Offensive CONOP
12 Dec 06

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad, reducing the level of sectarian violence while helping the GOI regain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?

Overall Classification for this Brief is SECRET-REL to USA, MCMVR

UNCLASSIFIED
**Purpose**

- To obtain additional guidance from the CG on concept development for offensive operations (date TBD)
- To provide a baseline response to MNF-I's RFIs for planning (from the MG Fastabend email)

**Agenda**

- Threat Assessment
- Facts, Constraints, Assumptions
- Tasks and Conditions
- Concept of Operations
- Risk
Attacks on Civilians
Murders on Civ & ISF
VBIEDS on Civ, ISF, CF
10 NOV – 08 DEC 06

July
Threat Courses of Action

Most Likely Threat COA
- AQI moves North
  Probe barrier for breach points
  Suicide attacks shift to Diyala, Salah ad Din
- JAM defends Sadr City
  Reinforce Sadr City defenses
  Emplace EFPs along AAs
  Consolidate fighters in Sadr City
  Control movement into Sadr City

Most Dangerous Threat COA
- AQI shifts focus to Sunni Belt
  M&I Campaign against local leaders
- JAM launches January Offensive
  Increase EFPs along LOCs, focus areas
  Increase IDF against CF FOBs
  Incite Shia demonstrations in Baghdad and in south (Diwaniyah, Najaf, al Kut) to disrupt FOM

Key Red Indicators:
- EFPs concentrated east of Tigris
- Death squads reduced west of Tigris
- Increase in HP attacks in MNDF-N

- VBIEDs built inside Baghdad will continue to be emplaced;
  target selection will be limited by CF/ISF operations
- Snipers will focus on barrier checkpoints
- AQI will attempt to attack barrier checkpoints with SVBIEDs
  and infiltrate SVESTs into Baghdad

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Significant Religious and Political Events: Impacts on Operations

LEGEND

TRAFFIC DENSITY
GATHERING POINTS
POTENTIAL BATTLE

Event
- Hajj
- Qawm
- Allah Kabir's Birthday
- Annivesary of Battle of Badr
- Soul of Suleyman
- Anniversary of Dibbi, Moth
- Procession from Najaf to Karbala

Date
- 23 Jul 2014
- 1-6 Oct
- 22 Sep
- 9 Oct
- 10-15 Sep
- 22-26 Sep
- 30 Sep
- 28 Sep

Impact
- Minimal anticipated impact
- Minor operational impact
- Potentially major operational impact

1.4a, 1.4g
Facts

- ISF
  - Iraqi population views ISF operating in conjunction with CF as impartial
- CF
  - MNDs are already conducting operations on a regular basis in the areas under consideration
  - Current mission requirements in MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-SE prohibit the reallocation of combat power from those units to MND-B
  - Existing MNC-I aviation assets already committed to critical missions
  - ISR requirements increase in Baghdad to support offensive operations
Constraints

- Must operate within current basing footprint
- Must obtain PM approval for kinetic and SOF operations
- Additional forces committed to Iraq from outside the theater must adhere to existing JRSOI timeline
Assumptions

- **Threat**
  - Disrupting the VBIED network will contribute to a decrease in popular Shia support of JAM
  - Disrupting EJ/K activity will contribute to a decrease in popular Sunni support of AQI
  - JAM led death squad activity west of the Tigris River will continue to perpetuate the sectarian cycle of violence in Baghdad
  - AQI and JAM will continue to contest control of the Baghdad Belts to secure LOCs in and out of Baghdad
  - Sunni extremists will continue to perpetuate the sectarian cycle of violence in Baghdad by attempting to cause mass casualty attacks against Shia
  - Shia extremists will find sanctuary in areas east of the Tigris River while Sunnis will move outside of Baghdad for sanctuary
  - MOI/MOT vehicles will continue to be used by militant forces to conduct EJ/K

- **ISF**
  - NP and IP units are heavily infiltrated by Shia militias; IA units are less infiltrated by militias, but are vulnerable to sectarian influences
  - IA BDEs move:
    - Under current timeline, 3 IA Bdes ready for operations in and around Baghdad by mid-January (1-IA, 2-IA, 3-IA)
    - 2 additional IA BDEs (elements from 3-IA and 1-IA) ready for operations by February at the earliest
  - Under current timeline, only 1 of the 3 IA BDEs (4/IA with 2 Bns) scheduled to redeploy to Baghdad will be available for operations
  - Strike Force will be available for operations ICW CF
  - As IA take the lead in operations, its units will incur more losses due to EFP attacks
Assumptions

