INTERVIEW OF

MAJ. GENERAL JAMES SIMMONS
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (US)
MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the Center of Military History.)
PROCEEDINGS

This is [b3.b6]

[b3.b6] the Multinational Corps Iraq historian. Today is Friday, the 15th of June 2007 at approximately 1830. We are at the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and we are interviewing Major General James E. Simmons. Also with me is --


[b3.b6] Sir, would you be kind enough to introduce yourself in your own words, so the listener can identify you?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Major General James E. Simmons, the Deputy Commanding General for Support for Multinational Corps - Iraq.


Sir, I wanted to start off by asking: You're really one of -- certainly, one of those in the Corps with the most

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longevity. If I understand properly, you had originally been assigned to III Corps in July of 2003, and I was just wondering if you could talk us through a little bit of --

That's not the position you originally came to the Corps in, the one that you are in now.

I wondered if you might talk us through a little bit of your background.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Oh, no, that is the position that I had been in as --

I've been the Deputy Commanding General of III Corps since July of 2003, but I have served in several different capacities as we have executed the deployments into and out of Iraq.

I received the notification that the Corps was going to replace V Corps on the 8th of August 2003 as the Corps was participating in UFL, and I received a phone call from General Cody who at that time was the G-3 of the Army, and I first came to Iraq in August of 2003 and was here August and...
September of 2003 as the lead officer in the planning for the transition between V Corps and III Corps.

This building that we are currently in was in a significant state of disrepair. We had been bombed where the JOC (Phonetic) is currently located, taking a 2,000 pounder. You could look up at the sky from in there. There was very little power in here, and most of the rooms were occupied by soldiers who were using it as a place to bed down after they had completed their duties.

I went back to Fort Hood, took the lessons that we had learned and planned for the first MRX for the transfer between the two corps, which was going to be phased, and General Metz, who was initially going to be going to be General Sanchez's Deputy, and then in the April time frame the Corps would stand up as a corps and split away from CJT-F7, and General Casey would come in and take

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During the first deployment, I was responsible for the RSO&I of the units that were coming in under the Corps, and ran a forward command post at Camp Udari in Kuwait where we pushed the 138,000 soldiers through Kuwait and into Iraq at the same time we were pulling the 134,000 soldiers of I Corps out.

At the end of that time, I'm well enough -- At the end of February I moved north here, and my title was Deputy Commanding General, III Corps. I was not part of CJTF-I and I was here until April, and in that capacity I was primarily responsible for the separate formations that were here, the MI Brigade, the MP Brigade, the similar brigade, the 185th Aviation formation, and the 13th (Inaudible).  

Those are the Corps troops, right?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Corps troops, right. And then in April it was
decided that we did not have sufficient command and control for receiving the (Inaudible) Division back at Fort Hood or for fishing the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood. So I was returned to Fort Hood as the Commanding General initially of Fort Hood, and the Deputy Commanding General of III Corps Rear, and Major General Bobby Wilson, at that time the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, was the Corps Rear Commanding General.

Immediately following the 4th Com change of command, General O'Neill (Phonetic) changed that arrangement and made me the Commanding General of III Corps Rear and the Commanding General of Fort Hood, and I supervised the training, employment and redeployment of 65 percent of the Corps for about a 14-month period while the Corps completed its mission over here.

Whenever the Corps came home and
after a period of time after the Corps came home, I reverted back to being the Deputy Corps Commander for General Metz, and then when we had the change of command between General Metz and General Odierno, I remained in that position.

We worked our way through the MRX, a great deal of discussion about roles, duties and responsibilities, because with my departure out of Iraq in April of 2004, we had not had a U.S. Deputy.

In regards to that, the British Deputy that was here became the principal deputy to the Commanding General, and that situation really had remained kind of fuzzy until General Hahn (Phonetic) came in with V Corps, and because of the confusion that was created about the roles and responsibilities of the DCG, we spent a considerable amount of time at Fort Hood trying to codify the roles that the British Deputy would play, the U.S. Deputy would play and, in our case, the
Canadian Deputy would play, because we have an assigned Deputy Commanding General in III Corps who is a Canadian, General Devlin, before him General Tingin (Phonetic).

So General Odierno crafted out very carefully the duties and responsibilities of the DCGs, and then on the 15th of December after the talk he renamed the Deputies to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations and Intelligence, the Deputy Commanding General for Support -- that's my role -- and General Devlin as the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition and Infrastructure.

So that's kind of how we got here. Great, sir. That actually answers a lot of interesting questions about how the structure went.

So one of the things that I didn't realize is that was a unique structure, but this was not a pattern that V Corps was following then.
MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No, it was not. My duties here in this position -- and my principal duty is to exercise command. General Odierno put his hand across that board right there and said everything above the line belongs to Odierno; everything below the line belongs to Simmons. Those were the separate troops for the Corps.

Over here, right now that consists of 17 brigades, several of those formations commanded by general officers, and about 34,000 soldiers. In addition to that, I am responsible for four focus areas that General Odierno has given me: Logistics; aviation; force protection; and basing.

So I exercise supervisory responsibility over those four focus areas and spend a structured amount of time each week in those four focused areas, and then spend the rest of my time out exercising a command function over those separate commands and formations that we have here supporting
the Corps.

That is exactly where I wanted to ask the next question, sir. Where do you spend most of your time? You spend them out there with the core troops, helping them out, or back here?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: We usually spend four to five days a week out of the palace. We usually depart here about 1030 in the morning, and I will come back in here sometime around 1930-2000 at night.

