# MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 06-03 (U)

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1. **Situation.** This order supersedes OPORD 06-01, 21 APR 2006 and serves as the base guidance for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) operations beginning 4 November 2006. This order reflects a reorientation of MNC-I’s operational focus since the seating of the GOI, and changes in the threat environment. MNC-I will continue to transition from a military-civil focus to a civil-military focus that places greater emphasis on developing the institutions and conditions that allow the GOI to achieve self-reliance as MNC-I evolves into a supporting command, rather than the supported command for Security and Transition. This command will continue to develop governance at all levels—local, district, provincial, and national—and support the economic development necessary to propel the people of Iraq forward along the path of democracy. To this end, the decisive operation for OPORD 06-03 is to secure Baghdad, the Operational Center of Gravity. On order, MNC-I will complete the decisive operation of OPORD 06-01 by transitioning all provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Supporting this process, there will be continued efforts to increase the capabilities of the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) while sustaining ongoing efforts to transition Iraqi Army (IA) units to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and placing them in the lead for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. OPORD 06-03 incorporates the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (30 November 2005), the Joint Mission statement issued (6 December 2005) by the United States Mission to Iraq in conjunction with Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), MNF-I Campaign Plan (May 2006), the MNF-I Joint Campaign Action Plan (June 2006), and the July 2006 USCENTCOM 2006 Campaign Plan “Regional War on Terrorism.” OPORD 06-03 provides guidance to MNC-I’s subordinates for the next twelve months and for the following key events: National Police Reform, sustained implementation of the “Year of the Police,” the continued process of transitioning Iraqi Army units to the command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), provincial elections, the next constitutional referendum, and the completion of the PIC process in all eighteen provinces.

a. **General.** OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) must be viewed in the context of the Global War on Terror and USCENTCOM’s role in this effort. Relevant guidance is contained in the March 2005 USCENTCOM PLANORD “Posturing for the Long War,” its counterpart the August 2005 PLANORD “Countering Al Qaida and Associated Movements,” and the July 2006 USCENTCOM 2006 Campaign Plan “Regional War on Terrorism.” The war in Iraq has continued to evolve since its initiation in 2003. Coalition Forces rapidly defeated the regime of Sadam Hussein and its associated conventional military forces. Unable to fill the void of governance and security left in the wake of conventional victory, an insurgency emerged. Initially, Saddamist and Sunni Rejectionists constituted the principal threat, but soon thereafter the insurgency expanded as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) took on a larger role. Although thousands of insurgents and AQI operatives have been killed or captured to include principal leaders, violence has increased and the enemy has shown a sustained capacity for regeneration. Whereas the insurgency has grown, efforts to provide legitimate governance (the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Transitional Government) and provide security for the Iraqi people have not been concomitant. The election of the National Government in December 2005 was a major milestone, but was followed by hesitation and inactivity. Furthermore, corruption and the imposition of a political spoils system have retarded progress; in some cases, entire ministries use their portfolios solely in the interest of advancing their particular ethnic or sectarian group at the
expense of all Iraqis. The Samara mosque bombing precipitated a new phase of the war bringing with it increased sectarian violence as Iraqis compete with one another for power. Efforts to increase the capability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have been successful, yet they are still unable to fully secure Iraq and have become increasingly the target of attack by insurgents and terrorists. This order and the MNC-I Commander’s Intent codifies a new approach for defeating the myriad enemies of the elected government of Iraq. The diverse goals of our enemies include toppling the Government of Iraq, expelling coalition forces from the country, return to power, and in the case of Sunni extremists establish caliphate, while Shi’a extremists want a Shi’a dominated Islamic state. Unfortunately, threat groups do not have to achieve decisive military success or significantly attrit coalition forces to reach their goals. Although an attritional aspect will remain embedded in the GOI and Coalition’s approach to defeating insurgents and terrorists—intelligence driven offensive operations that continue to target key leaders and those who cannot be reconciled to the GOI—it must use predominantly non-kinetic means to deny the enemies’ access to their most precious commodity, fighters willing to take up their cause. In conjunction with the GOI, we do this by enabling a wholesale change in the environment that has sustained the supply of foot soldiers in the face of heavy attrition. We must enable the GOI to institute political measures that seek the compromises necessary to draw Iraqis away from insurgent leaders and terrorist ideologies. We must create the economic opportunities that compete directly with the immediate monetary gains of being an insurgent. We must enable the GOI to give its citizens security, essential services, and a sense of honor in being an Iraqi citizen—tangible alternatives to the promises and deeds of the insurgents and their parent political organizations that operate openly. Only the Iraqis can secure their own victory; our role is to help them realize the day when the enemies of Iraq are paralyzed for a lack of the resources they require to sustain their efforts. Victory in Iraq is a function of eliminating the void of governance and security that emerged in 2003. The void must be filled by a government that is recognized by the Iraqi people as legitimate and competent Iraqi security forces accountable to the same government.

b. (S//REL) Environment of Conflict. The fundamental conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups over the distribution of political and economic power. The security environment in 2006 has continued to transition from primarily a Sunni rejectionist insurgency to a struggle for power between sectarian groups. Meanwhile, Sunni and Shi’a extremists are accelerating the conflict with acts of sectarian violence to gain control of key areas in Baghdad, protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Consequently, sectarian violence in Baghdad and outlying areas fueled by Sunni/Shi’a reprisal attacks is the top security concern for the Government of Iraq. The graphic below represents how the threat and security environment has evolved over the past three years. The shift in the threat reflects an increasing tendency for violence to be directed at civilians to foment sectarian divisions. Sectarian violence, accelerated by the Samarra Golden Mosque bombing in February, has caused the number of civilians murdered in Iraq to increase by over 900% thus far in 2006. The delay in the formation of the government and it’s slow start in tackling a legislative agenda, combined with terrorist attacks on Shi’a targets and the opportunity to fill perceived local security vaccums, has also allowed Shi’a militias, particularly Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) to grow in strength and capability. Although CF and ISF will continue to be a focus for insurgent
attacks, sectarian violence targeted at civilians is a highly corrosive component of the security environment.