- GOI
  - GOI will not impede or undermine the operation once it is underway
- CF
  - Forces from outside Iraq are available if required
  - Increasing the frequency and pace of CF operations against VBIED and EFP networks may require a decrease in targeting standards
### Tasks

- **Specified (from MG Fastabend email)**
  - Integrate operational activity in Baghdad belts, on the barrier, and in key focus areas in the city.
  - Integrate on-going CF, IA Combined Ops.
  - Integrate operational focus of Defeat AQIZ in Balad-Baghdad-Muqadadiya Triangle.
  - Integrate IA units recently deployed to Baghdad into operations. (Work to involve elements of 4-5 IA Divisions into operations.)
  - Conduct information operations that highlight the activities and successes of the ISF.
  - Consider tying operations to a “major clamp down” on the 141 border.

- **Implied**
  - Disrupt VBIED networks that exacerbate sectarian tensions in and around Baghdad.
  - Disrupt EJK activity, focusing on groups on both sides of the sectarian divide.
  - Disrupt EFP networks.
  - Employ CF and ISF in combined operations.
  - Partner CF with ISF units operating in and around Baghdad to the fullest practical extent.
  - Continue to build capacity of the ISF.
  - Isolate extremists in and around Baghdad.
  - Conduct strike operations.
  - Control access through access through the Baghdad barrier.
  - Strengthen the Baghdad barrier to make it more difficult to penetrate.
  - Clear and secure focus areas in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts, expanding on the concept of “gated communities.”
  - Posture forces for the accelerated transition of security self-reliance to the ISF.
  - Engage MNF-I with a view toward re-focusing TF 44 operations against the EFP network in Baghdad.
  - Coordinate with MNF CM for ISR reprioritization and synchronization—Initial increase in effort toward target development.
Critical Conditions
Required for Beginning the Operation

- Concurrency from GOI, including a strong statement of support from the PM
- Declaration of martial law in Baghdad and in the Baghdad Belts
  - GOI agreement regarding vehicle ban, curfew, random searches, and control of access
- CF available to establish an effective cordon around Baghdad in the vicinity of the existing barrier
  - Ability to surge counter-mobility capabilities shortly afterwards to improve the barrier and further control access
- CF available to immediately begin operations ICW ISF in focused areas of the city
  - Authorization to conduct operations in all areas of Baghdad, including Sadr City
- TF focused on VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
- Communications plan established; messages ready to be broadcast to target audiences (Iraqi populace, external actors, potential political participants)
- Agreement reached with MOD and MOI regarding C2 relationships (CF – IA unit C2 relationships, MNC-I coordination with MOD and MOI)
Critical Conditions
Required for Achieving the Endstate

- GOI and MNF-I develop an agreeable endstate and way ahead
- GOI must agree to Bridging Concept and sign an MOU that clearly articulates responsibilities in preparation for its execution
- GOI releases statement supporting MOU and explaining importance for all Iraqis
- GOI announces and institutes a plan for the near-term (Cease Fire), mid-term (Amnesty Program), and endstate for all militias
- CF develop a Strategic Communications plan to ensure Coalition and Iraqi people understand the purpose of the Bridging Strategy as the “Logical Next Step”
- GOI institutes genuine and transparent MOI reform and develops a plan for the improvement of ministerial capacity in Industry, Transportation, and Health
- GOI dictates command & control lead for Baghdad and how it should evolve, pursuant to CF relocation to the periphery (e.g., MOD to MOI to PDoP)
- GOI releases DFI Funds to Anbar & Tali Afar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
- Unambiguous agreement concerning CF enabler support and a plan to transition all to GOI
- Agreement on the gradual reallocation of MNC-I’s non-military tasks; guidance specifying support role to PRTs and IRMO (GOI agrees to assume phased responsibility for “build” projects and plans)
Concept of Operations

Phase I - Offensive
- Control access through the Baghdad barrier
- Improve the barrier, making it a viable obstacle
- CF-led operations in focused areas of Baghdad, including Sadr City
- Increased focus of OCF-I against targets east of the Tigris
- Increased focus by CJSTF on EFP and VBIED networks in Balad, barrier, and city
- Partnership with IA and IPS

15 Jan – 31 Jan 07

Phase II - Expand on OTF II
- Clear and secure focus areas in the Baghdad Belts and in Baghdad itself – Coalition responsibility
- Build in those areas – GOI responsibility
- Expand on the concept of “gated neighborhoods”
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF

1 Feb – 15 Mar 07

Phase III - Declared Cease Fire
- Announce reconciliation plan
- Implement bridging strategy: enhanced TFs, fading partnerships, movement to the periphery, posturing of forces for strike ops
- Battlespace handover to IA
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF

