# MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 08-01 (U)

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1. **(S//REL) Situation.** This order supersedes OPORD 07-01, 1 Jun 07, and serves as the overarching guidance for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) operations beginning 17 Dec 07. OPORD 08-01 provides the framework for a long-term campaign as well as more specific guidance to MNC-I’s subordinates for the next six to nine months.

   a. **(S//REL) “Bridging the Gap”**. The conflict in Iraq remains a communal struggle for power and survival, daunting in its complexity and array of destabilizing factors. Chief among these factors is violence of a kind and scale that has polarized the population along ethno-sectarian lines. Changes in the operational environment since the beginning of 2007 have led to marked improvements in security, but violence – though reduced – still occurs at unacceptably high levels. The nature of the violence has transformed to some degree, with the danger posed by Shia extremists becoming more pronounced compared to the receding (but still extant) terrorist threat from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The relative threat of intra-Shia competition to stability has grown as well. In contrast, infighting among Sunni Arabs has been more constructive as communities increasingly reject and oppose AQI. Though admittedly tenuous and far from permanent at this stage, localized security has emerged in places where Sunnis have found common cause with Coalition forces (CF) and the Government of Iraq (GOI) in the struggle against AQI. Despite fitful political progress, Iraq remains a fragile state. The government cannot fulfill its responsibilities to all Iraqis, and its legitimacy continues to be challenged. Thus, the “gap” between the GOI and its people persists. Many actors – both internal and external to Iraq – are exploiting the gap as they pursue their own interests. By improving Iraqi institutions, the GOI can bridge this gap and meet the needs and desires of its citizens. In the context of the communal struggle though, several Iraqi groups are competing for power and influence within the country’s political system as the GOI’s institutions mature. This internal competition is disruptive or destructive in many ways. Nevertheless, it is in the Coalition’s best interest for legitimate and capable political, security, legal, and economic institutions to “bridge the gap.” Rather than rely indefinitely on extensive Coalition support, the GOI must become and be seen as the protector of its people and the guarantor of their basic needs. Security gains have generated momentum toward this end. Momentum continues to build, allowing for a deliberate reduction of CF in some areas and the corresponding transfer of security responsibilities to capable ISF. As part of a larger effort, MNC-I will help the GOI capitalize on the opportunity that the improved security situation offers by working to preserve and expand upon the progress made thus far.

   b. **(U) Assumptions.** This campaign plan is based upon the following assumptions:

      1. **(S//REL) External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraqi sovereignty.**

      2. **(S//REL) Absent external influences, the GOI will continue its sectarian behavior at levels that destabilize Iraq; however, local political accommodations and a baseline of security will help reduce sectarianism.**

      3. **(S//REL) The Coalition will be able to alter the behavior of the GOI by capitalizing on local initiatives through the application of incentives and disincentives.**
(4) (S//REL) The U.S. Government (USG) will continue to support the current GOI.

(5) (S//REL) The GOI will desire a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and thus will continue to accept the presence of CF in Iraq for several years; this acceptance will be contingent on the Coalition’s acknowledgement and support of increasing Iraqi sovereignty.

(6) (S//REL) The GOI will make halting progress toward national reconciliation as different sects and factions continue to compete for power.

(7) (S//REL) Throughout 2008, CF will operate under a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that preserves the authorities necessary to accomplish key Coalition goals.

(8) (S//REL) Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) agreements will grant CF the freedom of action necessary to accomplish key Coalition goals.

(9) (S//REL) Provincial elections will occur no earlier than summer 2008.

(10) (S//REL) With Coalition help, ISF capacity will mature sufficiently to maintain adequate security as CF draw down gradually and by area.

(11) (S//REL) Any U.S. force reductions beyond the planned withdrawal of the “surge” units will be deliberate and conditions-based, allowing CF missions to shift gradually to overwatch.

(12) (S//REL) MNF-I will be able to maintain ten to fifteen U.S. BCTs in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) at least until summer 2009.

(13) (S//REL) A long-term strategic partnership between the USG and GOI will involve the presence of at least five U.S. BCTs on Iraqi soil for a period of five to ten additional years.

(14) (S//REL) The U.S. Army will maintain three division headquarters in the ITO through summer 2009.

(15) (S//REL) MARCENT will provide a MEF (Fwd) (including a two-star headquarters) in the ITO through 2009.

(16) (S//REL) OCF-I operations will continue through 2009 against AQ/AQI.

(17) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP will retain the equivalent of one Special Forces Group in the ITO through 2009.

(18) (S//REL) The UK will maintain a brigade-sized force of approximately 2,500 or greater, with a two-star headquarters in southern Iraq at least through 2008.
(19) (S//REL) Poland will maintain a force of approximately 900, with a two-star headquarters in Qadisiyah Province through Nov 08.

(20) (S//REL) MND-NE headquarters will remain in the ITO at least through 2008.

(21) (S//REL) Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition through Jan 09.

(22) (S//REL) USM-I will continue its efforts to fully man PRTs and Embedded PRTs, reaching a level of thirteen and fifteen respectively by Jul 08 and sustaining those numbers through at least summer 2009.

(23) (S//REL) Private security companies will retain the authorities to operate in Iraq, but there will be additional coordination mechanisms and oversight.

(24) (S//REL) The Coalition will occupy existing bases in the ITO and will not establish new ones.

c. (S//REL) Threat Situation. The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: terrorism and insurgency – which are diminishing; counter-occupation – which is an implicit cultural norm and therefore diminishing more slowly; and the communal struggle for power and survival – which is shifting from occurring primarily between sects to increasingly taking place within them. These interacting conflicts are set in the context of a fragile state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

(1) (S//REL) The communal struggle for power and survival is the fundamental threat to security and stability in Iraq. Although violence between sects has diminished, tensions remain, and the political competition will continue. Kurdish and Arab tensions are also escalating, especially in the north. The struggle is increasingly occurring within the various ethno-sectarian groups. Sunni tribal elements, former insurgents, and local citizens turning against AQI are the participants of the intra-Sunni conflict. The primary intra-Shia competition is between ISCI/Badr and its historical rival OMS/JAM. Intra-Shia conflict is also occurring within JAM. Special Group elements have split from JAM to form the Iraqi National Gathering, an organization that has stated it will adhere to Sadiq al-Sadr’s principles, remain anti-occupation, and will no longer follow Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS). This organization is not adhering to MAS’ freeze order and, like the Special Groups still loyal to MAS and led by Ahmed al-Sheybani, remains a credible threat to CF and the stability and security of Iraq.

(2) (S//REL) Terrorism in Iraq is linked to AQ’s global jihad that seeks to create a virtual caliphate. Over the past year, however, AQ reduced its support for AQI. This reduction in support has manifested itself in both reduced funding for AQI and reduced foreign-fighter flow. The terrorist organizations that remain a threat in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of AQI and the hard-line remnants of Ansar Al Islam (AAI). Sunni Extremists’ brutal and excessive tactics have drastically eroded their popular support base and caused an exodus of Iraqi members. The Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Rejectionist objective of reestablishing a Sunni-dominated GOI that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.
(3) (S//REL) The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Rejectionist movement aimed at regaining power and influence. The principal Sunni Rejectionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, Iraqi Hamas, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of AAI. These groups have failed to produce any tangible results, and their members have an increasing array of other options for inclusion, representation, and security. Many Rejectionists are turning away from armed insurgency and joining Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) groups, neighborhood watches, and tribal movements.

(4) (S//REL) Counter-occupation is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to support – at least passively – attacks against CF and contributes to the vulnerability of Iraqi youth to recruitment by more violent elements. Counter-occupation sentiment has reduced now that the population has learned that Muslim extremists conduct the most heinous crimes, not occupation forces.

(5) (S//REL) Criminal activities pose a significant threat to security and stability in Iraq. The principal threat comes from institutional corruption at all levels of the GOI and significant regional and local organized crime.

(6) (S//REL) The GOI is a fragile state with limited capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts. It is slowly developing the governmental, ministerial, and security capacity it requires to deal with the various threats.

d. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) Higher Headquarters. (Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)).

(a) (S//REL) Mission. The Coalition, in partnership with the GOI, employs integrated political, security, economic, and diplomatic means to, beginning in Dec 07:

- Transition from surge operations
- Maintain security in order to transition from lead to partner to overwatch
- Transfer responsibility for population security to the ISF
- Pursue establishment of a long-term strategic partnership based on a reduced and sustainable CF presence
- Continue to support political and economic development

In order to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

(b) (U) Intent.

1. (S//REL) Purpose. To help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.
2. (S//REL) Method. The Coalition will continue to promote political accommodation between the competing factions of the Iraqi population while simultaneously focusing, with our Iraqi counterparts, on the defeat of the extremist enemies of the GOI. The Coalition will employ an integrated engagement approach, combining persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means to help the GOI move the various key actors toward political accommodation and reconciliation. The Coalition strategy will focus on establishing a baseline of security for the people and create an environment conducive to political and economic progress leading to reconciliation. As GOI capabilities increase and conditions improve, the Coalition will play a decreasing role and security responsibilities will be transitioned to an Iraqi lead. It will be essential to ensure there is no degradation in the security situation during this transition. Authorities for Coalition operations, currently embodied in UNSCRs, will eventually transition to multi-faceted, long-term strategic partnerships between the GOI and various Coalition nations. The UNSCR for 2008 will be the last under the provisions of Chapter 7, though a subsequent UNSCR not under Chapter 7 is possible.

3. (U) End State. See “Campaign Goals” below.

(c) (S//REL) Lines of Operation (LOO) and Their Integration. The Coalition’s strategy through Jun 09 continues to be built on four integrated lines of operation: Political, Security, Economic, and Diplomatic, with the political line as the main effort. These are supported by efforts to build governmental capacity, promote good governance, communicate strategically, develop the rule of law, and bring about reconciliation between competing actors. A key aspect of this strategy is the deliberate integration of these efforts to achieve both near- and intermediate-term campaign goals.

1. (S//REL) Political LOO. The political LOO, executed by all components of the Coalition, uniformed and civilian, moves the GOI and Iraq’s communities toward political accommodation based upon a foundation of security and a growing web of economic, informational, and diplomatic support, while simultaneously improving governmental performance, advancing the rule of law, and working to isolate irreconcilable and criminal elements. The political LOO will focus on ensuring the functionality of the inclusive, high-level political process embodied in the “3+1” (President and Vice President plus the Prime Minister) process currently being used by the GOI. Based on priorities set by the USG, the political LOO will also focus on supporting the “3+1” process and any other influence points to achieve a Strategic Partnership Declaration, the 2008 budget, and benchmark legislation. In addition, the political LOO will work to ensure that national-level reconciliation initiatives are linked to local reconciliation progress. The goal is confidence of the Iraqi people in both the political process and in their local, provincial, regional (where appropriate), and national governments.

2. (S//REL) Security, Economic, and Diplomatic LOOs and Supporting Activities. The other LOOs and supporting activities are integrated with the political effort and all work, directly and indirectly, toward helping the Iraqis achieve political accommodation. The security line supports political accommodation through maintaining and expanding the established baseline foundation of security, which centers on protecting the population in order to enable political engagement through confidence and mutual trust. Securing improvements must be maintained, even as the ISF take the lead in maintaining security and as the Coalition
redeploys some military forces. The economic LOO strives to generate support for political accommodation, but initially focuses on activities that reinforce security progress, particularly focusing on providing sustainable employment opportunities in areas where security is improving and political accommodation is attainable. Economic activities concentrate on budget execution and include short-term and long-term reconstruction and employment initiatives, government performance improvements, private sector development, and capacity building both in key ministries and in provincial and local governments. The diplomatic LOO supports political accommodation through engagement with countries in the region and the broader international community to provide an environment to support and further internal reconciliation efforts. Major focal points must include reducing malign foreign influence and increasing international participation in the physical, societal, and political reconstruction of Iraq. Diplomatic efforts will also be crucial to extending UNSCR operating authorities and negotiating a long-term strategic partnership after the final UNSCR expires. Strategic communication, support for establishment of Iraqi rule-of-law structures, and focused engagement efforts are integrated into all LOOs and are key to overall success.

(d) (U) Campaign Goals.

1. (S//REL) Near-Term Goals (through Jul 08). A baseline of security maintained locally (i.e., irreconcilable armed groups rendered less effective, large-scale sectarian violence reduced) to allow for broad engagement leading to political accommodations and transition from lead to partner to overwatch; foundations for continuous, self-sustaining economic growth and political development established; formal and informal progress on localized political accommodations that is complemented regionally and nationally; security responsibilities transferred to ISF as local conditions permit, with remaining CF in appropriate lead, partner, or overwatch posture; Coalition surge forces and as many enablers and other elements as possible redeployed; new UNSCR passed; U.S. and Coalition partners pursuing a long-term strategic partnership.

2. (S//REL) Intermediate-Term Goals (through Jun 09). Sustainable security achieved nationwide with Iraqis in the lead and CF in overwatch posture; self-sustaining political and economic development established; transition from UNSCR to non-Chapter 7 resolution or long-term strategic partnership completed; size of U.S. force deployed to Iraq reduced in accordance with decisions made in Mar 08 and at subsequent decision points; AQI neutralized, sectarian influences reduced, and militias diminished; sufficient governmental capacity to provide basic services established to generate public confidence in the GOI; broad public confidence in the GOI taking root.

3. (S//REL) End State. A stable Iraq: sustained by a developing economy; committed to participatory governance under the rule of law and maintaining civil order; denied as a safe haven for extremists; integrated into the regional and international communities; engaged in a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and other Coalition partners and on the road to becoming an effective ally in the War on Terror, and characterized by prosperity, enhanced rule of law, developed security forces and supporting institutions, and fully functioning political and government structures.
(2) (U) Adjacent Units.

(a) (U) Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). IGFC provides operational command and control of the Iraqi Army (IA). It is an independent headquarters that partners with MNC-I. IGFC exercises control over eight IA divisions and will likely assume control of two more (12 IA and 14 IA) in the near future. IGFC also exercises control over four operational commands, located in Karbala, Samarra, Basra, and Diyala. Two additional commands – one in Anbar and one in Ninewa – will be established by summer 2008. Operational commands are viewed as an interim step on the way to establishing multiple corps headquarters for the IA.

(b) (U) Baghdad Operational Command (BOC). The BOC derives its authorities from a Prime Minister (PM) directive, dated 13 Feb 07. The directive appointed a commander who exercises operational control over all Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces in the Baghdad area. Currently, these forces consist of: 6 IA, 9 IA, and 11 IA, the 1st and 2d National Police Divisions, as well as many other MOI forces. The BOC’s mission is to conduct security operations within the ten urban security districts and the rural security districts in Baghdad Province in concert with CF. It is anticipated that the BOC will expand its AO to secure strategic energy infrastructure near Baghdad and to bring areas in the Baghdad Belts under greater ISF control. Thus, between July and December 2008, the BOC will adjust its boundaries to match the boundaries of Baghdad Province. The BOC receives its formal direction through a Crisis Cell chaired by the PM and comprised of the National Security Advisor, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the respective commanders of MNF-I, MNC-I, and the BOC. In practice, the BOC has taken orders directly from MOD, the National Security Advisor, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, and sometimes MOI. The BOC’s authority over its subordinate units is limited to operational control. MOI and MOD retain administrative control of their respective units. A BOC-MNC-I memorandum of understanding establishes MNC-I’s partnership with the BOC. This is accomplished through the BOC Advisory Team (BOCAT), overseen by one of the Deputy Commanding Generals of MNC-I. The BOCAT consists of officers from MNF-I and MNC-I, along with liaison officers from MND-B and MND-C. The BOCAT works to ensure the success of all operations that the BOC undertakes and does so by coaching and coordinating with the BOC commander and his staff. Senior leaders in each of the MNDs involved with BOC operations have also played a key role through their engagement with the leadership of the BOC and its subordinate area commands in Karkh and Rusafa.