Figure 1. (S//REL) Evolving Threat

(1) (S//REL) At the strategic level, the GOI’s ability to be a true national unity government with effective ministers and the capability to deliver essential services will be a significant factor in achieving MNC-I’s objectives for the remainder of 2006 and into 2007. The permanent GOI thus far has not been a national unity government, and for the most part has been following narrow sectarian interests. The national election in December 2005 produced a Council of Representatives (COR) primarily elected along sectarian lines, creating little incentive to compromise sectarian goals in support of united platform frameworks or issue-based agendas. The COR concluded its first legislative term on 30 July without addressing major constitutional issues, including setting a date and rules for provincial elections, establishing the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), defining executive procedures to resolve the status of Kirkuk, or enacting legislation on federalism.

(2) (S//REL) The upcoming political year with reconciliation plan efforts, the constitutional amendment process, and provincial elections will be a continued period of increased strategic risk. The graphic below depicts the proposed political timeline of events along with C2 assessments and a comparison of key group interests and objectives.
Figure 2, (S//REL) Strategic Threat Assessment

(3) (S//REL) Shi’a political groups are attempting to consolidate power and publicly support reconciliation plans, but have not followed-up with concrete programs to increase Sunni engagement in the political process. Recently, Shi’a political parties have begun to split over the issue of federalism with SCIRI supporting creation of a nine-province Southern Shi’a federal region, while PM Maliki along with Muqtada al Sadr hold on to the concept of ‘one Iraq’ with Shi’a groups in charge of the GOI. Kurdish political groups are working within, parallel to, around, and sometimes in coordination with Shi’a groups as long as it furthers their goal for Kurdish independence with Kirkuk as the capitol. Sunni groups find themselves struggling for survival, and are pushing for real reconciliation and amnesty programs along with trying to block Shi’a and Kurdish federalism efforts.

(4) (S//REL) The GOI, although following the constitution amendment timelines, will likely attempt to delay progress on amendments to avoid the controversial issues of federalism and Kirkuk. Upcoming provincial elections, not anticipated any earlier than March 2006, will be particularly contentious in Sunni/Shi’a contested areas such as Baghdad and Diyalá, and in Southern Iraq where Shi’a groups will fight internally for political control. The Shi’a SCIRI party, driven by fear that they may lose majority rule of provincial councils to the Sadrists and the Fadillah party, want to delay provincial elections, and are pushing for COR legislation to create a Southern Shi’a republic made up of nine Southern provinces. In general, Sunni political groups support provincial elections since they provide an opportunity to make up for past poor participation in elections. Provincial elections also provide a mechanism for Sunni dominated provinces to exert influence over the national political process and redefine relationships between the ministries and
provincial level governance, even without key appointment and budgetary authority, which will continue to flow from Baghdad.

(5) (S//REL) The UN review of UNSCR 1637 (mandate for CF presence in Iraq) expires on 31 Dec 06, and is another controversial issue that will impact the security environment. Currently, there is not a lot of movement at the UN on UNSCR 1637, and the GOI/major political Iraqi groups have little to gain politically with their constituents by publicly supporting the UN extension. UN mandate expiration would embolden Shi’a and Sunni rejectionists to increase ‘honorable resistance’ attacks against the perceived occupier. No extension of the UN mandate would also make CF authorities murky and would require some other legal framework to continue security and stability operations in Iraq.

(6) (S//REL) GOI’s ability to provide basic services and repair key infrastructure are fundamental to the legitimacy of the government. The decay and disruption of energy infrastructure, both oil and electric, hinders the GOI’s ability to generate revenue, grow the economy, and provide essential services to the people of Iraq. Organized crime elements, in collusion with Sunni Rejectionists, continue to attack lines and repair teams to maintain control over black market prices and demonstrate power to the GOI. Attacks occur with insider knowledge of infrastructure vulnerabilities and with at least tacit support of infrastructure industry officials and security services.

(7) (S//REL) In the end, separatist agendas, whether Sunni, Shi’a or Kurdish, place “one Iraq” at risk as a strategic goal, exacerbate conditions for a potential civil war, and shape provincial elections in favor of sectarian interests. Sectarian goals, if allowed to supersede Iraqi national goals, affect ministry seating and establish conditions for sub-regional withdrawal from the Iraqi national political process, especially during the constitutional amendment and referendum process.

(8) (S//REL) Narrow sectarian interests are fueling the sectarian violence cycle, which represents the current greatest security challenge to MNC-I. Despite large scale operations such as OPERATION TOGETHER FORWARD, sectarian violence remains unabated. The escalation of sectarian violence is pushing the indicators trending toward civil war to increase. Sunni extremists led by AQI and death squads with Shi’a militia support are locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian violence to contest areas for control. Sunni extremist mass casualty producing attacks against Shi’a population centers and religious sites provoke Shi’a militias to conduct retaliatory attacks against members of the Sunni populace. This self-sustaining cycle of violence must be disrupted especially in Baghdad in order for tensions to be reduced between the sectarian and social groups, and improve the overall security environment.

