Multi National Division-Baghdad Operations and Intelligence

2-82 ABN
6 December 2007
Purpose

To update the MNF-I Commander on recent actions in MND-B since the advent of Operation Pegasus Security Forever, and present plans for ongoing operations.
Agenda

- Intelligence Update
- Current Operations
- Future Operations
- Issues/Concerns
- Guidance
Phasing Construct

Phase I: Setting the Conditions
- GOI political conditions
- Organize forces
- Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks
- Develop Baghdad C2 structure

Phase II: Clear, Control, Retain
- Secure Baghdad
- MAIN EFFORT: Clear, Control, Retain
  - Interdict accelerants to Baghdad sectarian violence
  - Outlying BCTs deny AIP Sanctuary, Interdict LOCs, Deny FOM, Prevent JAM expansion
  - Neutralize VBIED and EFP networks
  - Deny extremist group sanctuaries

Supporting Efforts:
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Economic development initiatives
- Sustain PIC; continue transition to PIC

Phase III: Retain and Renew
- Increasingly capable ISF throughout Iraq supports the effort to secure Baghdad
Phase IV: Exploitation
- Operational Overwatch
- Conduct strike ops against AQI and Shia extremists

Overlap between phases and within certain phases

Combined operations with the ISF

Phase III tasks also support the main effort
Clear, Control, Retain Concept

**Lengths of subphases are not prescriptive; they are portrayed as shown strictly to illustrate the concept**

- Deliberate, achievable, sustainable
- Baghdad “mosaic” – districts in different sub-phases, varying lengths of time
- Deliberate selection of clear areas – balanced approach in targeting Sunni and Shia
- Disrupt – occurs throughout Baghdad – precise, intelligence-driven ops targeting VBIED networks, EFP networks, and militias responsible for EFPs
- Staggered approach; gradual accumulation of forces required – clear 2-3 districts at a time, progress to control and retain as conditions and available CF and ISF allow
- Do not risk “losing” a control or retain area in order to clear a new one
- Overseer ISF-led security of the Baghdad berm and the Army Canal throughout Phase II

Progress to Phase III based on conditions – not time; may vary by district
Tasks by Phase

- **Phase 1: Setting the Conditions**
  - Conduct focused raids, patrols and snap checkpoints in order to disrupt militia and AIF operations throughout Baghdad City
  - Initiate establishment of JSS concept within each of the nine Security Framework Districts
- **Phase 2: Clear, Control, Retain**
  - Simultaneously conduct clear, control, or retain operations throughout Baghdad City
  - Complete the establishment of JSS concept within each of the nine Security Framework Districts
  - Continue to progress the Hayys from Clear to Control to Retain
  - Continue to create “gated communities” in Retain Hayys
- **Phase 3: Retain and Renewal**
  - Enhance Transition Teams
  - ISF assume responsibility for security in all Districts
  - CF provides operational overwatch
- **Phase 4: Transition and Exploit**
  - CF maintains operational overwatch of ISF within Baghdad City and moves outside of Baghdad City and attacks AIF support zones to complete the reduction of AIF within MND-B AOR
Phase 1: Set Conditions

Conduct clearing operations in Kadamiya Security Framework District

Inside the city, increase presence, activity and security operations in previously cleared areas to protect citizens

Combined effort to secure citizens and disrupt enemy

Attack enemy outside city; prevent enemy from reinforcing

Conduct clearing operations in Rashid East Security Framework District

Focus/Retain
Clear
Control
Joint Security Station
Phase 3: Retain and Renewal

Coalition forces assist ISF in retaining all areas and allow ISF to establish / operate command and control.

Iraqi Security Forces aligned and controlled in accordance with Security Framework Districts.

Coalition forces positioned to respond to contingencies as needed to support Iraqi Security Forces and Transition Teams.
Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security within the capitol; civil authorities attain Provincial Iraqi Control.