(c) (S//REL) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Assists and, when necessary to protect the Iraqi population, enables the MOI and MOD to perform key civilian and military force management functions, in order to improve ISF capability in the near term and contribute to a baseline of security by summer 2008. Simultaneously, MNSTC-I assists the MOI and MOD to improve their institutional performance to assume self-management of the ISF by summer 2009, leading to operational independence by summer 2010 and an end state of security self-reliance. The purpose of MNSTC-I efforts from now through 1 Apr 08 is to help the MOI and MOD increase the capability of extant ISF units, generate new units, and help GOI security institutions develop institutional performance in the process, so that the ISF can increasingly conduct independent operations, or lead operations with Coalition support, in order to help achieve a baseline of security in summer 2008. [MNSTC-I OPORD 07-1, 1 Oct 07]
(d) (S//REL) TF 4-1a Conducts detainee operations by exercising command and control over Coalition detention, interrogation, and legal referral operations above division level, and coordinating detainee operations between GOI, Department of Defense (DoD), CF, Department of State (DoS), interagency organizations, and non-governmental human rights organizations.

(e) (S//REL) Gulf Region Division. Assists in the reconstruction of Iraq by providing engineering services to MNF-I and the GOI in order to rebuild critical infrastructure and provide essential services throughout the ITO.

(f) (S//REL) OCF-I. In partnership with the GOI and other U.S. agencies, OCF-I is principally responsible for targeting AQI.

2. (S//REL) Mission. MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat AQI and other extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and, as local conditions permit, transfer security responsibilities to the ISF in order to achieve irreversible momentum by late summer 2008, leading to sustainable security and, in the longer term, Iraqi self-reliance.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Commander’s Intent.

(1) (S//REL) Purpose.

• The conflict in Iraq is a communal struggle for power and survival. We must focus our efforts on reducing the severity and violent nature of this struggle. This requires an understanding of the interrelated factors that perpetuate it and the likely effects of our lethal and non-lethal actions. Commanders must thoroughly understand the complex dynamics at work in their AOs and recognize how they affect (and are affected by) the diverse conditions existing elsewhere. Our understanding of the conflict will be the primary driver of our operations.
• My intent is to achieve irreversible momentum towards sustainable security in Iraq. By late summer 2008, we will generate an environment in which the Iraqi people feel safer; have greater access to opportunities; feel more empowered; and increasingly come to rely on Iraqi institutions to fulfill their basic needs.
• We will seek this goal in the near-term by: protecting the population; reducing accelerants to violence; building the capacity of professional ISF; brokering local accommodations; facilitating reconciliation; encouraging broader participation in decision-making; promoting police primacy; facilitating equitable distribution of resources; promoting access to justice for all; fostering an environment for economic development; creating jobs; and facilitating the delivery of public services.
• Iraq still requires substantial Coalition assistance, but its leaders increasingly assert Iraqi sovereignty. As security and stability improve, we will modify our
TTPs to accommodate Iraq’s aspirations. In all cases, we will treat Iraqis with respect and work with them in the spirit of partnership. This partnership extends beyond the military dimension. It involves cultivating the active support of the people and strengthening their commitment to Iraqi institutions. CLCs serve as one example. They temporarily meet a need for security at the local level and become vehicles for reconciliation with their subsequent integration into the ISF or other forms of public service.

- Sustainable security requires a purposeful effort to transfer security responsibility to the ISF. We will do so as local conditions permit and in conjunction with a gradual, measured reduction of CF. We will transition deliberately by area and on a unit-by-unit basis, companies at a time if necessary.
- Much of our success hinges on the choices that Iraqis make and on the perceptions that shape those choices. Carefully considered information operations must support everything we do.

(2) (U) Key Tasks.

(a) (S//REL) Protect the population, with priority to Baghdad and then the nine key cities; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and obtain the active support of the people; work to solidify these gains at the local level as security responsibilities transition deliberately to a more capable, credible ISF.

(b) (S//REL) Facilitate reconciliation among major ethnic, religious, and political factions vying for power in Iraq; use persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means of engagement to separate reconcilable groups from the irreconcilable and to broker local ceasefires, political compromises, and agreements that integrate CLCs into formal GOI structures; combine local successes into broader opportunities and use these as a basis for bringing about longer lasting political and social stability.

(c) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and extremists; kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development.

(d) (S//REL) Develop ISF capacity through partnership, transition teams, and advisory/assistance units; work to make the IA and NP more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders; promote police primacy through the development of sustainable, competent, non-sectarian local police forces.

(e) (S//REL) Transfer security responsibility to capable, credible ISF units as local conditions permit; manage the risk of regression through a deliberate, area-by-area transition that maintains appropriate CF overwatch posture; in areas that progress to overwatch, adapt collection strategies that preserve situational awareness and help identify emerging threats to stability.
(f) (S//REL) Assist efforts to improve civil and governmental capacity, with a special focus on essential services; continue to build capacity that enables accountable local governance, rule of law, and sustainable economic development; deepen our understanding of Iraqi systems, processes, and perspectives, particularly as they relate to money and how it is allocated and spent; promote legitimate, non-sectarian behavior among Iraqi officials; along these lines, support efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry operations through Coalition oversight and an emphasis on enforcing GOI regulations.

(g) (S//REL) Protect the force through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against IED and indirect-fire networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats.

3) (S//REL) Near-Term and Long-Term Goals. In the near term (late summer 2008), irreversible momentum towards sustainable security is achieved; the population is protected, at a level sufficient to allow for continuing political accommodation and economic development, with priority to Baghdad and then the nine key cities; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. GOI efforts to reach political accommodation throughout the country begin to bear fruit and advance the process of reconciliation. Transfer of security responsibilities is well underway, with capable, credible ISF units increasingly in the lead. CF maintain a presence among the population in several places but have assumed overwatch elsewhere based on conditions. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent Iraqi or Coalition force pressure. Their freedom of action is limited, and their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation and sustainable economic development. In the long term (two to five years), Iraq is self-reliant and stable, with fully developed security forces and supporting institutions, fully functioning political and governmental structures, and a developing economy. The country is committed to participatory governance based on the rule of law, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

b. (U) Concept of Operations.

1) (U) Key Judgments.

(a) (S//REL) Despite improvements in the security situation, many threats to Iraq’s stability remain. The effects of past ethno-sectarian violence linger, making compromise and reconciliation difficult. In numerous places, CLC initiatives have had a significant, welcome impact. They illustrate the potential of so-called “bottom-up reconciliation” should the GOI respond in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, CLCs are not sustainable as a mechanism for local security. If they are not integrated into the ISF or transferred to other longer-term jobs in the public or private sector, CLCs – former Sunni belligerents and their sympathizers, especially – could conceivably take up arms against CF and the GOI. Reconciliation is an Iraqi choice. Although MNC-I facilitates the process by helping to strengthen linkages between the different levels of government, ultimate success in this area depends on the Iraqis. We can point to a few
examples of positive steps, but – by and large – GOI progress in advancing national reconciliation has been disappointing. Iraq is a fragile state and will remain so for years. The Shia-dominated central government and its ministries are marred by institutional corruption and chronic incapacity. Generally speaking, leaders in the GOI have shown an unwillingness to reach out to Sunni communities in ways that would enhance the national government’s legitimacy. At worst, they have demonstrated malign intent. In any case, the GOI’s failure to meet the people’s basic needs has led to resentment that will not easily be forgotten. Moreover, and organized crime continue to pose threats to stability over the long term, undermining the rule of law, the reliability of Iraq’s security apparatus, and the political process. The challenges facing Iraqis are daunting indeed, and they extend far beyond security-related matters.

(b) (S//REL) Although the overall outlook is grim, the Coalition and its Iraqi partners have made crucial security gains. Most significantly, there has been a marked reduction in violence. We attribute this to a number of interrelated factors. The surge enabled CF to place a renewed emphasis on population security and extend sustained operations into areas that had long been extremist sanctuaries. Second, ISF capability grew in terms of quality and quantity. There remains much to be done before most units are able to plan and conduct independent operations on a routine basis, but the ISF is better postured than before to accept security responsibility from the Coalition. Finally, Iraqis have made momentous choices – some as a consequence of the surge, some apart from it. Many Sunni communities have rejected AQI, and localized security has emerged where they have taken up arms alongside CF and the GOI against this common enemy. A similar dynamic has begun to develop among the Shia. Efforts to persuade Shia communities to distance themselves from extremists of their own sect are showing some promise. Concern among both Sunni and Shia regarding 14b, 14d in the long term may also serve as a lever applied toward accommodation. In the context of an ongoing communal struggle, these encouraging Iraqi choices reflect not an ideological shift but a shift based on a realistic appraisal of how best to preserve, gain, or consolidate political power and control of resources. Thus, we should not inflate the impact of the “surge.” Security progress by itself will not bring the struggle to an end any sooner.

(c) (S//REL) The combined efforts of the Coalition and the GOI have achieved momentum, characterized by an increasingly secure environment and a more capable ISF. The GOI must capitalize on this opportunity to preserve and further the progress made thus far in order to make lasting strategic gains. To help sustain the momentum, MNC-I continues to protect the population and reduce the extremist threat, and it supports the ISF as they assume a larger share of these tasks. Along these lines, the corps maintains its current effort to develop the ISF in order to enable the transfer of security responsibilities and mitigate the risks involved. MNC-I also facilitates reconciliation, conducting engagement to bring about local ceasefires and expanding such temporary, limited gains through engagement at the operational level. Finally, MNC-I assists with a broader Coalition effort to improve governmental performance and economic development, with the corps focusing on the local and provincial levels. Much of the Coalition’s strategic success will depend on the choices Iraqis make, and the choices that contribute to the accomplishment of our near-term and long-term goals will be mainly political – rather than military – in nature. Lasting success will require: strategic engagement with the GOI and regional state actors; sufficient GOI support of the Coalition’s efforts; a substantial
improvement in GOI ministerial capacity; aggressive GOI action against Shia extremists and proxies operating in Iraq; and a basic willingness on the part of the GOI and key Iraqi actors to reconcile and work peacefully towards a fair, functional power-sharing agreement.

- The gap between the GOI and its people remains but has closed somewhat
- A communal struggle continues, involving those seeking to exploit the gap as well as those competing for a stake in the new Iraq
- The GOI can bridge the gap and meet the needs and desires of its people by improving Iraqi institutions

**The Iraqi Individual**
- Needs and desires
  - Physical security
  - Hope for a better life
  - GOL improvements
  - Essential services
  - Dignified job
  - Justice under the rule of law
  - Respect for tribe & religion
  - Political representation
- Improved security
- CLC integration

**The Gap (still exists)**
- KDP & PUK
- SAI
- BP
- ISCU/Badr
- Tribes
- Fadhila
- Dawas
- OMS/JAM

**Struggling for a stake**
- Security
- Political
- Legal
- Economic

**Coalition**
- A fragile state that must improve:
  - Capacity of most basic needs (security, services)
  - Willingness to reconcile
  - Minimal accountability
  - Political representation
  - Perception from Shia-biased to a ruling body seen as advancing the interests of all Iraqis

**Exploiting the gap**
- Shia extremists
- Sunni rejectionists
- Organized crime
- AGIF & AAI
- 1.4b, 1.4d

Figure 1, (S//REL) Bridging the Gap – The Problem Set (Dec 07)

(d) (S//REL) Security progress has generated momentum. The reasons for this momentum suggest what might make it irreversible. If building momentum involves continued progress, then irreversible momentum in Iraq is achieved when Iraqi institutions can preserve that progress and expand upon it with gradually diminishing Coalition support. MNC-I seeks to realize this near-term goal by late summer 2008. Once we cross this threshold, the force of our momentum will be strong enough to withstand any likely setback and thus maintain movement on the way to accomplishing longer-term goals. Conceptually, when irreversible momentum is achieved, the operational environment contains no threat capable of derailing progress in the foreseeable future. In the context of MNC-I’s plan, irreversible momentum enables continued advancement toward sustainable security, a point when security can be maintained over time through Iraqi institutions with reduced Coalition involvement. We can assess the achievement of irreversible momentum through a set of loosely defined conditions based on trends related to the choices Iraqis make. These key conditions and trends are identified below, with further elaboration in the operational framework. Generally speaking, they reflect a steady “bridging of the gap” with Iraqi institutions – be they political, security, legal, or economic. The people’s confidence in Iraqi institutions must be seen as growing. If this basic indicator is not apparent by summer 2008, irreversible momentum will not have been achieved. Without the increasing capacity of Iraqi institutions coupled with rising public confidence in those institutions, there is
no real basis to claim that the Iraqis can preserve and expand the gains made thus far – especially given the possibility of further CF reductions.

1. (S//REL) In the area of security, we want the population secured to the point where political accommodation and economic development can continue. The level of ethno-sectarian violence should be unable to derail political progress. Established ceasefires should be holding, maintained in part by confidence-building measures resulting from GOI outreach to local groups. As the GOI takes meaningful steps to reconcile with local communities regardless of sect or ethnicity, momentum will build – approaching the point where it will be difficult to reverse. Complementing these trends should be a growing rejection of AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists. There is much middle ground between the two choices of supporting extremists and supporting the GOI, and, in reality, people will not choose one over the other outright. However, we should observe trends indicating an increased commitment to the GOI along with a parallel rise in the rejection of extremists. The former will be much more difficult to realize, but, without both, achieving irreversible momentum toward sustainable security is highly unlikely.

2. (S//REL) We want ISF capacity enhanced to the point where the deliberate transfer of security responsibilities can continue. ISF should be assuming the lead in some areas, with a minimal impact on population security and quality of life. This requires a sufficient quantity of ISF units that are adequately trained, equipped, sustained, and led. Improving capability of the ISF should be matched by a rise in their credibility as the people choose to increasingly rely on them – rather than militias – for their security. We should also observe positive trends related to the CLCs, showing either their continued integration into the ISF or their transition into sustainable non-security-related jobs in the public or private sector.

3. (S//REL) We want governmental capacity at the local and provincial levels enhanced, such that security progress is reinforced. Achieving irreversible momentum requires making advances toward political and social stability. One of the consequences of improved security should be a corresponding rise in the government’s ability to manage and distribute resources effectively and to provide direction and control for society in a manner consistent with the rule of law. Essential services should be improving and be provided increasingly on an equitable basis. Likewise, local and provincial governments should be developing into more representative institutions, and public confidence in those institutions should be growing. Iraqi judicial and investigative processes should be improving as well. In sum, we should observe Iraqis choosing the political process over the “rule of the gun.”