I have a significant number of formations that are at LSA Anaconda, the 13th Sustainment Command, the 411th Engineers, the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade, a signal battalion, and the 407th Army Field Services Brigade which is actually an AMC organization, but General Griffin, the AMC Commander, has given me authority to coordinate directly and task that formation, although I don't like report card.
The Sustainment brigades -- we just had the Rip Tower (Phonetic) with the 507th and the 593rd out of Al Asad that supports the Marines. The 45th is located up at Key West. The 82nd is located at Tallil. The 15th is located at Taji, and then we have the 167th that is located at Anaconda, and the other one, I always forget the number of it -- yeah, the 657th is also at Anaconda.

Those are large formations that operate on a general support area or support basis, and it's proven to be successful. This is the new logistics doctrine that has been developed.

While we had a great number of questions on it, the Sustainment Brigade concept has worked well. The 593rd was a CSG or Corps Support Group, but they have done a -- they did a magnificent job while they were here supporting the Marine Corps, and now the 507th is in up there. We'll whip the 45th out, I guess, next week sometime, and then
that will be followed by the 82nd and then the 15th.

Those are the four major ones that operate in the outlying areas. The 67th is -- they are in a -- They support a smaller footprint arrangement.

The Signal Brigade is headquartered here, but they have battalions at Anaconda, Spiker. They have one battalion here.

The Military Intelligence Brigade headquarters is located here. Three battalions are here, one battalion at Anaconda. Then we've got the 89th MP Brigade, which is OPCON. The Brigade Headquarters is OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division, but they have two battalions that are here in MNDB, although one battalion is also providing support to the Marines out west. Then we have an MP battalion up north at Spiker.

So the formation is spread all
over Iraq, and so just from a formation perspective, I spend probably 65 percent of my time with those, and then with the basing function that I have, I am constantly going, interacting with the garrison commanders or BSB commanders that are out in the outlying areas about the basing issues, the Log Cap, how that is interacting and working with supporting the formations that are located at the bases.

Then the aviation aspect of it, I spend a normal amount of time with the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade, which works for me, but also on behalf of General Odierno I ensure that the aviation brigades that are supporting the MNDs are operating in accordance with the Corps Commander's standards and rules for operating in the air space here, as well as evaluating their readiness levels, not necessarily from a maintenance perspective because those are all good, but from an effectiveness, how they are...
fighting and employing their formations.

Well, you are the senior aviator, aren't you, sir?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I am the senior aviator in theater, I guess. One of the W-5s told me the other day that I am the senior aviator that has been deployed into the theater. So I hadn't actually thought about that, but I kind of thought about it a little bit, and I guess that is also a true statement.

So that's -- The work that I do from the force protection aspect comes from two principal formations that work for me. That's Task Force 1.4a and two joint formations that are underneath my daily supervision.

Then from a staffing function, and the COIC (Phonetic), who worked for the Chief of Staff here in the Corps but I have a supervisory responsibility for looking at, and in some cases, and in...
accordance with General Odierno's desires of prioritizing where they are focusing their efforts on.

Sir, I wanted to ask you: Relative to what turned out to be a different approach than when III Corps came to assume responsibility for (inaudible) -- that is to say, a shift to the pins up to the addition of five brigades and change of strategies -- obviously a huge amount of impact for the areas that you are responsible for as the DCG for Support.

What has been the biggest challenge in those areas of your responsibility relative to taking this different direction, making this surge happen, particularly now that I think today was the day when the last of those plus-up forces are on hand?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, two aspects of it. The Chief of Staff and I, Joe Anderson and I, are the two primary guys that

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interact with the Army staff through a couple of meetings, the AR-2B that takes place on Thursday nights and the DA (Inaudible) that takes place on Saturday night.

In those meetings, we are able to -- As processes are being developed, we are able to alert the Army staff that these are things that are being considered. That has allowed the Army staff to be proactive in preparing, if in fact the requirement ends up being something that CENTCOM asks the Joint Staff to do.

So I would say that, first of all, General Anderson and I did a good job of setting the table for both the Joint Staff and for the Army staff in being able to anticipate the requirement for the surge.

I think the first time I raised this as an issue was in December, that I thought that this was going to be a possibility and that the Army should start
looking at this as an option as we moved forward.

Now from my perspective, the most difficult thing that we have had to manage in the surge was to set the conditions for the arrival of the formations and, truthfully, Joe Anderson made most of the decisions and recommendations in this process, and I think he and the C-7, the C-7 staff and the C-8 did a magnificent job in working this.

The areas that I probably focused my most effort on during this period of time was making sure that this new logistical construct that we had was going to be able to sustain the surge without increasing the forces that we had on the ground, and we took some risks here.

The logistical forces?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's right, from the logistical forces. What I challenged the 13th Sustainment Command with...
was we are going to support this without increasing any sustainment formations in theater. That's what the doctrine said that we would be able to do, if we did on an area basis, that there would be economies in scale that would result, and we would be able to make it happen.

Now this was a partnership between us and Third Army in Kuwait and the 377th down there with General Tom Robinson, that they would push the logistics convoys out of Kuwait. We would get the support out of Jordan, the support out of Turkey, and those would move to our sustainment hubs and, based on the 13th's analysis, based on the guidance that I had given them, they felt like that we could sustain the surge without any significant plus-ups.

So far that has proven to be accurate. So Joe Anderson and the 7 and the 8 set the stage by using LOGCAP to create the basing conditions, and then the
transportation assets were coordinated to move the units in. None of them -- You know, I would say this was just in time kind of arrangements. We were still in some cases driving stakes into the ground as the troops and equipment arrived into their FOBs, but that all worked.