c. (S//REL) Counter-Insurgency (COIN). COIN operations are manpower and resource intensive. Coalition COIN operations shape the environment of conflict in order to set the conditions for the GOI to assume the lead for the kinetic aspects of neutralizing the insurgency. These operations directly attack the enemies of the GOI and indirectly by separating them from their base of support. Diminishing resources will require calculated tactical risks to achieve operational and strategic success. The current strategy remains to build Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability. Further development of the IPS, National Police
(NP) reform, and the sustained development of the IA, will provide the GOI with the security forces necessary to neutralize the insurgency. This, in conjunction with political compromises and changes in the Iraqi environment, will shift the peoples’ allegiance to the GOI. ISF success will demonstrate that the GOI is meeting its security responsibilities; and, as multi-ethno/sectarian organizations, ISF provide an enduring vehicle to promote Iraqi patriotism and serve as a symbol of national unity.

d. **Area of Concern and Area of Responsibility**

1. **(S//REL)** The campaign in Iraq has become central to the GWOT. Failure would lead to the creation of a sanctuary from which terrorists could plan and launch attacks on a regional and global scale. It would embolden the terrorists and expand their reach and influence. Success in Iraq, however, would deal them a decisive blow, but success will not be achieved by dealing with the country in isolation. All of its neighbors have influence on Iraq and the potential to affect the achievement of the mission. The information age also provides regional and global audiences immediate access to events in Iraq through images and commentary, conveyed through print and televised media, the World Wide Web, personal email and BLOGs. The Coalition will encourage Iraq to engage with its neighbors to assist in the creation of stability in the region. Engagement with Sunni Arab neighbors may help to balance the perception of 1.4b, 1.4d in Iraq.

2. **(S//REL)** A number of neighboring countries support the Coalition in varying ways. To the north, Turkey provides an important Line of Communication (LOC). It is a key outlet for the export of Iraqi oil, and it has major interest and influence in the Kurdish region. To the west and south, both 1.4p and Saudi Arabia provide differing levels of support for the Coalition, which, in turn, has made them targets for terrorist attack. However, their borders are porous and are exploited as infiltration routes for foreign fighters and terrorist materiel. To the south, Kuwait provides an essential support base for the Coalition as well as its key LOC. Access through the Gulf is also vital to Iraq’s economy as it is a critical outlet for its oil exports.
e. *(S//REL)* **Area of Operations (AO).** CG MNC-I is responsible for operations within the national borders of Iraq. The Area of Operations (AO) and force disposition is described in the figure below.

**Figure 3.** *(S//REL)* MNC-I Area of Operations

f. *(S//REL)* **Threat Organizations.** Insurgents, terrorists, militias, death squads, and criminals are the primary dynamic physical threats to political stability in Iraq. More importantly, group membership and activities are not mutually exclusive; many threat organizations conduct tactical actions which can be considered criminal, terrorist, or insurgent simultaneously. They actively perpetuate instability in order to create the conditions to achieve their diverse end states. Each group views the CF as “occupiers” and the primary obstacle to achieving their political/economic/sectorian objectives. However, as the GOI assumes a greater share of the security mission, all threat groups will expend correspondingly larger shares of their resources in order to destroy, disrupt, intimidate and corrupt the ISF. The threat groups can also be viewed on a continuum organized around their social groupings as depicted in the graphic below.
SECRET/REL TO USA, MCFI/MR

Figure 4, (S//REL) Threat Group Continuum

Sunni and Shi'a extremists will continue to organize along cellular lines, while Sunni Rejectionists may form into larger groups strategically while operating at a decentralized, cellular level. National resistance movements are likely to structure themselves as militias along traditional military lines – forming into platoons, companies, battalions and brigades. Groups entering civil society will structure along the lines of a neighborhood watch. Both armed and unarmed neighborhood watches will structure geographically to protect a particular street or neighborhood from outside interference. Underpinning the entire continuum will be the influence of criminal gangs and individuals; selling their services to all parts of the insurgency, filling security voids and switching allegiance and loyalties. The following paragraphs contain key judgments about the threat organizations. A full description of the threats and overall risks presented to the GOI and the coalition mission is contained in Annex B (Intelligence) and Appendix B-1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this order.

(1) (S//REL) Sunni Extremists, Sunni extremists are those Sunni threat groups that are beyond engagement and are not expected to participate in the political process or transition to civil society. Some of the key Sunni extremist groups are the following: Mujahidin Shura Council (Al-Qaida in Iraq – Umar Brigade, Monotheism Support, Islamic Jihad Brigades, Al-Ahwal (Fear) Brigades, Al-Ghuraba (Foreigners) Brigades, Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaa Army, Murabitun Brigades), Ansar al Sunna, Al-Faruq Brigades, Brigades of Imam al Basri, Khalid’s Army, and Swords of the Righteous. AQI is the dominant terrorist network in Iraq established by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi (AMZ). AQI’s strategic goals are the following: topple the Government of Iraq, expel Coalition Forces, and establish caliphate. Despite AMZ’s death, AQI’s campaign of popular intimidation and commitment to extremist ideology is unchanged. As such, localized opposition to AQI from rejectionists in Anbar province and some tribal elements will continue and may widen further. Abd al Min’im Izz al Din Ali al Badri, AKA Abu Ayyub al Masri, the new AQI emir, will attempt to apply Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and AQ ideology to AQI and continue to foster close relations to AQ Senior Leadership while attempting to increase the AQI role in the Global Jihad. Ansar al-Sunna (AS) is attempting to become the dominant Sunni extremist group in Iraq and seeks to overshadow AQI in terms of lethality, sustainability in OPTEMPO and IO effectiveness in 2007. Adopting a mainstream AQ extremist strategy, they will continue to cast the coalition as ‘occupiers’ in order to create
Muslim unity. AS will attempt to unify Iraqi terrorist groups under a more Islamist banner and to establish their own constituency. To fulfill these goals, they will attempt to destabilize the nation by attacking CF, ISF, and what they perceive as an apostate government. AS presents the greatest mid- to long-term threat to the stability of Iraq because of their adaptability and Iraqi base membership. At the strategic level, all Sunni extremists are ideologically committed to causing failure of the GOI and Coalition mission. They cannot be enticed to join the political process. The creation of a failed state in Iraq will allow them to operate freely once coalition forces leave Iraq and provide them a base of operations for further acts throughout the Middle East and to support broader Al Qaeda global terror operations.