4. (S//REL) We want to establish a foundation for economic development at the local and provincial levels, such that security progress is reinforced. In the near term, we should observe Iraqis choosing options that improve their quality of life and demonstrate a willingness to invest in the future. Indications suggesting that the people are concerned only with day-to-day survival should become less apparent. Conversely, legitimate economic activity should increase, and employment opportunities in the public and private sectors should grow. The continuance of this trend will not only foster a self-sustaining economy but will also help to solidify security gains in the near term.
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(e) (S/REL) MNC-I maintains similar near-term goals, but changes in the operational environment will cause us to alter the way we pursue them (in some cases, they have already done so). There are several aspects to the changing dynamic of our operations.

1. (S/REL) Beginning in Dec 07, CF in Iraq will gradually decrease from a level of twenty U.S. BCTs to fifteen by the end of Jul 08. In the same period, we will likely see significant force reductions from other members of the Coalition, such as the United Kingdom, Korea, Poland, Australia, and potentially Georgia.

2. (S/REL) Since the beginning of 2007, protecting the population has been the number one priority of the corps. CF have expended their greatest level of effort in line with this priority. With the imminent BCT reductions, responsibility for executing the task of population security will increasingly shift to capable, credible ISF.

3. (S/REL) Due to the success of our engagement efforts and the encouraging prospects they still hold, facilitating reconciliation will increase in importance as a key task – as will the level of effort we devote to it. In part, the significance of our efforts along these lines stems from the growing prominence of the intra-sectarian dimension of the struggle. MNC-I seeks to exploit the widening rift between extremists and Iraq’s major Arab communities – whether Sunni or Shia. This requires a more nuanced approach than before, particularly in the Shia case. We want to broker local ceasefires and coordinate local security arrangements, reconciling with former belligerents if such a course has the potential to lead to political accommodation with the GOI. We must link the application of military force to our engagement efforts, using the threat of force to support negotiations if necessary.

4. (S/REL) Defeating AQI and other extremists remains important as a key task, but the level of effort MNC-I commits to it is declining. One reason for this change has to do with our successful lethal efforts during the past several months. Simply put, there are fewer remaining targets. Another reason is closely related to our increased emphasis on facilitating reconciliation. This drives us to be more circumspect in our targeting and should lead to more restrictive target lists.

5. (S/REL) Since early 2007, the level of effort devoted to developing ISF capability has increased with the number of U.S. BCTs available for partnership. As CF draw down, the level of effort will remain high – with units focusing more on preparing the ISF for independent operations and assisting them as they shoulder more and more of the local security burden. Achieving sustainable security requires this transition. When conditions allow, we must make a purposeful effort to transfer security responsibility to the Iraqis. Doing this sooner rather than later will provide opportunities for us to validate the ISF’s capacity for independent operations while adequate CF are available to respond in the event of crises.

6. (S/REL) Assisting with efforts to improve civil and governmental capacity will slightly increase in importance, particularly as the security environment improves. We anticipate that this change in emphasis will become more pronounced beyond the near term – that is, after MNC-I achieves irreversible momentum. The greater level of effort applied to this key task will probably not involve a larger troop commitment. Instead, it will likely come
through additional senior leader attention and a more prominent role for the PRTs and Embedded PRTs, whose numbers will remain relatively constant as U.S. BCTs decrease.

7. (S//REL) MNC-I’s area of responsibility consists of multiple regions, each with its own problem sets. Adding to the complexity, the diverse conditions throughout the country do not exist in isolation but are interrelated and, of course, change over time. As the resources available to the Coalition gradually diminish, the imperative to employ them judiciously increases. In part, this will take an enhanced level of situational understanding and a more sophisticated appreciation for the political, social, and economic factors that influence the environment. This detailed situational understanding is sharpest at the lower levels. It must be communicated to higher echelons – including the corps – to ensure unity of effort, to better align resource allocation with changing priorities, and to help build “connections” between the provinces and the national government.

Figure 2. (S//REL) Changing Dynamics, Changing Emphasis

(2) (S//REL) General Scheme of Maneuver: A key feature of MNC-I operations between now and summer 2008 is the gradual reduction of U.S. BCTs from twenty to fifteen. This drawdown will necessarily correspond with a transfer of security responsibility to ISF, especially in those areas facing the loss of Coalition combat power. The general scheme of the
reduction follows. The details of its implementation will be provided through fragmentary orders.

(a) (S//REL) With the redeployment of 3/1 CAV in early Dec 07, the number of U.S. BCTs in Iraq dropped to nineteen. This unit’s departure without backfill resulted in 4/2 ID (Stryker) expanding its operational environment from a portion of the Northern Baghdad Belts to assume Diyala Province in its entirety. MND-N allocated its forces so as to maintain roughly the same number of combat battalions in Diyala despite the loss of 3/1 CAV. In Jan 08, 2/25 ID (Stryker) will conduct a relief-in-place with 1/1 CAV. Because of the SBCT’s additional infantry battalion, this will serve to mitigate risk in the Northern Baghdad Belts even further. A boundary change that shifts responsibility for the Tarmiya area from MND-N to MND-B will also help along these lines.

(b) (S//REL) The Jan 08 boundary change also affects the employment of 3/4 ID when it arrives to backfill 2/1 CAV. Rather than relieve 2/1 CAV in place, 3/4 ID will assume control of MND-B’s newly-acquired operational environment in the vicinity of Husseniyah and southern Khan Bani Sad. For its part, 2/1 CAV will formally pass security responsibility for the International Zone (IZ) to the Joint Area Support Group (JASG) and the remainder of Karkh Security District to 2/101 AASLT, which will expand its operational environment. By increasing the role of the JASG in IZ security, the Coalition will offset – at least partially – the loss of one BCT headquarters.

(c) (S//REL) In Mar 08, 2/82 ABN will redeploy from Baghdad without backfill. Expanding its operational environment south from Husseniyah, 3/4 ID conducts a relief-in-place with 2/82 ABN and assumes responsibility for Sadr City and Adhamiyah Security Districts.

(d) (S//REL) In Apr 08, 1/3 ID will redeploy from the Ramadi area without backfill. The Coalition will assume additional risk in Anbar Province with the departure of two USMC rifle battalions approximately one month later. MNF-W mitigates the risk brought on by CF reductions mainly through transferring security responsibility to capable, credible ISF. The deployment of one non-standard BDE headquarters to Anbar in Apr 08 will help offset this risk as well. The essential task of this headquarters element will be to command Camp Ramadi. It will also work in conjunction with an Embedded PRT to improve governance and economic development at the local level, particularly in Ramadi.

(e) (S//REL) In Jun 08, 4/2 ID (Stryker) will redeploy without backfill, causing MNC-I to transfer OPCON of 2 CR (Stryker) from MND-B to MND-N. 2 CR will move to Diyala Province and conduct a relief-in-place with 4/2 ID. This loss of combat power in Baghdad will result in a realignment of U.S. battalions in the security districts and the likely transfer of security responsibility to ISF.

(f) (S//REL) In Jul 08, the last “surge BCT” – 2/3 ID – will redeploy without backfill, thus reducing the number of U.S. BCTs in MND-C from four to three and bringing the total number in Iraq to fifteen. The departure of 2/3 ID from the Southern Baghdad Belts will result in a further decrease of Coalition combat power in the security districts as well. Two battalions organic to 2/3 ID have been OPCON to MND-B since Jun 07. These will leave in
conjunction with their parent unit and not be backfilled. To help offset the loss of this BCT, MNC-I has requested one non-standard BDE headquarters to backfill the U.S. Fires BDE headquarters now based in Camp Delta. If the pending request for forces is approved, this headquarters element will conduct engagement and work in conjunction with an Embedded PRT to improve governance and economic development at the provincial and local levels. Its presence in Wasit – along with the Georgian BDE – will allow MND-C to concentrate its remaining combat power in the Southern Baghdad Belts.

(3) (S//REL) Operational Framework and Phasing. As MNC-I seeks to achieve irreversible momentum towards sustainable security and, ultimately, Iraqi self-reliance, the corps makes progress along purpose-based LOOs. These LOOs form part of an operational framework that organizes and guides MNC-I actions as it pursues its objectives. Each LOO leads to associated operational objectives. There are two sets of operational objectives – one for the near term (corresponding with late summer 2008) and one for the long term (continuing beyond summer 2009 for an undetermined number of years). Each objective has a number of supporting conditions that – when considered collectively – help describe the desired state of the operational environment when the objectives are accomplished. For the near term, we have identified measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess changes in the operational environment.
and to assist in gauging the extent to which the corps has achieved the supporting conditions related to each objective. While the supporting conditions will most likely remain constant, the MOEs may change if we identify more relevant measures. The near-term objectives are mutually reinforcing and, together with their supporting conditions, describe in slightly more detail the near-term goal of irreversible momentum. There are five phases of the MNC-I campaign. Whereas the operational framework relates campaign progress throughout Iraq to time in a general sense, the phasing construct acknowledges the diverse conditions existing in different AOs. It provides a framework for characterizing the relationship between CF and the Iraqi forces sharing their operational environment, as well as the security conditions that help to define that relationship. These factors vary by province and even locale, and thus areas will progress through phases at different rates. In short, the phasing construct outlines the methodology for gradually and deliberately transferring security responsibilities to the ISF.
1. **(U) LOO 1 – Secure Environment.**

   a. **(S//REL) Main Effort.** MNC-I’s main effort remains securing the population, with priority to Baghdad. Efforts to reduce violence include a balanced approach in the application of population control measures, as well as in the conduct of strike operations against Sunni and Shia extremists. Persistent CF and ISF presence and frequent security operations in mixed Sunni and Shia areas help mitigate the effects of a possible resurgence of violent Shia militia activity. Concurrently, CF and ISF efforts to improve security in Shia areas are aimed at making the role militias play increasingly irrelevant, protecting the Shia population against AQI high-profile attacks as well as Sunni reprisals. We aim to make population security sustainable over time through the deliberate transfer of this responsibility to a capable, credible ISF.

   b. **(S//REL) Supporting Efforts.** The principal supporting effort remains interdicting accelerants to sectarian violence in Baghdad and denying them sanctuary in the Baghdad Belts. The corps maintains adequate CF presence in outlying areas to execute other supporting efforts.

   (1). **(S//REL) In Anbar, MNC-I continues to exploit inroads made against AQI through tribal engagement, developing and assisting the ISF, and gradually transferring security responsibility.**

   (2). **(S//REL) In the Northern provinces, initial priority goes to security efforts in Diyala and Southern Salah ad Din. Combined operations earlier this year drove AQI up the Diyala River Valley toward the Hamran Mountains as well as north, up the Tigris River Valley. CF and ISF maintain pressure on AQI in both areas and continue to interdict these key AQI lines of communication through the Northern Belts into Baghdad. AQI does not have freedom of action in Mosul and the Zaab Triangle, but these areas are relatively more permissive for the Sunni extremist group. To an even greater extent than before, they constitute key terrain for AQI, serving as the primary route for foreign-fighter flow and perhaps the last region in Iraq where the group enjoys some measure of popular support. In order for it to renew operations in Diyala and Baghdad in the future with any degree of effectiveness, AQI must remain active in Mosul and the Zaab Triangle. For this reason, CF and ISF operations in these areas is an important supporting effort. We sustain security gains in the Mosul area by establishing the Ninewa Operational Command and continuing to support and develop the local ISF. To reduce Arab-Kurd tensions resulting in part from real or perceived Kurdish expansionism, MNC-I conducts engagement – principally to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI. In the Kurdish region itself, we maintain the current level of stability.

   (3). **(S//REL) In the south, CF take measures to ensure the intra-Shia conflict remains localized and does not threaten Coalition lines of communication. In the case of Qadisiyah and Wasit, we facilitate the transition to provincial control. In other cases, elements of the corps sustain it from an overwatch posture.**

   (4). **(S//REL) Integrated engagement throughout the country aims in part to isolate extremists and malign foreign actors from the population and to reduce the
severity of the ongoing communal struggle for power. MNC-I has a number of tools across a wide lethal/nonlethal spectrum to support negotiations and broker ceasefires leading to political accommodation. Engagement opportunities involving reconcilable groups should be coupled with specific military operations in order to generate maximum leverage.

c. (U) Reconciliation and Engagement.

(1). (S/REL) MNC-I conducts engagement with key leaders, communicators, and representatives from all groups, sects, and affiliations in order to facilitate their reconciliation with each other and, as necessary, the GOI. This requires a synchronized, coordinated corps effort to ensure resources are not diluted in locally executed, incongruent, non-complementary initiatives. MNC-I therefore employs an integrated approach of lethal and nonlethal targeting of all key leaders and groups, both within and outside of the GOI – from the irreconcilable and disruptive to the legitimate and moderate actors – in order to draw them into lawful, non-violent, and enduring political accommodations.

(2). (S/REL) MNC-I employs a wide range of means in order to help the GOI: reconciling with former belligerents who agree to turn away from violence; isolating extremists; and building credible national, provincial, and local institutions, especially a professional ISF. Additionally, the corps will prioritize engagements at the operational level in order to capitalize on regional successes driven by local efforts.

(3). (S/REL) MNC-I maintains a fusion cell – the Reconciliation and Engagement Cell (REC) – to exploit reconciliation and engagement opportunities in a timely manner and to provide support to MNDFs and CJSTF-P along these lines. The MNC-I REC also serves as the interface to MNF-I’s Strategic Engagements Cell (SEC) for reconciliation and engagement activities requiring support at the strategic level as well as specific GOI support. The REC assists with the commander’s estimate of engagement and reconciliation initiatives, to include engagement focus and priorities and how the array of infrastructure and service projects supports them.

(4). (S/REL) The REC pursues the integration and synchronization of all reconciliation and engagement activities in order to achieve conditions in the near term that will posture the coalition and the GOI for long-term success. Its efforts must be informed by a sophisticated understanding of the current operational environment. The REC helps to ensure that the corps avoids diluting its resources in non-complementary initiatives or investing in easily-achieved near-term objectives that – in the end – will likely hinder or prevent the accomplishment of long-term objectives.

(a). (S/REL) One of the primary means to facilitate reconciliation is by helping Iraqis protect their communities against AQI and other extremists. There are four options to support this effort: assist local leaders in persuading their tribal members to join the IP; use CERP-funded contracts to provide critical infrastructure protection; use financial rewards to encourage individuals to assist CF by providing information that contributes to local security or force protection; and help implement community watch programs.
(b) (S//REL) Other mechanisms or resources that CF may use to help Iraqis counter extremists include: de-confliction of CLC operations, CERP-funded projects, the DoD rewards program, targeted detainee release, and access to the GOI.

(c) (S//REL) As part of an integrated, comprehensive approach to engagement, commanders should frequently review planned and ongoing infrastructure improvements and economic development initiatives in their AOs and adjust priorities or the level of Coalition support in order to encourage cooperative behavior. This may include halting or delaying ongoing or future projects in a specific locale if proceeding as planned would be counterproductive or incompatible with engagement efforts.

