

~~SECRET/NO FORN~~

16. Is there anything you'd like to add?

(U) I always think that the ultimate credit for this goes to the men and women in uniform on the street, who are grinding out the missions, who are turning the big ideas into sensible solutions. They are the heroes of this, and America can never thank them enough for what they've done. 59:22

PREPARED INTRODUCTION AND QUESTIONS:

Sir, I'd like you to address the questions as if your audience were a War College seminar or a historian 15 years from now trying to work through all the various accounts and controversies of the war to make sense of the mosaic.

In this morning's update, you spent a couple of minutes discussing key issues, including Khanaqin, the SoI, Diyala operations, and the SOFA. You mentioned sensational press, the importance of being a calming influence, specific engagements by generals with key Iraqi leaders, and the tone we should all take. These are examples of much larger policy issues, including the disputed internal boundaries, reconciliation, federal and provincial authority, and of course the status of American forces.

What is the state of those challenges today, to differentiate them from what the situation was last year or may be next year?

How well do MNFI engagements and your frequent calls for calm exemplify your concepts of information operations?

What does the larger military need to learn about information operations?

In this morning's BUA, you congratulated a number of officers on their selection for promotion from BG to MG. The list reflected the value the service places on success in the tactical and operational environment.

How would you assess the state of the officer corps and officer professional development? And of non-commissioned officers?

In adjusting its DOTML for current operations, is the military gaining flexibility for whatever conflict it may face or leaving itself vulnerable by only being able to fight one kind of conflict?

How would you assess the battles in Basra and Sadr City, tactically and strategically?

Why is the "whole of government" approach important?

Please discuss the state of communications and information technology, the capabilities it gives you and the limitations it imposes, from video-teleconferencing to email to servers full of data. I ask this to differentiate today from analog maps, acetate, radio, field telephones, telegraphs, and dispatch riders, and from what may be developed tomorrow.

Other Questions:

1. What factors best explain MNFI from July 2004 through February 2007?
2. General Casey's campaign plan emphasized counterinsurgency, but he was not satisfied with the doctrine he had or its application. Did your efforts with the COIN manual reflect to some degree his search for solutions? What discussions did you have with General Casey about counterinsurgency?
3. What are the nuances of the command and support relationships (Central Command, Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense) under which MNFI operates?
8. What relationships, processes, or guarantees are necessary to coax Iraqis down the path of compromise and reconciliation?
10. What changes do you anticipate in the relationships of Central Command to MNFI and the various commands in Afghanistan?
12. What impresses you, or what is important, about how we do IZ transition, personnel reduction, and headquarters' consolidation?
13. What contribution has the recent Red Team made on Iran?
14. In an interview with MG McHale, he mentioned TF and MRAPS as instances of "inheriting the sins of the past." Does that theme resonate with some of the challenges you've faced? Does it resonate with certain challenges you're handing off to General Odierno?

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