We also told -- I think it was probably in January, and I'm pretty sure it was January, that I told the Army staff in an AR-2B update that I was fairly certain we were going to ask for a Division headquarters, because commanding and controlling this thing, we were going to be pushing the 1st Cav to a limit with the number of brigades that they could effectively command and control in Baghdad, and that, based on my analysis -- at this time, we had not done any staff analysis, but based on my analysis, I thought that we would need an additional aviation brigade.

Originally, whenever I looked at

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the aviation part of it, I thought that we would need an attack helicopter battalion and probably an assault helicopter battalion, and then the more we refined the data, we told the Army we needed a combat aviation brigade.

So that was kind of the late breaking stuff. And of course, stressing the Army in this process was one of the requirements, that we informed them early on was that we wanted one of these brigades to be a Stryker brigade, and that it could be later in the flow; but in order for us to do offensive operations, it would have to be -- we would have to have an additional Stryker Brigade.

So there were some condition settings that we had to do in order to put the logistics in place to support an additional Stryker formation here. We had one. Having two on the ground increased the contract logistic support and the systems in place in order to be able to do that, and get...
the right ammunition and fuel posture for those formations as they came in.

Now this -- You know, we are in a combat operation here. So we weren't going to wait to employ the formations once they arrived, once they had gotten on the ground and had gone through a kind of a right seat/left seat ride, battle space orientation.

Not only were we logistically preparing for the arrival of the additional brigades, but we had to adjust and sustain another brigade combat team in the fight as we were moving into JSSs and to COPs, which meant we had to move barriers, barrier material, communications, security apparatus and stuff--

(b)(3), (b)(6): Life support?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: -- life support at the same time we were strategically moving BCTs in. We had already developed and successfully executed a
tactical logistics shift to be able to support the brigades as they came in tactically in their fight.

I would say that this -- This is one of those things that came out of the modular construct of the new BCTs, that the organization of the BCTs and the logistics capability that is now inherent in them enabled all that to happen.

So it was -- You were working strategic, operational and tactical stuff all at the same time. We shifted coverage as the Third Infantry Division got in here, and we had one aviation brigade provide coverage for two divisions, something that has not been done in a long time. Actually, I don't think it's been done since Vietnam.

[Redacted] brigade up in the 1st Cavalry Division did that, and then as [Redacted] brought his brigade in, got them on the ground. That was probably the most fantastic piece of work done in theater,
transforming the buy-up over here into being able to bring that aviation brigade in here. It was actually fantastic what was done over there.

It was actually an Air Force lieutenant colonel that headed up that team, an engineer that headed up that team that brought all of those moving pieces together, and now [b(3),b(6)] brigade has assumed battle space and picked up that mission.

So we had [b 3 b 6] responsible for it, but like the command and control package for the Third Infantry Division was provided out of 36th Combat Aviation Brigade. So I mean, it was just a real mark of professional conduct as these different formations blended and merged, broke apart, went back, as we made all of this stuff come together.

[b 3 b 6]: Sir, let me follow up on the logistics piece of the surge. There was a lot made back in

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Washington that initially, you know, Bush had said five brigades, about 20,000, 22,000, and then, you know, about a month or two later, it came out, well, the surge is really going to have to be plussed-up to about 30,000, because you have to have all the enablers and the logistics people come in with them.

So what other additional -- I mean, you said that there was very few logistic troops.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: There were very few logistics troops, but there were a significant number of enablers that had to come in that are not organic to the brigade combat team.

b3, b6: Right.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: We had to bring in an EOD company. We had to bring in a civil affairs company. We had to bring in route clearance teams. We had to bring in postal platoons. We had to bring in -- There were psychological warfare detachments.
troops?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No. Public affairs detachments. All those things that enable the formation, and we also had to bring in additional electronic warfare folks to plug into those formations in order to enable them to be able to do their job.

So the brigades that came in -- How about the division? With the division headquarters, did it bring anymore logistics troops?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No. No, did not.

Sir, relative to being able to support this, I'm just curious to know your thoughts on the role of the contractors, because this war has been unique in the sense of our use of contractors, both in terms of at the low level -- third country nationals are coming here to help get the work done, and also the larger equipment...
needs that are coming in to supply us with
audibility in terms of logistics,
intelligence, etcetera.

How big a role did they play in
being able to support the surge, and also in
the ongoing logistic support of the fight?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, first
of all, I do not think that, to my knowledge,
that the American Army has ever fought
without contractors.

That's a true
statement, sir.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I'm fairly
certain of that. And I think that we took
the lessons learned out of Desert Shield,
Desert Storm, and the years that we provided
the operation that took place in Kuwait and
the operation that took place out of Turkey
in ensuring that Iraq -- or trying to ensure
that Iraq did not do something against its
neighbors or complying with the rules of the
termination of the Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, that I think we set in place there a series of mechanisms that said contractors are going to be a part of this. But I mean, you know, LOGCAP, which is the Army's doctrine for how you do this, has been in place now for over 20 years.

So it was a natural thought process that the contractors were going to be here with us as we did this.

Now I'm not sure that at the outset of this we envisioned that the contractor formations would look like they do. I think that has ebbed and flowed over the time that we are here.

Where does it fit, and what capability does it give us? Well, one, it has enabled us to make the strategic logistics functions without adding additional logistics formations.

So the white trucks that run out of Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, carrying supplies here into theater, we are doing those with
contracted assets as opposed to green trucks
that would be carrying the load, which would
then have put additional stress on the forces
for being able to meet the requirements.

For modifications to equipment
based off of either improvements or things
that were necessary based on tactics,
techniques and procedures that the enemy
employed, using contractors to make those
modifications as opposed to solely using
soldiers to do that - don't get me wrong; we
use soldiers in, I think, everyone of these -
- it enabled us to more quickly make the
modifications in order to protect the force
better than what it had been before we made
the modifications.

