MNC-I

Information Operations

Overview
The focus of IO efforts is to **shape** the populace to be receptive to the reconciliation message....

**Inform** the populace of once the GoI officially takes action...

...and to **influence** key audiences/communicators to actively support reconciliation.

This will be accomplished utilizing multiple IO tools, once again depending on the audience and the message.

While messages will be picked up by other audiences the **main effort is to shape, inform, and influence the Iraqi populace**, while negating or countering counter-messages from hostile elements such as AQ, or other AlF.
Note what is not our target audiences: not the Western media; not the Pan-Arab media; and not the western/US public.
- 4 existing production centers with distinct yet overlapping missions—hence the need to synchronize production across the dissemination means
  - Example: CII mission is done across all 4 prodn centers;
  - C-IED affects/is affected by both the Counter-Militia and AQI lines
- We use these 4 prodn centers to achieve Corps and Force IO tasks...
- We execute all IO for Corps and Force... Force has no independent IO production capabilities of its own
- Production Centers:
  - IOTF: Strategic/operational themes;
  - POTF: Operational/tactical themes;
  - C-IED: specific, threat-centric;
  - CUROPS: all target sets...our primary NP and counter-propaganda effort
Program OBJ (TA: 15-30 yr old Iraci males)
- Site OBJ is to counter propaganda and misinformation
- Increase support for GOL
- Deter extremist view
- Disrupt terrorist attacks and their SPT networks
- Increase reporting of terrorist and terrorist related activities
Operational/Tactical Wanted Program

National Wanted Program
- Facilitates flexibility of unbiased Sect mixture
- Focuses on both Operational and Tactical HVTs
- Augmented with tactical engagements
- Ability to update with recent capture/kills to demonstrate progression

1.4a, 1.4c

Operational Environment

Tactical Environment

Specific Targeting

Rewards

Billboards

Radio

Engagements

Demonstrate Progress

1.4a, 1.4c

Approved for Release
Population Reach of Products

- The average recall for each product is 60%
- Percentage of the population to recall at least one of these products is 94% - equivalent to roughly 27.3 million of the population
- Average bonding is at 92% - equivalent to roughly 26.7 million of the population bond with the message from one of these products

![Graph showing population reach and bonding percentage](image)

2. N/A: A change of 0% is not statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level
Do you think the Government of Iraq's current policies to improve the security situation in Iraq are a step in the right or wrong direction?
- MoP 6 = +15%, MoP 8 = +14%, MoP 9 = +1%
- MoP 6 = +19%, MoP 8 = +15%, MoP 9 = +9%

Do you think it likely or unlikely that the political process that is underway will secure a lasting peace in Iraq?
- MoP 6 = +14%, MoP 8 = +5%, MoP 9 = +9%

It is the duty of Iraqi Muslims to support Al Qaeda
- MoP 6 = +14%, MoP 8 = +5%, MoP 9 = +9%

- 56% of those who have seen an IOTF product think the GoI current policies to improve the security situation are a step in the right direction, 56% more than those who have not seen our product (46%)
- 66% of those who have seen an IOTF product think it is likely that the political process underway will secure a lasting peace in contrast to the 53% who have not seen our product (13% point difference)
- Individuals who have seen an IOTF product are 8% more inclined (90%) to disagree that it is the duty of Iraqi Muslims to support Al Qaeda than those who have not seen our content (82%)
Q4: How likely do you think it is that the political process that is underway will secure a lasting peace in Iraq?

- Nationwide, there has been an increase in the number of people who think it is likely that the political process that is underway will secure a lasting peace in Iraq, with the June-August average being 16% and the Oct-Dec average being 19%.

Note: The chart on the page illustrates the change in sentiment over time with color-coded bars representing different levels of likelihood: Very likely, Fairly likely, Very unlikely, Fairly unlikely, Don't Know, and No Answer. The chart includes data from various regions and time periods, indicating a trend towards increased optimism about securing lasting peace in Iraq.
Q11.1: How much do you trust the Iraqi Army to do its job effectively in your neighborhood these days?

Q11.3: How much do you trust the Iraqi Police to do its job effectively in your neighborhood these days?
Q12: Which of the following do you think currently offers better security to you and your family?

For nationwide and Baghdad, there has been a marginal increase (+4% vs. Aug '07) in the number of people who feel the GI & TF offer better security. No apparent trend has been seen in the number of people who feel the GI & TF offer better security in Anbar & Tikrit.

In Mosul, there has been a decrease (-4% vs. Aug '07) in the number of people who feel the GI & TF offer better security.