(d) (S//REL) Because some belligerents secure popular support through the provision of essential services, lethal engagement in a particular area must be combined with pre-planned infrastructure improvements and the restoration of services.

(5) (S//REL) MND/Fs and CJSTF-AP will prioritize engagements within their operational environments in order to optimize limited resources. Likewise, MNC-I will prioritize engagements at the operational level. As necessary, MND/Fs and CJSTF-AP should request higher-level support through MNC-I but should make clear how this support would help advance the reconciliation process in their operational environments. Where appropriate, MNC-I – in coordination with MNF-I and potentially the GOI – will bring additional resources to bear, including senior military and civilian leaders of the Coalition and members of the national government.

(6) (U) Shia Engagement.

(a) (S//REL) Shia engagement will be more complex than Sunni engagement because the Coalition does not have a significant troop presence in the Shia-dominated South. The fact that most of these provinces have already transitioned to PIC adds a layer of coordination and thus poses a challenge that does not exist to the same extent in mixed or largely Sunni areas. Finally, the conflict in the South is predominantly an intra-Shia struggle, not the anti-AQI one central to previous reconciliation efforts. Thus, it will likely be more difficult to rally Shia against a common enemy. MNC-I’s approach to Shia engagement will vary by area.

(b) (S//REL) The specific political circumstances for Shia communities in Baghdad, the Baghdad Belts, and Diyala are different from those of the Sunni. However, there is enough similarity to substantiate the use of the Sunni model as a basis for beginning engagement leading to the organization of CLCs.

(c) (S//REL) In many of the Southern provinces, CF must rely more heavily on Special Operating Forces for engagement. Additionally, in provinces under Iraqi control, we will probably see more success through an approach that empowers and supports provincial and district governments and the local ISF to a greater extent.
d. (S//REL) Border Security. The National Border Control Strategy provides strategic guidance on the conduct of border enforcement operations. It aims to ensure unity of purpose among participating departments, ministries, and MNF-I. It seeks to reduce accelerants that contribute to sectarian violence and directs methods to monitor, assess, and improve border enforcement administration, management, operations, and capabilities.

(1). (S//REL) Iraq’s National Border Strategy consists of twelve major goals, outlined below.

(a). (S//REL) Review and implement the legal basis of authority to conduct border enforcement operations.

(b). (S//REL) Optimize the organizational structure in order to increase the effectiveness of border capabilities.

(c). (S//REL) Establish a personnel management system in order to efficiently administer civil servants.

(d). (S//REL) Improve communications and reporting capabilities in order to support planning, decision-making, and information management.

(e). (S//REL) Review and enforce standard tables on duties and fees in order to support national economic growth.

(f). (S//REL) Review, issue, and enforce border enforcement standing operating procedures in order to integrate operations of all departments.

(g). (S//REL) Enhance criminal and customs investigations capabilities in order to enforce border laws, regulations, and policies.

(h). (S//REL) Enhance border enforcement intelligence capabilities to gain situational awareness and understanding on the borders.

(i). (S//REL) Establish inter-ministerial cooperation in order to synchronize border efforts.

(j). (S//REL) Reduce the corruptive environment that facilitates illegal armed groups and terrorists.

(k). (S//REL) Develop and implement a regional engagement initiative in order to stabilize border areas with neighboring countries.

(l). (S//REL) Enhance logistics and life support systems in order to sustain border operations and activities.
(2). (S//REL) As a consequence of a lack of significant progress in those areas that are the responsibility of the GOI/MOI, many of the goals and their subordinate objectives have yet to be met. This lack of emphasis on the implementation of the National Border Control Strategy has resulted in the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) receiving a low priority, particularly in sustainment, logistics, maintenance, infrastructure, budgeting, and personnel matters.

(3). (S//REL) As part of MOI’s supporting forces, the DBE is responsible for border enforcement and security of a border that stretches 3,650 km (Iran – 1460 km; Turkey – 352 km; Syria – 605 km; Jordan – 181 km; Saudi Arabia – 814 km; Kuwait – 240 km; coastline – 58 km). This is accomplished through the operation of 17 land ports of entry (POEs), 7 international airports, 5 seaports of entry, and over 450 border forts. Action by the GOI to transfer authority for air and seaports from the Ministry of Transportation to MOI remains incomplete. The DBE consists of 5 Divisions (Regions), 12 Brigades, and 49 Battalions, which include the Coast Guard Inter-Coastal Waterway and Commando Battalions. See Appendix 8, Annex C.

(4). (S//REL) MNF-I support to DBE is delivered through the engagement of several agencies. MNSTC-I is responsible for improving Iraqi border agency administration, intelligence, and logistical capacity to include recruiting, academy training, and unit equipping. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) serves as lead agency on developing Iraq’s National Border Strategy and provides Border Support Teams (BSTs) of Customs and Border Protection Agents to assist in the development of Iraqi customs, immigration, and border control procedures. In addition to the BSTs, the DHS-sponsored Contracted Border Advisors (CBA) Team program provides contracted subject matter experts to augment CF engaged in mentoring and assisting in development, implementation, and sustainment of systems and procedures that will increase the institutional capabilities of the DBE. MNC-I operations in support of the DBE are largely dependent on the implementation of the National Border Control Strategy and the effect achieved by the other supporting agencies.

(5). (S//REL) MNC-I will conduct operations to support the MOI and the DBE as they develop the capability and capacity to take the lead in delivering effective border security and to contribute to broader national security and economic growth. Operations will be conducted on three lines of effort (LOEs).

(a). (S//REL) LOE 1 – Training. MNC-I will assist in shaping realistic and achievable Iraqi border control through Iraqi-led, controlled and sustained border forces and by contributing to multi-layered interdiction operations and corruption control programs. This will be achieved through the deployment of Border Transition Teams (BTTs) at border forts, POEs, and at DBE National Headquarters in order to provide training, guidance, and access to CF enablers. MNC-I will also deploy Border Security Advisors and contracted Border Advisors in order to mentor DBE personnel as they gain the confidence and professional competence required to conduct Iraqi-led and supported border security operations.

(b). (S//REL) LOE 2 – Operations. In-depth border security must be conducted by an agency that is capable of developing and using intelligence, conducting law
enforcement operations, and applying international standards to encourage and support lawful commercial trade. Border security will contribute to national security through the deterrence and prevention of entry by foreign fighters and terrorists and their weapons, primarily from Afghanistan. Effective border security will also protect Iraq’s national resources and will foster public confidence, open commerce, and international investment. In the near term, MNC-I will conduct and enable intelligence-led, border interdiction operations in order to prevent the entry of foreign fighters and terrorists and their weapons. The need for some degree of MNC-I involvement in border security operations will remain beyond the near term.

(c). (S//REL) LOE 3 – Oversight. Until DBE and IA forces are fully capable of exercising independent control over Iraq’s borders, MNC-I will maintain oversight of Iraqi-led border enforcement operations. This includes assisting with the integration of Iraqi owned and operated biometric identification systems and ensuring that procedures are in place for joint periodic inspections at key POEs. The success of permanent BTL presence at specific POEs will be demonstrated through the disruption of the flow of foreign terrorists, facilitators and illegal munitions into Iraq.

e. (S//REL) Infrastructure Security. See Appendix 9, Annex C. CF will support ISF-led infrastructure security operations to enable improvements in Iraq electric, oil, and water systems. MNC-I will encourage ISF to partner with service ministries and support local security initiatives, such as CLCs. Iraqi-led security operations must continue to target and eliminate threats to Iraqi infrastructure. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will assist to isolate faults in electrical lines quickly and to identify breaks in oil pipelines in order to facilitate combined planning and Iraqi Ministry Repair Team efforts. MNC-I will work with the ISF to provide responsive ISR support to Iraqi-led security operations. The priority of effort will respect ministry priorities, as determined by the Energy Fusion Cell. CF efforts concentrate on engagements that result in the GOI and ISF gaining Iraqi support and assistance in securing infrastructure.

(1). (S//REL) Include infrastructure security as part of routine engagements with Iraqi leaders and their requirement to gain Iraqi assistance in securing infrastructure.

(2). (S//REL) Encourage ISF commanders at every level to engage with the people in their area on the need to secure the country’s infrastructure.

(3). (S//REL) Conduct information operations to educate the people of Iraq on the need to protect their infrastructure (See Appendix 5, Annex C). Messages and themes should be tailored to local areas.

f. (S//REL) Counter-IED Effort. While protecting the Iraqi populace is MNC-I’s primary focus in the Secure Environment LOO, maintaining CF freedom of movement and protecting the force remain key requirements that allow the corps to pursue its operational objectives. To this end, MNC-I adopts an offensive mindset in the fight to counter the enemy’s employment of IEDs. The MNC-I Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) will be
the principal mechanism for synchronizing the corps effort, leveraging all available ISR assets to not only defeat the device but, more importantly, disrupt or neutralize the networks themselves.

(e) **(S//REL) Operational Reserve.** MNC-I maintains an operational reserve (OPRES) in order to provide the commander flexibility to apply additional combat power rapidly and where it is needed most. The employment of the OPRES is often the most immediate way that the MNC-I commander can influence the battlefield. Critical to the effective employment of the OPRES is the understanding of its composition, unique capabilities, and strength, along with an understanding the environment into which it may deploy.

(1) **(S//REL) The OPRES consists of one Stryker battalion or squadron.** Each company- or troop-sized element will be at 90 percent or greater personnel strength. The Stryker battalion or squadron will have the following specialty sections at 90 percent or greater personnel strength: mortar sections and medics. The following digital systems will be available and operational: FBCB2, ASAS, MCS, and AAFATDS. The OPRES will be TACON to the gaining command and fall into the area support structure of the sustainment brigade supporting the gaining command.

(2) **(S//REL) When the MNC-I commander directs the deployment of the OPRES to influence tactical and operational gains in the ITO or to reinforce another unit in order to defuse a crisis, the OPRES will respond in the following manner:** deploy a Stryker company- or troop-sized element within 14a in a TACON status to the gaining command and, on order, deploy the remainder of the Stryker battalion or squadron in a TACON status to the gaining command within 14a.

(h) **(S//REL) Scaleable Strike Packages.** Scaleable Strike Packages (SSPs) provide options for rapid Coalition response to emerging crises. SSPs are built around a company-sized Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) unit that can deploy anywhere in Iraq on short notice. Their purpose is to provide a specialized force to stabilize deteriorating security situations, restore ISF control to contested areas, and quickly gain situational awareness for CF commanders in an otherwise non-permissive area. The core of any SSP is an ISOF company supported by CJSTF-AF advisors, close air support, ISR assets, helicopters or theater airlift, and other enablers as required. Key to appropriately scaling the element is an early assessment of the crisis (in terms of hours, not days) in order to task organize the strike force and to identify the most effective method to deploy to the crisis site. Command of SSP operations is exercised in one of two methods: either the SSP is attached to the CF commander of the AO in which the crisis is occurring, and that commander exercises TACON of the SSP; or a Combined Joint Special Operations Area is established and the CJSTF-AF commander exercises OPCON of the SSP. In either case, the local CF commander will establish a company-sized quick response force (QRF) to support the SSP if necessary.

2. **(S//REL) LOO 2 – Capable, Credible ISF.** Establishing a capable, credible ISF remains central to improving stability in Iraq. ISF must assume substantially more responsibility for the overall security of Iraq as CF levels continue to decrease. The Capable, Credible ISF LOO will set the conditions for the transition of security responsibilities in Iraq and lead ultimately to enduring self-reliance.
a. (S//REL) Developing ISF Capability. MNC-I will continue to develop ISF capability throughout the duration of the campaign. Developing a capable and credible ISF requires persistent engagement by Transition Teams (TT) and is often complemented by partnering with a CF unit. CJSTF-AP plays a crucial role in developing ISF capability as well, partnering with ISOF and ISWAT and advising or providing specialized training to selected local ISF units. The number of externally-sourced TTs is unlikely to increase in the future. As the ISF continues to expand, MNC-I must maintain a flexible posture designed to ensure the steady progression of Iraqi forces. MNC-I has developed several models for providing coverage to the ISF. These represent options for the MSCs, based on conditions in their operational environment. The models are explained in detail below (see paragraph 3.b.3.a.2.a.5).

(1) (S//REL) Iraqi Army (IA) Development.

(a). (S//REL) Over the past year we have witnessed much growth in the capability, confidence, and effectiveness of the IA. The IA is no longer a subordinate unit; it is an adjacent unit. During the upcoming year, we will continue to develop the capacity of the IA through partnership, TTs, and advisory/assistance units. Development of the IA will focus on building a confident, capable, and credible counterinsurgency force.

(b). (S//REL) At all levels, we will continue to mentor and develop IA leadership and assist them in eliminating sectarianism from their ranks. Units and staffs must take a proactive role in partnering with, and assisting in the development of IA headquarters units, operational commands, and the IGFC. There will be an increasing role for liaison officers over the next year as IA command and control is developed and exercised. In order to improve battlefield coordination, we must examine how we can further assist in developing IA communications.

(c). (S//REL) The protection of key infrastructure is critical to the future of Iraq. In conjunction with IGFC and MNSTC-I, we will improve the IA’s capacity to conduct this mission through the implementation of the IA Infrastructure Battalion Training Plan, completion of the Exclusion Zones, and development of the Infrastructure Repair Battalion.

(d). (S//REL) The IA will become increasingly mechanized over the next twelve months; we must teach, coach, and mentor its leaders on the most effective use of armored forces in a counterinsurgency environment. We must assist them in developing the capability of their intra-theater lift assets to move these units as required.

(e). (S//REL) Developing an IA capable of sustaining itself remains one of the toughest challenges. Dependence on support from CF must be reduced. We will continue to assist the Iraqis in developing a robust logistical system that addresses fuel, life support, sustainability, and equipment repair and exchange.

(f). (S//REL) Recognizing that border security has an impact not only national security but on economic growth as well, we will encourage the IA to work in conjunction with the DBE to implement a feasible, effective border control strategy. This
partnership is described in the 23 Nov 06 memorandum of understanding (MOU), Support for Iraqi Border Enforcement Operations, and should improve the capacity of both organizations to conduct intelligence-driven interdiction operations.

(2). (S//REL) National Police (NP) Development. With Coalition assistance, the GOI aims to reform the NP into a truly professional police organization, enforcing the rule of law while also conducting effective counterinsurgency operations. In order to achieve this goal, the NP must conduct internal reforms, train, and continue counterinsurgency-focused operations. To facilitate NP development, MNC-I will support NP training opportunities and stress self-reliance. MNC-I will continue to mentor NP leadership through engagement by the NPHQ TT. MNDs and NPTTs facilitate NP development, encouraging internal reforms and transition to a professional organization resembling the Italian Carabinieri or French Gendarmerie. This effort is supported by NATO Training Mission – Iraq. In 2008, the NP will begin reorganizing in order to develop a presence in the provinces.

(3). (S//REL) Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Development.

