of Operation Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic), which as a result of the efforts in Baghdad have pushed mainly JAM elements south into the Codicea (Phonetic) Province, the Diwaniya area and have thrown out of balance the Shia forces, the Bader (Phonetic) and the JAM balance that existed before Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic) in Diwaniya.

So more JAM folks than Bader (Phonetic) folks, more tension, more conflict, more violence, which resulted in Operation Black Eagle which was a Coalition effort that saw a U.S. brigade-minus, essentially a U.S. battalion with a command and control element of a brigade HQ and some other enablers go down into the Center-South effort, mainly in the Codicea (Phonetic) Province, and deal with the JAM folks in that area.
It was -- The approach was much the same as we see in Baghdad, the clear control retained, the establishment of joint security stations, but we are in a competition for forces. And so the operation took place. It was successful, and then those valuable U.S. combat forces were needed elsewhere to continue the battle against the enemy.

So the number of forces available within Center-South went down. They have ROE and use of force challenges that are -- from the U.S. that limit their approach in that they are less aggressive. They are less -- and they have less of an offensive spirit than U.S. elements, and as a result of that, some of the progress that had been made with Operation Black Eagle -- we have lost some of that progress.

We are not back to where it was, but we have definitely taken some steps backwards, and the arrival of the Georgians, the concentration of Center-South forces in Codicea (Phonetic) Province, and Wasit Province being handed over to Multinational Division Center led by 3 ID is a good thing.

It's a good thing for the Coalition and, hopefully, it will allow enough -- It will allow more forces in Diwaniya to be able to have the presence that is necessary
in the Joint Security Stations.

There were supposed to be two established. One has been established. One is permanently manned. The other one has yet to -- has not been built yet and, obviously, is not yet manned.

So difficulties working with the police, difficulties working with 8th Iraqi Army, difficulties with the Governor and the Police Chief who are the Province. And so it's a combination of many issues, [b](3), [b](6) that have challenged the efforts in Codicat (Phonetic) Province: Threat and limited number of troops, the equipment.

But some of that is tied up in the offensive spirit, which is less in Center-South than you would find in a U.S. Division, all part of being part of a Multinational Force, all part of managing a team.

So that would be one of the negative things of being part of a Multinational team, but I would argue with anyone that there are more benefits that come from being part
of a Coalition and being part of a Multinational team.

Those benefits are tied to different approaches, based on different cultures and different histories, different equipment which can be employed in unique and novel ways, greater understanding, a team approach, and lasting relationships that are extremely difficult to put a price on.

You know, I think that the U.S. people should look at a response that President Bush got last week when he visited as an example of the relationships that develop between countries often as a result of shared military experiences.

The Albanians that are here do marvelous work. There is a large company that is here. They are hard soldiers. They are very devoted to what they do, and part of that involvement in a U.S. led team here, I would submit to you, has had a lot to do with the strengthening of the relationship between Albania and the U.S.

So those are some of the things that are the great things and the benefits that come from being part of a Coalition, and every now and then there are the frustrations, like we have dealing in Codicea, Diwaniya right now with Center-South, and there is a balance, and that is what we do.
We manage that balance.

I'm glad you talked about that, and I really -- because in looking at your background, you really have a unique perspective you can bring, one that kind of -- I'm going to take you to a slightly different direction on that, which is: You have these experiences in various joint and Coalition type environments before.

How do you compare what you observe here in this Coalition compared to your other experiences in places like the former Yugoslavia and Europe, these sorts of things? Is this -- What's unique about this Coalition environment?

MAJ. GENERAL DEWILL: What I see here more than I have seen in my other lives has been that there is a stronger integration of Coalition into the forces than I have seen in the past where we dealt with coalitions based on boundaries and based on very well defined tasks.

As we -- I say we. I mean, the U.S. and NATO and other international organizations, the U.N., have become more experienced and more comfortable with coalition operations, we are willing to accept the risks of integrating coalition forces into formations that in the past we dealt with that risk with boundaries and with tasks.
If I were to look at Multinational Division-Baghdad as an example, the Estonians are fully integrated into a U.S. battalion, and they undertake tasks as a U.S. element in that battalion, and there are no lines on a map that define the Estonian AO. It is a U.S. battalion, a U.S. brigade AO, and the Estonians are part of that U.S. team.

I think that it's a good thing that we have moved to that level of understanding, that level of confidence in coalition operations, that level of operations that we've grown over time and with greater understanding and with greater confidence, and willing to accept that risk as well.