In the aviation arena, it has
given us the opportunity to produce more
flying hours than we would have with just
green suiters. Right now, it looks like we
are on track got probably fly more than
400,000 hours this year, maybe 500,000 hours
this year in Iraq.

I don't think anyone would have envisioned that, you know, even just a couple of years ago. So I think -- One, I think there is significant historical precedents for us using them. I think they have for the most part been managed effectively, and they have been a significant combat multiplier being here.

Now like everything else that human beings are involved in, you are going to have some things that did not work out from the way they were supposed to. You are going to have some people, some companies, some contractors, that say they can do thing, but they cannot actually live up to what they committed themselves to, and so you have to have oversight as you are executing the contracts in order for you to ensure that you are getting exactly what the American taxpayer paid for whenever you hire somebody to do it.
Sir, can you comment on the pending TOA of the 13th Support Command Expeditionary and the 316th ESC? Will the MNC be more logistically capable with the newer modular support command, because I believe the -- Correct me if I'm wrong, but the 316th is the new modular support command.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Yeah. This is -- I'll take a second to try to explain how we got to where we are.

The 13th transitioned to the new MTO (Phonetic) before they deployed, but in order for this new organization to function effectively, you have to first convert the higher level theater sustainment command, and that had not taken place.

So the 377th was a legacy organization operating under legacy rules. So even though we on paper converted the 13th, we turned right around and submitted an RFF to bring them back up to their COSCOM.
strength before they deployed over here.

Now the 377th is being replaced by the 1st Theater Sustainment Command out of Fort Bragg, and that now enables us to put a transformed sustainment command expeditionary in to replace the 13th.

We have had some questions about whether or not this new construct is going to be as efficient and as effective as the 13th. I believe that it will be, but it is going to change some ways that we have done things in the past.

There is not a significant materiel management capability in the 316th. So that is supposed to migrate to the C-4 shop and down to the brigade combat teams, really, because there is no capability in the division to do that.

So that will make most of us who are older uncomfortable with not being able to know exactly initially who you touch to get the visibility on the materiel management
piece of it.

The rest of it, though, I think, is going to be fairly seamless. There may be a few issues as we work our way through the ammunition management piece of it. The transportation piece of it looks very sound to me.

So I don't think we will have any significant challenges there, and we have definitely proven that the Sustainment Brigades are incredibly flexible and capable formations.

So I really and truly think that most folks in theater will not know the difference, and we will go through the normal little head bending things that staffs always go through as they refigure out how to get some reports and those kind of things as we go through it, but I think right now it appears to me that it is going to work.

[b][b](b)(3), (b)(6)\] The Corps staff -

- you said, the C-4 will take over some
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materiel management responsibilities?

Maj. General Simmons: Right.

Yes, and as always they are supposed to get — You know, there was supposed to be a plug of folks that go in there to do that.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

Maj. General Simmons: And it's not nearly as large or robust as what we had down in Sustainment Command. We will see how that aspect of it works. That's the area where I think we are going to have probably the most challenges.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That takes place in July, I think. Right?

Maj. General Simmons: Right.

Sir, I wanted to change gears a little bit and get back to one of your other main areas of focus, which would be the piece with regard to the IED fight, force protection. You spoke a little bit earlier about some of the different entities there, Task Force, oversight role of...
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COIC.

Can you describe in a little more depth about what the overlap is in some of those areas, which we do have a number of areas that focus on different pieces of the IED fight, in particular? It would be good to have your perspective on what they do and what you see the focus is.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Anything we talk about on IEDs, of course, is classified, and fairly sensitive. But the IEDs account for about two-thirds of our killed in action and about two-thirds of our wounded.

It was very clear to all of us as we prepared to come back over here, keeping in mind this time we had a long time to prepare to come back -- We understood where we fit in the rotation to come back, and there were some key things that happened that most people don't understand nor even take note of.

Now the first one is that [b](3), [b](6)
asked to stay on as the Corps two. The second thing that happened is who was serving as the Corps Chief of Staff, asked to remain with the Corps and volunteered to step down to serve as the Corps G-3, two acts that I think were incredibly selfless in setting the conditions for the Corps to be successful.

With those two guys on board, I think they started doing some thinking, along with who was at that time serving as the Corps C-3 whenever this thought process started to come about -- one of the smartest guys that I have ever known, -- and we came to the conclusion that, if this was the thing that was doing the most harm to our force, that we needed to have a Corps focus on how to fight it.

So when General Odierno came in, we had done some work with JIDO (Phonetic) and with some other folks, but Colonel --
a discussion one night as General Odierno was
describing what he was trying to get after, I
think it was *(b)(3), (b)(6)* or it might have
been *(b), (b)* that said, you know, what
you are describing is kind of organizing
staff the way we attempted to do the deep
shaping operations at the corps level using
attack helicopters.

General Odierno said, yeah, that's
exactly what I'm talking about. So out of
that, really driven by General Odierno, came
this idea of the COIC, the one place where
Intel, Operations, Special Programs,
technology could be synchronized to go after
-- offensively go after the counter-IED
fight.

So what you end up with is a triad
inside the Corps that all three of these
aspects are focused on counter-IEDs. Task
Force *(1.4a)* is focused on the force protection
aspect of counter-IEDs, protecting the force
from IEDs through detection, once they are

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detected to then assist the route clearance
teams in the destruction of the IED or the
rendering safe of the IED.

JCC's S-1, charged with the
electronic warfare protection of the force
through jamming the RC-IEDs and fielding and
supervising the fielding of that kind of
equipment to function in the organization.

So that is from a force protection
side. The COIC was designed to identify
weaknesses in the IED networks so that we
could attack them. \(\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}\) has
taken over that, former Brigade commander
here during OIF-1, very good thinking, clear
understanding of what his mission is, and so
that is kind of the genesis of how we got
after it.