16 Mar – UTC (overlap in phases)

Phase IV - Exploitation and Transition
- CJSTF/OCF-I/ISOF – sustained strike against EFP and VBIED networks
- Strike ops
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF
- Accelerated transition toward robust TFs, reduction in scope of CF missions
Concept Sketch
Phase II: Expand on OTF II

DDF-I (no change)
- Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River
- Disrupt VBIED networks
- Accelerate sectarian tension

MND-I (no change)
- Conduct combined operations on selected focus areas in Diyala Province
- Disrupt IED networks

MBOTF (no change)
- Conduct strike operations ICW ISF
- Disrupt EFP and VBIED networks in focus areas W the Baghdad Belt barrier, and cities

No change to other MNDs current mission set
Concept Sketch
Phase III: Declared Cease Fire

- DCF (Request for Support)
  - Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River (reduced commitment)
  - Disrupt VBIED networks and accelerating sectarian tension

- MNEA
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
  - Enhance legitimacy and capability of the IEF

Other MNEs
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Enhance legitimacy and capability of the IEF
Concept Sketch
Phase IV: Exploitation and Transition

DCO1 (Request for Support)
T: Conduct strike operations (reduced commitment)
P: Disrupt VBIED networks
accelerating sectarian tension

AU/MNO:
T1: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
T2: Conduct strike ops
P1: Enhance legitimacy and capability of the ISF
P2: Disrupt EFP and VBIED networks

FIBOTE (no changes)
T: Conduct strike operations ICW ISOF
P: Disrupt EFP and VBIED networks
in focus areas w/ the Baghdad Belt
barrier, and city
Options / Considerations

- Partnership Ratio
  - 1 x U.S. Company partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier
  - 1 x U.S. Battalion partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier
  - 1 U.S. Company partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier; 2 U.S. Strike Bns – 1 on each side of the Tigris River
- Border Operations
  - No shaping operation on the border
  - 1 x U.S. Battalion (Stryker) committed to border operations in Wasit Province
  - Lighter force committed to border operations in Wasit Province
- Boundary Change
  - Expansion of MND-B AO to the north, to include Baqubah and perhaps Balad
- “Hot-seating” equipment to sustain the surge
Options to Generate Additional Maneuver Capability

- Potential Maneuver Capabilities

  1.4a, 1.4g

- Issues
  - Basing
  - Sustainment
  - TPE sets (APS-3/5 ?)
  - Crew
  - Heavy Machine Guns
  - BFT/FBCB2/Comms
  - Strategic transportation
  - Intra-Theater transportation
MNF-I Reinforcing Effects

- Gaining GOI concurrency with the operation
- Achieving agreement with the GOI on a legislative agenda addressing:
  - Militias
  - Reconciliation
  - Provincial elections
  - Ceasefire, followed by some form of disarmament policy
- Exploit the execution of Saddam as a springboard for reconciliation; mark the event with a GOI announcement on a new approach to de-Ba’athification
- Focusing TF I on VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
- Assisting with MOI reform and the continued development of the industry, agriculture, and health ministries
- Achieving agreement with GOI on the release of DFI Funds to Anbar and Tall Afar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis

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Risk

- Overplaying the importance of the operation from an IQ and PA perspective may lead to a quicker degradation of GOI and ISF legitimacy if it fails to visibly reduce sectarian violence.
- Escalation of U.S. involvement in kinetic operations will appear to contradict our stated intent to transition control to the Iraqis – even if that remains our ultimate objective.
- Collateral damage resulting from a surge in kinetic operations in urban areas may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunnis and Shia perceive CF and ISF operations as biased or unbalanced.
- The declaration of martial law may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunnis perceive a partial GOI as clamping down overbearing in Sunni areas.
- GOI interference may hamstring CF activity and result in the perception of an unbalanced operation.
- Manpower-intensive operation will limit CF operational and tactical flexibility (i.e. the ability to surge against cross-border activity).
- Failure to commit enough forces to the operation may result not only in a misuse of combat power but may also exacerbate sectarian tensions (i.e. declaring martial law without delivering on enhanced security).
Risk

- Imposition of martial law and tighter access controls may have a negative economic impact on certain communities and may also result in a more sustained disruption of basic needs.
- The escalation of kinetic operations may lead to negative global media coverage and result in the imposition of constraints.
- The escalation of ISF activity in and around Baghdad will expose these forces to more frequent attacks, perhaps resulting in the unstoppable disintegration of certain units.
- Interdiction of CF LOCs.
- Surge in CF activity may trigger a parallel surge in 14b, 14d.
Guidance
BACK-UP

UNCLASSIFIED
This slide depicts the areas that the MSCs will be conducting shaping operations and coordinating support for OCF-I targeted Ops.

