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CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW OF

MAJ. GENERAL JAMES SIMMONS

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (US)

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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15 JUNE 2007

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Approved for Release

(This transcript was produced from
tapes provided by the Center of Military
History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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[b 3 b 6] This is [b 3, b 6]

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[b(3), (b)(6)], the Multinational Corps Iraq

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historian. Today is Friday, the 15th of June

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2007 at approximately 1830. We are at the Al

6

Faw Palace at Camp Victory outside of

7

Baghdad, Iraq, and we are interviewing Major

8

General James E. Simmons. Also with me is --

9

[b(6)]: This is [b 6]

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[b(6)] U.S. Army Center of Military History.

11

[b 3 b 6] Sir, would you be

12

kind enough to introduce yourself in your own

13

words, so the listener can identify you?

14

MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Major

15

General James E. Simmons, the Deputy

16

Commanding General for Support for

17

Multinational Corps - Iraq.

18

[b(3), (b)(6)] Great. Thank

19

you, sir.

20

Sir, I wanted to start off by

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asking: You're really one of -- certainly,

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one of those in the Corps with the most

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1 longevity. If I understand properly, you had
2 originally been assigned to III Corps in July
3 of 2003, and I was just wondering if you
4 could talk us through a little bit of --
5 That's not the position you originally came
6 to the Corps in, the one that you are in now.

7 I wondered if you might talk us through a
8 little bit of your background.

9 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Oh, no,
10 that is the position that I had been in as --
11 I've been the Deputy Commanding General of
12 III Corps since July of 2003, but I have
13 served in several different capacities as we
14 have executed the deployments into and out of
15 Iraq.

16 I received the notification that
17 the Corps was going to replace V Corps on the
18 8th of August 2003 as the Corps was
19 participating in UFL, and I received a phone
20 call from General Cody who at that time was
21 the G-3 of the Army, and I first came to Iraq
22 in August of 2003 and was here August and

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1 September of 2003 as the lead officer in the
2 planning for the transition between V Corps
3 and III Corps.

4 This building that we are
5 currently in was in a significant state of
6 disrepair. We had been bombed where the JOC
7 (Phonetic) is currently located, taking a
8 2,000 pounder. You could look up at the sky
9 from in there. There was very little power
10 in here, and most of the rooms were occupied
11 by soldiers who were using it as a place to
12 bed down after they had completed their
13 duties.

14 I went back to Fort Hood, took the
15 lessons that we had learned and planned for
16 the first MRX for the transfer between the
17 two corps, which was going to be phased, and
18 General Metz, who was initially going to be
19 going to be General Sanchez's Deputy, and
20 then in the April time frame the Corps would
21 stand up as a corps and split away from CJT-
22 F7, and General Casey would come in and take

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1 command.

2 During the first deployment, I was
3 responsible for the RSO&I of the units that
4 were coming in under the Corps, and ran a
5 forward command post at Camp Udari in Kuwait
6 where we pushed the 138,000 soldiers through
7 Kuwait and into Iraq at the same time we were
8 pulling the 134,000 soldiers of V Corps out.

9 At the end of that time, I'm well
10 enough -- At the end of February I moved
11 north here, and my title was Deputy
12 Commanding General, III Corps. I was not
13 part of CJTF-7, and I was here until April,
14 and in that capacity I was primarily
15 responsible for the separate formations that
16 were here, the MI Brigade, the MP Brigade,
17 the similar brigade, the 185th Aviation
18 formation, and the 13th (Inaudible).

19 b 3 b 6 Those are the
20 Corps troops, right?

21 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Corps
22 troops, right. And then in April it was

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1 decided that we did not have sufficient
2 command and control for receiving the
3 (Inaudible) Division back at Fort Hood or for
4 fishing the remainder of the 1st Cavalry
5 Division out of Fort Hood. So I was returned
6 to Fort Hood as the Commanding General
7 initially of Fort Hood, and the Deputy
8 Commanding General of III Corps Rear, and
9 Major General Bobby Wilson, at that time the
10 Commanding General of the 7th Infantry
11 Division, was the Corps Rear Commanding
12 General.

13 Immediately following the 4th Com
14 change of command, General O'Neill (Phonetic)
15 changed that arrangement and made me the
16 Commanding General of III Corps Rear and the
17 Commanding General of Fort Hood, and I
18 supervised the training, employment and
19 redeployment of 65 percent of the Corps for
20 about a 14-month period while the Corps
21 completed its mission over here.

22 Whenever the Corps came home and

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1 after a period of time after the Corps came
2 home, I reverted back to being the Deputy
3 Corps Commander for General Metz, and then
4 when we had the change of command between
5 General Metz and General Odierno, I remained
6 in that position.

7 We worked our way through the MRX,
8 a great deal of discussion about roles,
9 duties and responsibilities, because with my
10 departure out of Iraq in April of 2004, we
11 had not had a U.S. Deputy.

12 In regards to that, the British
13 Deputy that was here became the principal
14 deputy to the Commanding General, and that
15 situation really had remained kind of fuzzy
16 until General Hahn (Phonetic) came in with V
17 Corps, and because of the confusion that was
18 created about the roles and responsibilities
19 of the DCG, we spent a considerable amount of
20 time at Fort Hood trying to codify the roles
21 that the British Deputy would play, the U.S.
22 Deputy would play and, in our case, the

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1 Canadian Deputy would play, because we have
2 an assigned Deputy Commanding General in III
3 Corps who is a Canadian, General Devlin,
4 before him General Tingin (Phonetic).

5 So General Odierno crafted out
6 very carefully the duties and
7 responsibilities of the DCGs, and then on the
8 15th of December after the Tola he renamed
9 the Deputies to the Deputy Commanding General
10 for Operations and Intelligence, the Deputy
11 Commanding General for Support -- that's my
12 role -- and General Devlin as the Deputy
13 Commanding General for Coalition and
14 Infrastructure.

15 So that's kind of how we got here.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great, sir. That
17 actually answers a lot of interesting
18 questions about how the structure went.

19 So one of the things that I didn't
20 realize is that was a unique structure, but
21 this was not a pattern that V Corps was
22 following then.

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1 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No, it was
2 not. My duties here in this position -- and
3 my principal duty is to exercise command.
4 General Odierno put his hand across that
5 board right there and said everything above
6 the line belongs to Odierno; everything below
7 the line belongs to Simmons. Those were the
8 separate troops for the Corps.

9 Over here, right now that consists
10 of 17 brigades, several of those formations
11 commanded by general officers, and about
12 34,000 soldiers. In addition to that, I am
13 responsible for four focus areas that General
14 Odierno has given me: Logistics; aviation;
15 force protection; and basing.

16 So I exercise supervisory
17 responsibility over those four focus areas
18 and spend a structured amount of time each
19 week in those four focused areas, and then
20 spend the rest of my time out exercising a
21 command function over those separate commands
22 and formations that we have here supporting

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1 the Corps.

2 [REDACTED] That is exactly
3 where I wanted to ask the next question, sir.

