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UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

b 3, b 6

C-2 MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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26 JUNE 2007

HEADQUARTERS MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes  
provided by the Center of Military History.)

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 [ (b)(6) ] This is [ b 6 ] writing a  
3 story on Multinational Corps - Iraq in the U.S. Army Center  
4 of Military History. Today is 21 -- Correction, today is 26  
5 June 2007, and I am about to interview [ b 3 b 6 ] C-  
6 2 Multinational Corps - Iraq at Headquarters, Multinational  
7 Corps - Iraq, Al Faw Palace, outside Baghdad, Iraq. This is  
8 the second in a series of interviews with [ b 3, b 6 ] the  
9 C-2.

10 [ b 3 b 6 ] I last interviewed you three months  
11 ago on 21 March, and Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic) had been in  
12 progress for about a month. The Fardel Kanoun was the  
13 operation to secure Baghdad, and the surge was about -- I  
14 think, about two-fifths complete. That is, two brigades had  
15 arrived.

16 You indicated at the time -- and you said in that  
17 interview -- you were cautiously optimistic. What I'd like  
18 to do is ask you for an update on that, how you feel, how the  
19 progress is going from where you sit as the C-2.

20 [ b 3, b 6 ] Okay. As you know, the surge  
21 forces have recently all arrived, and so we are really now  
22 just in the surge -- As my boss would say, we've gone from a

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1 surge in troops to a surge in forces to a surge in  
2 operations. And so that's just -- It really began on the  
3 15th of this month.

4 So the things that we expected to happen have.  
5 Sectarian violence in Baghdad has been reduced because of the  
6 presence of more Coalition forces and the activities of Iraq  
7 security forces.

8 Equally important, I believe, the forces outside  
9 Baghdad, particularly in the Baghdad belts, but also in  
10 Diyala, particularly Baqubah, have done two things, really.  
11 One is that they have reduced what we call the accelerants  
12 coming into the Baghdad area, those things that cause  
13 sectarian violence like VBIEDs. But then they have also been  
14 there for the forces that have -- the enemy forces that have  
15 departed Baghdad, so something to deal with them, not  
16 allowing them to have safe havens in places that they have  
17 gone before.

18 So all of this has given -- beginning to give the  
19 Iraq security forces both room and time to gain capability so  
20 that they will be able to, hopefully, eventually stand on  
21 their own.

22 So I think it's gotten off to a good start. It

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1 is still just at a start.

2 [b 6]: And so would you characterize your  
3 assessment as cautiously optimistic again?

4 [b 3, b 6] I would. Nothing has changed in  
5 terms of that.

6 [b 6] But there is a decrease in sectarian  
7 violence in Baghdad?

8 [b 3, b 6] There is.

9 (b)(6): As a result of Fardel Kanoun.

10 [b 3, b 6] Correct.

11 [b 6] Under Op Order 0701 under the threat  
12 situation, you assess the GOI's current condition as,  
13 quote/unquote, "a failing state." I wondered if you could  
14 explain that a little bit?

15 [b 3, b 6] I think -- Well, a failing state  
16 or part of a failing state, I would say, is still in effect,  
17 because if we were to leave right now or decrease rapidly, I  
18 do not believe they are mature enough to stand on their own.

19 So that's how I would define that, the inability  
20 to secure Iraq and, therefore, preserve it as a state. And  
21 that hasn't changed either. They need time, room and time,  
22 as I said before, and so at least several months of surge

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1 operations to mature and have an opportunity to do that.

2 (b)(6) Today we see the security situation  
3 as improved in Anbar, and other Sunni groups appear to be  
4 willing to cooperate with Coalition forces.

5 Should this movement be seen as reconciliation or  
6 some tactical move on the part of the Sunnis to strength  
7 their positions, and reconciliation, you know, implies  
8 reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia, but what we see  
9 like in Anbar is that the Sunnis are really kind of aligning  
10 themselves with us for their own protection against AQI.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right. So I think the simple  
12 answer to your question is both. Some places, it is for  
13 their own security. Yes, there are more reconciling with us  
14 than the Shia in those particular areas.