Now what this does is this puts an
operator into looking at the problem instead
of an Intel guy. Now don't get me wrong.
The Intel guys are very important in this
process, but whenever an operator looks at
the information, he starts piecing together where the enemy's battle space is and how the enemy's battle space lays out.

The combat operations that we are getting ready to conduct here starting tonight are based off of that operational look, that we clearly identified that the enemy is coming out of areas to place IEDs, that the enemy has placed IEDs in order to deny us access or make access painful to other areas and, therefore, he's got something in there that he wants to protect and, as a result, these major combat operations that we will start tonight in Arab Jabour and in the -- with the MEW up in the southwestern corner of the Merchant's Triangle and the 1st Brigade of the First Cav Division going into the southern part of the Merchant's Triangle, and then followed up later by an operation going into the Quarries, is designed to go after the IED networks, to go after the folks that are
building them, the caches where they store
the weapons systems that they are using,
going after the financial networks that
support them, identifying where this stuff is
coming from, how it is getting into country,
and all of those things are the things that
the COIC works.

In addition to that, they have
taken some of the analysis that Task Force
begun, and they have turned that into a
much more refined product that says here is
exactly the kind of IED that you can expect,
depending on where you are in Iraq, and here
is the kind of insurgent that employs that
kind of IED, and then from that networks have
been developed in which we understand who is
at the top and who the lieutenants are all
the way down to emplacers, and then in a
combination of us and (Inaudible), we have
been going after them.

So it is not where it will end up
being. It is still a work in progress, but
it has been a successful work in progress thus far, and some of the things that have come out of it have been fairly fascinating.

Whenever you get folks in that are specialists in statistics, for example -- I mean real specialists, not just amateur conduits. They really can tell you where and when things are happening.

I had a reporter the other day that said, well, IED attacks are up since February. I said, well, yeah, that's true. I said, they go up every year after February; and if your statisticians would have actually looked at the data for the whole time that we've been here, you would know that February is not a big month for IEDs. We don't necessarily understand why, but we know that that's a fact. So you can always report that IEDs are up since February. And I said, and if you put it -- you know, and you report on it and I get asked a question, I will say just what I just told you. It is not new
information; it's been there for three and a half years. The idea of it is good.

Now the enemy is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and what we know is that, even with all the improvements that we've made with the armored Humvee, that that is not the vehicle that we need to be using here.

First of all, it was not designed to be a combat, patrolling vehicle. It was a utility vehicle, and even though we put armor on it and we put a machine gun on it and everything else, the visibility out of it doesn't allow you to acquire targets.

It doesn't allow you to acquire the IEDs, and that is why we have levied a requirement on the Department of Defense that we need a vehicle that is more survivable in this environment, that is resistant to deep and buried IEDs and survive them, but also is a vehicle that allows us to conduct combat patrolling much more effectively than what we
do out of the Humvee.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, just to pause for a minute. We switched gears, and you are talking about the armored Humvee being inefficient to the task.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's correct.

b 3 b 6 Okay. Is the MRAP an answer to that?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: The MRAP is a beginning of the answer to that. The MRAP appears to have some potential to lessen the number of casualties from deep and buried IEDs, and there are some spirals off of some work that has been done by ATEK (Phonetic) that can give us the capability in areas that EFPs are employed to provide the vehicle with additional capability to be survivable against an EFP.

It also appears that the vehicle has the potential to be sustainable in this environment and to have better engagement
capability and patrolling capability. So it appears that it is a -- It looks like it has the possibility to be a part of the solution against the IED fight.

Can I ask a question about that, sir? Just relative to what we have seen and your knowledge of our IED program, the enemy has proven to be very adaptive in terms of the types of IEDs, and we have suffered catastrophic casualties to vehicles that we thought would be impervious to them, M-1 tanks, Stryker vehicles.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I don't think there is any commander out there that I know of has ever thought that. I mean, we've had anti-tank mines around in large proliferations since World War II, and this is, in many cases, not significantly different from an anti-tank mine.

It doesn't take a whole lot of -- I mean, I've got a degree in physical education, and I can figure out what the

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correlation is between the amount of explosives that I need in order to inflict damage on the occupants of a vehicle.

So I don't think that any of us thought that any of our vehicles are totally invincible. I don't think that. I certainly have never thought that.

Now I do believe that there was a certain level of surprise at how rapidly the enemy adapted to using this kind of technology to work against us. But if you look at other fights in other places here in the Middle East, this kind of technology has been employed in other places, and in today's environment with the Internet and instant communications, the ability to transfer that knowledge from one terrorist group to another is fairly significant.

Sir, I am going to take you back to February -- late January/early February time frame 2007 when there was a fairly large number of U.S.
helicopters shot down or crashed.

I know you did an interview with Stars and Stripes in February commenting on the insurgent methods. I read that article, and I got the impression from the article that you were very involved in the oversight and review of countering an apparent change in enemy tactics and TTPs to shoot down more helicopters.

Can you please comment on your role involving to look at the way we used aviation assets during that time, and what actions the Corps took under your direction?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, I will talk about this from the perspective of how it happened and how I saw it and, if you don't mind, I will even talk a little bit about the emotions of it.

This all started on the 20th of January whenever EZ-40 was shot down in which 12 American soldiers were killed. That was followed by several other instances, to
include Tarantula 1.4a which I was personally involved in, which was shot down out by Hit.

We had an Apache that was shot down in the Merchese (Phonetic) Triangle. We had a Blackwater helicopter shot down. We had a Marine Corps 46 that was shot down. Yes, we had the operation down in Najaf in which we lost the Apache down there.