4 Where do you spend most of your time? You
5 spend them out there with the core troops,
6 helping them out, or back here?

7 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: We usually
8 spend four to five days a week out of the
9 palace. We usually depart here about 1030 in
10 the morning, and I will come back in here
11 sometime around 1930-2000 at night.

12 I have a significant number of
13 formations that are at LSA Anaconda, the 13th
14 Sustainment Command, the 411th Engineers, the
15 36th Combat Aviation Brigade, a signal
16 battalion, and the 407nd Army Field Services
17 Brigade which is actually an AMC
18 organization, but General Griffin, the AMC
19 Commander, has given me authority to
20 coordinate directly and task that formation,
21 although I don't like [REDACTED]
22 report card.

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1 The Sustainment brigades -- we
2 just had the Rip Tower (Phonetic) with the
3 507th and the 593rd out of Al Asad that
4 supports the Marines. The 45th is located up
5 at Key West. The 82nd is located at Tallil.
6 The 15th is located at Taji, and then we
7 have the 167th that is located at Anaconda,
8 and the other one, I always forget the number
9 of it -- yeah, the 657th is also at Anaconda.

10 Those are large formations that
11 operate on a general support area or support
12 basis, and it's proven to be successful.
13 This is the new logistics doctrine that has
14 been developed.

15 While we had a great number of
16 questions on it, the Sustainment Brigade
17 concept has worked well. The 593rd was a CSG
18 or Corps Support Group, but they have done a
19 -- they did a magnificent job while they were
20 here supporting the Marine Corps, and now the
21 507th is in up there. We'll whip the 45th
22 out, I guess, next week sometime, and then

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1 that will be followed by the 82nd and then
2 the 15th.

3 Those are the four major ones that
4 operate in the outlying areas. The 67th is -
5 - they are in a -- They support a smaller
6 footprint arrangement.

7 The Signal Brigade is
8 headquartered here, but they have battalions
9 at Anaconda, Spiker. They have one battalion
10 here.

11 The Military Intelligence Brigade
12 headquarters is located here. Three
13 battalions are here, one battalion at
14 Anaconda. Then we've got the 89th MP
15 Brigade, which is OPCON. The Brigade
16 Headquarters is OPCON to the 1st Cavalry
17 Division, but they have two battalions that
18 are here in MNDB, although one battalion is
19 also providing support to the Marines out
20 west. Then we have an MP battalion up north
21 at Spiker.

22 So the formation is spread all

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1 over Iraq, and so just from a formation
2 perspective, I spend probably 65 percent of
3 my time with those, and then with the basing
4 function that I have, I am constantly going,
5 interacting with the garrison commanders or
6 BSB commanders that are out in the outlying
7 areas about the basing issues, the Log Cap,
8 how that is interacting and working with
9 supporting the formations that are located at
10 the bases.

11 Then the aviation aspect of it, I
12 spend a normal amount of time with the 36th
13 Combat Aviation Brigade, which works for me,
14 but also on behalf of General Odierno I
15 ensure that the aviation brigades that are
16 supporting the MNDs are operating in
17 accordance with the Corps Commander's
18 standards and rules for operating in the air
19 space here, as well as evaluating their
20 readiness levels, not necessarily from a
21 maintenance perspective because those are all
22 good, but from an effectiveness, how they are

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1 fighting and employing their formations.

2 [REDACTED] Well, you are the
3 senior aviator, aren't you, sir?

4 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I am the
5 senior aviator in theater, I guess. One of
6 the W-5s told me the other day that I am the
7 senior aviator that has been deployed into
8 the theater. So I hadn't actually thought
9 about that, but I kind of thought about it a
10 little bit, and I guess that is also a true
11 statement.

12 So that's -- The work that I do
13 from the force protection aspect comes from
14 two principal formations that work for me.
15 That's Task Force [REDACTED] 1.4a and [REDACTED] 1.4a two joint
16 formations that are underneath my daily
17 supervision.

18 Then from a staffing function,
19 [REDACTED] and the COIC (Phonetic),
20 who worked for the Chief of Staff here in the
21 Corps but I have a supervisory responsibility
22 for looking at, and in some cases, and in

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1 accordance with General Odierno's desires of
2 prioritizing where they are focusing their
3 efforts on.

4 b 3, b 6 Sir, I wanted to
5 ask you: Relative to what turned out to be a
6 different approach than when III Corps came
7 to assume responsibility for (Inaudible) --
8 that is to say, a shift to the plus-up to the
9 addition of five brigades and change of
10 strategies -- obviously, a huge amount of
11 impact for the areas that you are responsible
12 for as the DCG for Support.

13 What has been the biggest
14 challenge in those areas of your
15 responsibility relative to taking this
16 different direction, making this surge
17 happen, particularly now that I think today
18 was the day when the last of those plus-up
19 forces are on hand?

20 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, two
21 aspects of it. The Chief of Staff and I, Joe
22 Anderson and I, are the two primary guys that

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1 interact with the Army staff through a
2 couple of meetings, the AR-2B that takes
3 place on Thursday nights and the DA
4 (Inaudible) that takes place on Saturday
5 night.

6 In those meetings, we are able to
7 -- As processes are being developed, we are
8 able to alert the Army staff that these are
9 things that are being considered. That has
10 allowed the Army staff to be proactive in
11 preparing, if in fact the requirement ends up
12 being something that CENTCOM asks the Joint
13 Staff to do.

14 So I would say that, first of all,
15 General Anderson and I did a good job of
16 setting the table for both the Joint Staff
17 and for the Army staff in being able to
18 anticipate the requirement for the surge.

19 I think the first time I raised
20 this as an issue was in December, that I
21 thought that this was going to be a
22 possibility and that the Army should start

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1 looking at this as an option as we moved
2 forward.

3 Now from my perspective, the most
4 difficult thing that we have had to manage in
5 the surge was to set the conditions for the
6 arrival of the formations and, truthfully,
7 Joe Anderson made most of the decisions and
8 recommendations in this process, and I think
9 he and the C-7, the C-7 staff and the C-8 did
10 a magnificent job in working this.

11 The areas that I probably focused
12 my most effort on during this period of time
13 was making sure that this new logistical
14 construct that we had was going to be able to
15 sustain the surge without increasing the
16 forces that we had on the ground, and we took
17 some risks here.

18 b 3, b 6 The logistical
19 forces?

20 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's
21 right, from the logistical forces. What I
22 challenged the 13th Sustainment Command with

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1 was we are going to support this without
2 increasing any sustainment formations in
3 theater. That's what the doctrine said that
4 we would be able to do, if we did on an area
5 basis, that there would be economies in scale
6 that would result, and we would be able to
7 make it happen.

8 Now this was a partnership between
9 us and Third Army in Kuwait and the 377th
10 down there with General Tom Robinson, that
11 they would push the logistics convoys out of
12 Kuwait. We would get the support out of
13 Jordan, the support out of Turkey, and those
14 would move to our sustainment hubs and, based
15 on the 13th's analysis, based on the guidance
16 that I had given them, they felt like that we
17 could sustain the surge without any
18 significant plus-ups.