15 Other places, it's both. They are reconciling  
16 with both us and the Shia, but what we also see -- and it's  
17 not in the headlines as much -- is outreach from both Shia  
18 groups to Sunni groups and also Sunni groups, specifically in  
19 Anbar, to Shia groups.

20 Example: Yesterday's suicide vest bombing. It  
21 was actually after a reconciliation conference at the Monsur  
22 (Phonetic) Hotel in Baghdad. Among the dead were both Shia

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1 and Sunni representatives. So that's an example of it was  
2 both involved in that. But it's not a clean definition of  
3 what they are reconciling with.

4 [ b 6 ] Right.

5 [ b 3, b 6 ]: Clearly, among just the Sunnis  
6 there is movement to fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq, simply  
7 because they are tired of being intimidated and run by Al  
8 Qaeda in Iraq.

9 So you know, aside from the Shia reconciliation,  
10 that's going on, again for their self-preservation and for  
11 their ability to gain power and, therefore, self-  
12 determination in their area but also to participate in the  
13 central government. And they've got to get past Al Qaeda in  
14 Iraq to do that.

15 [ b 6 ] Right.

16 [ b 3, b 6 ] Get rid of the intimidation  
17 against them participating to be able to do that. But that's  
18 all part of reconciliation, in my view, participating in the  
19 political process.

20 [ b 6 ]: You know, General Odierno has been  
21 placing a lot more emphasis on reconciliation, as I'm sure  
22 you know, and in particular this past month or so. I also

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1 noticed in 0701 where reconciliation appears as a key task,  
2 and in the past it hadn't. It was mentioned, but not as a  
3 key task.

4 I wondered how much are you and your staff  
5 section, intelligence staff section, playing in this  
6 reconciliation emphasis, if you will, that the CG is placing  
7 on it?

8 [b 6] Well, we're playing very heavily.  
9 As you know, it began with the successes that started in  
10 Anbar, but then in [1.4c] we started seeing  
11 this attract the attention of groups in other places.

12 So you know, it was partially on our advice to  
13 the leadership and, you know, their knowledge of the  
14 situation and their intuitiveness as well, but also our  
15 advice based on [1.4c] that this is something  
16 we needed to seriously consider, that the time was becoming  
17 right to do that. So we ended up actually sponsoring  
18 the first reconciliation conference that we had here over a  
19 month ago -- I'll get you the dates -- was an [1.4c]

20 [1.4c] What are the opportunities that we see  
21 based on [1.4c] out there? And we brought in  
22 all of the MNDs.

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1 We ran that, and that was sort of a catalyst.

2 [b 6]: I have seen some of your documents on  
3 it.

4 [b 3, b 6] That worked pretty well, and then  
5 that was the spark that got it over to the Operations side.

6 Now we formed in a case what was the analysis and  
7 control element on that, a reconciliation cell, and it tells  
8 -- It's Support to Reconciliation Cell. So we've got that  
9 going.

10 [b 6]: And when was that formed?

11 [b 3, b 6]: I would say it was about a month  
12 and a half ago. So that would have been toward the beginning  
13 of May.

14 [b 6] Beginning of May? Okay.

15 [b 3, b 6]: First week or two of May. So that  
16 supports the efforts here in the Headquarters as well as the  
17 MNDs, many of which are standing up their own cells.

18 What we've seen is that is a sustained effort  
19 now, and actually growing. We are adding some folks from  
20 other areas to that, but it's no longer just an [1.4c]

21 [1.4c]

22 [1.4c] but all the

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1 operators are involved right now. We are into execution as  
2 opposed to what are the possibilities. So that's been a  
3 shift over the last month or so.

4 [b 6]: Right. Okay, okay.