Coalition Forces in coordination with other ISF complete the reduction of enemy support zones on the outside of Baghdad; sustain ISF in Baghdad by interdicting enemy lines of communication into Baghdad and maintaining a responsive force to assist as needed inside the city.
Pegasus Security Forever, Phase I Operations, Day 2
(Main Effort – 3-2 SBCT – 03 JAN 07)

Objective Cleveland

Objective Wilson

Legend:
- AIF/JAM forces were unable to respond on D+1
- JAM activity disrupted in Huriya

Caches:
- OBU Wilson East: 1 x SKS, 1 x MG, 2 x pistols
- OBU Wilson West: 4 x pistols, 5 x AK47 magazines (loaded), 2 x air rifles
- OBU Cleveland: 10 x AK47, 11 x AK47 magazines, 250 x 762 ammo, 250 x 5.56 ammo

部队无法响应在D+1
- JAM活动在胡里亚被中断

库藏:
- OBU Wilson East: 1 x SKS, 1 x MG, 2 x pistols
- OBU Wilson West: 4 x pistols, 5 x AK47 magazines (loaded), 2 x air rifles
- OBU Cleveland: 10 x AK47, 11 x AK47 magazines, 250 x 762 ammo, 250 x 5.56 ammo
**Pegasus Security Forever, Phase I Operations, Day 3**
(Main Effort – 3-2 SBCT – 04 JAN 07)

**Caches Rollup: X 3**
- 12 x RPG launchers
- 1 x PKC
- 1 x AK47
- 8 x parachute grenades
- 1 x bolt action rifle
- 2 x shotguns
- 2 x pellet rifles
- 5 x pistols
- MG parts
- 2 x 105mm sp
- 4 x 82mm sp
- 15 x 14.5MM sp
- 50 rds 7.5mm sp
- 12 x tear gas caps
- 1 defoliant
- 12 x 84 stencils
- 1000 rounds
- 1000 rounds
- 1 x 20mm headcover

**Impact:**
- After JAM efforts inconsequential
- JAM thoroughly disrupted
- OP MEDOP near OBJ Cleveland undermines JAM influence
Phase 1: Set Conditions, Establish Offensive Momentum

- 2/3 SBCT and 1/16 clear OBJ Huriyah
- Adjacent ISF and CF contain

• Conduct clearing operations in Hadar
  • Based on arrival of 2/2ID(ABN)
    – Forces to control in Huriyah
    – Forces to control in Shaab
    – Forces to control in Hadar

• Continued isolation of Sadr City: 3/2SBCT disrupts to north, 2/2ID increases presence in New Baghdad to fix JAM
Phase 2: Clear, Control and Retain

- Clearing operations continue as:
  - Forces are available for control
  - Threat conditions in cleared areas
  - Progress of JSS and ISF ability

Continue clearing:
- Dependent on sufficient forces to control
- Arrival of DRB / additional BCTS
- IA reinforcements
Combined BCT / ISF operations expand the influence / stability / security from retained, gated communities to neighboring muhallas.

Phase 2 End State:
- JS3 operational- CF tactical overwatch
- Functioning ISF C2 within all districts
- Sufficient clear and retain forces on hand
Phase 3: Retain and Renewal

Coalition forces assist ISF in retaining all areas and allow ISF to establish / operate command and control.

Iraqi Security Forces aligned and controlled in accordance with administrative districts.

Coalition forces positioned to respond to contingencies as needed to support Iraqi Security Forces and Transition Teams.

Command/Control
Support
Transition Team
Phase 4: Transition and Exploit

Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security within the capitol; civil authorities attain Provincial Iraqi Control.

Coalition Forces in coordination with other ISF complete the reduction of enemy support zones on the outside of Baghdad; support ISF in Baghdad by interdicting enemy lines of communication into Baghdad and maintaining a responsive force to assist as needed inside the city.
Multi National Division-Baghdad Operations and Intelligence

RSOI – IA/CF
We are beginning Phase I now with focusing 3/2 SBCT on specific areas and directing land owning BCTs to begin control tasks. If we have sufficient combat power available, we can begin clearing on 15 January.

As we come to the end of January, two decisions present themselves. First, if offensive clearing is not done we may have to delay transfer of 6 and 9 IA to IGFC. The other decision is whether we must prosecute targets in Sadr City to eliminate AIF resistance.
2/82 AB DIV RSO

TOTAL PAX: 3392

TOTAL: 360 UAHs
RDD – JAN 15TH

TOTAL: 458 Plots
RDD – JAN 15TH

* Trans Prio given until 1/15
** Applies to 2/82 Div only

2/82d ABN
1-325
BCT (-)

RDD to FOC
14a, 14g

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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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Multi National Division-Baghdad
Operations and Intelligence

Joint Security Stations
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(b)(5)
Joint Security Station

