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The risks of early '08: We want Iraqis to be more self-sufficient, but with that comes less control for us. It leaves us less able to influence what the Iraqis do. Their priorities are not the same as ours. The risk comes in not letting them take the reins. We have to check ourselves from doing too much. It (any given solution) has to work for them, not us.

The power of the purse gives us a carrot and a stick, but that does not foster self-sufficiency.

We must be willing to let them fail. The example of the 1 Dec '08 cut off of life support (food and fuel) by US to ISF, which was ugly, but ISF then figured out 95% how to do it themselves. It has to be their solution, and that is good enough. We risk trying to apply western standards, which don't apply.

### *Issues for Dubik*

The Iraqi Surge – He needs to be able to talk about this more.

How does he explain things to Congressmen. Congressmen and congressional staffers always come to Iraq with preconceived notions of how things are based on what they've read or previous trips. The truth is that things change. What was is not what is. A lot has happened. This is a huge challenge, and MNSTCI's success is key to the US getting out decently. The MNCI surge and offensive created maneuver space, but the fight is far from over. We have to press the fight. Congress wants a timeline, but there can't be one. Why would we leave Iraq after all that we have invested? DOD needs to commit to a permanent presence and invest in the future. Then we can craft the future. The model may be Korea, Japan, or Germany, but long-term presence helps everybody. Now is the time for a strategic concept. It will not be 45 BCTs here long-term, but it will likely be a division and key bases.

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