That one is different. So I am not going to talk about that one. That was the uprising that took place down there with these zealots, and that was a major combat operation that those guys got struck in.

The others, though -- The EZ 1.4a looked very similar to an engagement that happened with an Apache out of the 4th Infantry Division back during J.D. Thurmond's tour over here and an engagement that I had looked at against one of the 1st Cav Apaches, two Apaches, out of the 4th of the 227 in which there was a clearly established triangular shaped ambush that was set up
using a 14.5 and a 12.7 millimeter heavy
machine guns.

Of course, the big concern was
were these guys using shoulder fired air
defense weapons, and we believed that that
was true in the case of the Marine Corps H-
46, but in these other aircraft there was
heavy machine guns.

So the first thing I would tell
you is that it made me mad as hell, and two
parts of it made me mad. One was the way the
news reported the event in which they never
told the complete story of what happened; and
two, the idea that somehow this was going to
affect our ability to conduct combat
operations.

So EZ Two aircraft. The
second aircraft was hit. The air crew,

who was an instructor

pilot out of looked like they had
everything under control, going to get it on
the ground, and then our guess is the second

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or third burst of heavy machine gun fire
killed the two guys up front.

So the aircraft was already on
fire, crashed into the ground. His wing man,
the dual gunners laid down suppressive fire.
The aircraft had moved somewhat out of the
engagement area, and they circled around and
landed, and the two crew chiefs tried to go
on the aircraft and save the guys.

What wasn't reported was that
there was a second flight of two Black Hawks.

In fact, they were on route to pick me up at
Washington LZ, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic)
saw the aircraft go down, and these Black
Hawks attacked the enemy position.

They took out the heavy machine
gun that was in the bomb truck, killed the
four guys that were in that truck, and then
they conducted a series of attacks using the
door gunners against the other two positions.
That forced the enemy to flee the
battlefield. As a result, they set
the conditions for the rest of the operations that took place in there that night. They came around and landed, also secured the BLZ or the crash site.

Because of their activity, because of the actions that and the crews took, and the interviews that were conducted afterwards in which I am the one that got to sit down with them, it was very clear to me that this was, one, a deliberate operation and that it was most likely based off of something that we were doing that had made us predictable that aircraft were going to fly through that particular place, and this is a patient enemy. So my guess was is that they had reconed this, and they had done some deliberate planning, and that they had sprung the attack on these aircraft.

So what did we do? Following the engagement on Tarantula which I was on, we got all the aviation commanders together, and we did a review of the tactics that the
enemy had used in this operation.

We did a hard look at the terrain in which they had engaged us, the altitudes in which the aircraft were flying, and we took a hard look at whether or not we were being predictable in the way we were moving around in the battle space, and discovered that we were.

One of the reasons that we were being predictable was because we had a fairly inflexible way of turning the air space on and off based off of whether or not we had a special operation going in or we had a tick declared and the CAS had been called out on the tick.

So the first thing we did was refine (Inaudible) and air space control measures so that we had more air space for the flight crews to be able to utilize as they executed their missions.

The second thing that we did was we focused intel assets, both -- This is all

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classified. -- both traditional ISR, full motion video stuff, as well as Signia and human assets, and as a result, we were able to capture one of the guys that was involved in the shootdown, which led to some development of some more information. Then following that, we captured a video up in MND-North's area battle space in which it was the training video for how they were doing it.

Once we got that figured out, then we started targeting, looking for them, figuring out the terrain that they needed to set up these triangular shaped ambushes and then we started going after them.

Many times it would be a UAV that would pick them up, and then we would bring Apaches in or (Inaudible) to attack them. We had one out here the other day in which we had two Apaches that caught them on the move and took out five 14.5s in the back of Bongo trucks.
Now we've gotten so smart with what we are doing, the Apaches pulled out. We had a UAV in at altitude. The bad guys come in to pick up the weapons and police the bodies up, and we tracked them right back to the safe house, and then came in with another Apache and took out the car and the house.

So did I have something to do with this? Yes, I had something to do with it, but the majority of the work was done by

in the aviation community who were not going to let the enemy dictate how we were conducting our operations over here.

Are our aircraft engaged? Yes. About 100 aircraft are engaged every month, and about 14 or 15 of them are hit every month, but those, generally speaking, are isolated incidents in which we surprise somebody who is doing something wrong and they engage the aircraft with one or two weapons systems. That's different from these
deliberate ambushes that they set up to engage the aircraft.

It's a thinking, adaptive enemy. I think they got a pretty good idea right now that we have figured out what they are doing and, if they go to set one of these things up, we are going to be coming after them.

So I am fairly certain they will change the way they do things as we move forward. But we have been much more successful in killing these guys than what anybody is willing to report. I went up and presented the two Black Hawk crews, a Silver Star and the other -- and his co-pilot a Distinguished Flying Cross, and his wing man, both of those guys Distinguished Flying Crosses, and the aircrew that landed in the battle space out there Air Medal with V Devices, as did the door guys.

Until General Petraeus decided that he would come up here, we had one reporter that was going to cover the event,
because no one is interested in hearing about how our guys are being successful.

(b)(3), (b)(6) But, sir, you said you brought all the aviator commanders together. You chaired that. So it's the Corps that brought that conference together.

Is that correct?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's correct.

(b)(3), (b)(6) All right.