G2
- IA or NP in command of ISF
- IPs TACON to ISF CDR
- Partnered with CF, subordinate to US BDE CDR
- ISF remain ADCON to Iraqi Ministry

Physical Requirements
- IP Headquarters
- Force Protection
- Detainee Holding Facility
- Motorpool

Communications
- SG/PT between ISF units
- ICOM radios
- Cell phones

Quality of Life
- Electricity (Generators)
- Water
- Sewer
- Bed down (QRF)

Force Protection
- Barriers
- Fighting positions (roof)
- ECPs
- Balanced with isolating the station from the population

Discussion
- ISF Implementation
- Law of War
- Interpreters
### HURRIYA JSS_KADHIMIYA SFD_1/1 6 IA_TF 2-12 CAV MB 3655 8990

#### ISF UNITS
- IA: 1/1 TR IA
- CP: HURRIYA CP
- CF UNIT: 2-12 CAV

#### GRID:
- MB 3655 8990
- CELL PHONE:

#### HURRIYA FP REQUIREMENTS

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<th>CANADA</th>
<th>AFRICA</th>
<th>ASIA</th>
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#### LIFE SUPPORT 6 ROOM AVIAGE

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#### STATUS
- IA Occupied
- CP Occupied
- CF Occupied
- Force Protection
- Commw w/ HQ
- Commw w/ Sub-Units
- Map Board
- TOC Furniture
- Office Supplies
- Lifes Support

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<th>FDC</th>
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1.4c

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# AMERIYA JSS_MANSOUR SFD_5/6 IA BDE TF 1-5_MB332854

## AMERIYA FP REQUIREMENTS

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## LIFE SUPPORT

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**Notes on Ambush Status:**

1. JDC examined, but not confirmed without in situ inspection.
2. JDC & FPD require communication with other than cell phones.
3. Equipment - tables & chairs, no desks or other furniture, minimal office supplies, no contract pending approval.
4. Green for ISF; amber if CF expected to occupy 24F (anything more than 25/90/90%)

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PM Operational Reserve
MNC-I Concept for Operational Reserve

- Operational Reserve BDE is envisioned as a land-owning force employed in crisis conditions under authority of the PM.
- Operational Reserve BDE activated by National Joint Operations Center once it is operational (15 Jan 07):
  - NJOC notifies MOD / MOI --- who then notifies IGFC and NP HQs
  - NP HQs notifies NP Mech BN; IGFC notifies 9IA
  - 9IA accounts for, deploys, and provides C2 for Operational Reserve BDE
  - MND-B will alert TACON Operational Reserve units once PM decides to employ them
- Timeline
  - 2 Jan 07 – Commex
  - 8-10 Jan 07 – Key Leader Rehearsal
  - 13-15 Jan 07 – Emergency Muster Exercise
  - 16 Jan 07 – Emergency Muster Exercise complete, units released to MND-B
Operational Reserve

- Emergency Muster Exercise: 15 Jan 07
- Location: FOB Taji
- Logistics support: 9IA responsibility; HETs not required
- Soldiers / National Police recalled to FOB Taji 48 hours prior to alert
  - 100% accountability, 70% present
  - All equipment on hand
  - Personal gear packed
  - Basic loads on hand to support for 3 days
- Transportation assets mission capable / PMCSd

**Initial Emergency Muster Exercise under MNC-I / MND-B control as Proof of Principle**

**Go! Alert Chain – “A Way”**

**Initial Emergency Muster Exercise under MNC-I / MND-B control as Proof of Principle**

**Operational Reserve Partnering “A Way”**
- Perform similar missions
- Can train and share TTPs
Operational Reserve Timeline

1. MA/CDA Brief (31 Dec 06)
2. MND-B FRAGO (1 Jan 07)
3. COMMEX (5 Jan 07)
4. Concept Brief to MNC-IMNF-I ** (7 Jan 07)
5. Key Leader Rehearsal (8 Jan 07)
7. Units return to MND-B Control (16 Jan 07)

** MNC-IMNF-I briefing will focus on the concept of the key leader rehearsal (16 Jan) and the concept of the emergency muster exercise (13-16 Jan)
Issues/Concerns

- Appointment of CG, Baghdad Security Command
- Stand up of Command Posts
- Operational Reserve Concept
Backup
 reflections indicate associates of detainees unable to act due to increased CF presence

 indicates other C2 have fled both Sadr City and Shula fearing CF detention / unfriendly environment - from Sadr City and Sheikh Hamid from Shula

 indicates OMS released statement following detention claiming that he was part of JAM but had left the organization 4 months ago / No indications of reactions to yet, however indications are may be bigger fish than we thought MTF as we collect more

 IVO Karbala chastised Sadr city Jam for not firing on CF when the detained ordered future attacks on CF that enter the city.