5 Can you tell me -- this is a little bit of a  
6 change in direction here -- you know, about your organization  
7 a little bit. You explained this the last time, your case,  
8 but I want to hear a little bit about the Red Cell team. How  
9 do you use them? Are they analogous to -- I don't know  
10 whether you know [b(6)] (Phonetic) at Fort Hood and  
11 his playing in the red cell area.

12 [b 3, b 6]: Well, the Red Cell doesn't work  
13 for me. It works for me. It works directly for the  
14 Commander and the Chief of Staff. So that's not my  
15 organization at all.

16 [b 3, b 6]: Okay. But it's under the case file  
17 on it that --

18 [b 3, b 6] If you see that on there, it's an  
19 old one.

20 [b 6]: It's an old one? Okay.

21 [b(3), (b)(6)] And that was a Red Cell, not a Red  
22 Team.

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1 [b 6] Right.

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6 (b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4c

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11 The Red Team that joined us is a [b(6)]

12 trained --

13 [b 6] Right.

14 [b 3, b 6] -- Red Team that works for the  
15 Chief of Staff, the Commander, does alternative analysis,  
16 gives them advice, all the things that you think of that a  
17 real Red Team, they do that, don't work for me.

18 That Red Cell did not try to do that.

19 [b 6]: Okay. Well, that clarifies. I got  
20 an e-mail from [b(6)] and you know, and I had just been  
21 exploring your case cell, and I saw the Red Team, and I said,  
22 well, in the C-2, in the [b(3), (b)(6)]

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1 [b 3, b 6] Well, no. That was a thought when  
2 we came over, but -- and in fact, I did the coordination with  
3 [b 3, b 6] (Inaudible), [b 3, b 6] and all of his guys. But when  
4 we finally got it coordinated that we were going to get the  
5 Red Team, it went like it should, a sort of separate and  
6 autonomous (Inaudible) by the Chief.

7 [b(6)] Okay. I am going to ask you a little  
8 bit about the [1.4c] you have focused on [1.4b, 1.4d] and this  
9 is a classified interview, up to Secret.

10 You know, the Commander and General Petraeus have  
11 both made statements about arms being identified as coming  
12 from [1.4b, 1.4d] and I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit on  
13 this from the 2's perspective.

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17 (b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4b, 1.4d  
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21 So that has grown over time, and that's obviously  
22 a concern, because you want an Iraq that's independent, that

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1 is not as influenced, and certainly don't want Coalition  
2 soldiers being killed by the things that are coming across,  
3 EFPs and other things.

4 So what we've done at the Corps level is focus on  
5 those surrogates at Multinational Force-Iraq, and in CENTCOM  
6 they are focused on 1.4b, 1.4d itself, particularly CENTCOM. But  
7 what we look at is the influence it has inside the country  
8 and the groups that are operating under its influence using  
9 its weapons and those kinds of things.

10 The answer to your question is: A growth in  
11 influence that has continued. The boss asked the other day,  
12 has there been a surge by 1.4b, 1.4d to influence Iraq commensurate  
13 with our surge. And the answer is no, but there continues to  
14 be an increase, and it's a gradual, deliberate increase, it  
15 appears to us, in influence, independent of our surge.

16 It was on the incline before, and it continues to  
17 be on the incline.

18 b 6: Well, I know you track IEDs and the  
19 use of IEDs and anti-armor IEDs. So I followed your charts  
20 and what-not, and they all show an increase over the last  
21 year in the use of IEDs, in particular anti-armor IEDs. Is  
22 that a result of the influx from 1.4b, 1.4d the knowledge, the

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1 training, and perhaps the equipment?

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1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10 So that's a gradual but steady system increase  
11 that I've talked about before. So, yes, that is one  
12 indicator, but of course, some of the press conferences have  
13 shown other types of conditions, whether it's armor piercing  
14 bullets or what, sniper rifles or whatever are on the  
15 increase from 1.4b, 1.4d too.