(2) (S/REL) Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF). This is an umbrella term for Sunni extremists and foreign fighters operating in Iraq. The composition and organization of T&FF will continue to change through the remainder of 2006 and into 2007. Once primarily associated with AQI and the late Jordanian al-Zarqawi, the Sunni extremist terror organizations within Iraq are increasingly Iraqi and decreasingly controlled by AQI. Major groups in this category are AQI and AS.

(3) (S/REL) Iraqi Sunni Reactionists (IZR-Sunni). Sunni Reactionists constitute the majority base of the Iraqi insurgency, focus their attacks on CF/ISF and are potentially reconcilable. The major IZR-Sunni groups are the following: 1920 Revolutionary Brigade, New Ba’ath Party (NBP), Jaysh Muhammad (JM), Islamic Army of Iraq, Mujahidin Army and Rayfidin Army. The 1920 Revolutionary Brigade is the largest element of the IZR Sunni grouping. They primarily oppose the ‘occupation’ of Iraq by MNF and fear Shi’a domination and Jaysh Muhammad was originally established by Saddam Hussein in early 2003 as the military wing of the NBP. These two groups operate closely together and overlap significantly. NBP/JM goals also include the expulsion of the MNF, provision of security in Sunni and mixed communities and the broad restoration of political and economic rights for Sunnis. Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) is an Islamist terrorist group with reactionist elements established by former Iraq Ba’ath and military officers in 2003. IAI’s primary goals are the defense of the Iraqi Sunni populace, expulsion of foreign influence from Iraq, including MNF and establishment of a Sunni dominated Sharia government. IZR-Sunni groups consistently seek to portray themselves as the Iraqi ‘honorable resistance’ to MNF, and accordingly renounce an overtly sectarian agenda. However, they sub rosa seek to reassert Sunni dominance in Iraq and rebuff the Iraqi Government and ISF as illegitimate Shi’a dominated institutions pursuing their own sectarian agenda. During the wave of sectarian violence following the 22 Feb Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra, IZR-Sunni and neighborhood groups took steps to defend local Sunni interests, and in any future escalation of sectarian tensions, they will more aggressively respond to perceived provocations and target Shi’a Militias. Their involvement in sectarian violence will be facilitated by their pre-existing operational connections to AQI and is most likely to occur in mixed Sunni-Shi’a areas with a strong AQI presence, especially in Baghdad, Diyala and northern Babil. A future escalation in sectarian tensions will likely be met with increased popular support among Sunnis for an anti-Shi’a agenda and reinforced unity.
(4) (S//REL) Iraqi Shi’a Rejectionists (IZR-Shi’a). IZR-Shi’a consist of mostly JAM splinter elements, Thar Allah, and 15th Sha’abian groups, and remain a minority portion of the insurgency operating primarily in Najaf, Karbala, Basrah, Maysan, and Wasit Provinces. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCRI)/Badr Organization and the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS)/JAM are not considered IZR-Shia, and are addressed under the Shi’a militia grouping. IZR-Shi’a have access to Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) technologies and technical employment skills. EFPs related capabilities (materials and knowledge) are provided by Most IZR-Shi’a groups are opportunists or followers of charismatic leaders and seek a Shi’a theocracy based on Shari’a law. IZR-Shi’a are not controlled by Sadr or SCRI, and are not influenced by Grand Ayatollah Sistani. The lack of support from either OMS or SCRI will limit the growth of IZR-Shi’a insurgent groups. They will continue to remain active primarily due to support through intelligence training, financing and technology. Actual and perceived adversely affects Sunni Arab views, further complicating efforts to achieve inclusive politics and national unity. IZR-Shi’a sporadically attack GOI and CF in order to defeat the formation of a secular, Western style democracy. In late 2006 and 2007, expect the rejectionist categories to shrink further as small numbers of constituents move into the extremist categories at either the end of the continuum and larger numbers move into the militia category as MNF draws down and the GOI slowly starts meeting public expectations.

(5) (S//REL) Shi’a Extremists. networks make up this category. Similar to Sunni extremists, these groups are beyond engagement and are unlikely to participate in the political process or transition to civil society. Shi’a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi’a enclaves from ‘Ba’athist Belts’ by portraying themselves as Shi’a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition.

(6) (S//REL) Death Squads. Many threat organizations have members guilty of death squad activity. These organizations range from Sunni/Shi’a extremists to Shi’a militias. The term death squad is descriptive of an organization’s activities and tactics, and is primarily focused at a particular sectarian group. A death squad is an armed group conducting attacks with the specific intent to commit extra judicial killings. Death squad victims are often bound and then shot execution style, throats slit, or beheaded. This does not exclude other sectarian motivated killings as being classified as death squad activities, such as drive by shootings. However, indirect fire attacks, SVBIEDS, VBIEDS, and IEDs will remain categorized as acts of terrorism. Denying death squads physical sanctuary, political authority, and religious legitimacy through kinetic targeting and effective information operations will significantly reduce the level of violence directed at civilians.