Changing gears, different subject here relative to equipment: You talked a little bit about the FARP, but in general I just wanted to get your perspective on what has been the strategy as far as replacement of combat loss type of equipment, thinking in particular about Strykers because they have proved to be very successful, and the issue of trying to get as many Stryker brigades out there. It has been a ready stream of replacement equipment or is the strategy to press on with what is on hand?
MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Oh, no. Since the very beginning, we have had a --
Well, I mean the beginning of the Corps' operations here, not just this time but the last time. We had a fairly sound battle loss strategy in place that was really based off of Army doctrine that had to be modified because of how rapidly the environment changed from a conventional fight to a COIN environment. But we have -- Together with ARCENT, we have a two-pronged strategy for replacing battle losses.

The first thing is we evacuate to the full second the brigade that's up at Balad to determine if it is possible to field repair the vehicle to a level that it can be returned to action, and they have incredible capability up there to do that.

The second one, of course, is the traditional method of bringing in replacement vehicles from out of stocks either in Kuwait or from the United States.
Generally speaking, we have been able to sustain the formations with sufficient resources to replace our battle losses usually within 30 to 45 days of them losing a vehicle, if not sooner.

Some of it has to do with transportation time. Some of it has to do with putting the GFE in the equipment, the commo equipment, and everything else to get it up to an operating status.

Strykers: Last month we had more losses on Strykers than what is habitually programmed for. Asked the Army staff to help us with that problem. They have shipped us 14 Strykers out of the production line in order to bring us back up so that we've got the right pool of vehicles to sustain combat operations uninterrupted.

The Army -- The Army has been very, very good at doing that. Same thing with aircraft. In addition to having some floats here in theater, we have done very
well. Whenever we have a loss, Major General Jim Goldsbury, the AMCOM Commander, of identifying a resources, and the Army G-3 directing that resource be flown here into theater. We put it back together, and get back into the fight.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Sir, I want to talk a little bit about the old Iraqi ammunition dumps. Do you have anything to do with the oversight of the sealing of those or the security of those or the overwatch of those?

Maj. General Simmons: Well, to some degree, as DCG I have some kind of supervisory responsibility over everything. But yes, this kind of ties in with -- When we were here last time, this was a high priority to get these things cleaned up, destroy the ammunition, make it unusable, and this was done through a contracted process, generally.

Well, when I first got here, we
had artillery units that were hauling the stuff down, and then you would have five or six explosions around here every night as we detonated the stuff, just down south of here.

That shifted to a contracted operation in which some companies came in that were clearing these. Now the problem that came out of this was we didn't have enough troops on the ground here to secure every piece of ground in Iraq and, as a result, the insurgents had the opportunities to go in and take large quantities of ammunition out of these things and create caches all over Iraq.

The other problem that we had is I'm not sure we knew where they all were, and I think it took us some time to figure out who we needed to ask who could tell us where they all were.

So between other agencies of our government and our own resources, we finally got a decent plan put together, and these
things were gone after.

Now when we came in this time, we were convinced that the ammunition for supplying a lot of the IEDs had to be coming from these old ammunition dumps and, sure enough, they were. Now I'm not sure I know exactly how that happened. I just know that it was happening, and we've got video of it happening with Kiowa warriors up in MND-North watching the guys coming out of holes in the ground carrying large quantities.

We went in and found huge quantities of this stuff. That was still in the old ammo dump that was supposedly cleared and cleaned up.

So we have reintensified that effort, and now that is a required reporting issue for the MNDs, that they are in fact going out and making sure these things are cleared, and that somebody is checking on them, and that there actually is not stuff coming out of them.
There is so much ammunition here that I would never be foolish enough to say we got it all. We were flying out of Al Asad the other day, and we flew over -- what did you say? -- 100-150 bombs.

Sitting in the desert?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Sitting in the desert. So, I mean, it's... You know, in 1982-'83 I set down on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, and every day I would take photographs of ships coming from the Soviet Union that were docking in Akaba and were loaded with military equipment.

So I got a pretty good idea of how much stuff was up here, just from the sense of those large ships making that trek every two or three days in there. I think we have got at a lot of it, but I have never seen a place that had so much ammunition.

Sir, I really just wanted to maybe come around to you. I
don't know how many more questions -- I wanted to come back around to a last question about your feelings about why you stayed with the staff.

Sir, I am going to repeat the question then that I asked you about during the intermission we had, and it was, if I recall, how does a Major General get to stay in one position for four years? And you were talking about what a unique opportunity this was and that you wanted to come back with the 3rd Corps, and I wondered if you just would pick up on that.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Okay. We knew the Corps was coming back. I mean, it was known basically from the time we got back that we would -- last time, that we would be coming back, and we had some very talented people inside the organization that made the decision to stay.

is the two, and

is the Chief of Staff who

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volunteered to move down to be the Corps G-3.
Whenever I learned that General Odierno was coming in to be the Corps Commander, I felt like that he would be a great Corps Commander.

So whenever the Army asked me, you know, what I wanted to do, and they gave me the opportunity to go do a couple of things, I asked to remain with the Corps and come back over, because I felt like that we had an opportunity to do something significant with the level of talent and organization and experience that we would have under the leadership of General Odierno, a man that I have immense respect for, have known for a long time. We were brigade commanders at the same time, and I felt like that -- Honestly, I felt like we owed it to the nation and to the soldiers to bring as much of the team back together as we could for the potential that we could bring this thing to a close.

So you know, I mean, it wasn't my
decision alone. First of all, General Odierno had to agree that he would like to have me as his Deputy. We had that conversation before he took command. He called me from Washington. He asked me to stay as well.

Of course, my wife had something to say about it. And so it seemed like to be the right decision.

Now there is another piece of this, too, and you know, to be totally honest with you. I was mad as hell whenever they sent me back to be the CG at Fort Hood. Now it turned out to be a fairly satisfying experience, but I felt like that we had 30,000 soldiers over here who did not receive the benefit of having a Deputy Corps Commander now, and I have been pretty much a pain in everybody's butt about that topic ever since.