(a). (S//REL) Iraqi Police Expansion. A fully functional IPS is needed to capitalize on recent security gains and bring rule of law to Iraq. IPS development must be accelerated to establish full operational capability as CF reduce their presence. MNC-I, in conjunction with CPATT and IPS leadership, will assess the quantity and quality of IP infrastructure and personnel required by each province in order to enable the IP to develop and maintain a secure environment in its assigned neighborhoods. Following this assessment, MNDs will tailor the desired IPS end state within their AO to best match available assets, synchronize activities, and detail resource requirements. Assessments, planning, and recommendations will consider appropriateness of force size, other ISF support to the area, neighborhood watch programs, police public image, IP stations, training facilities, maintenance facilities, IP maintenance, and specialized police functions as required.

(b). (S//REL) Iraqi Police Training Focus. To achieve stabilization of Iraq, it is imperative that credible local law enforcement agencies operate in compliance with Iraqi law and within internationally recognized human rights standards. IPS capability and public confidence are necessary prerequisites to achieve PIC. An effective IPS should be the GOI’s first instrument of choice for domestic law enforcement. A credible IPS also reduces the requirement for emergency measures. For the IPS to take on these responsibilities it must be competent, adequately resourced, and have the confidence and trust of the people. During the last six months, training has focused mainly at the basic police level (shurta and station level). A shift is now required to develop a professional and enduring police force that will serve Iraqi citizens in the future. Units will focus on tasks derived from the Police Essential Task List. These seven critical tasks are: leadership, administration, operations, logistics/sustainment, investigations, facilities, and training. Additionally, units will focus at the district and provincial level. The goal is to establish systems and procedures through IPA teams working with Iraqi counterparts who can operate with little CF help. This will start at the MOI level with developing systems and creating reporting and tracking mechanisms down to PDoP, district, and station level. IPA teams will also assist police headquarters with establishing and
enforcing of a code of conduct, disciplining infractions, carrying out higher authority instructions, improving response times, and producing fair evaluations periodically.

(4). (S//REL) DBE Development. See “Border Security” section above.

(5). (S//REL) Transition Team Models. The corps adheres to a BCT-centric approach in its employment of TTs. A fixed number of external teams are attached to each MND/F to be allocated based on the assessments of division and BCT commanders, who prioritize coverage based on the capability of ISF units in their AOs and accept risk where they deem it appropriate. The criteria describing the models include the local security situation, the level of training and effectiveness of ISF units, and the effectiveness of local governance. This conditions-based concept provides commanders maximum flexibility. More capable ISF units in relatively low-threat areas require a smaller ratio of TT coverage; conversely, a less capable ISF unit in a high-threat area may require a partner unit and a TT to provide for its continued development. Through this concept, it will be possible to continue to develop the ISF towards self-sufficiency while maintaining the current level of externally-sourced TTs.

(a). (S//REL) Standard Coverage and Partnership. Standard coverage is based on the original plan of allocating one TT to one ISF unit, along with a partnered CF unit. This model is used in areas of higher risk where the security situation is more demanding and CF are focused on a mix of lethal and nonlethal operations. Given MNC-I commander approval, select ISF units at ORA 1 or ORA 2 may have no TT assigned and may be covered with a partnered unit based on the commander’s analysis. TTs and partnership allow commanders the flexibility to apply different methods of coverage based on the security situation and the varied effectiveness of ISF units.

(b). (S//REL) Embedded Battalion Partnership. In this model, a CF battalion is embedded as a partner unit to an Iraqi brigade. This partnership provides the highest degree of CF-ISF interaction and is useful in areas of more demanding security situations. It is also useful to achieve rapid development of a newly-formed Iraqi brigade. This relationship is often supplemented with key leader engagement at the same echelon (i.e. U.S. BCT commander to Iraqi brigade commander). Habitual partnering relationships extend down to company and platoon level and involve interaction in both combat and training environments. Partnership implies CF forward presence, “24/7 coverage,” and combined operations at all levels with the ISF units. Embedded Battalion Partnerships provide a robust package to the ISF unit and allow for its rapid improvement. The model is troop-to-task intensive yet provides maximum awareness and control within the Iraqi unit.

(c). (S//REL) Enhanced Transition Teams (ETTs). ETTs are made up of a standard TT, along with an augmentation element (roughly 40 personnel) that provides mobility, force protection, and support. There are two ways ETTs are employed. The first method is referred to as Enhanced Heavy; a 1:1 ratio is maintained with every ISF unit. The second method is Enhanced Light; this method enables the ETT to cover multiple units in low-threat areas and mitigates risk in high-threat areas when operating without CF units in close proximity. The MND/F commander determines the TT:ISF ratio based on an analysis of the
environment. Additionally, the MND/F can adjust the augmentation package to perform more than a security function.

(d). (S//REL) Way Ahead. These TT concepts provide inherent flexibility as conditions change. They serve as the bridge to the next TT strategy, allowing commanders the ability to adjust as their AOs progress through the corps phases. With MNC-I commander approval, Advisory/Assistance BDEs could be constituted from BCTs that are reorganized and re-missioned to perform primarily advisory and assistance functions instead of primarily combat or security functions. This method of “sourcing” TTs (or advisory/assistance teams) assumes that MNC-I will not have the manpower to provide TT coverage to all ISF units all of the time while CF remain in Iraq. As the number of U.S. BCTs in Iraq decreases, sourcing TTs using an Advisory/Assistance BDE approach will provide the necessary command and control, logistical support, and maneuver integration currently provided by BCTs. This concept may be implemented in the future and requires further development.

b. (S//REL) Reducing Sectarian Behavior in the ISF. The presence of sectarian leaders in the ISF is one of the main obstacles to ISF credibility. It hampers reconciliation and undermines the willingness of the people to invest hope and trust in the vision of an inclusive, representative GOI. While the emphasis is on working alongside ISF as a means of developing their capability, units should be prepared to apply leverage in creative and potentially confrontational ways to address the problem of sectarian behavior. In support of a broader Coalition effort, MNC-I seeks to reduce destructive sectarianism in the ISF and assists in vetting candidates for key leadership positions with the goal of promoting non-sectarian behavior. To this end, MNC-I leaders will monitor their ISF counterparts, report on instances or trends of sectarian behavior, and compile evidence to support the removal of malign and ineffective leaders. MNC-I ensures that assessment methodologies are in place to assist subordinates along these lines. See “Unacceptable Sectarian Behavior” in paragraph 3.d.2.n.

c. (S//REL) Transitioning Security Responsibilities to the ISF.

(1). (S//REL) Securing the population is the priority. Transitioning security responsibilities to ISF occurs in a deliberate fashion and is based on local conditions. CF encourage and support the gradual shift to Iraqi-led and then more independent Iraqi operations, building to the assumption of security responsibilities by civil authorities under PIC. However, MNC-I will avoid a “rush to failure” that places Iraqis in control of local or provincial security before they are ready. Transition is a desirable goal that comes with risks in any locale, but CF units should not accept the risks associated with a premature transition simply on the assumption that transition itself will generate stability. The MNC-I phasing construct provides guidance on transferring security responsibility.

(2). (S//REL) PIC remains a significant milestone on the path to security self-reliance. Its purpose is to complete the process of gradually transferring primary security responsibility in a province from MNC-I to Iraqi civil authorities. PIC involves the governor, as the senior civil authority in a province, assuming primary responsibility for security within his province. A recommendation for granting PIC status to a province is based on the following general conditions: the security threat level; the capability of the ISF (including both
the IP and IA); the level of proficiency of provincial civilian governance (pertaining specifically to security-related issues); and the ability of CF to maintain an appropriate overwatch stance in the province following transition. This is not an absolute or total transition but one characterized by nuances determined in part by the specific security conditions that exist in the province at the time. At a minimum, CF will support PRT operations and continue to engage political, security, community, and tribal leaders to monitor the progress of governance and economic development in the province. The relationship between CF, ISF (including operational commands in the province), and the provincial civil authorities is formally established in the PIC MOU signed by the provincial governor and the respective MND/F commander. For details on the Provincial Security Transition Assessment and the PIC process, see Appendix 17, Annex C.

3. (S//REL) LOO 3 – Legitimate, Capable Government. Sustainable security and progress toward self-reliance is not possible without substantial improvements in governmental capacity and legitimacy. The near-term objectives related to this LOO are to enhance governmental capacity and economic development at the local and provincial levels. At these levels, BCTs and PRTs work in combination to strengthen the rule of law, provide improved essential services, increase legitimate economic activity, increase employment opportunities, and increase public confidence in the local and provincial government. Numerous programs are already in place in many provinces in order to meet these objectives. At the operational level, MNC-I conducts engagement to “link” the national GOI with the provinces and municipalities in order to further enhance its legitimacy. A component of these efforts is reducing sectarian behavior at all levels of the GOI. One dimension involves promoting cooperative, non-sectarian behavior, as well as competence, in Iraqi officials in local and provincial government. Conversely, another dimension includes identifying officials who adhere to sectarian agendas, reporting them, and then taking steps in conjunction with the GOI to remove them from positions of power and influence.

a. (S//REL) PRTs. The PRTs are joint DoD and DoS entities with key tasks to bolster moderates, support counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. All PRTs (including Provincial Support Teams (PSTs)) are DoS-led interagency elements designed to develop the capacity of the GOI and provide a critical capability to achieve the commander’s end state. PRT, Embedded PRT, and PST efforts will be focused on capacity-building initiatives. All teams will take the lead in mentoring and supporting the GOI’s ability to provide its citizens with responsible and appropriate governance. PRTs and PSTs support the provincial level. Embedded PRT efforts are focused on the district and municipal level. All teams provide the GOI mentoring, assistance, and capacity-building expertise in the five pillar areas of security, governance, rule of law, essential services, and economic development. The efforts of PRTs and CF must be complementary across these five pillar areas.

b. (S//REL) Governance. MNC-I efforts to improve governance aim to make the Iraqi government more legitimate and capable by facilitating the establishment of representative local and provincial governments, enhancing government capacity, and fostering conditions that shape perceptions of the GOI as pursuing a national rather than sectarian agenda. Through a partnership of PRTs, Embedded PRTs, BCTs, and other agencies, MNC-I will build and strengthen provincial and municipal linkages, support provincial capacity development,
enhance GOI budget execution in provinces and municipalities, develop rule-of-law assistance in local and provincial governments, and collaborate with UNAMI and the GOI to conduct transparent and legitimate elections (should they occur).

c. (S//REL) Rule of Law. Rule of Law is a fundamental principle of governance under which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws which are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. The laws must be consistent in both substance and enforcement with international human rights standards and norms. Establishing public confidence in the rule of law will be accomplished by providing support and technical expertise to the Iraqi government at the local and provincial levels. MNC-I and subordinate units will coordinate and manage programs/initiatives to assist the GOI in enhancing its legal and judicial systems and building the capacity of Iraqi legal professionals and institutions to administer fair, efficient, and effective justice. These programs/initiatives will include the establishment of Judicial Complexes in key cities outside of Baghdad to permit Iraqi investigative judges and trial judges to review cases in a secure environment. MSCs will provide a bi-monthly plan indicating all conducted and projected operations or programs implemented for the purpose of building the capacity of rule of law through direct contact and relationships with the provincial and local judicial systems. See Appendix 1, Annex U.

d. (S//REL) Reconstruction. MNC-I’s reconstruction focus is supporting ministry efforts to improve critical infrastructure and providing essential services to the population. At the national level, MNC-I supports GOI ministerial priorities by nesting provincial reconstruction efforts through the Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDC) and PRTs. At the provincial level, MNC-I supports government efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens through improvements in essential services and support for economic development. Improvement to essential services includes projects designed to improve to the local water and sewer systems, local power production and distribution, trash removal, and road construction and repair. In addition, MNC-I executes projects to improve security, such as solar street lights or the installation of checkpoints. MNC-I uses CERP as the primary tool to repair, complete, and increase GOI capacity to provide essential services at the provincial level. MNC-I units coordinate projects with local government, PRDCs, local ministerial director generals, and PRTs to identify requirements leading to increased GOI capacity. This coordination is critical and ensures the project has a transition plan with the local representatives of the GOI. MNC-I supports the GOI efforts to improve essential services in Baghdad by supporting efforts of the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center and Iraqi Essential Services Committee. These organizations provide a forum for coordination among all levels of the Iraqi government and the Coalition to improve capacity to provide essential services to the citizens of Baghdad. MNC-I supports local economic development initiatives, which improve employment opportunities for Iraqis. These efforts include support to the irrigation system to improve agricultural development and support to local industry as it develops. MNC-I supports provincial efforts to improve public access to educational opportunities and public health services through construction of facilities and by providing supplies. Construction of facilities must be coordinated and approved by the local ministerial director general to ensure that the GOI is willing and capable to take charge of a facility once it is completed. See Annex V.
e. (S//REL) Economic Development. Historically, Iraq’s economy has been dominated by the petroleum sector, which provided about 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The oil industry has been in a state of neglect since 1990, suffering from a lack of infrastructure development and maintenance. Illicit oil activities such as pipeline interdiction, crude oil and refined fuel product theft, and corruption continue to have detrimental effects on Iraq’s economy. These activities lead to a direct loss of Iraqi revenue (from crude exports and from the sale of refined fuel products to the populace), which limits resources the GOI might otherwise be able to allocate to reconstruction efforts. Illicit activity also reduces public and foreign investor confidence in the GOI. Iraq’s economy will grow only if revenue from the petroleum sector can be restored to pre-1990 levels – and if the GOI can subsequently begin to execute their budget efficiently, elicit consumer confidence, and produce job growth. In order to sustain a viable economic foundation for Iraq, MNC-I must focus heavily on the development of those industries and natural resources where Iraq has a clear competitive advantage. These are areas where products and/or services produce revenue (returning money to the Iraqi economy rather than just moving dinars back and forth). A focus on the banking structure lays a foundation for moving away from simple cash exchange to electronic or otherwise documented exchange, which will slow the growth of fraud and limit the profitability of black market activities. MNC-I will manage programs that mass efforts on five key economic functions: banking, job creation, secure commercial zones, industrial revitalization (focusing especially on the exploitation of fossil fuels), and agri-business. Progress in these focus areas will provide a foundation for long-term economic growth, combined with increased employment opportunities in the near term. See Appendix 1, Annex G.