19 So far that has proven to be
20 accurate. So Joe Anderson and the 7 and the
21 8 set the stage by using LOGCAP to create the
22 basing conditions, and then the

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1 transportation assets were coordinated to
2 move the units in. None of them -- You know,
3 I would say this was just in time kind of
4 arrangements. We were still in some cases
5 driving stakes into the ground as the troops
6 and equipment arrived into their FOBs, but
7 that all worked.

8 We also told -- I think it was
9 probably in January, and I'm pretty sure it
10 was January, that I told the Army staff in an
11 AR-2B update that I was fairly certain we
12 were going to ask for a Division
13 headquarters, because commanding and
14 controlling this thing, we were going to be
15 pushing the 1st Cav to a limit with the
16 number of brigades that they could
17 effectively command and control in Baghdad,
18 and that, based on my analysis -- at this
19 time, we had not done any staff analysis, but
20 based on my analysis, I thought that we would
21 need an additional aviation brigade.

22 Originally, whenever I looked at

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1 the aviation part of it, I thought that we
2 would need an attack helicopter battalion and
3 probably an assault helicopter battalion, and
4 then the more we refined the data, we told
5 the Army we needed a combat aviation brigade.

6 So that was kind of the late
7 breaking stuff. And of course, stressing the
8 Army in this process was one of the
9 requirements, that we informed them early on
10 was that we wanted one of these brigades to
11 be a Stryker brigade, and that it could be
12 later in the flow; but in order for us to do
13 offensive operations, it would have to be --
14 we would have to have an additional Stryker
15 Brigade.

16 So there were some condition
17 settings that we had to do in order to put
18 the logistics in place to support an
19 additional Stryker formation here. We had
20 one. Having two on the ground increased the
21 contract logistic support and the systems in
22 place in order to be able to do that, and get

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1 the right ammunition and fuel posture for
2 those formations as they came in.

3 Now this -- You know, we are in a
4 combat operation here. So we weren't going
5 to wait to employ the formations once they
6 arrived, once they had gotten on the ground
7 and had gone through a kind of a right
8 seat/left seat ride, battle space
9 orientation.

10 Not only were we logistically
11 preparing for the arrival of the additional
12 brigades, but we had to adjust and sustain
13 another brigade combat team in the fight as
14 we were moving into JSSs and to COPs, which
15 meant we had to move barriers, barrier
16 material, communications, security apparatus
17 and stuff--

18 [REDACTED]: Life support?

19 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: -- life
20 support at the same time we were
21 strategically moving BCTs in. We had already
22 developed and successfully executed a

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1 tactical logistics shift to be able to
2 support the brigades as they came in
3 tactically in their fight.

4 I would say that this -- This is
5 one of those things that came out of the
6 modular construct of the new BCTs, that the
7 organization of the BCTs and the logistics
8 capability that is now inherent in them
9 enabled all that to happen.

10 So it was -- You were working
11 strategic, operational and tactical stuff all
12 at the same time. We shifted coverage as the
13 Third Infantry Division got in here, and we
14 had one aviation brigade provide coverage for
15 two divisions, something that has not been
16 done in a long time. Actually, I don't think
17 it's been done since Vietnam.

18 b 3, b 6 brigade up in the
19 1st Cavalry Division did that, and then as
20 (b)(3), (b)(6) brought his brigade in, got them
21 on the ground. That was probably the most
22 fantastic piece of work done in theater, was

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1 transforming the buy-up over here into being
2 able to bring that aviation brigade in here.

3 It was actually fantastic what was done over
4 there.

5 It was actually an Air Force
6 lieutenant colonel that headed up that team,
7 an engineer that headed up that team that
8 brought all of those moving pieces together,
9 and now [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] brigade has assumed
10 battle space and picked up that mission.

11 So we had [redacted b 3 b 6] responsible
12 for it, but like the command and control
13 package for the Third Infantry Division was
14 provided out of 36th Combat Aviation Brigade.

15 So I mean, it was just a real mark of
16 professional conduct as these different
17 formations blended and merged, broke apart,
18 went back, as we made all of this stuff come
19 together.

20 [redacted b 3, b 6]: Sir, let me
21 follow up on the logistics piece of the
22 surge. There was a lot made back in

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1 Washington that initially, you know, Bush had
2 said five brigades, about 20,000, 22,000, and
3 then, you know, about a month or two later,
4 it came out, well, the surge is really going
5 to have to be plussed-up to about 30,000,
6 because you have to have all the enablers and
7 the logistics people come in with them.

8 So what other additional -- I
9 mean, you said that there was very few
10 logistic troops.

11 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: There were
12 very few logistics troops, but there were a
13 significant number of enablers that had to
14 come in that are not organic to the brigade
15 combat team.

16 b 3, b 6: Right.

17 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: We had to
18 bring in an EOD company. We had to bring in
19 a civil affairs company. We had to bring in
20 route clearance teams. We had to bring in
21 postal platoons. We had to bring in -- There
22 were psychological warfare detachments.

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1 [redacted] Anymore Intel
2 troops?

3 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No. Public
4 affairs detachments. All those things that
5 enable the formation, and we also had to
6 bring in additional electronic warfare folks
7 to plug into those formations in order to
8 enable them to be able to do their job.

9 [redacted] So the brigades
10 that came in -- How about the division? With
11 the division headquarters, did it bring
12 anymore logistics troops?

13 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: No. No,
14 did not.

15 [redacted]: Sir, relative to
16 being able to support this, I'm just curious
17 to know your thoughts on the role of the
18 contractors, because this war has been unique
19 in the sense of our use of contractors, both
20 in terms of at the low level -- third country
21 nationals are coming here to help get the
22 work done, and also the larger equipment

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1 needs that are coming in to supply us with
2 audibility in terms of logistics,
3 intelligence, etcetera.

4 How big a role did they play in
5 being able to support the surge, and also in
6 the ongoing logistic support of the fight?

7 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, first
8 of all, I do not think that, to my knowledge,
9 that the American Army has ever fought
10 without contractors.

11 b 6 That's a true
12 statement, sir.

13 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I'm fairly
14 certain of that. And I think that we took
15 the lessons learned out of Desert Shield,
16 Desert Storm, and the years that we provided
17 the operation that took place in Kuwait and
18 the operation that took place out of Turkey
19 in ensuring that Iraq -- or trying to ensure
20 that Iraq did not do something against its
21 neighbors or complying with the rules of the
22 termination of the Desert Shield/Desert

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1 Storm, that I think we set in place there a
2 series of mechanisms that said contractors
3 are going to be a part of this. But I mean,
4 you know, LOGCAP, which is the Army's
5 doctrine for how you do this, has been in
6 place now for over 20 years.

7 So it was a natural thought
8 process that the contractors were going to be
9 here with us as we did this.

10 Now I'm not sure that at the
11 outset of this we envisioned that the
12 contractor formations would look like they
13 do. I think that has ebbed and flowed over
14 the time that we are here.

15 Where does it fit, and what
16 capability does it give us? Well, one, it
17 has enabled us to make the strategic
18 logistics functions without adding additional
19 logistics formations.

