(U) **FRAGO 278 OPERATION MAINTAIN RESOLVE** TO MNC-I OPRD 08-01.

(U) REFERENCES:

A. (U) MNC-I EXORD TO OPERATIONALIZE THE UPDATE TO JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (27 JANUARY, 2008)

B. (U) MNC-I FRAGO 08-126 SUPPORT TO IRAQ BASRA RESPONSE PLAN

C. (U) MOD 1 TO FRAGO 08-126 SUPPORT TO IRAQ BASRA RESPONSE PLAN

D. (U) MNC-I FRAGO 08-138 BASRA POST KINETIC OPERATIONS

(U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THIS ORDER: CHARLIE

1. **S//REL** SITUATION.

1.A. **S//REL** ENEMY

1.A.1. **S//REL** CURRENT THREAT SITUATION. THE SITUATION IN BASRA CITY REMAINS STABLE OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS AND WILL LIKELY CONTINUE THAT WAY AS LONG AS IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, RATHER THAN MAINSTREAM JAM. HOWEVER, SPECIAL GROUP CRIMINALS WILL STILL OFFER RESISTANCE THROUGH THE USE OF INDIRECT FIRE (IDF), IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED), AND LOW INTENSITY SMALL SCALE ATTACKS. PM MALIKI’S INITIATIVES WILL HELP TO LEGITIMIZE THE GOI AND SERVE AS AN INDICATION OF HIS COMMITMENT TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE CIVILIAN POPULACE. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BASRA WILL REINFORCE GOI SUPPORT FOR STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION AND WILL FOSTER IMPROVEMENT IN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF STABILITY BY PROVIDING REASSURANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF BASRA.

1.A.2. **S//REL** PROJECTED THREAT SITUATION. WHILE RECENT OPERATIONS WERE FOCUSED ON PERIPHERAL AREAS OF THE CITY AND CRIMINAL GROUPINGS, THE PERCEPTION OF THE ISF’S OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE REMAINS THE KEY DETERMINING FACTOR IN PROVINCIAL SECURITY. FUTURE OPERATIONS INTO SPECIFIC MILITIA STRONGHOLDS MAY BE PERCEIVED AS AN AGGRESSIVE ACT AGAINST ALL JAM. ANY WIDESPREAD KINETIC STRIKE IN THE CITY MAY BE NEGATIVELY INTERPRETED AND MAY SPARK A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE.

1.A.2.A. **S//REL** MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION. IF GOI/ISF FOCUSES ON HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND RIDDING THE CITY OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION IS FOR MAINSTREAM JAM TO REMAIN COMPLIANT TO THE FREEZE ON VIOLENCE. HOWEVER, EXTREMISTS, CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, PROXIES, AND THOSE WHO STAND TO LOSE MONEY, POWER OR INFLUENCE FROM CURRENT OPERATIONS WILL PERSIST AND CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS AGAINST GOI FACILITIES, ISF TROOPS, AND CF.

1.A.2.B. **S//REL** MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION. IN THE MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION, MAINSTREAM JAM PERCEIVES THEY ARE UNDER ATTACK AND RESPONDS BY BREAKING THE FREEZE AND JOINING WITH SPECIAL GROUP CRIMINALS TO DEFEND THE CITY. THIS WILL BE INDICATED BY A RETURN TO FULL-SCALE MILITIA VIOLENCE AND A SUDDEN SPIKE IN IDF ATTACKS AGAINST THE PJCC, BOC AND BASRA PALACE.