Note: The data is from a survey conducted in August 2007. The sample sizes for each region are as follows: nationwide - 1200, Baghdad - 223, Anbar & Tikrit - 120, Mosul - 135. The margin of error is ±3%.
Nationwide
Q.22.20: FAQ has been effective in improving the quality of life

- No Answer
- Don't Know
- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

* Nationwide there has been an increase in the number of people who agree that FAQ has been effective in improving the quality of life, +15% from the Jun-Aug 07 average to the Dec-Feb 07 average.

Field Work - Dec 07: Total = 3,571, African Americans = 1,467, Catholics = 1,329, Muslims = 127, Jews = 136, Christians = 1,070, Buddhists = 1,000, Hindus = 100, Sikhs = 50,425, Total Sample Size = 3,571, Margin of Error x ±2%.
Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1.4a, 1.4c
PSYOP Approval Process
Detainee Image / Name Release

Approval Authority
Detainee Visual Image and Name Release
(FRAGO 322 to OPORD 07-01 252150DSEP07)

Detainees with ISN assigned:
Photo and/or Name release - CDR, MNC-I or his designee.

Detainees without ISN assigned:
"Photo only” or “photo w/ identifying information” (including Names) – CDR, USCENTCOM
   a. Requires an “Operational Needs Statement” for release prior to ISN.

"Name only" releases – CDR, MNC-I
   a. Requires an “Operational Needs Statement” for release prior to ISN.
Operations Security: Protect the Force

- **EMAIL:** Itineraries were consistently an issue. In many cases, they are sent out a week in advance over unsecure NIPRnet.
- **CELL PHONES:** Cell phones continued to be a problem with units in remote locations that have limited communications. Too much risk is being accepted in some cases.
- **THUMB DRIVES:** Thumb drives and other items were discovered at laundry points, trash bins, or other inappropriate locations. Establishing and enforcing accountability procedures for items of a sensitive nature is critical.
- **UNIFORM DISPOSAL:** Uniform items to include complete sets of ACL and IBA were discovered on IDF personnel. Most claimed to have secured from trash points.
- **SOLDIER IMAGERY:** Personal videos of combat operations should be reviewed. There is a great risk that they will be misused, either intentionally or unintentionally. Videos and pictures of combat operations should never be emailed or unsecured mediums.

1.4a, 1.4c

Next Slide
IO Way Ahead

Defeat AQI
- Diminish influence in Iraq
- Continue AQ v. AQ split
- Highlight nationalism v. foreign leadership

Citizens
- Unity through compromise and dialogue

FaO
- Increased focus on economic development and infrastructure improvement

Neutralize militias / Counter Foreign influence
- Improved security measures and ISF capability reduces need for militias
- Highlight opportunities to reconcile with communities

Justice
- Rule of Law; explain detention and release processes
- Continuously update and modify Wanted Products

1.4a, 1.4c

Content-based TV programs
- Matha Low
- Men Have a Cause
- Dreams of Iraq
Discussion
### MNC-I SPECIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IO TASKS</th>
<th>MNC-I SPECIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt Shi'a extremists and criminals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt malign foreign influence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote GoI credibility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape perception CF serves Iraqi interests.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IO OBJECTIVES

- Iraqi populace rejects Shi'a extremists and criminals.
- Iraqi populace rejects AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals.
- Iraqi populace does not support IED networks.
- Iraqi populace rejects malign foreign influence in Iraq.
- Iraqi populace perceives there is effective security.
- Iraqi populace perceives the ISF as effective and non-terrorist.
- Iraqi populace perceives all levels of government as effective at providing essential services.
- Iraqi populace perceives there is steady economic growth.
- Iraqi populace rejects corruption within all levels of government.
- Iraqi populace perceives participation in the political process will serve their interests.
- Iraqi populace perceives the GoI as effective and representative.
- Iraqi populace perceives continued CF presence will serve Iraqi interests.

### IO TASKS TO MSCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSC</th>
<th>IO TASKS TO MSCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14b</td>
<td>Disrupt Adversary Operational Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14d</td>
<td>Disrupt IED Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disrupt Foreign Terrorists &amp; Facilitators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote GoI Capacity Building &amp; Governance Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Build confidence in the ISF and the Rule of Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Build confidence in economic development, reconstruction, and essential service distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disrupt corruption within the GoI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promote reconciliation efforts at local, provincial, and national levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promote participation in the GoI (i.e., elections).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disrupt external influence on the GoI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrate Perceptions of GoI &amp; Iraqi Populace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrate CF capability during Reconstituting Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote CF credibility and commitment to Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>