20 So the white trucks that run out
21 of Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, carrying supplies
22 here into theater, we are doing those with

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1 contracted assets as opposed to green trucks
2 that would be carrying the load, which would
3 then have put additional stress on the forces
4 for being able to meet the requirements.

5 For modifications to equipment
6 based off of either improvements or things
7 that were necessary based on tactics,
8 techniques and procedures that the enemy
9 employed, using contractors to make those
10 modifications as opposed to solely using
11 soldiers to do that -- don't get me wrong; we
12 use soldiers in, I think, everyone of these -
13 - it enabled us to more quickly make the
14 modifications in order to protect the force
15 better than what it had been before we made
16 the modifications.

17 In the aviation arena, it has
18 given us the opportunity to produce more
19 flying hours than we would have with just
20 green suiters. Right now, it looks like we
21 are on track got probably fly more than
22 400,000 hours this year, maybe 500,000 hours

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1 this year in Iraq.

2 I don't think anyone would have
3 envisioned that, you know, even just a couple
4 of years ago. So I think -- One, I think
5 there is significant historical precedents
6 for us using them. I think they have for the
7 most part been managed effectively, and they
8 have been a significant combat multiplier
9 being here.

10 Now like everything else that
11 human beings are involved in, you are going
12 to have some things that did not work out
13 from the way they were supposed to. You are
14 going to have some people, some companies,
15 some contractors, that say they can do thing,
16 but they cannot actually live up to what they
17 committed themselves to, and so you have to
18 have oversight as you are executing the
19 contracts in order for you to ensure that you
20 are getting exactly what the American
21 taxpayer paid for whenever you hire somebody
22 to do it.

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1 strength before they deployed over here.

2 Now the 377th is being replaced by
3 the 1st Theater Sustainment Command out of
4 Fort Bragg, and that now enables us to put a
5 transformed sustainment command expeditionary
6 in to replace the 13th.

7 We have had some questions about
8 whether or not this new construct is going to
9 be as efficient and as effective as the 13th.

10 I believe that it will be, but it is going
11 to change some ways that we have done things
12 in the past.

13 There is not a significant
14 materiel management capability in the 316th.

15 So that is supposed to migrate to the C-4
16 shop and down to the brigade combat teams,
17 really, because there is no capability in the
18 division to do that.

19 So that will make most of us who
20 are older uncomfortable with not being able
21 to know exactly initially who you touch to
22 get the visibility on the materiel management

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1 piece of it.

2 The rest of it, though, I think,
3 is going to be fairly seamless. There may be
4 a few issues as we work our way through the
5 ammunition management piece of it. The
6 transportation piece of it looks very sound
7 to me.

8 So I don't think we will have any
9 significant challenges there, and we have
10 definitely proven that the Sustainment
11 Brigades are incredibly flexible and capable
12 formations.

13 So I really and truly think that
14 most folks in theater will not know the
15 difference, and we will go through the normal
16 little head bending things that staffs always
17 go through as they refigure out how to get
18 some reports and those kind of things as we
19 go through it, but I think right now it
20 appears to me that it is going to work.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) The Corps staff -
22 - you said, the C-4 will take over some

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1 materiel management responsibilities?

2 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Right.

3 Yes, and as always they are supposed to get -
4 - You know, there was supposed to be a plug
5 of folks that go in there to do that.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

7 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: And it's
8 not nearly as large or robust as what we had
9 down in Sustainment Command. We will see how
10 that aspect of it works. That's the area
11 where I think we are going to have probably
12 the most challenges.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) That takes place
14 in July, I think. Right?

15 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Right.

16 b 3, b 6 Sir, I wanted to
17 change gears a little bit and get back to one
18 of your other main areas of focus, which
19 would be the piece with regard to the IED
20 fight, force protection. You spoke a little
21 bit earlier about some of the different
22 entities there, Task Force, oversight role of

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1 COIC.

2 Can you describe in a little more
3 depth about what the overlap is in some of
4 those areas, which we do have a number of
5 areas that focus on different pieces of the
6 IED fight, in particular? It would be good
7 to have your perspective on what they do and
8 what you see the focus is.

9 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Anything we
10 talk about on IEDs, of course, is classified,
11 and fairly sensitive. But the IEDs account
12 for about two-thirds of our killed in action
13 and about two-thirds of our wounded.

14 It was very clear to all of us as
15 we prepared to come back over here, keeping
16 in mind this time we had a long time to
17 prepare to come back -- We understood where
18 we fit in the rotation to come back, and
19 there were some key things that happened that
20 most people don't understand nor even take
21 note of.

22 Now the first one is that (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1 [b 3, b 6] asked to stay on as
2 the Corps two. The second thing that
3 happened is [b(3), (b)(6)] who was
4 serving as the Corps Chief of Staff, asked to
5 remain with the Corps and volunteered to step
6 down to serve as the Corps G-3, two acts that
7 I think were incredibly selfless in setting
8 the conditions for the Corps to be
9 successful.

10 With those two guys on board, I
11 think they started doing some thinking, along
12 with [b(3), (b)(6)] who was at that time
13 serving as the Corps C-3 whenever this
14 thought process started to come about -- one
15 of the smartest guys that I have ever known,
16 [b(3), (b)(6)] -- and we came to the conclusion
17 that, if this was the thing that was doing
18 the most harm to our force, that we needed to
19 have a Corps focus on how to fight it.

20 So when General Odierno came in,
21 we had done some work with JIDO (Phonetic)
22 and with some other folks, but Colonel -- In

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1 a discussion one night as General Odierno was
2 describing what he was trying to get after, I
3 think it was [(b)(3), (b)(6)] or it might have
4 been [b 3, b 6] that said, you know, what
5 you are describing is kind of organizing
6 staff the way we attempted to do the deep
7 shaping operations at the corps level using
8 attack helicopters.

9 General Odierno said, yeah, that's
10 exactly what I'm talking about. So out of
11 that, really driven by General Odierno, came
12 this idea of the COIC, the one place where
13 Intel, Operations, Special Programs,
14 technology could be synchronized to go after
15 -- offensively go after the counter-IED
16 fight.

17 So what you end up with is a triad
18 inside the Corps that all three of these
19 aspects are focused on counter-IEDs. Task
20 Force [1.4a] is focused on the force protection
21 aspect of counter-IEDs, protecting the force
22 from IEDs through detection, once they are

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1 detected to then assist the route clearance
2 teams in the destruction of the IED or the
3 rendering safe of the IED.

4 JCC's S-1, charged with the
5 electronic warfare protection of the force
6 through jamming the RC-IEDs and fielding and
7 supervising the fielding of that kind of
8 equipment to function in the organization.

9 So that is from a force protection
10 side. The COIC was designed to identify
11 weaknesses in the IED networks so that we
12 could attack them. (b)(3), (b)(6) has
13 taken over that, former Brigade commander
14 here during OIF-1, very good thinking, clear
15 understanding of what his mission is, and so
16 that is kind of the genesis of how we got
17 after it.