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1.4b, 1.4d

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1.4b, 1.4d

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[b 6]: What is that?

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(b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4b, 1.4d

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[b 6] Okay.

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(b)(3), (b)(6), 1.4b, 1.4d

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[b 6]: Okay. I'd like you to talk a little

20 bit about the CG's huddles. You know, the Chief of Staff had

21 told me this, that the CG likes to work in small groups, and

22 then when I interviewed him on Sunday, he says he likes to

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1 work in small groups better and in kind of an iterative  
2 approach the planning and planning development.

3 I wonder if you could talk a little bit about  
4 that from your perspective, how often you are included in it,  
5 and how often they happen?

6 [b 3 b 6]: Okay. The CG every day has --  
7 Well, I'll back up. There is one item that we talked about,  
8 but the first thing he does in the morning is a small group,  
9 me and my guys only.

10 [b 6]: Just you and --

11 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] About 15 minutes.

12 [b 6]: -- J-2

13 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right, C-2.

14 [b 6]: C-2.

15 [b 3 b 6]: Right.

16 [b 6]: The first thing, before the BUA.

17 [b 3 b 6] 0700, yes, sir. Me, the night  
18 watch person in the JOC from C-2, from the case, the case  
19 chief and the CIA rep, [(b)(6)] (Inaudible). We all go in, and  
20 we give him an update on what happened last night, but it's  
21 more than that.

22 That's our opportunity to tell him the hot stuff

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1 that's going on and --

2 [ (b)(6) ] That's in his office?

3 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]: It's in his office, desk-side. He  
4 sits at his desk.

5 [ b 6 ]: Right.

6 [ b 3, b 6 ] We give him the update, and our  
7 night guy from the JOC tells him the stuff that happened  
8 overnight. So that's the immediate information he needs.

9 The Case gives him a little bit more in depth  
10 analysis of the high side, the (Inaudible) and all that kind  
11 of stuff included, that they get down there that the watch  
12 doesn't get.

13 Then [ (b)(6) ] the Case Chief, will give some  
14 what I call high end analysis, some Sadr stuff, some AQI  
15 stuff, just what's going on, and our goal is to give him a  
16 quick update to make sure he's ready for what he's going to  
17 hear in the BUA from MNFI and he's ready for his small group  
18 with General Petraeus, which he goes to.

19 [ b 6 ]: Right.

20 [ b 3, b 6 ]: That's what we do first thing.  
21 Then, of course, the BUA. He goes to small group. While  
22 he's in small group, we have the Chief of Staff huddle, which

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1 is (Inaudible) --

2 [b 6]: Right.

3 [b 3, b 6]: And then after that, we come  
4 together in the small group, the CG/Senior Leader Huddle.  
5 That's what he calls it.

6 [b 6] Right.

7 [b 3, b 6]: That's where he's got -- You've  
8 probably heard who goes to that. [b 6]: The 3,  
9 the planner.

10 [b 3, b 6]: The only two colonels are me and  
11 the 3.

12 [b 6]: Okay.

13 [b 3, b 6]: The rest are the three DCGs.

14 [b 6]: Right.

15 [b 3, b 6]: The CG -- I'm missing one. CG,  
16 three DCGs, Chief of Staff, ECORD (Phonetic), the  
17 (Inaudible), the ORA rep --

18 [b 6]: Who?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6): (b)(3) 50 USC 3507

20 [b 6]: Okay.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6): Me and the 3. And that is the  
22 small group that comes together. It gets smaller sometimes.

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1 Okay, so we do that. That's the everyday thing.

2 Then I think it's four nights a week now, we have  
3 either a planner's huddle meeting with MND-Baghdad or meeting  
4 with MND-Center. These are at 1930, and those are small  
5 sessions like you described at the beginning. And that's  
6 that group plus whoever it is that's briefing.