(7) (S//REL) Shi’a Militias. This category describes armed groups, who are engaged and partially involved in the political process. Militias are armed organizations not sanctioned by the GOI; not designated as a terrorist or an Iraqi insurgent group; and have the standing potential to use force to further political, religious, vigilante, financial, or other objectives. The terms militia or national resistance cover a range of groups including JAM and the Badr Organization, each of which support sectarian political organizations and maintain the capability to mobilize rapidly and challenge CF and ISF formations.
(8) **(S//REL) Criminals and Gangs.** Some smaller IZR groups will become increasingly criminal, rather than insurgent in nature, outside the control of political actors. Criminal elements will conduct kidnapping, smuggling, drug running and other illicit activities for profit, and in collusion with some insurgent groups and terror organizations. Some of these groups will also attempt to keep T&FF out of their areas, and prevent the need for Shi’a or Kurdish-led ISF deployments to Sunni-dominated areas. Sunni groups in particular will remain closely linked to tribal, religious and political leaders in their local areas, drawing on familial and tribal linkages for manpower and logistical support.

(9) **(S//REL) Most Likely Threat Adaptation.** GOI will remain mired in political infighting, at the expense of administering the country for the remainder of the year and into early 2007. Iraqi political groups will continue to follow narrowly based sectarian agendas rather than truly form a unity government and get on with pursuing a truly national legislative agenda. We will continue to see a shifting of the threat from a Sunni rejectionist insurgency to a struggle for power between entities accelerated by extremist elements. Baghdad will define the conflict and remain the focus for sectarian violence. The impact of increased Baghdad security operations will cause threat groups to “go to ground” in localized sanctuaries in the city, and later displace to outlying areas in Diyala, Baghdad Belt, and Eastern Anbar province. The graphic below depicts the most likely threat adaptation with mixed Baghdad security success over the remainder of 2006. GOI will remain gridlocked over the contentious issues of federalism, constitutional amendments, reconciliation plans, and dealing with the rising role of militias. Due to sectarian interests, the constitutional review process and provincial elections will likely be pushed to the right, further delaying resolution of key political problems. If the GOI is not in political paralysis and continues to provide minimal services to major cities, the Sunni rejectionist insurgency will not spread geographically and is likely to reduce in overall numbers of active and passive supporters. The reduction of CF footprint in conjunction with the transfer of battle space to Iraqi lead may diminish active support to ‘honorable resistance.’ Sunni rejectionists have arrived at a crossroads of continued insurgency, political engagement or radicalization towards AQI/AS. Widening the rift between Sunni rejectionists and AQI will largely depend on whether the new government delivers tangible results to Sunni Arabs in Iraq. SCIRI and OMS will continue competition for Shi’a popular support and GOI control, with SCIRI likely to emerge as the dominant Shi’a influence at the expense of OMS. The overall nature of the kinetic fight will not change significantly; the enemy will continue using IEDs, IDF, SAF and periodic suicide attacks against civilian and ISF. IZR groups will conduct fewer attacks against ISF and the IG, instead becoming more criminal as popular support for continued violence decreases. T&FF will remain a key threat to the MNF-I strategic end state because of their ideological commitment to inducing a failed state in prelude to the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.
Most Likely Threat Adaptation – Baghdad Security
Mixed Success, AIF Work Around CF OPs, and GOI Struggles

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**S//REL TO USA, MCFI/MR**

**Most Likely Threat Adaptation – Baghdad Security**

**Mixed Success, AIF Work Around CF OPs, and GOI Struggles**

**BLUE** – Increased CF presence in Baghdad initially decreases murders and intimidation acts in the city, but AIF activity remains high outside cleared areas and elevated in Diyala, Yusufiyah, and Ramadi. GOI continues to struggle due to sectarian interests and meddles with constitutional amendment process and provincial elections. Sunni/Shia extremists continue reprisal violence and seek control of contested areas. Shia dominated GOI continues to consolidate power and Shia militias expand out to Baghdad Belt.

**ASSESSMENT**

- Mixed success for Baghdad security forces AIF to go to ground in safe havens; attacks increase outside cleared areas and later increase in cleared areas.
- Sunni AIF – Baghdad (Doura, Adhamiyah, Mansour, Bait (Abu G., Yusufiyah, Salman Pak)
- Shia AIF – Baghdad (Sad City/Shaab, Khadamiya, Ghazaliya, Shula)
- Some AIF groups leave Baghdad AO
- Sunni AIF – Go West-Anbar, Go North
- Baqubah, Kirkuk
- Shia AIF – Diyala, Babil and points South
- GOI progress in national reconciliation, militia integration and constitutional reform is likely to be slow and difficult.
- Early 2007, tense security period in the run-up to provincial elections/const. referendum
- Sectarian tensions increase in contested areas (Diyala, Baghdad, Kirkuk) prior to provincial elections.

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**Figure 5. (S//REL) Most Likely Threat Adaptation**

(S//REL) GOI will remain gridlocked over the contentious issues of federalism, constitutional amendments, reconciliation plans, and dealing with the rising role of militias. Due to sectarian interests, the constitutional review process and provincial elections will likely be pushed to the right, further delaying resolution of key political problems. If the GOI is not in political paralysis and continues to provide minimal services to major cities, the Sunni rejectionist insurgency will not spread geographically and is likely to reduce in overall numbers of active and passive supporters. The reduction of CF footprint in conjunction with the transfer of battle space to Iraqi lead may diminish active support to ‘honorable resistance.’ Sunni rejectionists have arrived at a crossroads of continued insurgency, political engagement or radicalization towards AQI/AS. Widening the rift between Sunni rejectionists and AQI will largely depend on whether the new government delivers tangible results to Sunni Arabs in Iraq. SCIRI and OMS will continue competition for Shia popular support and GOI control, with SCIRI likely to emerge as the dominant Shia influence at the expense of OMS. The overall nature of the kinetic fight will not change significantly; the enemy will continue using IEDs, IDF, SAF and periodic suicide attacks against civilian and ISF. IZR groups will conduct fewer attacks against ISF and the IG, instead becoming more criminal as popular support for continued violence decreases. T&FF will remain a key accelerant and threat to the MNF-I strategic end state because of their ideological commitment to inducing a failed state in prelude to the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.