18 Now what this does is this puts an
19 operator into looking at the problem instead
20 of an Intel guy. Now don't get me wrong.
21 The Intel guys are very important in this
22 process, but whenever an operator looks at

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1 the information, he starts piecing together
2 where the enemy's battle space is and how the
3 enemy's battle space lays out.

4 The combat operations that we are
5 getting ready to conduct here starting
6 tonight are based off of that operational
7 look, that we clearly identified that the
8 enemy is coming out of areas to place IEDs,
9 that the enemy has placed IEDs in order to
10 deny us access or make access painful to
11 other areas and, therefore, he's got
12 something in there that he wants to protect
13 and, as a result, these major combat
14 operations that we will start tonight in Arab
15 Jabour and in the -- with the MEW up in the
16 southwestern corner of the Merchant's
17 Triangle and the 1st Brigade of the First Cav
18 Division going into the southern part of the
19 Merchant's Triangle, and then followed up
20 later by an operation going into the
21 Quarries, is designed to go after the IED
22 networks, to go after the folks that are

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1 building them, the caches where they store
2 the weapons systems that they are using,
3 going after the financial networks that
4 support them, identifying where this stuff is
5 coming from, how it is getting into country,
6 and all of those things are the things that
7 the COIC works.

8 In addition to that, they have
9 taken some of the analysis that Task Force
10 14a begun, and they have turned that into a
11 much more refined product that says here is
12 exactly the kind of IED that you can expect,
13 depending on where you are in Iraq, and here
14 is the kind of insurgent that employs that
15 kind of IED, and then from that networks have
16 been developed in which we understand who is
17 at the top and who the lieutenants are all
18 the way down to emplacers, and then in a
19 combination of us and (Inaudible), we have
20 been going after them.

21 So it is not where it will end up
22 being. It is still a work in progress, but

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1 it has been a successful work in progress
2 thus far, and some of the things that have
3 come out of it have been fairly fascinating.

4 Whenever you get folks in that are
5 specialists in statistics, for example -- I
6 mean real specialists, not just amateur
7 conduits. They really can tell you where and
8 when things are happening.

9 I had a reporter the other day
10 that said, well, IED attacks are up since
11 February. I said, well, yeah, that's true.
12 I said, they go up every year after February;
13 and if your statisticians would have actually
14 looked at the data for the whole time that
15 we've been here, you would know that February
16 is not a big month for IEDs. We don't
17 necessarily understand why, but we know that
18 that's a fact. So you can always report that
19 IEDs are up since February. And I said, and
20 if you put it -- you know, and you report on
21 it and I get asked a question, I will say
22 just what I just told you. It is not new

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1 information; it's been there for three and a
2 half years. The idea of it is good.

3 Now the enemy is a thinking,
4 adaptive enemy, and what we know is that,
5 even with all the improvements that we've
6 made with the armored Humvee, that that is
7 not the vehicle that we need to be using
8 here.

9 First of all, it was not designed
10 to be a combat, patrolling vehicle. It was a
11 utility vehicle, and even though we put armor
12 on it and we put a machine gun on it and
13 everything else, the visibility out of it
14 doesn't allow you to acquire targets.

15 It doesn't allow you to acquire
16 the IEDs, and that is why we have levied a
17 requirement on the Department of Defense that
18 we need a vehicle that is more survivable in
19 this environment, that is resistant to deep
20 and buried IEDs and survive them, but also is
21 a vehicle that allows us to conduct combat
22 patrolling much more effectively than what we

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1 do out of the Humvee.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, just to
3 pause for a minute. We switched gears, and
4 you are talking about the armored Humvee
5 being inefficient to the task.

6 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's
7 correct.

8 [REDACTED] b 3 b 6 Okay. Is the
9 MRAP an answer to that?

10 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: The MRAP is
11 a beginning of the answer to that. The MRAP
12 appears to have some potential to lessen the
13 number of casualties from deep and buried
14 IEDs, and there are some spirals off of some
15 work that has been done by ATEK (Phonetic)
16 that can give us the capability in areas that
17 EFPs are employed to provide the vehicle with
18 additional capability to be survivable
19 against an EFP.

20 It also appears that the vehicle
21 has the potential to be sustainable in this
22 environment and to have better engagement

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1 capability and patrolling capability. So it
2 appears that it is a -- It looks like it has
3 the possibility to be a part of the solution
4 against the IED fight.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6)

6 Can I ask a
7 question about that, sir? Just relative to
8 what we have seen and your knowledge of our
9 IED program, the enemy has proven to be very
10 adaptive in terms of the types of IEDs, and
11 we have suffered catastrophic casualties to
12 vehicles that we thought would be impervious
13 to them, M-1 tanks, Stryker vehicles.

14 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: I don't
15 think there is any commander out there that I
16 know of has ever thought that. I mean, we've
17 had anti-tank mines around in large
18 proliferations since World War II, and this
19 is, in many cases, not significantly
20 different from an anti-tank mine.

21 It doesn't take a whole lot of --
22 I mean, I've got a degree in physical
education, and I can figure out what the

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1 correlation is between the amount of
2 explosives that I need in order to inflict
3 damage on the occupants of a vehicle.

4 So I don't think that any of us
5 thought that any of our vehicles are totally
6 invincible. I don't think that. I certainly
7 have never thought that.

8 Now I do believe that there was a
9 certain level of surprise at how rapidly the
10 enemy adapted to using this kind of
11 technology to work against us. But if you
12 look at other fights in other places here in
13 the Middle East, this kind of technology has
14 been employed in other places, and in today's
15 environment with the Internet and instant
16 communications, the ability to transfer that
17 knowledge from one terrorist group to another
18 is fairly significant.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I am going
20 to take you back to February -- late
21 January/early February time frame 2007 when
22 there was a fairly large number of U.S.

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1 helicopters shot down or crashed.

2 I know you did an interview with
3 Stars and Stripes in February commenting on
4 the insurgent methods. I read that article,
5 and I got the impression from the article
6 that you were very involved in the oversight
7 and review of countering an apparent change
8 in enemy tactics and TTPs to shoot down more
9 helicopters.

10 Can you please comment on your
11 role involving to look at the way we used
12 aviation assets during that time, and what
13 actions the Corps took under your direction?

14 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, I
15 will talk about this from the perspective of
16 how it happened and how I saw it and, if you
17 don't mind, I will even talk a little bit
18 about the emotions of it.

19 This all started on the 20th of
20 January whenever EZ-40 was shot down in which
21 12 American soldiers were killed. That was
22 followed by several other instances, to

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1 include Tarantula 1.4a which I was personally
2 involved in, which was shot down out by Hit.

3 We had an Apache that was shot
4 down in the Merchese (Phonetic) Triangle. We
5 had a Blackwater helicopter shot down. We
6 had a Marine Corps 46 that was shot down.
7 Yes, we had the operation down in Najaf in
8 which we lost the Apache down there.

9 That one is different. So I am
10 not going to talk about that one. That was
11 the uprising that took place down there with
12 these zealots, and that was a major combat
13 operation that those guys got struck in.