So that would be my answer, my comments to that question.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Given these challenges and my suspicions, I'm sure there are probably commanders of Coalition forces here that are probably in something of a dilemma because they have their home country political guidelines. They have different rules of engagement that they are aligned to follow.

Is one of your roles -- Do you find yourself being a sounding board for coalition partners' frustrations with trying to bridge those gaps or not?
MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes, often. And my philosophy, I think, very much consistent with General O. telling me to go forth and be good with the Coalition, is just to work quietly behind the scenes to deal with senior national representatives from all the different countries who try to balance their commitment to combat here with their national desires back home.

That might be an upcoming federal election. That might be the fact that there are changes that are happening in boundaries or command and control relationships that are adjusted in a very delicate fashion without having to go back for national approval back home, because if we did that, it would result in the end of that nation's commitment to this mission.

So, yes, it's done on a regular basis. It's done quietly. It's often a sit-down, a venting. Then sometimes it's, you know, here's the cold, hard truth, and we need to manage that, and we manage it with supporting relationships sometime.

An example of that would be with the adjustments that are taking place in MND-Center-South and Center, some countries have had their commitment to Iraq based on a
command and control relationship with Poland as the lead nation for Center-South, but they will be staying and operating in MND-Center's AO. So they will be still commanded and controlled by Poland, who will have a supported -- who will be the supporting force supporting MND-Center for that nation's commitment of a EOB platoon; and sometimes it's just to have the realization in other nations that they are very risk averse to casualties at this particular time, because there is an upcoming federal election, and they don't want to -- The military just wants the Coalition to be aware that it's a sensitive time back home, and casualties would jeopardize that nation's commitment to the mission.

(b)(3), (b)(6) It's a very complex job.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's a very interesting job. It's rewarding. There is no better job here in theater, to be quite honest with you. But I love what I do.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask something totally different, sir, which exists again because of your unique relationship with III Corps prior to coming here.

In the work-up process and also in the ongoing fight of the war, I happen to have overheard that you are the liaison, for instance, to some of the think tank people that
sometimes come to theater.

I'm just wondering: As you observed the Corps get ready to come back to the fight here and to assume responsibility, and given that MNCI and MNFI, because their commanders are going in a different direction because of the surge this time -- Looking back on that whole process, do you see that -- the staff or future managers -- has there been a particular theory on warfare, a particular group of think tank experts that the Corps has looked toward to be ones that they tend to put a lot of faith in or draw from at least as a source for planning out the strategy of the fight right now?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: A great question. I think that -- I don't know whether the Corps did anything particularly special. I think that the Joint Forces Command and the DCTP or the Army BCTP program, Battle Command Training Program, if I have that acronym correct -- I'm not exactly sure -- did a wonderful job at preparing the Corps to come back over here.

I'd like to key on the word "come back over here," because I think the biggest -- or not necessarily the biggest, but one of the concerns is coming back here, and that you come back to a theater with a past vision and past
I think the real challenge for any military and any commander is to make sure that they don't live in the past and that they are living today with an eye to the future, and I think that there was a conscious effort on behalf of General O. and his team not to be stuck in the past, and in General O.'s case not to be stuck as Commander, 4 ID, but to be living as Commander, III Corps, getting ready to take over from V Corps, and to develop a training program that respected that approach.

I found that the contribution of V Corps to III Corps' training was extraordinary, and General Corelli (Phonetic) was very giving of his key staff to come over and educate and develop the III Corps staff.

In fact, I would also say, one of the great things for me personally and professionally was to leave before III Corps did, two months before III Corps.

So I've been here since October, a couple of months. So I was able to see V Corps work, which was awesome, a great Corps with great leaders. I was able to be part of the RIP process, Relief in Place, and to transition from V Corps to III Corps.
I hope that I was able to provide some value to III Corps as they had completed their training and were in the final throes of getting ready to come over here, because I was already on the ground, and there was a large liaison team from III Corps that was already here.

Were you tasked then with heading that liaison team?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No, No, No. It was -- I came over early, because I took over from an Italian who was leaving theater, and I had to be here to take a handover from the Italian, and that was just by luck for me that he left, that I arrived, and I had the opportunity to soldier with V Corps, aid in the transition of III Corps, and then work as part of III Corps' team.

So I think that we did some good training. I don't think we did anything overly special. The Joint Forces Command and the Army's training regime to ready a Corps is sound. As long as you are living today with an eye to the future, I think that you are well placed.