4. (S//REL) Effective Communications. The MNC-I Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) cells are co-leads in Effective Communications. As MNC-I’s actions within the other LOOs have shown, everything MNC-I does, or fails to do, will have an impact on Iraqi perceptions. Planners at all levels must continue to consider how their operations will affect the populace, either directly or indirectly. Shaping the information environment within Iraq supports the campaign goal of gaining the support of the local populace. Effective Communications consists of engagements with Iraqi leadership or key individuals, interaction with local media, and IO. Focus areas for Effective Communications are decreasing violence against the populace, promoting ISF and GOI capacity, and promoting economic development. PA will maintain their adherence to providing only true and accurate information while supporting the objectives of the command. This will entail highlighting GOI successes and coordinating for local media to cover major events and operations when possible. Media operations – including senior leader major market, key leader medium market, and Service Member small market engagements – all contribute to Effective Communications. The overarching MNC-I PA guidance to subordinate units is intended to provide commanders wide latitude. MNC-I will avoid overly prescriptive messaging and allow commanders and their subordinates to use their good judgment as they focus on talking about the mission, staying in their respective lanes, and respecting operational security. See Annex F for detailed PA guidance. The MNC-I REC will use the targeting process to identify those Iraqi leaders (political, social, tribal, religious, business, etc.) who hold sway over key sectors of the populace and, because of this, can influence perceptions and, ultimately, actions. The REC will develop a key leader engagement strategy and coordinate engagements with selected Iraqi leaders, synchronizing MNC-I’s themes and talking points as part of their efforts. See Appendix 4,
Annex C, for detailed guidance on engagements. MNC-I IO will seek to exploit the successes of the ISF and GOI across all LOOs to assist in meeting the commander’s intent. Additionally, MNC-I will use the core, supporting, and related elements of IO and other forms of effective communications to mitigate negative events in Iraq that have potential propaganda value. IO will focus efforts on: disrupting Shi’a extremists and criminals; disrupting AQI and Sunni extremists and criminals; disrupting malign foreign influence; promoting GOI credibility; and promoting CF credibility and commitment to Iraq. See Appendix 5, Annex C for the IO concept of support.

(b) (U) Operational Objectives.

1. (U) Near Term.

   a. (S//REL) Secure the population, such that political accommodation and economic development can continue.

   (1). (U) Supporting Conditions.

      (a). (S//REL) AQI and other extremists isolated.

      (b). (S//REL) Militia influence diminished.

      (c). (S//REL) Local populations increasingly reconciled with GOI.

      (d). (S//REL) Lethal aid to extremists disrupted.

      (e). (S//REL) IED networks neutralized.

   (2). (U) Measures of Effectiveness.

      (a). (S//REL) High-profile attacks on civilians decreasing.

      (b). (S//REL) AQI and other extremist sanctuaries decreasing.

      (c). (S//REL) Ethno-sectarian attacks in Baghdad and nine key cities decreasing.

      (d). (S//REL) Population displacement in Baghdad halted.

      (e). (S//REL) Return of displaced and internally displaced persons to Baghdad increasing.

      (f). (S//REL) Iraqi population increasingly rejects extremist groups.
(g). (S//REL) Militia influence and illegal activity in Baghdad decreasing.

(h). (S//REL) Local ceasefires involving the ISF increasing.

(i). (S//REL) Aggressive actions against ISF decreasing.

(j). (S//REL) CLC integration into formal GOI structures increasing.

(k). (S//REL) Effective IED attacks against CF and ISF decreasing.

(l). (S//REL) Enhance ISF capacity, such that the deliberate transfer of security responsibility can continue.

1. (U) Supporting Conditions.

(a). (S//REL) ISF effectiveness improved.

(b). (S//REL) Critical infrastructure protected.

(c). (S//REL) ISF reliability increased.

(d). (S//REL) Public confidence in ISF increased.

2. (U) Measures of Effectiveness.

(a). (S//REL) IA units that demonstrate ability to lead counterinsurgency operations increasing.

(b). (S//REL) IP and NP that demonstrate ability to maintain law and order increasing.

(c). (S//REL) Capability of DBE and POE forces to secure the border improving.

(d). (S//REL) Capability of IA Infrastructure Battalions improving.

(e). (S//REL) Ability of ISF command-and-control centers to coordinate operations improving.

(f). (S//REL) Ability of ISF units to sustain operations improving.
(g). (S//REL) Effective attacks against critical infrastructure decreasing.

(h). (S//REL) Militia infiltration of ISF decreasing.

(i). (S//REL) ISF leaders increasingly demonstrate non-sectarian behavior.

(j). (S//REL) Iraqi civilians increasingly consider the ISF reliable and capable of providing security.

c. (S//REL) Enhance government capacity at the local and provincial level, such that security progress is reinforced.

1. (U) Supporting Conditions.

(a). (S//REL) Provision of essential services improved.

(b). (S//REL) Rule of law strengthened.

(c). (S//REL) Public confidence in local and provincial government increased.

2. (U) Measures of Effectiveness.

(a). (S//REL) Iraqis increasingly perceive improvements in their quality of life.

(b). (S//REL) Government capacity to provide essential services increasing.

(c). (S//REL) Government capacity to undertake reconstruction and infrastructure development increasing.

(d). (S//REL) Government ability to execute fiscal responsibilities improving (i.e. budget execution).

(e). (S//REL) Judicial process improving.

(f). (S//REL) Pre-trial investigative process improving.

(g). (S//REL) Majority of Iraqis accept the political process as legitimate.

(h). (S//REL) Governing mechanisms increasingly representative.
(i). (S//REL) Government officials increasingly demonstrate non-sectarian behavior.

(j). (S//REL) Institutional corruption decreasing.

d. (S//REL) Establish foundation for economic development at local and provincial levels, such that security progress is reinforced.

(1). (U) Supporting Conditions.

(a). (S//REL) Legitimate economic activity in public and private sectors increased.

(b). (S//REL) Increased employment opportunities generated.

(2). (U) Measures of Effectiveness.

(a). (S//REL) Consumer confidence increasing.

(b). (S//REL) Capacity of oil/fuel system increasing.

(c). (S//REL) Allocation of fuel to provinces increasing.

(d). (S//REL) Black market fuel prices decreasing.

(e). (S//REL) Macroeconomic stability and viability increasing.

(f). (S//REL) Business development improving.

(g). (S//REL) Agricultural development improving.

(h). (S//REL) Employment in Baghdad and nine key cities increasing.

2. (U) Long Term.

a. (S//REL) Security throughout Iraq, sufficient to enable effective civil and civic life. Supporting Conditions:

(1). (S//REL) Iraq denied as a safe haven for terrorists.

(2). (S//REL) AQI and other extremists isolated from external support and rejected by the Iraqi populace.

(3). (S//REL) Sunni insurgents reconciled with GOI or defeated.
(4). (S/REL) Militias demobilized and integrating into formal GOI structures.

(5). (S/REL) Lethal aid from [1.4b, 1.4d] largely curtailed.

(6). (S/REL) Violent crime reduced to levels manageable by the Iraqi police.

b. (S/REL) Effective, fully developed security forces and supporting institutions in place. Supporting Conditions:

(1). (S/REL) ISF in sufficient numbers and with required capabilities to:
   (a). (S/REL) IA: Provide for the defense of Iraq against external threats; conduct counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and border security operations in support of IP and DBE as required.
   (b). (S/REL) IP: Maintain law and order; in the lead for local security.
   (c). (S/REL) NP: Serve as a regionally-based response force for counterinsurgency and law enforcement operations that exceed IP capability.
   (d). (S/REL) DBE: Conduct POE and border security operations.

(2). (S/REL) ISF led by competent and professional leaders.

(3). (S/REL) ISF able to sustain and regenerate themselves.

(4). (S/REL) ISF supported by institutions with the capacity to manage the force, build the future force, and ensure compliance with the rule of law.

(5). (S/REL) ISF manned by personnel committed to the GOI, their organization, and their mission.

(6). (S/REL) Broad public confidence in the ISF established.

c. (S/REL) Fully functioning participatory government and supporting structures in place. Supporting Conditions:

(1). (S/REL) Broad agreement among Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders reached on the balance of power as it pertains to national, regional, and local authorities.

(2). (S/REL) Iraqi provincial control established and sustained throughout Iraq.
(3). (S//REL) A representative, inclusive GOI viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi people.

(4). (S//REL) Broad public confidence in the GOI established.

(5). (S//REL) GOI provides consistent, adequate essential services to Iraqis.

(6). (S//REL) Rule-of-law system established and functioning; provincial systems in place for detention, trial, and incarceration operate in accordance with Iraq’s constitution.

(7). (S//REL) GOI integrated into the regional and international communities.

(8). (S//REL) Iraq engaged in a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and Coalition partners.

(9). (S//REL) Iraq an effective ally in the War on Terror.

d. (S//REL) **Foundation for self-sustaining economic development in place.**

**Supporting Conditions:**

(1). (S//REL) Opportunities for legitimate, sustainable employment in Baghdad and the key cities compare favorably to those in urban areas of other regional states.

(2). (S//REL) Refined hydrocarbon products supply Iraqis with adequate levels of fuel to meet basic needs and generate revenues on par with existing infrastructure’s potential.

(3). (S//REL) Existing power-generation infrastructure provides electricity to Baghdad and the key cities in amounts sufficient to meet basic needs and sustain small businesses and industry.

(4). (S//REL) GOI programs and revenues able to support long-term infrastructure development.

(5). (S//REL) Financial systems conducive to growth of a free market in place and supported by GOI policies.

(6). (S//REL) Select state-owned enterprises revitalized; private sector growth underway.

(7). (S//REL) Vocational training and higher education institutions providing labor to meet demands of a stable, developing economy.
(c) (S/REL) Phasing. There are five phases of the campaign. The phasing construct acknowledges the diverse conditions existing in different areas. It embodies the changing relationship between CF and the Iraqi forces sharing their operational environment, as well as the general conditions (security-related or otherwise) that help to define that relationship. These factors vary by province and even locale, and thus areas will progress through phases at different rates. Phase progression is not based on a distinct point in time or driven by a single event. Rather, a shift from one phase to the next is gradual. In short, the phasing construct serves as the framework for transition. As areas progress through phases, conditions should allow for a gradual reduction of CF in those areas. With that reduction, there will be a corresponding reduction in the tasks CF perform and a similar rise in ISF primacy in some major tasks. The phasing construct illustrates this reduction through a list of major CF tasks by phase. Appendix 19 of Annex C provides lists of sub-tasks as examples to better describe what CF actions occur for each major task by phase.

![Diagram of MNC-I Campaign Phases]

**Figure 5, (S/REL) MNC-I Campaign Phases**

1. (S/REL) Phase 1 – Setting Key Conditions. Phase 1 is underway and lasts throughout much of the campaign. It involves MNC-I’s continual effort to connect the national GOI to the provinces and districts so that government legitimacy is enhanced in the eyes of Iraqis. MNC-I helps to improve local and provincial governance while working as part of a broader Coalition endeavor to persuade and encourage the central government and ministries to address critical concerns raised by the provinces in a responsive manner. This includes monitoring the
progress of important legislation and taking actions to reduce sectarian behavior, particularly in Iraqi security institutions. Another key action lasting the duration of the campaign is facilitating reconciliation to set conditions for local ceasefires leading to political accommodation.

2. (S//REL) Phase 2 – Clear, Control, Retain. The purpose of this phase is to establish security for the population in areas marked by high levels of violence and to improve local ISF capability in those areas. “Clear, control, and retain” are each sub-phases that classify an area in terms of the primary tactical task that CF and ISF perform there. Starting with “clear,” operations in a designated area progress in a deliberate fashion to the “control” and, later, “retain” stages. Iraqi-led operations increase in frequency over time, but CF presence among the population continues throughout all sub-phases. CF and ISF conduct offensive operations against AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists and implement population control measures. They complement these efforts through engagement with local leaders and potentially reconcilable groups. Forces closely link improvements in local security to the initiation or expansion of economic development and efforts to enhance governmental capacity. Toward the end of the “retain” sub-phase, CF begin the shift to Tactical Overwatch.

a. (U) Conditions for Transition: None specified since this is the initial phase.

b. (U) Description.

1. (S//REL) Clear, Control, Retain is characterized by combined operations – initially planned and led predominantly by CF but progressing to operations planned and led by both CF and ISF, with ISF taking the lead increasingly over time. CF encourage “Iraqi lead” whenever conditions permit. CF conduct independent operations as necessary.

2. (S//REL) CF provide direct support to key Iraqi command-and-control nodes to coordinate operations between ISF elements.

3. (S//REL) CF maintain ground and air QRFs.

4. (S//REL) CF maintain habitual relationships to develop ISF units, providing dedicated coverage in training and operations through partnership and transition teams.

5. (S//REL) CF provide ISF with combat and combat support enablers on a routine basis, to include: Joint fires, ISR assets, mobility support, supplementary communications, and intelligence-sharing.

6. (S//REL) CF provide ISF with necessary sustainment support on a routine basis, including ground and air MEDEVAC.

7. (S//REL) Route clearance is provided predominantly by CF but shifts to ISF as assets become available.
c. (U) Tasks Executed by CF.

(1). (S//REL) Population security.

(2). (S//REL) Infrastructure security.

(3). (S//REL) Border security.

(4). (S//REL) Building civil and governmental capacity.

(5). (S//REL) Engagement.

(6). (S//REL) ISF development and support.

(7). (S//REL) Strike operations.

(8). (S//REL) Information operations and public affairs.

(9). (S//REL) Force protection.

3. (S//REL) Phase 3 – Tactical Overwatch. The purpose of this phase is to sustain an improved level of security as local ISF increasingly conduct independent operations. Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under Iraqi lead. With improved security conditions and growing governmental capacity, economic development initiatives and projects to improve infrastructure and essential services in the area increase in scale and scope. CF participation in local security missions decreases as the ISF assume more responsibility. As security and ISF capability improve, CF continue a measured reduction of presence in unit sectors, shifting gradually and deliberately to Operational Overwatch.

a. (U) Conditions for Transition: From Clear, Control, Retain to Tactical Overwatch.

(1). (S//REL) ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with Coalition enabler support.

(2). (S//REL) ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population and critical infrastructure – relative to the threat and anticipated threat.

(3). (S//REL) Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning.
b. (U) Description.

(1). (S//REL) Tactical Overwatch is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by CF support. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

(2). (S//REL) CF provide assistance to key Iraqi command-and-control nodes (assistance limited to planning and communications).

(3). (S//REL) CF maintain ground and air QRFs to prevent ISF failure at the tactical level.

(4). (S//REL) CF maintain habitual relationships to develop ISF units, but they are more limited in some ways. Where necessary and as resources allow, CF provide dedicated coverage in training and operations. CF provide rotational coverage to ISF units in cases where commanders can assume risk. Partnership continues but is more limited, given the likelihood of single Coalition units partnering with an increasing number of Iraqi units. As a guideline, the Enhanced TT (Heavy) and Enhanced TT (Light) models should be considered for transition team coverage.

(5). (S//REL) CF provide ISF with combat and combat support enablers as required, to include: Joint fires, ISR assets, mobility support, supplementary communications, and intelligence-sharing.

(6). (S//REL) CF provide ISF with air MEDEVAC and level II/III medical support. All other sustainment support is provided by exception.

(7). (S//REL) CF provide route clearance support to ISF on MSRs and ASRs that Iraqi assets cannot cover.

c. (U) Tasks Executed by CF.

(1). (S//REL) Border security.

(2). (S//REL) Building civil and governmental capacity.

(3). (S//REL) Engagement.

(4). (S//REL) ISF development and support.

(5). (S//REL) Strike operations.

(6). (S//REL) Information operations and public affairs.