14 The others, though -- The EZ 1.4a
15 looked very similar to an engagement that
16 happened with an Apache out of the 4th
17 Infantry Division back during J.D. Thurmond's
18 tour over here and an engagement that I had
19 looked at against one of the 1st Cav Apaches,
20 two Apaches, out of the 4th of the 227 in
21 which there was a clearly established
22 triangular shaped ambush that was set up

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1 using a 14.5 and a 12.7 millimeter heavy
2 machine guns.

3 Of course, the big concern was
4 were these guys using shoulder fired air
5 defense weapons, and we believed that that
6 was true in the case of the Marine Corps H-
7 46, but in these other aircraft there was
8 heavy machine guns.

9 So the first thing I would tell
10 you is that it made me mad as hell, and two
11 parts of it made me mad. One was the way the
12 news reported the event in which they never
13 told the complete story of what happened; and
14 two, the idea that somehow this was going to
15 affect our ability to conduct combat
16 operations.

17 So EZ 1.4a Two aircraft. The
18 second aircraft was hit. The air crew,
19 b 3, b 6 who was an instructor
20 pilot out of (b)(3), (b)(6) looked like they had
21 everything under control, going to get it on
22 the ground, and then our guess is the second

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1 or third burst of heavy machine gun fire
2 killed the two guys up front.

3 So the aircraft was already on
4 fire, crashed into the ground. His wing man,
5 the dual gunners laid down suppressive fire.

6 The aircraft had moved somewhat out of the
7 engagement area, and they circled around and
8 landed, and the two crew chiefs tried to go
9 on the aircraft and save the guys.

10 What wasn't reported was that
11 there was a second flight of two Black Hawks.

12 In fact, they were en route to pick me up at
13 Washington LZ, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic)
14 saw the aircraft go down, and these Black
15 Hawks attacked the enemy position.

16 They took out the heavy machine
17 gun that was in the bomb truck, killed the
18 four guys that were in that truck, and then
19 they conducted a series of attacks using the
20 door gunners against the other two positions.
21 That forced the enemy to flee the
22 battlefield. As a result, they set

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1 the conditions for the rest of the operations
2 that took place in there that night. They
3 came around and landed, also secured the BLZ
4 or the crash site.

5 Because of their activity, because
6 of the actions that (b)(3), (b)(6) and the crews
7 took, and the interviews that were conducted
8 afterwards in which I am the one that got to
9 sit down with them, it was very clear to me
10 that this was, one, a deliberate operation
11 and that it was most likely based off of
12 something that we were doing that had made us
13 predictable that aircraft were going to fly
14 through that particular place, and this is a
15 patient enemy. So my guess was is that they
16 had reconned this, and they had done some
17 deliberate planning, and that they had sprung
18 the attack on these aircraft.

19 So what did we do? Following the
20 engagement on Tarantula 1.4a which I was on,
21 we got all the aviation commanders together,
22 and we did a review of the tactics that the

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1 enemy had used in this operation.

2 We did a hard look at the terrain
3 in which they had engaged us, the altitudes
4 in which the aircraft were flying, and we
5 took a hard look at whether or not we were
6 being predictable in the way we were moving
7 around in the battle space, and discovered
8 that we were.

9 One of the reasons that we were
10 being predictable was because we had a fairly
11 inflexible way of turning the air space on
12 and off based off of whether or not we had a
13 special operation going in or we had a tick
14 declared and the CAS had been called out on
15 the tick.

16 So the first thing we did was
17 refine (Inaudible) and air space control
18 measures so that we had more air space for
19 the flight crews to be able to utilize as
20 they executed their missions.

21 The second thing that we did was
22 we focused intel assets, both -- This is all

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1 classified. -- both traditional ISR, full
2 motion video stuff, as well as Signia and
3 human assets, and as a result, we were able
4 to capture one of the guys that was involved
5 in the shootdown, which led to some
6 development of some more information. Then
7 following that, we captured a video up in
8 MND-North's area battle space in which it
9 was the training video for how they were
10 doing it.

11 Once we got that figured out, then
12 we started targeting, looking for them,
13 figuring out the terrain that they needed to
14 set up these triangular shaped ambushes and
15 then we started going after them.

16 Many times it would be a UAV that
17 would pick them up, and then we would bring
18 Apaches in or (Inaudible) to attack them. We
19 had one out here the other day in which we
20 had two Apaches that caught them on the move
21 and took out five 14.5s in the back of Bongo
22 trucks.

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1 Now we've gotten so smart with
2 what we are doing, the Apaches pulled out.
3 We had a UAV in at altitude. The bad guys
4 come in to pick up the weapons and police the
5 bodies up, and we tracked them right back to
6 the safe house, and then came in with another
7 Apache and took out the car and the house.

8 So did I have something to do with
9 this? Yes, I had something to do with it,
10 but the majority of the work was done by

11 14c and
12 in the aviation community who were not going
13 to let the enemy dictate how we were
14 conducting our operations over here.

15 Are our aircraft engaged? Yes.
16 About 100 aircraft are engaged every month,
17 and about 14 or 15 of them are hit every
18 month, but those, generally speaking, are
19 isolated incidents in which we surprise
20 somebody who is doing something wrong and
21 they engage the aircraft with one or two
22 weapons systems. That's different from these

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1 deliberate ambushes that they set up to
2 engage the aircraft.

3 It's a thinking, adaptive enemy.
4 I think they got a pretty good idea right now
5 that we have figured out what they are doing
6 and, if they go to set one of these things
7 up, we are going to be coming after them.

8 So I am fairly certain they will
9 change the way they do things as we move
10 forward. But we have been much more
11 successful in killing these guys than what
12 anybody is willing to report. I went up and
13 presented the two Black Hawk crews, (b)(3), (b)(6)
14 (b)(3), (b)(6) a Silver Star and the other -- and his
15 co-pilot a Distinguished Flying Cross, and
16 his wing man, both of those guys
17 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and the aircrew
18 that landed in the battle space out there Air
19 Medal with V Devices, as did the door guys.

20 Until General Petraeus decided
21 that he would come up here, we had one
22 reporter that was going to cover the event,

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1 because no one is interested in hearing about
2 how our guys are being successful.

3 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) But, sir, you
4 said you brought all the aviator commanders
5 together. You chaired that. So it's the
6 Corps that brought that conference together.

7 Is that correct?

8 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: That's
9 correct.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) All right.
11 Changing gears, different subject here
12 relative to equipment: You talked a little
13 bit about the MRAP, but in general I just
14 wanted to get your perspective on what has
15 been the strategy as far as replacement of
16 combat loss type of equipment, thinking in
17 particular about Strykers because they have
18 proved to be very successful, and the issue
19 of trying to get as many Stryker brigades out
20 there. It has been a ready stream of
21 replacement equipment or is the strategy to
22 press on with what is on hand?