We do have some organizations that are new, the Red Team Cell which, to be honest with you, I don't think that we fully exploit to their full potential. That would
just be my observation.

I think that the Army needs to relook at the whole title, Red Team, because it has a connotation that surrounds it which is not at all what their real potential is. Their potential is to be looking at other approaches, and because they are titled Red Team, we think of them as the bad guys approach, and it's all tied to the past gaming and that, and we need to move forward.

Part of that moving forward is the Army needs to title the Red Team something different, and that is part of why we have not taken advantage of the full potential of the Red Team Cell that we currently have within the Corps.

I think this is the first time that the Corps -- that a Multinational Corps-Iraq has had a Red Team that has been part of it.

What is their task?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I think their task is to challenge the approach that the Corps is moving along, to see if it's sound, to explore branches off the plan, to give thought to sequels. And, yes, there is the Plans Cell which does that, too.

So I don't think that there is competition here
at all. They complement each other. So the Corps' Plans Cell needs to be complemented by the Red Team, and the Red Team needs to be looking toward the future, challenging their Corps' approach, looking at sequels, looking branches, and looking for different approaches.

Sir, I've been asking a lot of questions. Are there areas that I haven't touched on that you are thinking, hey, he's the historian, and he didn't ask me about this?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: You know, I deal with the Coalition. I deal with infrastructure stuff. I also am blessed just to be able to see what's happening across the theater here.

You know we've been here for four years. I haven't been here before. So I don't have a detailed understanding of the past, but I would tell you, that the investment in the government of Iraq is so critical to the future, and I don't know whether we, the Coalition and the U.S., has had the appropriate investment in the government of Iraq over the past number of years.

I would just say that. That's the future. That's the key to having a country that is able to stand up
on its own, not as a little mini-U.S., not as -- just as an independent country which is a friend in the region, which has a style of government that is acceptable to the U.S., and has enjoyed the confidence of the people.

So we need to invest in that. We need to invest tremendously in that, and there is a balance between doing stuff and supporting the government of Iraq. Reconciliation would be the most current example of that, and MNCI and MNFI needs to be careful as they balance the reconciliation efforts around doing things for the government of Iraq and for the people of Iraq, and supporting the government of Iraq in their efforts at reconciliation.

That balance is tied to time. So that's why there is such a balancing act and a very challenging, difficult balancing act, because there is only so much time. That time is based on the support of the American people and governments across the world that are part of the Coalition here, but you have to be cognizant of the time, cognizant of the government of Iraq, and cognizant of your task and balance it so that you are not necessarily doing it, but you are supporting the government of Iraq.

I don't mean to suggest for a moment that the end
of June '07 here that we are doing too much on the reconciliation front ourselves, the Force and the GIM and FI. I just believe that we need to make sure that we have the government of Iraq's support, make sure that they are the ones that are supportive of these efforts, and I could use that with reconciliation. I could use it with infrastructure.

So the fact that the Energy Fusion Cell says that it is important for the Beji (Phonetic) oil refinery to have an independent power source, that needs to be what the government of Iraq thinks; and the Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Oil need to say, hey, it's important, darn it, that we have an independent power source for the Baji oil refinery.

The uncontrolled shutdowns and blackouts that happen in the north are no longer acceptable. It costs us too much, and that cost being the damage to equipment and the loss of revenue that comes from the flow of crude and product is no longer worth it. But that's true enough. I'll just use it as an example, but there needs to be that balance, and there needs to be the government of Iraq support for all this stuff so that it is --
Now we don't as a Coalition get frustrated by an independent government who is trying to stand up on their own.

Sir, we are at the end of our time. I appreciate your time with me.

Are there any last comments on your part?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No. I'm grateful for the opportunity to make some comments. It's a great place to be. I'm honored to be part of MNCI, tremendously honored.

There are some fantastic soldiers. There's some fantastic leaders doing incredible things in this country. I'm a half-full glass kind of guy, and so I have a reasonable amount of optimism for what's happening here, what's happening with the government of Iraq, what's happening with the Coalition.

I think, whether or not there is the patience and the support in countries across the globe for what is happening here, I hope that there is that level of patience to allow us to get over a hill or to arrive at a level of stability here, stability in terms of an acceptable level of violence and an acceptable capability with the government of Iraq, and the confidence from the people of Iraq that we can
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-- that they can continue to move the country forward in a way that is acceptable to the people of Iraq. And of course, I think it also has to be acceptable to the members of the Coalition.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thank you, sir. That concludes this interview.

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