(10) (S//REL) Most Dangerous Threat Adaptation. The Iraqi people quickly lose faith in the GOI because it fails to provide the services that Iraqis expect: security, economic
opportunity, food, water, power and basic health services. Iraqis turn to alternative support networks embedded within their ethnic and religious communities to solve their problems and ignore the Baghdad government. This will lead to an effective partition of Iraq, with outbreaks of violence in mixed population areas along ethnic fault-lines to achieve full separation. In Baghdad, increased security operations fail to prevent murder and intimidation acts in the beladis, and sectarian violence spreads across the country. Sunni extremists, especially AQIZ and Shi’a extremists, JAM, increase reprisal attacks to gain control of contested areas. JAM refuses to relinquish responsibility for security of Shi’a neighborhoods and confrontations with CF/ISF escalate. The graphic below depicts the most dangerous threat adaptation if Baghdad security fails over the remainder of 2006.

Most Dangerous Threat Adaptation – Baghdad Security Fails: Widespread Sectarian Violence

ASSESSMENT
- AF go to ground in safe havens initially followed by increased attacks along Sunni/Shi’awi faultlines
- Death squad Shi’a activity up in Baghdad along Kadamiyah, Mansour, Bayaa corridor increased AQI suicide attacks East of Tikrit Sunni fight back
- Some AF leave Baghdad AO
- Sunni AF – Go West Anbar, Go North SAC, Kirkuk, Mosul
- Shi’a AF – Diyala, Babylon and points South
- GOI reconciliation plan fails and Sunni resistance increases
- Refusal of JAM to relinquish “responsibility” for security of Shi’a safe havens
- CF/ISF “incursion” into Shi’a safe havens results in violent confrontations
- Refusal of IP, NP, JA units to confront militias
- AQIZ uses sectarian violence to enhance FoM
- Ramadi and Baghdad Belt remains AQIZ operational support zone JAM contests belt area
- GOI fails to resolve federalism issue and constitutional amendment issues

Figure 6, (S/REL) Most Dangerous Threat Adaptation

(S/REL) Some IA and IP elements will disband and return to sectarian areas as potential militia. The KRG will use Peshmerga to fortify behind a line that includes Kirkuk and its oilfields. The Shi’a will pull back to Baghdad and Southern provinces leaving Sunni Arabs with Al Anbar, parts of Sal al Din and Nineveh. T&FF and criminals will thrive in ungoverned spaces and collude to exact concessions of support from tribes and urban centers. The unleashing of centrifugal forces increasingly leads to a defacto disassembly of the state of Iraq into separate political entities similar to the map below.
Strategic Factors
- To Iraqi politicians, power is a zero sum game
- Sectarian interests prevailing
- Political factions aligned with armed groups
- Coalition in referee role
- Regional countries not helping
- GOI not providing basic services
- Sunni provinces (Anbar) not a priority for the GOI

Operational/Tactical Factors
- Security for civilians
- Militias protect turf
- IA/IP infiltration by sectarian groups
- AQIZ suicide attacks followed by Shia death squad murders
- Extremists fight for contested areas
- Protection of infrastructure
- Follow-thru with basic services

Fracture of Iraq or Federalism Opportunity?

Figure 7, (S//REL) Fracture of Iraq or Federalism Opportunity?

(11) (S//REL) Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis. Myriad enemies confront the GOI and CF assisting them; thus, it is not practical to define a single Center of Gravity (CoG) that if acted against will achieve victory. Although the enemies have divergent strategic objectives and desired end states, they generally share a collective intermediate objective: the withdrawal of the Coalition and the elimination of the GOI in its present form as a democratically representative body of the Iraqi people. They share many Critical Capabilities: the ability to inflict casualties (CF and ISF); terrify the people of Iraq through intimidation, murder, and mass casualty producing events; and create doubt in the minds of Iraqis that the GOI can provide security or basic services. They generally share these common Critical Requirements: young men, principally, willing to conduct attacks and emplace IEDs; technical expertise in the manufacture of IEDs and similar devices; economic conditions that make the risks associated with AIF activity worthwhile; the active / passive support of the Iraqi people; funding (domestic and foreign); an easily identified target on which to focus their effort; the ability to deliver control of key commodities or basic services; the passive and active support of local and national religious leaders; and leadership. Their Critical Vulnerabilities are: offer no better alternative; loss of access to recruits; a shifting alliance of the Iraqi people toward the GOI; improvements in the economy that provide more choices for employment and generate the wealth needed to provide better basic services; a reduction of CF as ISF take on a greater burden for COIN; confidence of the people in the Rule of Law, thus removing the ethno / sectarian distinctions that facilitate the ideological focus of many AIF.

g. (S//REL) Friendly Forces.
(1) **(S//REL) Nature of the Coalition.** The purpose of the twenty-seven nation coalition is to establish an independent Iraq with a representative government that participates in the international community; a sovereign nation at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the Global War on Terror. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have developed and progressed; the need for additional progress remains, especially the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Other elements of national power continue to lag. The GOI must develop the ministerial capacity to ensure its ability to provide for the Iraqi people—deliver basic services, establish/develop the rule of law, regulate commerce, and provide for its common defense. MNC-I must continue to assist the GOI as it develops its governmental capacity that will allow it to become self-reliant. MNC-I supports MNF-I, adjacent units, and agencies in their efforts to develop Iraq politically and economically while continuing to develop the ISF and set conditions for the long-term security of the Iraqi people.