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1 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Oh, no.
2 Since the very beginning, we have had a --
3 Well, I mean the beginning of the Corps'
4 operations here, not just this time but the
5 last time. We had a fairly sound battle loss
6 strategy in place that was really based off
7 of Army doctrine that had to be modified
8 because of how rapidly the environment
9 changed from a conventional fight to a COIN
10 environment. But we have -- Together with
11 ARCENT, we have a two-pronged strategy for
12 replacing battle losses.

13 The first thing is we evacuate to
14 the full second the brigade that's up at
15 Balad to determine if it is possible to field
16 repair the vehicle to a level that it can be
17 returned to action, and they have incredible
18 capability up there to do that.

19 The second one, of course, is the
20 traditional method of bringing in replacement
21 vehicles from out of stocks either in Kuwait
22 or from the United States.

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1 Generally speaking, we have been
2 able to sustain the formations with
3 sufficient resources to replace our battle
4 losses usually within 30 to 45 days of them
5 losing a vehicle, if not sooner.

6 Some of it has to do with
7 transportation time. Some of it has to do
8 with putting the GFE in the equipment, the
9 commo equipment, and everything else to get
10 it up to an operating status.

11 Strykers: Last month we had more
12 losses on Strykers than what is habitually
13 programmed for. Asked the Army staff to help
14 us with that problem. They have shipped us
15 14 Strykers out of the production line in
16 order to bring us back up so that we've got
17 the right pool of vehicles to sustain combat
18 operations uninterrupted.

19 The Army -- The Army has been
20 very, very good at doing that. Same thing
21 with aircraft. In addition to having some
22 floats here in theater, we have done very

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1 well. Whenever we have a loss, Major General
2 Jim Goldsbury, the AMCOM Commander, of
3 identifying a resources, and the Army G-3
4 directing that resource be flown here into
5 theater. We put it back together, and get
6 back into the fight.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Great. Sir, I

8 want to talk a little bit about the old Iraqi
9 ammunition dumps. Do you have anything to do
10 with the oversight of the sealing of those or
11 the security of those or the overwatch of
12 those?

13 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, to
14 some degree, as DCG I have some kind of
15 supervisory responsibility over everything.
16 But, yes, this kind of ties in with -- When
17 we were here last time, this was a high
18 priority to get these things cleaned up,
19 destroy the ammunition, make it unusable, and
20 this was done through a contracted process,
21 generally.

22 Well, when I first got here, we

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1 had artillery units that were hauling the
2 stuff down, and then you would have five or
3 six explosions around here every night as we
4 detonated the stuff, just down south of here.

5 That shifted to a contracted
6 operation in which some companies came in
7 that were clearing these. Now the problem
8 that came out of this was we didn't had
9 enough troops on the ground here to secure
10 every piece of ground in Iraq and, as a
11 result, the insurgents had the opportunities
12 to go in and take large quantities of
13 ammunition out of these things and create
14 caches all over Iraq.

15 The other problem that we had is
16 I'm not sure we knew where they all were, and
17 I think it took us some time to figure out
18 who we needed to ask who could tell us where
19 they all were.

20 So between other agencies of our
21 government and our own resources, we finally
22 got a decent plan put together, and these

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1 things were gone after.

2 Now when we came in this time, we
3 were convinced that the ammunition for
4 supplying a lot of the IEDs had to be coming
5 from these old ammunition dumps and, sure
6 enough, they were. Now I'm not sure I know
7 exactly how that happened. I just know that
8 it was happening, and we've got video of it
9 happening with Kiowa warriors up in MND-North
10 watching the guys coming out of holes in the
11 ground carrying large quantities.

12 We went in and found huge
13 quantities of this stuff. That was still in
14 the old ammo dump that was supposedly cleared
15 and cleaned up.

16 So we have reintensified that
17 effort, and now that is a required reporting
18 issue for the MNDs, that they are in fact
19 going out and making sure these things are
20 cleared, and that somebody is checking on
21 them, and that there actually is not stuff
22 coming out of them.

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1 There is so much ammunition here
2 that I would never be foolish enough to say
3 we got it all. We were flying out of Al Asad
4 the other day, and we flew over -- what did
5 you say? -- 100-150 bombs.

6 [REDACTED] b 3, b 6 : Sitting in the
7 desert?

8 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Sitting in
9 the desert. So, I mean, it's -- You know, in
10 1982-'83 I set down on the southern tip of
11 the Sinai Peninsula, and every day I would
12 take photographs of ships coming from the
13 Soviet Union that were docking in Akaba and
14 were loaded with military equipment.

15 So I got a pretty good idea of how
16 much stuff was up here, just from the sense
17 of those large ships making that trek every
18 two or three days in there. I think we have
19 got at a lot of it, but I have never seen a
20 place that had so much ammunition.

21 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I really
22 just wanted to maybe come around to you. I

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1 don't know how many more questions -- I
2 wanted to come back around to a last question
3 about your feelings about why you stayed with
4 the staff.

5 [REDACTED] (b)(6) Sir, I am going to
6 repeat the question then that I asked you
7 about during the intermission we had, and it
8 was, if I recall, how does a Major General
9 get to stay in one position for four years?
10 And you were talking about what a unique
11 opportunity this was and that you wanted to
12 come back with the 3rd Corps, and I wondered
13 if you just would pick up on that.

14 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Okay. We
15 knew the Corps was coming back. I mean, it
16 was known basically from the time we got back
17 that we would -- last time, that we would be
18 coming back, and we had some very talented
19 people inside the organization that made the
20 decision to stay.

21 [REDACTED] b 3 b 6 is the two, and
22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) is the Chief of Staff who

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63

1 volunteered to move down to be the Corps G-3.

2 Whenever I learned that General Odierno was
3 coming in to be the Corps Commander, I felt
4 like that he would be a great Corps
5 Commander.

6 So whenever the Army asked me, you
7 know, what I wanted to do, and they gave me
8 the opportunity to go do a couple of things,
9 I asked to remain with the Corps and come
10 back over, because I felt like that we had an
11 opportunity to do something significant with
12 the level of talent and organization and
13 experience that we would have under the
14 leadership of General Odierno, a man that I
15 have immense respect for, have known for a
16 long time. We were brigade commanders at the
17 same time, and I felt like that -- Honestly,
18 I felt like we owed it to the nation and to
19 the soldiers to bring as much of the team
20 back together as we could for the potential
21 that we could bring this thing to a close.

22 So you know, I mean, it wasn't my

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1 decision alone. First of all, General
2 Odierno had to agree that he would like to
3 have me as his Deputy. We had that
4 conversation before he took command. He
5 called me from Washington. He asked me to
6 stay as well.

7 Of course, my wife had something
8 to say about it. And so it seemed like to be
9 the right decision.

10 Now there is another piece of
11 this, too, and you know, to be totally honest
12 with you. I was mad as hell whenever they
13 sent me back to be the CG at Fort Hood. Now
14 it turned out to be a fairly satisfying
15 experience, but I felt like that we had
16 30,000 soldiers over here who did not receive
17 the benefit of having a Deputy Corps
18 Commander now, and I have been pretty much a
19 pain in everybody's butt about that topic
20 ever since.

