The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: counter-occupation, terrorism, insurgency and a communal struggle for power and survival, occurring in the context of failing state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

Solving just one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse, so our solution set should be as complex as our problem set.

Counter-occupation is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to at least passively support attacks against Coalition Forces and contributes to Iraqi youth vulnerability to recruitment by more violent elements.

Terrorism in Iraq is connected to Al Qaeda’s global jihad that aims to create a virtual caliphate which is facilitated by regional terrorist and foreign fighter networks. The primary terrorist organizations in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to a lesser extent, Ansar al Sunnah (AAS). Sunni Extremist brutality and excessive tactics such as the use of suicide bombers, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and targeting fellow Muslims have eroded its popular support base. Sunni Extremist terrorism overlaps with the Sunni Rejectionist insurgency. Their intermediate objectives of weakening the Shia-dominated government coincide. However, the Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Rejectionist objective of re-establishing a Sunni-dominated Government of Iraq that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.

The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Rejectionist movement aimed at regaining former power and influence. The principal Sunni Rejectionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of Ansar al Sunnah. The Sunni Rejectionist goal at restoring Sunni power is just one part of the ongoing communal struggle for power and survival.

The communal struggle for power and survival is occurring both between and among the various ethno-sectarian groups. The major Shia groups of SCIRI, Badr, OMS and Fadilah are working together to prevent the Sunni resurgence, but fight among themselves for Shia dominance. The primary Kurdish groups: the KDP and PUK are working to increase Kurd autonomy and extend the limits of Kurdistan where possible. The potential expansion of Kurdistan is opposed by both Sunni and Shia Arabs, as well as by minorities such as the Turkmens. Sunni tribes are banding together to fight AQI, but may pose a challenge to Sunni provincial and national politicians as the tribal influence grows.
The GoI’s capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts is hindered by its current condition as a failing state. The GoI is struggling to develop the governmental, ministerial and security capacity to deal with the threats that confront it. The external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian and Arab civilizations increase the complexity of GoI’s situation and reduce the likelihood of solutions agreeable to all actors.
Sunni Extremists: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Changes in context:
- Long term CF presence
- Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

AQI objectives:
- Intimidate Sunni Arab populace along the TRV and DRV to maintain footholds to launch high profile attacks against minority populations and sectarian targets of opportunity
- Conduct MEI campaign against anti-AQI tribal organizations and ISF to regain freedom of action
- IOT ignite civil war and cause a failed state
The Sadrists and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)

Changes in context:
- Long-term CF presence
- Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

Sadrists/JAM objectives:
- Stand-down and reorganize JAM to reverse the decline in popular support
- Conduct political maneuvers to reverse decline in influence and counter Party of Four
- 1.4b, 1.4d
- Adjust counter-Occupation stance
SUNNI AREAS:
- CLC groups more mature integrated with CP/EJ
- Some ISF recruitment, but GOI resistance
- Economic factors (jobs) and political inclusion key
- Reconciliation is not a done deal = GOI paralysis on key issues could cause failure.

SHIA AREAS:
- Not the same dynamic as Anbar
- Little CF presence
- Shia "awakening" based on more individual community dynamics
- JAM a threat, but not "like AQI"
- Political equation more complex Due to factional elements in GOI
- High degree of 14b, 14d

Tribal Awakening/CLC Objectives:
- Establish broad-based tribal organizations to protect the populace from AQI and JAM
- Integrate members into ISF or other employment opportunities
- Develop a competitive political party leveraging local/tribal councils
- Ensures inclusion in GOI

From Sunni provincial focus to Iraqi national focus
**Threat Courses of Action**

**MLCOA**
- Local, isolated CLC tensions with GOI/ISF and other CLCs over perceptions of sectarianism
- Sunni Rejectionists increasingly join CLCs and tribal movements
- Tribal movements focused on political inclusion
- AQI remains isolated as common enemy
- Badr-JAM tensions flare-ups localized and temporary
- JAM conducts localized operations

**MDCOA**
- CLC/Tribal frustration revives Sunni insurgency
- AQI exploits rift between CLCs and GOI
- External support to AQI increases
- Badr-JAM violence causes JAM to turn
- Kurd-Shia alliance turns against Sunni Arabs
- ISF fractures and GOI fails
Phasing construct acknowledges diverse conditions throughout the country

Different parts in different phases

Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition Force posture in a given area

The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time

In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retool approach in partnership with the Iraqis

In Phase 3 – efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under ISF lead; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for COIN operations

In Phase 4 – ISF independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs

In Phase 5 – All elements of the ISF performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities
Phases by Area
~ Aug 08

- Colored shading depicts phases by area (projecting out to Aug 08)
- Areas transition from phase to phase as local conditions improve
  - Threat
  - INF capability
  - Political accommodation; organization of Concerned Local Citizens
  - Government and civil capacity
- As phases progress, CF missions shift
- Campaign end state corresponds with the time when all areas are in Strategic Overwatch
This slide shows the forecast disposition of the IA on 31 Jul 08. By then the IA will comprise 12 Divisions, 47 Brigades and 153 Battalions at FOC or better. The 1st Presidential Brigade will have been generated and plans for the integration of 2 Peshmerga Divisions will have become a reality. This total includes 9 of the former SIBs that will have completed training and will have transitioned to the IA as IAIIB, leaving 8 to train and transition. Finally, the new EOD Regiment and the Infrastructure Repair Battalion will be in place.