1.B. **S//REL** FRIENDLY. ON 24 MARCH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ DEPLOYED COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES TO BASRA TO COUNTER VIOLENT ATTACKS BY JAM SPECIAL GROUPS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ELEMENTS. COMBAT OPERATIONS HAVE AFFECTED ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FRESH FOODSTUFFS TO THE CITIZENS OF BASRA. IRAQI-LED OPERATIONS WILL ENSURE RESTORATION OF THESE AND OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ARE CRITICAL TO THE OVERALL SUCCESS AND LEGITIMACY OF THE GOI.
2. (S//REL) MISSION. ON ORDER, CP SUPPORT ISF-LED CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PROVINCE OF BASRA IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH THE RULE OF LAW AND TO PROVIDE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR ALL CITIZENS.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

3. A. (U) COMMANDER’S INTENT.

3. A. 1. (U) KEY TASKS:

3. A. 1. A. (U) ENABLE THE ISF TO ESTABLISH SECURITY AND STABILITY IN BASRA.

3. A. 1. B. (S//REL) FACILITATE ISF OPERATIONS TO SECURE KEY INFRASTRUCTURE, HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL SUPPLY WAREHOUSES.

3. A. 1. C. (U) SYNCHRONIZE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3. A. 1. D. (S//REL) CONDUCT INFORMATION OPERATIONS IOT SUPPORT ISF TO GOI.

3. B. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. MND-SE IS THE OPERATIONAL LEADER DURING OVERLAPPING PHASES MNC-I OPERATIONS WILL SUPPORT THE ISF & GOI IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITH SECURITY OVERWATCH, LOGISTICS MOVEMENTS, AND PLANNING FOR LONG TERM ECONOMIC AND CIVIL DEVELOPMENT. THROUGHOUT ALL PHASES, IT IS VITAL THAT THE GOI BE THE LEAD AND THAT MNC-I WILL OVERWATCH TO ENSURE GOI SUCCESS. SUPPORTING AGENCIES INCLUDE USAID, USMI-I, UNAMI, OTHER NGOS, AND SELECT PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS.

3. C. (U) TASKS TO SUBORDINATES

3. C. 1. (U) MND-SE.

3. C. 1. A. (U) PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT THE GOI’S ABILITY TO REESTABLISH THE RULE OF LAW AND PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF BASRA PROVINCE.

3. C. 1. B. (U) ACCEPT CMOC AT BASRA AIR BASE TO COORDINATE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BASRA ICW USAID (OFDA), UNAMI AND RELEVANT NGOS. THE CMOC IS TACON TO MND-SE.

3. C. 1. B. 1. (S//REL) CONDUCT DISTRIBUTION COORDINATION OF ISF-LED HA THROUGH MITTS.

3. C. 1. B. 2. (S//REL) ICW ISF AND USAID, IDENTIFY HA DISTRIBUTION SITES.

3. C. 1. B. 3. (S//REL) ICW THE BASRA PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT), ASSIST THE GOI TO PLAN AND RESOURCE A VIABLE PROGRAM OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC AND CIVIC DEVELOPMENT IN BASRA.

3. C. 1. B. 4. (S//REL) BPT PROVIDE CM Functions SPECIALITY SECTIONS TO THE CMOC FOR SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

3. C. 1. C. (U) BPT RECEIVE PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND PROVIDE LIFE SUPPORT ISO CMOC.

3. C. 1. D. (U) PROVIDE FOR THE LIFE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, TO INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION ASSETS, FOR USG PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS IN BASRA PROVINCE. ALL LIFE SUPPORT WILL BE COVERED UNDER ACSA AND ANNOTATED ON A CC FORM 35 BY THE MND-SE J4.

3. C. 1. E. (S//REL) REPORT EXPECTED SHORTAGES OF LODGING, TRANSPORTATION, AND FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS TO MNC-I AS SOON AS IDENTIFIED.

3. C. 1. F. (U) FACILITATE GOI OPERATIONS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DELIVERY OF FUEL, FUNDS, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.
3.C.1.G. (U) FACILITATE GOI OPERATIONS TO SECURE KEY INFRASTRUCTURE, HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL SUPPLY WAREHOUSES.