21 So whenever the decision was made
22 that the Corps' DCG would deploy, then I felt

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1 obligated because of the argument that I had
2 been making with the Army for two years that
3 I should be the guy to go and do it.

4 Although General Hahn (Phonetic)
5 came here as the U.S. DCG, it was not lined
6 up the way we are doing it. General Odierno
7 has had an absolute stroke of genius in doing
8 nothing but changing names, because by saying
9 that Jerry Durbin (Phonetic) is the Deputy
10 Commanding General for Operations and that
11 I'm the Deputy Commanding General for Support
12 and that Peter Devlin is the Deputy
13 Commanding General for Coalition, it tells
14 the subordinate commanders and the
15 subordinate DCGs and the subordinate Chiefs
16 of Staff who they need to pick up the phone
17 and call.

18 It also tells the Corps staff here
19 is the guy that this idea or this thought has
20 got to go through. Now the other -- If I
21 have done anything here of value for the
22 Corps in this role is that over the time that

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1 I have been here, I have come to understand
2 how a senior operational staff becomes
3 effective.

4 There is only one commander, and
5 there is only one set of priorities, and that
6 is General Odierno. And his priorities are
7 directed to the staff through one guy, and
8 that's the Corps Chief of Staff. When the
9 DCGs are executing their duties and
10 responsibilities as they go out, they see
11 problems, they identify things that have to
12 be fixed, they go to the Chief of Staff who
13 then prioritizes those requirements into
14 General Odierno's established priorities to
15 direct the staff to get after them.

16 Organizations become dysfunctional
17 whenever the DCGs come back and they go to
18 the there or they go to the two and they
19 start telling the staff to do something,
20 because there can only be one set of
21 priorities. So, you know, my first duty is
22 when the new guys come in, which they do --

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1 they change out; the DCGs change out -- you
2 know, I sit down and talk to them.

3 You know, General Berragan,
4 absolutely no issues. He's been a Chief of
5 Staff at a high level. General Devlin,
6 absolutely no issues, because he has been
7 both a commander and a senior staff officer.

8 So we understand it. Just frankly, I'm not
9 sure the team that was here before us
10 understood that part.

11 So that aspect of it, I think,
12 makes this headquarters as effective as it
13 is. So that's probably my one tiny
14 contribution to what the organization is
15 doing over here.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) We are just about
17 done. In fact, my only last question, sir,
18 was going to be is there anything we haven't
19 touched upon here that --

20 (b)(6): I've got one other.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you want to
22 try and get this last couple of minutes on

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1 tape then? Okay, we'll press on without
2 (Inaudible) then. We don't need that.

3 b 6 The effort at sealing,
4 if you will -- and I don't know whether that
5 is the right word -- the Iraqi borders -- I
6 wondered -- Somehow I've got your name
7 involved with that effort, and I've read the
8 operations order on it.

9 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Yes. I'm a
10 radical whenever it comes to the borders here
11 in that I don't think that we are going after
12 it the right way at all.

13 If I were completely in charge,
14 which I'm not, I would declare the border
15 ports as trained, because they are as trained
16 as we are ever going to make them, and I
17 would take our border training transition
18 teams that we have out there, and I would
19 focus on the legitimate POEs coming into
20 Iraq, because most of the bad stuff that is
21 actually coming in here that hurts us, we
22 believe, actually comes through the POEs.

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1 So if you get these ports of entry
2 to where they are actually enforcing Iraqi
3 law, it is more profitable for them to
4 enforce Iraqi law than it is to take bribes
5 for guys to come through. You know, you can
6 either do that through (Inaudible)
7 perspective or prison, if they are not
8 following the rules correctly.

9 Then I think what that will do is
10 then that will force the bad guys that are
11 bringing bad stuff into this country to then
12 go to the traditional smuggling routes to
13 come in, and as a result, there will be an
14 increase in that traffic which we can focus
15 ISR assets on, and then we can do
16 interdiction operations against those
17 activities.

18 Now sometimes we are going to get
19 folks that are bringing dates and sheep
20 across and bundles of cigarettes on the backs
21 of donkeys. But that's all we are getting at
22 the border ports now anyway.

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1 So this, I think, would give us
2 higher probability of forcing the bad guys to
3 do something different from what they have
4 been doing, and at least interrupt the ease
5 with which they get stuff into the country.

6 [REDACTED] (b)(6) All right. Thank you,
7 sir.

8 [REDACTED] b 3, b 6 Sir, is there
9 anything we haven't touched upon that you
10 think is something that we ought to make sure
11 we catch at this time with you?

12 MAJ. GENERAL SIMMONS: Well, I
13 would tell you that, emotionally speaking, I
14 spend a lot of time trying to educate -- I
15 think that would be the right word -- educate
16 the subordinate commanders and their staffs
17 about a couple of things that I think are
18 incredibly important.

19 The first one is about the media.
20 In a democratic nation, the media is at
21 least as important as the military, because
22 it is the media or journalists that report to

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1 the American people and actually through
2 their reporting holds our government
3 accountable for what it does. You could say
4 it holds our generals accountable for what it
5 does.

6 In this particular conflict, the
7 amount of criticism leveraged by the media on
8 the President and/or the generals is no more
9 severe than it has been in any other war. If
10 you go back and look at World War II,
11 President Roosevelt took huge criticism every
12 day in the newspapers. So I mean, that
13 aspect of it has not changed.

14 I mean, it's legendary about
15 Patton in and out of trouble with the press
16 and Eisenhower being criticized. So that
17 aspect of it has not changed, and we as
18 professionals now -- this is a professional
19 Army -- should not be surprised or upset with
20 that.

21 On the other side of the coin, the
22 American media, and the British media, as a

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1 matter of fact, too, has broken trust with
2 the people of their countries in that they
3 have not told the story that appeared on the
4 front pages of newspapers throughout our
5 history of the American soldier who has
6 closed with and killed the enemy -- in other
7 words, the American hero.

8 I am disturbed with that, and I
9 think that the journalists have broken faith
10 with the American people by not telling that
11 story. Even in Vietnam, they told the story
12 of the heroes, and that aspect of it is
13 absolutely not covered here.

14 This is the next greatest
15 generation of Americans. This is a
16 generation that has volunteered to come in
17 and take a stand for America. Now they came
18 into the Army for hundreds of different
19 reasons, some of them to get a college
20 education, some of them because they didn't
21 know what else to do, some of them, you know,
22 as an opportunity to put bread on the table,

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1 to take care of a family.

2 They fight for the same reasons
3 that their grandfathers and fathers before
4 them fought. They fight for each other, and
5 they are so courageous, and they have so much
6 trust and confidence in their sergeants that
7 they do not recognize valor.

8 An event that would have won very
9 high decoration in previous wars is submitted
10 as something that is normal activity here,
11 because our youngsters are so incredibly
12 valorous, and they have so much trust in
13 their sergeants that they don't report it as
14 anything significant at all.

15 I would love to see those great
16 kids that go outside the line every day get
17 their due recognition with the American
18 people.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thanks
20 very much, sir.

21 b 6 Thank you very much,
22 sir. That concludes this interview.

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