Further equipment will have been fielded: Badger fielding will be complete by end 07, 110 BMP 1 will have been purchased to equip 3 IA BNs (probably in 5, 6 and 11 Divisions) and 251 ECM sets will be issued in early 08. M16/M4 fielding to 3, 6, 8, 9 DIV and 3/1 BDE will be complete and fielding of 60mm mortar could be achieved. Finally MRAP delivery may make HWMMV/UH available for the IA and ~320 x 120mm mortars could be available.

This equipment delivery is not without implications – greater tactical mobility will result in greater demand for fuel; additional BMP battalions may result in a demand for operational mobility that is beyond the IA and 120mm mortars bring obvious requirements for FDC, tactical communications, interoperability and air-space control.

The ML and MDCOA briefed earlier highlighted the implications of sectarianism and militia influence and these will remain the greatest threat to IA acceptability.

Finally, the identified systemic issues (the lack of NCOs and officers and logistic support) will continue to hamper IA development and effectiveness.
This slide shows the ORA status of the IP now and a forecast for 31 Jul 08 for the Provinces and for the major cities. The IP currently comprises an authorised strength of 239,209 with 238,681 assigned. Based on current proposals this will increase to at least 288,232 by next July.

Reconciliation will contribute both to an increase in IP and more representational policing, dependent on MOI clearing the names of potential recruits and issuing hiring orders. By 31 Jul 08 the Baghdad IP expansion will have seen the use of expedient police stations and the first of the new stations will be complete.

This expansion is not without risk: financial, training, logistic and sectarian but if successful could be followed by a similar process elsewhere. The scale of effort required for such activity demands that future expansion of this type be prioritised to deliver greatest effect in relation to CF posture and presence.

Sectarianism and militia influence pose the greatest long-term threat to ISF acceptability and the lack of officers will continue to inhibit IP development and effectiveness.
Sir, this slide lays out projected shortages with a plan to mitigate shortages in each MND.

MNF-W and MND-N can mitigate all shortfalls through a combination of enhanced TTs, standard coverage in the higher risk areas and embedded BNs with newer or less experienced units. MND-SE will use an enhanced partnership with two plus battle groups to provide adequate coverage to the IA units in MND-SE.

MND-C will have three remaining shortages which could accept risk and remain uncovered. The units are 1/4/8, Unity and Sarafiyah BNs.

MND-B will have 9 units uncovered. The Pres BDE and 3 BNs, the 11th MTR, Justice BN and three Log BNs.

Overall we believe we can provide adequate coverage to the ISF with a mixture of the different models and acceptance of some risk.
Active Bases
53 MNC-I
09 MNF-I
62 Total

Base Locations (31 July 2008)

Bases Closed:
Corregidor
Combat Outpost
Blue Diamond

Produced by: (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNC-I Basing Engineer
18 SEP 07
Operational Risk:

1. Failure of the GOI to capitalize on the security gains/ breathing space given it by the Surge and Fardh al Qanoon.

2. CLC’s begin isolating themselves from the GOI/ CF and choose not to legitimate through the political process.

3. Intra-sectarian Violence increasing: Especially in the South over resources, the Port system, etc. This may represent a threat to our ground LOCs.

4. Inter-sectarian Violence increasing: Sunni on Shi’a violence increasing throughout key locations/ regions in the Irbid

5. Rate of ISF force generation too slow to control and retain cleared areas as CFs depart.

6. ISF force generation exceeding resources available to develop and sustain them.

7. Failure to approve appropriate long-term security agreements.
CG Comments
**Suni Rejectionists:**
Iraqi Hamas/1920RB/JAL/JM

**Changes in context:**
- Long-term CF presence
- Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

**Rejectionist objectives:**
- Recruit members disillusion with extremist groups into rejectionist groups
- Merge disparate armed factions that are torn between targeting CF or AQI
- Organize united negotiating position
- Exploit former AQI members for intelligence and isolate NBP
Sir, this slide is designed to represent a Theater Posturing Conference. The different plateaus represented by this concept are representative of the MNC-I Campaign Plan. Of note, we have made it clear to MNF-I in our joint planning efforts that this is a flexible and conditions-based concept. As such each of the steps we will go through tonight attempt to clearly lay out the security and ISF capabilities necessary to move us from one plateau to the next. We recognize there are decision points associated with each plateau, the decision to go from one step to the next is dependent on the conditions we will lay out being met. Finally, let me highlight that the conditions we used are taken directly from the MNC-I campaign plan or OPORD 07-01.
Sir, the slide on the left shows the current ISF laydown and the current TT shortages which you were briefed on yesterday.

In the TT column the numbers in blue are the internal Transition teams
And the number in red at the bottom of each call out box shows the current TT shortages
Sir, the slide on the left shows the projected numbers for the ISF and the TT shortages as of 31 JUL 08. The number in purple shows the growth of the ISF during this time. MND-N, MND-SE and MND-B have the largest amount of growth over this time. We project that we will be short approximately 128 Transition teams at this point. Sir the bottom line of this slide is the box highlighted in red in the impacts box.
Sir, the next two slides lay out a couple of examples of how these models can be applied to battlespace.

In MNF-W out along the western border we use an Enhanced LT model where the threat is lower and as we move towards Fallujah and the threat increases the models change. Around the Haditha area we move to an Enhanced Heavy model.

4/7 IA will be a brand new unit so we used an embad model in an attempt to put more emphasis on rapidly building this unit and finally near Fallujah we use a standard model.
Sir, next we move to MND-N in the Nineawa province.

In MND-N we used a combination of Enhanced Heavy and Enhanced Light to cover the IA units. To cover all the borders and IA units would require

1/3 ACR is dedicated to ISF/TT oversight and 2/3 ACR is centrally located to act as a QRF.

3/3 ACR is free to conduct kinetic operations or could assume additional battlespace.