3.C.1.H. (S//REL) RESOURCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CMOC TO PROVIDE A MEETING ROOM AND SEPARATE SECURE OFFICE WORKSPACE TO INCLUDE A COPIER, WHITEBOARDS, DESK, CHAIRS, AND TABLES TO SUPPORT AN ELEVEN PERSON CMOC ON BASRA AIRBASE.

3.C.1.I. (S//REL) PROVIDE FOUR (4) INET ACCOUNTS AND SYNERGY RED CONNECTIVITY FOR CMOC OPERATIONS.

3.C.1.J. (S//REL) ICW MITT, ENSURE ISF COMPLETES ROUTE CLEARING AND CONVOY SECURITY FOR PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

3.C.1.K. (S//REL) ASSIST ISF AS NEEDED IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

3.C.1.L. (S//REL) CONDUCT IO ITO SUPPORTS THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

3.C.1.L.1. (S//REL) INCREASE SUPPORT FOR ISF (BOLSTER PERCEPTION OF ISF STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY).

3.C.1.L.2. (S//REL) PROMOTE HUMANITARIAN AID EFFORTS ISO ISF AND GOI EFFORTS.

3.C.1.L.3. (S//REL) INCREASE PERCEPTION THAT CRIMINALS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE (AVOID CONDEMNING OR CHAMPIONING SPECIFIC PARTIES OR GROUPS SUCH AS JAM).

3.C.1.L.4. (S//REL) DECREASE ABILITY OF [redacted] AND ITS SURROGATES TO OPERATE WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF BASRA.

3.C.1.M. CONDUCT IO ISO CORPS EFFORTS IOT ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS:

3.C.1.M.1. DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS (SG)

3.C.1.M.2. MINIMIZE JAM'S INFLUENCE ON POPULATION

3.C.1.M.3. ISOLATE SG FROM THE BASRA POPULATION


3.C.1.N. (S//REL) INCLUDED HA ASSESSMENT IN ROUTINE REPORTS TO MNC-I.

3.C.1.O. (S//REL) LEVERAGE DEVELOPING SONS OF IRAQ - LIKE CAPACITY IOT SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

3.C.1.P. (S//REL) DETERMINE DISTRIBUTION SITES, DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE, AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS.

3.C.1.Q. (S//REL) BPT PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE PRT.

3.C.2. (U) 360TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

3.C.2.A. (U) PROVIDE CMOC TACON TO MND-SE TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TASKS:

3.C.1.A.1. (S//REL) COORDINATE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BASRA ICW USAID (OFDA), UNAMI AND RELEVANT NGOS.

3.C.1.A.2. (S//REL) CONDUCT DISTRIBUTION COORDINATION OF ISF-LED HA THROUGH MITTS.

3.C.1.A.3. (S//REL) ICW USAID, IDENTIFY HA DISTRIBUTION SITES.

3.C.1.A.4. (S//REL) ICW THE BASRA PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT), ASSIST THE GOI TO PLAN AND RESOURCE A VIALBE PROGRAM OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC AND CIVIC DEVELOPMENT IN BASRA.
3.C.1.A.S. (S//REL) BPT PROVIDE CMD FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY SECTIONS TO THE CMOC FOR SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

3.C.2.B. (U) PROVIDE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT FOR CA BDE MEMBERS OF CMOC TEAM, INCLUDING COMPUTERS, PHONES, AND WIRE ISO MND-SE OPERATIONS.

3.C.2.C. (S//REL) SUBMIT AMR’S FOR MOVEMENT OF CMOC PERSONNEL FROM BAGHDAD TO BASRA TO C-3 AIR NLT 72 HOURS PRIOR TO REQUIRED MOVEMENT.

3.C.3. (U) 316TH ESC.


3.C.3.B. (S//REL) PROVIDE ONE (1) PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER TO AUGMENT THE CMOC. THE OFFICER WILL PLAN, COORDINATE AND FACILITATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES ICW MND-SE FAO AND THE CMOC.

3.C.4. (U) POTF.