 Unconfirmed reporting indicates that orders from Najaf are to stop assassinating Sunni and focus attacks on CF - conflicting reporting between sources on whether to attack outside Sadr City or within - majority of indicates that JAM is still preparing for a CF offensive on Sadr City
INTEL TARGETING: EFP / ADD NETWORKS

Recent Significant Detainees:

- B-6 JAM cell leader - Humiya: ADD / IED (02 JAN 07)

Intel Way Ahead:

- TF ADDER: Coordinated analytical focus on EFP / ADD problem set
- EFP / ADD specific SDRs for current JAM C2 detainees

1CD ACE Assessment:

- OP Arrowhead Strike 2 in New Baghdad late December 2006 caused JAM to assume defensive posture; perceived CF preparations to attack Sadr City
- Increased EFP / ADD attacks targeting 35 SECT in New Baghdad
- Further confusion noted within JAM C2 as a result of OP Arrowhead Strike 3 in Hurriya in early January 07
- Expect increased AAIEP (EFP/ADD) attacks IVO New Baghdad and Hurriya / Shula ICOT deny CF freedom of maneuver to continue operations

4 reflections indicate associates of detainee's unable to act due to increased CF presence

14 indicates other C2 have fled both Sadr City and Shula fearing CF detention / unfriendly environment from Sadr City and Sheikh Hamid from Shula

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INTEL TARGETING: AQI VBIED NETWORKS

Recent Significant Detainees:
- (b) was a bomb maker for various Sunni groups (25 DEC 06)
- (b) was a VBIED cell member associated with (b) (27 DEC 06)
- (b) associated with Abu Nuj network (3 JAN 07)

ATTACKS:

1CD ACE Assessment
- Recent cache find degraded AQI's ability to employ VBIEDs on the eastern side of Baghdad, attacks here have primarily been SVIED and IED, asset worsening cache find will have similar effects.
- CF operations in Mahmudiya impacted the VBIED supply chain, AQI networks having difficulty.
- Detention of (b) will hinder AQI / Sunni ART activity in Western Baghdad, however, previously detained IED builders have indicated they have skills to other members in case of detention.
- Detention of (b) will have minimal immediate disruptive impacts on Abu Nuj Network, indications of negative effects already seen as network is dropping selection.
After the spike in VBIED attacks that occurred following the 23 November attacks directed at Shia in Sadr City, overall VBIED activity dropped off by 26% within the Beladiyahs. Despite this drop, the increased use of suicide VBIED during the 7 – 20 Dec period produced higher WIA than the previous period. This effective use of suicide bombers maintained tensions between Shia and Sunni groups keeping the overall attacks against civilians between the periods consistent. While the last two weeks has seen a slight increase in overall VBIED activity, the number of detonated VBIED decreased by 1 and there were no suicide VBIEDs. The last reported suicide VBIED directed at civilians was on 20 December. The use of static VBIEDs can be attributed to the reduced numbers of KIA and WIA civilians during the period. We expect the number of suicide VBIEDs to pick back up to around 5 – 8 per month, increasing the number of KIA and WIA civilians as the Abu Nur Network continues to try to destabilize Baghdad.

KIA / WIA of VBIED Attacks by Period
23 NOV – 6 DEC  IA KIA – 2, IA WIA – 1, IP KIA – 1, IP WIA – 1, LN KIA – 237, LN KIA – 310
7 – 20 DEC  IA KIA – 0, IA WIA – 19, IP KIA – 3, IP WIA – 19, LN KIA – 87, LN WIA – 345
21 DEC – 3 JAN  IA KIA – 0, IA WIA – 0, IP KIA – 0, IP WIA – 2, LN KIA – 105, LN WIA – 217

VBIEDs by Beladiyah
23 NOV – 6 DEC  VBIED FOUND – 5, VBIED DET – 15, SVBIED DET – 3
7 – 20 DEC  VBIED FOUND – 3, VBIED DET – 9, SVBIED DET – 5
21 DEC – 3 JAN  VBIED FOUND – 6, VBIED DET – 13, SVBIED DET – 0