(7). (S//REL) Force protection.
4. (S//REL) Phase 4 – Operational Overwatch. The purpose of this phase is to sustain independent Iraqi operations while expanding ISF capacity to take full responsibility for local security. Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue primarily under ISF control, with the IP assuming greater responsibility for maintaining domestic order in population centers. Key to this phase is making progress toward the completion of a functioning ISF logistical support system. The continuing transition of security responsibilities accompanies a further reduction in direct CF participation with local security missions and a noticeable decline in Coalition presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs. With CF operations likely to be more dispersed and taking place over a larger area, commanders maintain the ability to provide adequate and responsive security to PRTs and advisory/assistance teams. Over time though, even these teams will be gradually withdrawn as CF in the ITO assume strategic overwatch and the limited mission set that posture entails.

a. (U) Conditions for Transition: From Tactical Overwatch to Operational Overwatch.

(1). (S//REL) ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with specific, tailored Coalition enabler support only.

(2). (S//REL) ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) – relative to the threat and anticipated threat.

(3). (S//REL) Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability.

(4). (S//REL) Capacity to provide essential services is sufficient to generate public confidence in local government.

(5). (S//REL) Local economic development is ongoing.

b. (U) Description.

(1). (S//REL) Operational Overwatch is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by tailored CF support to critical, planned operations. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

(2). (S//REL) ISF operations are coordinated through Iraqi command-and-control nodes without CF assistance.

(3). (S//REL) CF maintain a response force that constitutes an operational reserve, capable of intervening to restore order in the event of a crisis. Unlike a QRF, this force operates with longer response times and a higher threshold of intervention.

(4). (S//REL) Habitual relationships involve less frequent interaction with ISF units. Generally, CF provide rotational coverage to ISF units, but commanders retain
flexibility to focus coverage where required. As a guideline, the Enhanced TT (Light) model should be considered for transition (or advisory/assistance) team coverage. Partnership continues – most likely through Advisory/Assistance BDEs – but is even more limited than before.

(5) (S//REL) CF provide ISF with key combat and combat support enablers during critical, planned operations only; key enablers include: Joint fires, ISR assets, and intelligence-sharing.

(6) (S//REL) CF provide ISF with air MEDEVAC. All other sustainment support is provided by exception.

(7) (S//REL) CF provide route clearance support to ISF on MSRs that Iraqi assets cannot cover.

c. (U) Tasks Executed by CF.

(1) (S//REL) Building civil and governmental capacity.

(2) (S//REL) Engagement.

(3) (S//REL) ISF development and support.

(4) (S//REL) Strike operations.

(5) (S//REL) Information operations and public affairs.

(6) (S//REL) Force protection.

5. (S//REL) Phase 5 – Strategic Overwatch. The purpose of this phase is to sustain independent Iraqi operations in a given area while the GOI take steps to consolidate local and provincial progress on the way toward national reconciliation. Iraqi civil authorities have full responsibility for security in their areas and exercise control over local ISF that are able to protect the population and neutralize internal threats through independent operations. CF have a limited mission set and maintain relationships with the ISF through periodic joint and combined exchange training and staff assistance visits to key command-and-control nodes.

a. (U) Conditions for Transition: From Operational Overwatch to Strategic Overwatch.

(1) (S//REL) ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support (generally by exception only).
(2). (S//REL) ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) – relative to the threat and anticipated threat.

(3). (S//REL) Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability.

(4). (S//REL) Capacity to provide essential services is sufficient to generate public confidence in local government.

(5). (S//REL) Sustainable local economic development is ongoing.

b. (U) Description.

(1). (S//REL) Strategic Overwatch is characterized by largely independent Iraqi operations, supported by limited CF enablers provided generally by exception. In coordination with the GOI, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

(2). (S//REL) ISF operations are coordinated through Iraqi command-and-control nodes without CF assistance.

(3). (S//REL) CF maintain a strategic reserve, capable of intervening in a timely manner in the event of a crisis. Compared to an operational reserve, this force operates with longer response times and a higher threshold of intervention.

(4). (S//REL) CF continue to develop ISF capability in more limited ways and – when most of Iraq reaches this phase – through a robust Office of Military Cooperation (or a similar organization). CF conduct staff assistance visits to key Iraqi command-and-control nodes, such as JHQ, IGFC, operational commands, and POEs. CF also participate in combined exercises and maneuvers that enhance collective training at the battalion and brigade level.

(5). (S//REL) CF share intelligence with ISF as required; all other combat and combat support enablers are provided by exception only.

(6). (S//REL) CF provide sustainment support by exception only.

(7). (S//REL) CF provide route clearance support to ISF by exception only.

c. (U) Tasks Executed by CF.

(1). (S//REL) ISF development and support.

(2). (S//REL) Strike operations.
(3). (S//REL) Information operations and public affairs.

(4). (S//REL) Force protection.

c. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) (U) MND-B

(a) (S//REL) In partnership with ISF, secure the population of the Baghdad security districts.

(b) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists in Baghdad and support zones.

(c) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

(d) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors.

(e) (S//REL) Partner with subordinate area commands of the Baghdad Operational Command.

(f) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Baghdad to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(g) (S//REL) Secure Victory Base Complex.

(2) (U) MNF-W

(a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and Sunni extremists in Anbar.

(b) (S//REL) Conduct tribal engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and further isolate AQI operating in Anbar.

(c) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.

(d) (S//REL) Partner with the Anbar Operational Command; support its establishment and development.

(e) (S//REL) Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi POE and border security operations. [Box: 1.4b, 1.4d]
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(f) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Anbar to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(3) (U) MND-N.

   (a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists, with priority to Diyala and Salah ad Din (south of Samarra).

   (b) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.

   (c) (S//REL) Conduct engagement to reduce Arab-Kurd tensions, with priority to Kirkuk and Ninewa Provinces, in order to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI.

   (d) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors.

   (e) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

   (f) (S//REL) Conduct lethal and nonlethal operations to disrupt black market and oil smuggling activities that fund AQI, extremists, and insurgent groups, with priority to the Bayji area.

   (g) (S//REL) Take the lead in establishing the Ninewa Operational Command (NOC) and enable its transition to full operational capability; partner with the NOC after it achieves FOC.

   (h) (S//REL) Partner with the Diyala Operational Command.

   (i) (S//REL) Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi POE and border security operations, 1.4b, 1.4d

   (j) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(4) (U) MND-C.

   (a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and Sunni extremists in the Southern Baghdad Belt.

   (b) (S//REL) Defeat Shia extremists, with priority to the Southern Baghdad Belt.

   (c) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.
(d) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

(e) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors.

(f) (S//REL) Partner with the Karbala Operational Command.

(g) (S//REL) Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi POE and border security.

(h) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Babil and Wasit to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(5) (U) MND-SE.

(a) (S//REL) In support of ISF and with a focus on Basra, defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert provincial Iraqi control.

(b) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

(c) (S//REL) In conjunction with the Basra Operational Command, maintain situational awareness of the operational environment in the province and provide CF assistance if required.

(d) (S//REL) Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi POE and border security.

(e) (S//REL) Maintain CF freedom of movement along MSR TAMPA and primary ASRs in AO.

(f) (S//REL) Assist the ISF with the protection of critical infrastructure where necessary.

(g) (S//REL) BPT provide a company-sized QRF in support of Camp Bucca should the security situation at the camp deteriorate.

(6) (U) MND-CS.

(a) (S//REL) In conjunction with ISF and with a focus on Diwaniyah, support efforts to defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation.
(b) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

(c) (S//REL) Provide support, as required and within the division’s capabilities, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.

(d) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Qadisiyah to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(7) (U) MND-NE.

(a) (S//REL) Sustain non-kinetic operations to maintain current levels of stability.

(8) (U) CJSOTF-AP.

(a) (S//REL) Disrupt terrorist, extremist, and insurgent networks.

(b) (S//REL) Develop ISOF, National ERU, and Provincial Iraqi SWAT into non-sectarian precision strike forces capable of conducting unilateral operations.

(c) (S//REL) Advise and provide specialized or advanced training to selected local ISF units to develop their capability for independent counterinsurgency operations.

(d) (S//REL) Conduct engagement with local Iraqi leaders to deny sanctuary to terrorist and extremist networks; coordinate engagement activities with appropriate “ground-owning” MND/Fs to ensure unity of effort.

(e) (S//REL) BPT neutralize extremist and insurgent financing derived from the Bayji Oil Refinery.

(9) (U) 316 ESC.

(a) (S//REL) Provide echelon-above-brigade sustainment support to forces within ITO in accordance with Title X responsibilities and in accordance with agreements with other services, Coalition partners, other U.S. agencies, or UNAMI.

(b) (S//REL) Maintain 7 x FOB-In-A-Box sets and 6 x Corps Contingency Outpost Packages for expeditionary life support capability, pending appropriate funding and spending authorization.

(c) (S//REL) Manage Empty Container Collection Points and Central Receiving Shipment Points for MNC-I.

(d) (S//REL) Provide Contracting Officer Technical Representatives for the Individual Protective Equipment Warehouse at Taji.
(c) (S/REL) O/O support CF as they adjust their overwatch posture and basing arrangements.

(f) (S/REL) BPT provide movement support to the MNC-I operational reserve if it is committed to another AO.

(g) (S/REL) BPT support CF operations with emergency common-item sustainment (Class I, III, V, water) through aerial resupply; BPT palletize and prepare cargo for rapid movement and delivery through the following means: fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or air drop.

(h) (S/REL) BPT provide emergency support to ISF until their logistical capability is self-sustaining.

(i) (S/REL) BPT provide humanitarian assistance (such as Halal/OTER meals, bottled water, and blankets) to local nationals in the event of a crisis.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Tasks Common to All MND/Fs.

(a) (S/REL) Provide monthly assessments of the operational environment to CG, MNC-I to enhance situational understanding across the corps.

(b) (S/REL) Conduct engagement to facilitate cessation of hostilities and accommodation among groups and key leaders willing to renounce violence and enter into dialogue with CF, ISF, and/or GOI; BPT complement engagement with the threat of force, should it be required to dissuade groups from resorting to violence to achieve their goals.

(c) (S/REL) In conjunction with ISF, control and monitor the activities of CLCs.

(d) (S/REL) Facilitate GOI efforts to transfer CLCs from short-term, CERP-funded contracts to more sustainable GOI or civilian employment as security conditions allow.

(e) (S/REL) Support continued development of ISF by mentoring their leadership and assisting in training their personnel in order to improve unit effectiveness and reliability.

(f) (S/REL) As conditions allow and on a deliberate basis, transfer security responsibilities to local ISF and assume appropriate overwatch posture – company by company if necessary.

(g) (S/REL) Support planned ISF operations to return displaced or internally displaced persons in order to help the GOI advance the reconciliation process; avoid direct involvement in the return of displaced or internally displaced persons to specific residences.
(h) (S//REL) In coordination with PRTs, facilitate regular meetings among provincial, district, and neighborhood councils to promote dialogue across sectarian lines and help obtain funding for local development priorities.

(i) (S//REL) In coordination with PRTs, work with local authorities to develop reconstruction and economic development plans that will help channel resources to specific, appropriate needs.

(j) (S//REL) In coordination with PRTs, implement economic, governance, rule-of-law, and capacity-building programs designed to produce near-term results at the local and provincial level; facilitate GOI efforts to develop sustainable, longer-term programs along these lines.

(k) (S//REL) In coordination with PRTs, work with local authorities to identify commercial opportunities and channel financial assistance to them for business development.

(l) (S//REL) In coordination with PRTs, support Iraqi officials or offices that have effectively provided services on a non-sectarian basis.

(m) (S//REL) Facilitate GOI efforts to provide security for critical infrastructure.

(n) (S//REL) Continue providing QRF, MEDEVAC, route clearance, convoy net, and sheriff’s net coverage along MNC-I sustainment routes, including areas that have been transitioned to the ISF or have transitioned to PIC.

(o) (S//REL) BPT support ISF in the distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions.

(p) (S//REL) BPT provide security to USM-I personnel to facilitate their ability to conduct engagement in a timely and flexible manner.

(2) (U) Definitions.

(a) (S//REL) Key Cities. After Baghdad, the nine key cities are: Baqubah, Basra, Fallujah, Kirkuk, Mosul, Najaf, North Babil, Ramadi, and Samarra. The nine key cities are listed in alphabetical order.

(b) (S//REL) Concerned Local Citizen (CLC). A person who is part of an organized group working with CF/GOI under a CERP civilian infrastructure security (CIS) contract or GOI contract or a security volunteer receiving no payment. A CLC must take an oath to be a law-abiding citizen, is processed through BAT/IIIDE, and is registered with CF as a CLC. Not active: All other individuals willing to participate in a security activity but, due to operational needs or constraints, are not currently used. These individuals may be considered for transition into future civil service programs.
(c) **S/REL Accelerants of Sectarian Violence.** An accelerant increases the intensity or frequency of the cycle of sectarian violence, providing momentum to the cycle. The opposite of an accelerant of sectarian violence is something that disrupts, slows, or serves as an obstacle to the forces that fuel the cycle. In real terms, an accelerant is a person or a group who perpetuates the cycle of sectarian violence by playing an active role in committing acts of violence against members of the opposite sect.

(d) **S/REL Sanctuary.** Sanctuary is a place where enemy forces have freedom of action to refit, plan, and direct operations. With limited centralized command and control, the enemy is capable of sustained activity, has some capability to mass, and partially controls the area. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses that the benefits of sanctuary mentioned above no longer exist.

(e) **S/REL Security.** Sufficient protection against hostile acts to enable effective civil and civic life. [MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 27 Nov 07]

(f) **S/REL Sustainable Security.** Security that can be maintained over time through Iraqi security, civil, and civic institutions with reduced Coalition involvement. [MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 27 Nov 07]

(g) **S/REL Political Accommodation.** A negotiated power-sharing agreement sanctioned by the GOI that contributes to establishment of sustainable security guaranteed by the ISF, in some combination with CF. Parties turn to political accommodation because they are unable to achieve their goals through violence or reject achieving their goals in that fashion. Political accommodation is much more than a ceasefire, but one of the essential elements of any agreement is the cessation of hostilities. Measures designed to build confidence in the maintenance of security should also be considered as critical to the agreement’s success. [MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 27 Nov 07]

(h) **S/REL Reconciliation.** An end to a relationship of enmity, and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes; also, the process leading to this end. Total reconciliation probably requires generational change. [MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 27 Nov 07]

(i) **S/REL Long-Term Strategic Partnership.** A negotiated agreement between the GOI and one or more members of the Coalition that establishes post-UNSCR economic and political cooperation and security commitments and authorities. [MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 27 Nov 07]

(j) **U Security Institutional Functions.** MNSTC-I identifies six critical security institutional functions: force management, acquisition, training, resource management, sustainment, and development. [MNSTC-I OPORD 07-1, 1 Oct 07]

(k) **U Security Self-Management.** The MOI and MOD assume primary day-to-day responsibility, with limited assistance from Coalition and international organizations, for security institutional functions, adopting a decision horizon that extends beyond the current year, identifying requirements sufficiently in advance to obtain and align resources to meet those...
requirements, and integrating decisions in each institutional function with necessary, corresponding decisions in other institutional functions. [MNSTC-I OPORD 07-1, 1 Oct 07]

(l) (U) Operational Independence. ISF in sufficient number and with the required capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations with CF in strategic overwatch; able to sustain and regenerate themselves with limited Coalition support; led by competent and professional leaders; supported by institutions with the functional capacity to manage the force and build the future force; manned with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and police committed to the GOI, their organization, and mission. [MNSTC-I OPORD 07-1, 1 Oct 07]

(m)(U) Security Self-Reliance. ISF in sufficient number and with the required capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and provide for the defense of Iraq against external threats; able to sustain and regenerate themselves; led by competent and professional leaders; supported by institutions with the functional capacity to manage the force, build the future force, and ensure compliance with the rule of law; manned with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and police committed to the GOI, their organization, and mission. [MNSTC-I OPORD 07-1, 1 Oct 07]

(n) (U) Unacceptable Sectarian Behavior. Sectarian behavior could be described as (but not limited to) the following:

1. (S//REL) Arrest or killing of a member of another sect for no apparent reason.