3.C.4.A. (S//REL) ENSURE PSYOP IS PLANNED AND COORDINATED WITH ONGOING AND PLANNED CMOC OPERATIONS. AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE PLANNER TO CMOC IF REQUIRED.

3.C.5. (U) MNC-I TAC

3.C.5.A. (S//REL) CONDUCT PLANNING FOR FOLLOW-ON DEVELOPMENT PLANS ICW CMOC, MND-SE AND BASRA PRT.

3.C.5.B. (S//REL) ICW MND-SE, PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT THE GOI’S ABILITY TO REESTABLISH THE RULE OF LAW AND PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF BASRA PROVINCE.

3.C.5.C. (S//REL) PROVIDE ONE (1) FAO ADC TO SUPPORT CMOC AS REQUIRED.


3.C.6.B. (S//REL) BPT IDENTIFY AND REPORT SUPPLIES AND SERVICES SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS REQUIRING MNP-I AND USM-I LEVEL ENGAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION.

3.C.7. (U) MNC-I CS.

3.C.7.A. (U) PROVIDE SIPR, NIPR, VOSIP (APPROXIMATELY FIVE (5) SIPR, FOUR (4) NIPR, AND EIGHT (8) VOSIP LINES, AND THREE (3) NVOIP CONNECTIVITY TO THE CMOC.

3.C.8. (U) MNC-I CS.

3.C.8.A. (S//REL) BPT AUTHORIZE IMMEDIATE CERP FUNDING AS REQUIRED FOR RECONSTRUCTION, IRAQI ECONOMIC INITIATIVE (IEI), HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DEATH BENEFITS/BATTLE DAMAGE.

3.C.8.B. (S//REL) BPT AUTHORIZE TRANSITION TEAM INTEGRATION FUNDS (TTIF) AS A QUICK AND EFFECTIVE MEANS TO BUY EMERGENT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR ISF UNITS.

3.C.9. (U) MNC-I SURGEON


3.C.9.B. (S//REL) ENSURE ADEQUATE HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT, TO INCLUDE LEVEL I, II, III AND MEDEVAC, TO CF AND USG PERSONNEL IN THE BASRA AREA.
3.C.9.C. (S//REL) EFT RESOURCE ADDITIONAL MEDICAL TEAMS AS REQUIRED.

3.C.9.D. (S//REL) COORDINATE WITH IGFC SURGEON TO IDENTIFY ISF MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSIST IN PLANNING EFFORTS TO MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS.

3.C.9.E. (S//REL) FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF ISF PATIENTS FROM BASRA TO APPROPRIATE MEDICAL FACILITIES.

3.C.9.F. (S//REL) ASSIST THE IGFC SURGEON IN MAINTAINING ACCOUNTABILITY OF ISF PATIENTS EVACUATED OUT OF BASRA.

3.C.9.G. (S//REL) PROVIDE COORDINATION BETWEEN IGFC, MOD, AND MOH TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF MOH MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO BASRA.

3.C.10. (S//REL) JFEC-RECONCILIATION.

3.C.10.A. (S//REL) DEVELOP A TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT SCHEME TO IDENTIFY RECONCILIATION OPPORTUNITIES (POLITICAL, SECURITY).

3.C.10.B. (S//REL) ASSIST GOI IN EXECUTION OF THE ENGAGEMENT SCHEME.

3.C.10.C. (S//REL) ICW WITH THE GOI, INITIATE AND DEVELOP A GOI-DRIVEN SOI-LIKE PROGRAM.

3.C.10.C.1. (S//REL) ESTABLISH GOI AND TRIBE PATRONAGE.


3.C.10.C.3. (S//REL) ASSIST ISF IN DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SCHEME OF SOI TO SUPPORT SECURITY OPERATIONS.