So whenever the decision was made that the Corps' DCG would deploy, then I felt
obligated because of the argument that I had been making with the Army for two years that I should be the guy to go and do it.

Although General Hahn (Phonetic) came here as the U.S. DCG, it was not lined up the way we are doing it. General Odierno has had an absolute stroke of genius in doing nothing but changing names, because by saying that Jerry Durbin (Phonetic) is the Deputy Commanding General for Operations and that I'm the Deputy Commanding General for Support and that Peter Devlin is the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition, it tells the subordinate commanders and the subordinate DCGs and the subordinate Chiefs of Staff who they need to pick up the phone and call.

It also tells the Corps staff here is the guy that this idea or this thought has got to go through. Now the other -- If I have done anything here of value for the Corps in this role is that over the time that...
I have been here, I have come to understand how a senior operational staff becomes effective.

There is only one commander, and there is only one set of priorities, and that is General Odierno. And his priorities are directed to the staff through one guy, and that's the Corps Chief of Staff. When the DCGs are executing their duties and responsibilities as they go out, they see problems, they identify things that have to be fixed, they go to the Chief of Staff who then prioritizes those requirements into General Odierno's established priorities to direct the staff to get after them.

Organizations become dysfunctional whenever the DCGs come back and they go to the there or they go to the two and they start telling the staff to do something, because there can only be one set of priorities. So, you know, my first duty is when the new guys come in, which they do --
they change out; the DCGs change out -- you know, I sit down and talk to them.

You know, General Berriagan, absolutely no issues. He's been a Chief of Staff at a high level. General Devlin, absolutely no issues, because he has been both a commander and a senior staff officer.

So we understand it. Just frankly, I'm not sure the team that was here before us understood that part.

So that aspect of it, I think, makes this headquarters as effective as it is. So that's probably my one tiny contribution to what the organization is doing over here.

We are just about done. In fact, my only last question, sir, was going to be is there anything we haven't touched upon here that --

I've got one other.

Do you want to try and get this last couple of minutes on
tape then? Okay, we'll press on without
(Inaudible) then. We don't need that.

The effort at sealing, if you will -- and I don't know whether that
is the right word -- the Iraqi borders -- I
wondered -- Somehow I've got your name
involved with that effort, and I've read the
operations order on it.

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Yes. I'm a
radical whenever it comes to the borders here
in that I don't think that we are going after
it the right way at all.

If I were completely in charge,
which I'm not, I would declare the border
ports as trained, because they are as trained
as we are ever going to make them, and I
would take our border training transition
teams that we have out there, and I would
focus on the legitimate POEs coming into
Iraq, because most of the bad stuff that is
actually coming in here that hurts us, we
believe, actually comes through the POEs.
So if you get these ports of entry to where they are actually enforcing Iraqi law, it is more profitable for them to enforce Iraqi law than it is to take bribes for guys to come through. You know, you can either do that through (Inaudible) perspective or prison, if they are not following the rules correctly.

Then I think what that will do is then that will force the bad guys that are bringing bad stuff into this country to then go to the traditional smuggling routes to come in, and as a result, there will be an increase in that traffic which we can focus ISR assets on, and then we can do interdiction operations against those activities.

Now sometimes we are going to get folks that are bringing dates and sheep across and bundles of cigarettes on the backs of donkeys. But that's all we are getting at the border ports now anyway.
So this, I think, would give us higher probability of forcing the bad guys to do something different from what they have been doing, and at least interrupt the ease with which they get stuff into the country.

(b)(6) All right. Thank you, sir.

Sir, is there anything we haven't touched upon that you think is something that we ought to make sure we catch at this time with you?

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, I would tell you that, emotionally speaking, I spend a lot of time trying to educate -- I think that would be the right word -- educate the subordinate commanders and their staffs about a couple of things that I think are incredibly important.

The first one is about the media.

In a democratic nation, the media is at least as important as the military, because it is the media or journalists that report to
the American people and actually through their reporting holds our government accountable for what it does. You could say it holds our generals accountable for what it does.

In this particular conflict, the amount of criticism leveraged by the media on the President and/or the generals is no more severe than it has been in any other war. If you go back and look at World War II, President Roosevelt took huge criticism every day in the newspapers. So I mean, that aspect of it has not changed.

I mean, it's legendary about Patton in and out of trouble with the press and Eisenhower being criticized. So that aspect of it has not changed, and we as professionals now -- this is a professional Army -- should not be surprised or upset with that.

On the other side of the coin, the American media, and the British media, as a
matter of fact, too, has broken trust with the people of their countries in that they have not told the story that appeared on the front pages of newspapers throughout our history of the American soldier who has closed with and killed the enemy -- in other words, the American hero.

I am disturbed with that, and I think that the journalists have broken faith with the American people by not telling that story. Even in Vietnam, they told the story of the heroes, and that aspect of it is absolutely not covered here.

This is the next greatest generation of Americans. This is a generation that has volunteered to come in and take a stand for America. Now they came into the Army for hundreds of different reasons, some of them to get a college education, some of them because they didn't know what else to do, some of them, you know, as an opportunity to put bread on the table,
to take care of a family.

They fight for the same reasons that their grandfathers and fathers before them fought. They fight for each other, and they are so courageous, and they have so much trust and confidence in their sergeants that they do not recognize valor.

An event that would have won very high decoration in previous wars is submitted as something that is normal activity here, because our youngsters are so incredibly valorous, and they have so much trust in their sergeants that they don't report it as anything significant at all.

I would love to see those great kids that go outside the line every day get their due recognition with the American people.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thanks very much, sir.

(b.6) Thank you very much, sir. That concludes this interview.

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