7 So if it's a planner's huddle, the Plans team  
8 comes in and briefs him. If it's MND-Baghdad or MND-Center,  
9 because they are close, either we go to their place or they  
10 come here, and it's that group plus the CG and whoever he  
11 wants to bring to do the update. I mean their CG.

12 [b 6]: Well, when you do it like at one of  
13 the MNDs that are close here, is that more formal?

14 [b 3, b 6]: No. It's around their conference  
15 table. Just around the table. It's not a briefing.  
16 Usually, you don't use the audio-visual. They can, if they  
17 want. It's usually paper copies, talking around the table.  
18 Very, very informal.

19 Trying to make sure I -- Now there is also -- and  
20 the ECORD (Phonetic) can tell you this. It's his  
21 (Inaudible). There are periodic Effects Board, either a  
22 synchronization meeting or an assessment meeting. It's the

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1 same group plus whoever the ECORD wants to bring.

2 [b 6] Right.

3 [b 3, b 6]: And now there is the  
4 reconciliation meetings that we have. There are at least one  
5 a week. Right now I can't remember when. They chose, I  
6 think, Tuesday nights. Small group plus the reconciliation  
7 people. That just highlights this core group of people who  
8 are meeting with whoever it is that's meeting.

9 [b 6]: And how effective do you think that  
10 is?

11 [b 3, b 6]: Very effective.

12 [b 6] Very effective, okay. You know,

13 (b)(3), (b)(6), I know we are running a little short on time,  
14 but I've tailored the questions to get what I wanted, but I  
15 wanted to leave it open to you to bring out anything else  
16 that you want to at this point.

17 [b 3, b 6]: First of all, I want to make sure.

18 I realize there are people who would like bigger groups,  
19 because they would like to hear the boss's guidance or  
20 thoughts or the information that he is getting as well, but I  
21 think we do a good job of disseminating it afterwards.

22 The reason I say very effective is that's just

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1 the way he likes to operate and he feels comfortable;  
2 therefore, that is how he is most effective (Several words  
3 inaudible). But there is another side to that.

4 That's also demanding of the two colonels who do  
5 go in there all the time, but I think for the box it's real  
6 effective.

7 Organizationally, mission-wise and everything  
8 else, looking at it kind of holistically, having done the  
9 mission here before and now back in the same job doing it  
10 again, this is a much more complex environment, much more  
11 difficult.

12 You are balancing, as you mentioned, the  
13 reconciliation type of operation with some serious kinetic  
14 type operations that are going on, too, with the most troops  
15 that have been here since the end of major combat operations,  
16 really, more Division Headquarters and everything else.

17 b 6: Right.

18 b 3, b 6: I think that effective may not be  
19 the right word, but impressive is how I would describe the  
20 operation that got everybody in here, a plan together to  
21 execute, and then the execution of that. Whether or not it  
22 is successful, as we said earlier, I'm cautiously optimistic.

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1 But that has nothing to do with all these things I just  
2 mentioned, the success or failure of -- it won't be failure,  
3 but the level of success of the operation has nothing to do  
4 with how well it's been executed.

5 [ b 6 ]: Right.

6 [ b 3 b 6 ]: Planned and executed. It's  
7 amazing. That is the most well planned and executed thing I  
8 have seen in now 20 months of being over here in the two  
9 tours. So --

10 [ b 6 ]: And, again, how long have you been in  
11 the service?

12 [ b 3, b 6 ] Twenty-seven years.

13 [ b 6 ]: Twenty-seven years,

14 [ b 3 b 6 ] Good stuff, and I attribute that  
15 to two great commanders, General Petraeus and General Odierno  
16 and some great staffs. And a lot of it fell on the Corps  
17 staff, because we are kind of the continuity side.

18 [ (b)(6) ] Well, thank you very much, [ b 3, b 6 ]

19 [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] I appreciate it. This concludes the interview. Thank  
20 you.

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