3.D. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

3.D.1. (S//REL) TIMELINE

(S//REL) 4 APR 08 - ISSUE THE ORDER
6 APR 08 - DEPLOY THE CMOC; MND-SE CONFIRMATION BRIEF
7 APR 08 - CMOC ESTABLISHED IOC; NOTIFY USG, UN, NGOs OF CMOC LOCATION; CONTINUE DAILY RESOURCE ASSESSMENT
7 APR 08 - INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULACE REQUIREMENTS
11 APR 08 - INTER/GOI REPAIR PRIORITIES RECOMMENDATION
14 APR 08 - COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF POPULACE REQUIREMENTS

3.D.2. (U) THIS INSTRUCT EXPRISES UPON MNC-I TAC REDEPLOYMENT UNLESS OTHERWISE EXTENDED.

3.D.3. (U) DIPLOMATIC ACOON.


3.D.5. (U) USAID IS THE OVERALL USG LEAD FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, AND MANAGES THE OFFICE OF THE US FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA) HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (HA) PROGRAM FOR IRAQ. IN THIS CAPACITY, USAID IS RESPONSIBLE FOR:


3.D.5.B. (U) DEVELOPING A SYSTEMATIC PROCESS FOR COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO GOI HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN BASRA.

3.D.5.C. (U) MONITORING UN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS THROUGH IN KEY INTERLOCUTORS AND OFDA; SHARING OF INFORMATION AND REPORTS WITH OTHER USG AND CF ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
3.D.5.D. (U) COORDINATING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WITH IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN BASRA PROVINCE.

3.D.6. (U) TASKS AND DIRECTIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION WITH UNAMI WILL BE WRITTEN AS UNCLASSIFIED.

3.D.7. (U) ROE REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR ALL COALITION FORCES.

3.D.8. (S//REL) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE:

3.D.8.A. (S//REL) HOW WILL THE LOCAL COMMUNITY REACT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND COALITION FORCE PRESENCE IN BASRA?

3.D.8.B. (S//REL) WHAT EXTERNAL INFLUENCES THREATEN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEGITIMATE GOV RULE OF LAW?


3.D.9.E. (S//REL) CURRENT LEVELS OF ISR WILL REMAIN ON STATION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

3.D.10. (U) PERSONNEL TASKED TO SUPPORT THE CMOC ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ALL IT EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO EXECUTE MISSION TO INCLUDE COMPUTER AND PHONE SETS.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. NO CHANGE.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

5.A. COMMAND. NO CHANGE.

5.B. SIGNAL. CHANGE.

5.B.1. POINTS OF CONTACT:

5.B.1.A. (U//FOUO) ACT FOR THIS FRAGO IS C9 FUOPS b3 b6
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

5.B.1.B. (U//FOUO) MNC-I ACOS C9 IS mnu (b6)
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

5.B.1.C. (U//FOUO) MNC-I C9 LNO TO USAID IS (b3), (b6)
NIPR: b6 COMM: b6 EXT b6 IRAQNA: b6

5.B.1.D. (U//FOUO) MNC-I C9 CHIEF OF PLANS IS b3 b6
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

5.B.1.E. (U//FOUO) MNC-I MND-SE SENIOR LNO IS (b3), (b6)
DSN: b6 NIPR: (b3), (b6) CENTRIX: b6 RED PHONE: b6
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

5.B.1.F. (U//FOUO) 360TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE POC IS DEPUTY OPS AND INTEL CHIEF b3 b6
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

5.B.1.G. (U//FOUO) 360TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE CMOC CHIEF IS (b3), (b6)
SIPR: (b3), (b6) DSN: b6 SVOIP: b6

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04/03/2008 9:00 PM
5.B.1.H. (U//FOUO) MNF-I ACTION OFFICER IS (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN (b)(6)

5.B.1.I. (U//FOUO) MNF-SE J3 POC IS: b 3 b 6 SYNERGY RED (b)(6)


ACKNOWLEDGE:

AUSTIN
LTG

OFFICIAL:

BAILEY
C3

ANNEXES:

ANNEX A - (S//REL) TASKORG

Approved for Release