**MND-N**

- In Bayji, which is quickly becoming a focal point in MND-N, the MSC has suffered a significant blow to its leadership picture as well. The normal composition of the Bayji MSC is 8 voting members (4 representatives from AAS and 4 representatives from AQIZ). Due to recent operations the leadership has been cut in half with 4 members KIA or detained. In lieu of pressure being put on the MSC’s, significant AQ figures are still active in the AO. Most notably is [1.4c] who has direct ties with AAM. Reporting indicates that [1.4c] operates mainly in the Tikrit River Valley (TRV) while making trips to Baghdad to meet with other senior AQ officials.

- In addition to significant pressure being put on AQ leadership, the identification of the financial networks in the MND has begun. With the recent success of the operation conducted on [1.4a] (Facility has ties to [b][c]), SSE includes 55 ledgers, 2 computers, and several other pieces of media. Translation of materials complete, exploitation now being conducted. Will take several months before anything is produced from this), CF is beginning to take a look at
how to influence and disrupt the financial network. The Bayji Oil Refinery particularly will be looked at due to the sheer amount of smuggling that goes on from that facility.

• CJSOTF

• MND-B
  • MND-B will look to increase offensive operations against Abu Nur and Azhar VBIED networks (Rusafa, New Baghdad, Karada, Doura, and Mansoor districts).
  • They will continue security operations and will conduct shaping operations in: The Shakariya triangle - YTPP.

• MNF-W
  • Out west, the focus remains Ramadi but they continue to apply pressure along the Hit- Haditha corridor. They will go into more detail on activities in their AO.
ISR Concept of Support

- ISR requirements increase in Baghdad to support offensive operations
  - Support shaping and decisive operations with ISR ISO operations to capture/kill T&FF and Extremist cells/leaders, locate weapons caches, and neutralize the IED networks.
  - Support CJSOTF operations focused on VBIED networks.
  - Provide ISE to DIV MITTs to provide intelligence in support of force protection and intelligence sharing (must be internally sourced).
  - Provide contingency support as required to unplanned events.

- Coordinate with MNF CM for ISR reprioritization and synchronization - Initial increase in effort toward target development

- No ISR assets in reserve
  - 1.4c posture focused on target development.
  - 1.4c capacity adequate to support CF operations; shift efforts to assist MITT and ISF operations.

Problem Set:
- AOI & TASS Sanctuary land/Air
- Iraqi Insurgency
- Sunni engagement
- IED fight
- Military
- Control of Iraq's Borders
ISR Concept of Support
MITT Teams: Intelligence Augmentation

Current Situation:

1.4c

Recommendation:
- Augment MITTs with an ISE (internally sourced by supporting Division/BCT)
- ISE will provide MITTs with force protection Intelligence
- ISE will provide MITT and intelligence sharing capability
- ISE will provide communication package and access to interpreter support
- Formalize intelligence training and standards: Develop Division C2/C2 METL and supporting tasks
Proposed Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, execute the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to ISSR.
Proposed Commander’s Intent

- Purpose
  - Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; isolate extremists
  - Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation

- Key Tasks
  - Conduct predominantly U.S.-led operations in the Baghdad belts and barrier, and against focused areas within the city itself.
  - Use a balanced approach in operations, targeting both Sunni and Shia extremists—particularly those involved in networks employing VBIEDs and EFPs respectively.
  - Maximize the "Iraqi face" on operations and exploit the information operations opportunity stemming from a surge in ISF activity.
  - ICW MNF-I, assist the GOI with the development of a substantial political package leading immediately to a cease fire and, ultimately, reconciliation.

- Endstate
  - Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF.
  - Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force.
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it.
  - Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire.
  - MOI reform underway; improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated.
  - Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy.
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation.
Considerations / Issues

- Consider the use of CJSOTF and OCF-I (as well as ISOF) as a shaping operation
- Role of police (secure)
- Develop an improvement package for DBE and POE forces as part of the Transition Bridging Strategy
- Role of National Police
- Develop options to sustain surge periods in focus areas (i.e. equipment-sharing)
Concept Sketch

- Sketch – a multi-divisional effort
- Include task and purpose for subordinate units
- Additional COAs?
  - Strike operations
  - Control with strike ops
  - Clear
  - Combined
- Possible focus areas
  - Southern Sunni Belt
  - Eastern Diyala (esp. Baqubah)
  - Southern Salah ad Din (esp. Taji and Balad)
  - Abu Ghraib
  - Selected areas in Baghdad
  - Others?
- Timeframe: 15 Jan – 15 Mar
Way Ahead

- XXX