(2) **(U) Friendly Center of Gravity Analysis.**

(a) **(S//REL) Grand Strategic (MNF-I).** The grand strategic center of gravity is Coalition will. The legitimacy of the Coalition’s presence, its positive relationship with the GOI, and the vital nature of its operations to the national interests all serve to underpin Coalition will. UNSCR 1637 provides formal legitimacy to Coalition operations, at the request of the GOI, to assist in the development of Iraq as a secure and self-reliant nation. Operations in Iraq are vital to the national interests of Coalition members and to broader international stability. But public will must be underwritten by a firm belief that the Coalition is succeeding as demonstrated by continuous progress towards our endstate. Public will in Coalition nations unwilling to accept the human costs of the operation, the commitment of resources, and the requirement to sustain effort until the task is complete. It is therefore essential to communicate the strategic importance of success and progress in Iraq to Coalition audiences and the wider international community.

(b) **(S//REL) Strategic (MNF-I).** The strategic center of gravity is the legitimacy of the GOI. A solid foundation was laid by the broad participation in the 15 December 2005 election. Recognition and continued support by the international community will reinforce its legitimacy in the region and throughout the world. But a critical element of legitimacy will be a GOI which can provide security for all Iraqis and govern effectively and in a representative manner. This requires the development of capable institutions and effective systems at national, provincial and local levels that are able to provide for the security of the people of Iraq, to meet their basic needs, to develop a free-market economy, and to operate within a framework of good governance and the rule of law. This must be underpinned by a GOI agenda which is demonstrably inclusive rather than sectarian or ethnically based and ministries that operate according to program guidelines. Assisting the GOI to achieve this will form a major part of the Coalition’s strategy. It demands a cross-spectrum approach spanning governance, the economy, as well as security and the development of capable institutions to support these. It will also require assistance to the GOI in formulating a program to enhance national unity and to remove sectarian influences from government institutions. This program will promote inclusiveness and address issues of contention, such as sectarianism,
EGAGs and the perception of foreign influence, through peaceful means in accordance with the rule of law.

(c) (S//REL) Operational (MNC-I). The Operational Center of Gravity is Baghdad, not as a geographic location, but in the Clausewitzian sense as the hub of all power, a complex system of systems upon which the unified nation-state of Iraq is dependent. Its Critical Capabilities include: it is the national capital in a nation that in the modern era has become accustomed to strong central governance, all roads lead to Baghdad; it is the touchstone of external influence to include embassies, international business headquarters, and non-governmental organizations (NGO); it has been the cultural capital of the state of Iraq, home to museums, performing arts, and athletics; it is the home of higher education in Iraq, to include Baghdad University and eleven medical schools; it has been the seat of secular society and political life; it is the home of Iraqi media and communications, and issues the message the rest of the country hears; it has been a cosmopolitan Iraqi city, multi ethnic and sectarian; it represents roughly one quarter of the nation’s overall population and thus twenty-five percent of the recruiting base for ISF. Baghdad’s Critical Requirements include: the people’s confidence in the government, which is contingent upon the security to go to work, school, worship and go about their daily lives; the government must provide the Rule of Law; the GOI must attract international interest, both economic and diplomatic; electricity is necessary for business and industry to operate, it is necessary to provide water and sewage services, and is the most important issue in the eyes of Iraqis. Baghdad has many Critical Vulnerabilities; they include: sectarian fault lines; the emergence of viable shadow governments that provide security through militias and other basic services (Hamas model); an easily interdicted electrical grid; consumerism that has unbalanced the infrastructure; the flight of the middle class technocrats and bureaucrats necessary to run an effective metropolitan city and the national governmental apparatus—doctors, lawyers, judges, administrators, and teachers. Because it is the operational CoG, MNC-I must enable the GOI to defend it against myriad enemies.

(3) (U) Higher Headquarters.

(a) (U) US Central Command (USCENTCOM).

1. (S//REL) Coalition Mission. To integrate coalition partners at the strategic level in support of military operations.

2. (U) Commander’s Intent (Key Tasks).

a. (S//REL) Defeat Al Qaida and associated movements (AQAM).

(1) (S//REL) They represent the main enemy.

(2) (S//REL) Military actions coupled with coalition, local counter-terrorist (CT) activities are having an effect on the enemy.
(3) (S//REL) Attack Al Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM) wherever we find them, in both the physical and virtual realms.
(4) (S//REL) Theater intelligence and CT capabilities will focus on AQAM as their first priority.

b. (S//REL) Stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain political progress and promote self-reliance.

(1) (S//REL) Exploit the momentum resulting from successful elections.
(2) (S//REL) Focus on units and individuals trained, equipped, and capable of leading the COIN fight.
(3) (S//REL) Move forward with disarming, demobilizing and reintegration of militias.

c. (S//REL) Build loyal, well-trained, partner security forces capable of taking the lead in the fight against extremists.

(1) (S//REL) Some Gulf States remain vulnerable to extremism.
(2) (S//REL) Continue to build indigenous forces and capacity throughout the region.
(3) (S//REL) Create centers of excellence within the AOR.

d. (S//REL) Sustain the flow of oil by protecting key infrastructure and sea lines of communication (SLOC).

(1) (S//REL) Prevent major terrorist strike against regional oil infrastructure.
(2) (S//REL) Theater forces will ensure free access and friendly national control over strategic points of navigation.
(3) (S//REL) Retain the capability to execute timely and effective consequence management.

e. (S//REL) Protect the Force against asymmetric threats with priority against IEDs and indirect fire.

(1) (S//REL) Remain alert to changing battlefield conditions while facing a thinking and adaptive enemy.
(2) (S//REL) Make the necessary force protection enhancements.
(3) (S//REL) Neutralize the effects of IEDs on friendly forces.

f. (S//REL) Seize the strategic communications initiative—expose the enemy.

(1) (S//REL) Win the perception battle.
(2) (S//REL) Make obvious to all the true nature of the extremist enemy.
SECRET/REL TO USA, MCFI/MR

(3) (S/REL) Expose the enemy for what he is: cowardly, desperate, and without a viable vision for the future.

g. (S/REL) Reshape our strategic posture in the AOR for the Long War.