2. (S//REL) Extortion of funds from members of another sect.

3. (S//REL) Threats and intimidation directed at another sect.

4. (S//REL) Production and use of arrest lists that are based on sectarian affiliation rather than insurgent activities.

5. (S//REL) Unwillingness of Iraqi commanders and police to share “arrest lists” or to name the sources of intelligence that labeled people on the list worthy of arrest.

6. (S//REL) Unwillingness of an ISF unit or GOI ministry to protect or provide services to a community solely because of sect.

7. (S//REL) Unwillingness of a command or ministry to adequately resource a unit made up of soldiers from another sect.

(o) (S//REL) Joint Security Station (JSS). A JSS is a position from which ISF and CF units conduct operations to maintain presence in the local community and control key terrain. A JSS provides limited life support and force protection for the forces residing there. It serves as a place in which to conduct combined planning and pre-patrol/combat preparations, the point of origin and destination for patrols, a staging area for reaction forces, a secure position to which
forces may withdraw, and a command and control node. Unlike a Coalition Outpost, a JSS will eventually be turned over to Iraqi control as ISF continue to conduct area security operations.

(p) (S//REL) Coalition Outpost (COP). A COP is a fortified outpost used to defend, observe, and conduct operations that allow CF to project forces into neighborhoods in order to protect the population and disrupt enemy activity. COPs are normally employed in restrictive or urban terrain. They can be manned by CF alone or in conjunction with ISF.

4. (S//REL) Logistics. MNC-I develops sustainment plans, policies and procedures, and postures logistics assets across Iraq in order to support the development of ISF, while retaining flexibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Key to success is gaining efficiencies in fixed site operations through contracts and LOGCAP support, while maximizing expeditionary capability to support operations as required throughout Iraq without loss of momentum. Also important is the development of concepts to support TTs arrayed across Iraq while minimizing the logistics footprint; this may entail non-traditional support arrangements. While tactical level logistical support remains a service responsibility, every effort should be made to maximize efficiencies gained through common-item support. This order will refer to the Sustainment Command in Iraq as the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and the Theater-Level Command in Kuwait as the TSC. See Annex D for additional details on logistics.

a. (S//REL) Concept of Support to U.S. Forces. The TSC provides EAC CSS, Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement (JRSO), and Title X support to MNC-I through service channels. The ESC provides general common-item support to all services as required, in accordance with acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs). The ESC provides general support on an area basis from nine GS/DS Logistical Hubs: LSA Anaconda (Main Hub), Tallil (Southern), Al Asad (Western), Al Taqadum (Western), Q-West (Northern), Marez (Northern), Speicher (Northern), Taji (Central), and Seitz/BIAP (Central). The ESC provides DS to non-divisional Army units and provides General Support Reinforcing to divisional units as required. TTs will be supported on an area basis, from the nearest MND or ESC CSS unit. When the nearest logistics unit is across MND boundaries, the two MND commanders will establish a memorandum of agreement to allow for cross-boundary support to the TTs. See Appendix 9, Annex D of the MNC-I SOP. Currently in Kuwait, the ESC exercises command and control over MNC-KU, which facilitates JRSO of inbound MNC-I units.

b. (S//REL) Support to ISF. Iraqi logistical systems must be utilized by the ISF in order for ISF logistics to be further refined and developed into a robust and fully operational ISF logistics solution. CF must continue to assist with the Iraqi development of solutions and systems in order for ISF to gain full responsibility and capability to sustain independent logistics operations at all levels. CF will assist in the development of the critical support structure for the IA, to include logistical support complexes and bases, Infrastructure Repair Battalions and training facilities for developing professional Iraqi logisticians who can create an effective supply system that is sustainable without CF assistance. Now that a capable ISF logistics force is being generated, dependence must shift from Coalition-provided CSS to Iraqi-provided CSS. While gradually withdrawing CSS, CF will continue to mentor and assist the ISF with developing a capable, self-sustaining logistic system (fund, source, manage, and deliver) that functions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. See Appendix 8, Annex D of the MNC-I SOP.
c. (S//REL) Support to Other-Than-U.S. Military Forces. MNC-I may be required to provide common-item support, if available, to other U.S. agencies, CF, or the UN in accordance with applicable MOUs. Coalition support remains a national responsibility. MNC-I provides common-item support and services in accordance with applicable ACSAs. MSCs will provide monthly reporting of support required to Coalition partners.

d. (S//REL) Non-Standard Support Requirements. The ongoing BCT drawdown initially results in the IZ losing the robust BSB support it has traditionally received. The BSB (organic to the BCT currently positioned in the IZ) provides retail level logistics support to all the civilian and military forces within the IZ. Despite the fact that this logistics capability will not be replaced or backfilled, MNC-I maintains the Title X responsibility to provide all areas of logistics support to over 5,500 personnel residing in the IZ. This problem requires untraditional, creative solutions in order to continue to provide adequate logistics support to the IZ. The long-term solution is to source capabilities predominately by LOGCAP with the interim gap filled by an ad hoc Forward Logistical Element resourced with a combination of LOGCAP, ESC, and MND-B sustainment enablers. This is the first location in the ITO where this situation will occur. We must remain aware of the secondary and tertiary impacts to area support as we continue to draw down units and bring in non-standard BDE headquarters, which do not have internal logistics support.

e. (S//REL) Health Service Support (HSS). In the near term, MNC-I HSS elements will provide comprehensive medical support to CF and authorized beneficiaries. MNC-I will restructure HSS assets to correspond with the deliberate, area-by-area reduction of CF in Iraq. Additionally, MNC-I will coordinate the development of ISF medical capability and will support Cooperative Medical Engagements as a way of developing the Iraqi civilian health care system’s sustained capacity. These actions will help generate irreversible momentum in the near term as Iraqi institutions deliver essential health services to the people of Iraq. Over time, the HSS footprint will be adjusted to continue to provide rapid response to CF and to reinforce the ISF and Ministry of Health as required. The strict adherence by CF to the established medical rules of engagement and medical civil-military operations guidance will be critical to developing the Iraqi health sector since it helps to counter Iraqi over-reliance on Coalition HSS assets. See Annex Q of this order, as well as Annex Q of the MNC-I SOP.

5. (U) Command and Control.

a. (S//REL) Command. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory. CG, MNF-W is TACON to CG, MNC-I IAW COMUSMARCENT OPORD 06-0001. CJSOTF-AP is TACON to MNC-I and has a mutual support relationship when conducting operations in the AOR.
b. (S//REL) Command Relationships. MNC-I maintains partnership relationships at the division, brigade, and battalion levels to advise and support IA and NP units at the appropriate echelon. In terms of relationships, the term "partnered" equates to coordination through liaison officers at a minimum. MNC-I also establishes partnership with the IPS at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters, and Police Station level to develop IPS capacity. TTs are attached to the MSC to train, coach, and mentor ISF. With one exception, all IA units are OPCON to IGFC or the BOC (1/7 IA will transition to IGFC control in early 2008). IA units currently in force generation will transition from MOD control directly to IGFC and then on to an IA division or operational command.

(1) (S//REL) IGFC Command Relationships and Coordination with IGFC.

(a) (S//REL) Currently, there are three control entities within the MOD: JHQ, IGFC, and the BOC. JHQ is partnered with MNSTC-I; IGFC is partnered with MNC-I; the BOC reports to the Iraqi PM. IGFC retains ADCON of IA units that are under the BOC’s operational control. There is no command relationship between MNC-I and the JHQ. JHQ and its subordinate units are the supported command in AOs where they have assumed control. The IGFC is under the operational control of JHQ. There is no command relationship between CF
and Iraqi forces under the command and control of JHQ (to include IGFC). The IGFC will coordinate with MNC-I for moves of battalion or larger units. Within Iraqi AOs, CF may retain FOBs and their own AOs but must coordinate all movement across Iraqi divisional boundaries – on a case-by-case basis or through established MOUs that facilitate routine movements along MSRs and within established Combined Operations Areas (COA). There is no requirement to coordinate for CF overflight of AOs controlled by the IGFC and its subordinates. As required, MNC-I and the IGFC will create COAs; CF will revert to the supported command for the duration of operations inside the COA. CF will continue to provide support and force protection for transition teams operating in Iraqi AOs and will coordinate their actions when possible.

(b) (S//REL) Coordination at the strategic level between the JHQ and MNF-I is facilitated by the Liaison and Partnership Division. MNC-I has established a Liaison Cell with the IGFC for coordination. This liaison team is embedded in the IGFC HQ and has computer connectivity to MNC-I. MND/F will exchange liaison officers and interpreters with adjacent Iraqi units for coordination. At PIC they will be more dependent on the PICC as the point of coordination with Iraqi officials.

(2) (S//REL) Operational Commands. The Iraqi PM has directed the creation of several operational commands to improve the security situation in specific areas. Besides Baghdad, operational commands have been established in Basra, Diyala, Samarra, and Karbala. Additional operational commands will be established in Anbar (Ramadi) and Ninewa (Mosul). While the BOC reports directly to the PM, existing and planned operational commands are (or will be) OPCON to IGFC. Operational commands are viewed as an interim step on the way to establishing multiple corps headquarters for the IA.

(3) (S//REL) Command of Transition Teams. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) will coordinate TT issues between MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and the Fort Riley TT training base. Although TTs have been attached to the divisions, the IAG still retains ADCON responsibility of all National Level TTs (IGFC, NP HQ TT, DBE) and for U.S. externally-sourced U.S. Army TTs during the deployment and re-deployment phase of the TT lifecycle, and future RFF external TTs (less PTTs) attached to MNC-I. The IAG will provide the full range of tasks necessary to receive, train, and redeploy externally-sourced TTs throughout their lifecycle, to include oversight of team manning, initial team positioning assignment, execution of the RIP/TOA program, and policy development for TTs. CG, II MEF (Fwd) has OPCON of all USMC TTs operating in ITO. TACON of USMC transition teams operating outside MNF-W’s AO but within another MND’s AO will be passed to the respective MND commander; CG, II MEF (Fwd) retains OPCON of those teams. Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), NPTTs, and BTTs are attached to a U.S.-led MND and partner at the division, brigade or battalion level. PTTs are ADCON to 18th MP BDE and OPCON to the MND/F where they operate.
(4) (S//REL) Succession of Command. CG, MNC-I; US DCG, MNC-I; the senior U.S. MSC CG.

c. (U) Joint Communications System Support.

(1) (S//REL) General. Annex K (C4) details the planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of Iraq Theater Information Grid (I-TIG) services to MNC-I and its subordinate commands, to include SIPRNet, NIPRNet, CENTRIXS, VOSIP, DSN, RPRNET, and Video-Tele-Conference services.

(2) (S//REL) Coalition Command and Control. MNC-I will continue to conduct Coalition command and control via CENTRIXS and Command Post of the Future terminals deployed to the MND level.

(3) (S//REL) Command Post of the Future (CPOF). MNC-I Knowledge Management Officer will continue to improve the CPOF program. Improvements will include implementation of Ventrillo voice capabilities and a partial reset of older hardware.
(4) **(S//REL) Transition Team Communications.** In addition to organic tactical single channel communications assets, all TTs will have access to SIPRNet to meet operational and force protection requirements. MND/Fs are responsible for the provision of SIPRNet to their transition teams. MNC-I is responsible for the provision of SIPRNet to TTs in cases where the demand exceeds the capabilities of the owning MND/F. MNC-I, in conjunction with IAG has fielded VSAT systems to those MiTTs that do not have SIPR/NIPR connectivity or who are located in isolated locations.

(5) **(S//REL) Satellite Bases.** A satellite base is defined as any of the following: JSS, COP, patrol base, PJCC, or any other remotely-manned outpost.

(6) **(S//REL) JSS and COP Communications.** In addition to organic communications assets provided by the MND/Fs, JSSs and COPs require SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to meet operational and force protection requirements. MND/Fs are responsible for the provision of SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to their applicable JSS/COP locations. MNC-I is responsible for the provision of SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to JSSs and COPs when all available resources under the MND/Fs have been exhausted. MTOE equipment (i.e., JNN, CPN, SEN, LOS V1, etc.) should not be used to provide communications to JSSs or COPs. The use of MTOE equipment takes away from the self-sustainment of the BCT. MNC-I ICW the Department of the Army is in the process of sourcing, through a JUONS, 130 VSATs to provide SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP services to all remote locations (i.e., JSSs, COPs, BTs, MiTTs, POEs, RRPs, and a CSC). This initiative will relieve some of the MTOE equipment that is currently being used in-order to provide services to remote locations.

(7) **(S//REL) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR).** SPAWAR is a government agency that MNC-I has an agreement with to provide MWR Internet Service throughout the ITO. SPAWAR subcontracts to DRS Technologies in order to provide the Internet and VOIP phone service to Soldiers. The internet service is free and the phone service through the purchase of phone cards bought off of at four cents per minute. SPAWAR is responsible for the training, distribution, installation, and maintenance of SPAWAR systems according to geographical and subscriber density requirements. See MNC-I Policy Letter (FY08 MWRNET Internet Café Policy (SPAWAR)) in Annex K.

(8) **(S//REL) IGFC-MNC-I Communications.** IAW DoD Information Assurance policies and guidelines, U.S. and Iraqi data networks will not be physically or logically connected. IGFC-MNC-I Information flow uses the following means:

   a) **(S//REL) Liaison Officers.** Both IGFC and MNC-I maintain LNO capabilities at their counterpart headquarters. The MNC-I LNO to IGFC has access to all I-TIG services, to include SIPRNet and DSN. Properly vetted data can be sent to the MNC-I LNO for release or display to IGFC as required. The respective LNOs serve as a conduit for operational information between the two headquarters.

   b) **(S//REL) Information Exchange Center (IEC).** MNC-I establishes IECs at both headquarters to facilitate translation and exchange of administrative and non-time-sensitive
information between IGFC and MNC-I. The IECs have access to all I-TIG services as well as dedicated interpreters.

(c) (S//REL) VTC Capability. MNC-I FUOPS ICW MNC-I C6 obtained a VTC capability to support the IGFC and IA Divisions under this command.

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