(1) (S/REL) Smaller, more expeditionary US forces, enabling others to help themselves.
(2) (S/REL) Transition the lead for security operations to capable partner states as much as and as early as possible.
(3) (S/REL) US forces will shed battlespace and become more flexible and responsive.

(b) (U) MNF-I.

1. (S/REL) Mission Statement. The US Mission and Coalition Forces will, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the insurgency and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

2. (S/REL) Lines of Operations. Activities will be planned and executed along the lines of operation to generate the effects listed below. It is through the generation of these effects that the Campaign Objectives articulated in the Joint Mission Statement and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq will be achieved. The achievement of these Campaign Objectives will drive us to our endstate.

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MNF-I Lines of Operation

Strategic Effects:

- Terrorists defeated and insurgents neutralized. (MNC-A)
- Representative government that promotes national unity. (EMB POL)
- Strengthened rule of law. (JTF TF)
- Meet basic needs. (RMG)
- Economic reforms spur development. (EMB ECON Treasury)
- International support for Iraq increased. (EMB POL)
- Enhanced understanding of Coalition efforts. (CRTEFF)

End-State:

- Iraq at peace with its neighbors and enliven in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
Figure 8, (S/REL) MNF-I, Lines of Operations (replace with homework assignments version)

3. (S/REL) Phasing. The campaign will be conducted in three phases. Given the varying rates of progress along each LOO in each of the eighteen provinces, the phases of the campaign plan will overlap in both time and space.

4. (S/REL) Key Tasks, Phase I – Stabilization (2006 to Early 2007) derived from the MNF-I Campaign Plan. Tasks specifically assigned to MNC-I in the 2006 Joint Campaign Action Plan (JCAP) are listed in bold text.
   a. (S/REL) Seat government of national unity; non-sectarian.
   b. (S/REL) Elect provincial governments [Secure provincial elections].
   c. (S/REL) Support GOI conduct of constitutional amendment referendum [Secure constitutional referendum].
   d. (S/REL) Defeat AQI.
   e. (S/REL) Secure Iraq’s borders and national infrastructure.
   f. (S/REL) Secure Baghdad and nine other key cities.
   g. (S/REL) Spur economic growth by improving infrastructure, creating environment for private sector development, and encouraging policy reforms.
   h. (S/REL) Increase oil exports to increase revenue.
   i. (S/REL) Transition battlespace to capable IA units, allowing MNF-I units to assume “tactical overwatch.”
   j. (S/REL) Develop capable IPS during the 2006 “Year of the Police” to assume the lead for security in 2007.
   k. (S/REL) Transition provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC); conditions based (MUTHANNA complete JULY 2006, DHI QAR complete SEPTEMBER 2006).
   l. (S/REL) Neutralize the insurgency.
   m. (S/REL) Defeat Shi’a Extremists.
   n. (S/REL) Transition to ISF.
   o. (S/REL) Reduce MNF-I visibility and presence.

5. (S/REL) End State, Phase I. The endstate for this phase is when GOI ministries and institutions begin to develop the skills needed to govern effectively. Provincial governments will continue to develop their capabilities, and the linkages between all levels of government will be established and working. The fundamentals of the economic framework for improved performance in 2007 will be in place. The security situation will have been improved with AQI defeated, and the conditions set for the transfer of security responsibilities to capable Iraqi civil authorities.
6. *(S/REL)* Key Tasks, Phase II – Restoration of Civil Authority (Early 2007 to Early 2008).

   a. *(S/REL)* National unity government continues to mature; maintains engagement with Sunni Arabs to prevent insurgency from reemerging.
   b. *(S/REL)* Iraqi civil authorities take the lead along all LOOs.
   c. *(S/REL)* Robust Rule of Law (RoL) established.
   d. *(S/REL)* Foster efforts to formalize civil services; support policy and reforms to increase government transparency.
   e. *(S/REL)* Increasing oil revenues, international investment, and private sector growth.
   f. *(S/REL)* Reduce CF presence.

7. *(S/REL)* End State, Phase II. The endstate for this phase is for Iraqi ministries and institutions at all levels to be providing effectively for the needs of the Iraqi people without regard to ethnicity or sect, with minimal Coalition support. The insurgency will have been neutralized and Iraq will have a more normal relationship with its neighbors and the Coalition.

8. *(S/REL)* Campaign Framework. The Campaign Plan framework is shown below. The phases will overlap in both time and space. Many of the activities require action on multiple lines of operation. The tasks represented on the chart are further explained in the 2006 Campaign Action Plan at Annex C and the detailed Campaign Objectives at Annex V of the MNF-I 2006 Campaign Plan.
(4) Adjacent Units.
   (a) Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). The IGFC is an adjacent corps
level command with non-contiguous battlespace. It will progressively assume
greater amounts of battlespace. Although the IGFC is an independent
adjacent headquarters, MNC-I retains tactical and operational overwatch
responsibilities for IA units. MNC-I retains operational overwatch for
provinces that have attained Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) even if they are
wholly within battlespace allotted to the IGFC.

(b) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
MNSTC-I organizes, trains, and equips Iraqi Security Forces to field to MNC-
I in order to support Iraq's ultimate goal of a unified, stable and democratic
Iraq, which provides a representative government for the Iraqi people; is
underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing
market economy; and is able to defend itself and not pose a threat to the
region.

1. (U) Military.
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a. (S//REL) Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT organizes, trains, and equips Iraqi Army forces. During operations, provides ongoing mentoring and advising to Iraqi leaders at all levels of command. Assists the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) leadership in developing accession sources and leadership programs across all services of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). Endstate is the development of an Iraqi Armed Forces capable of planning and conducting unilateral operations in order to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of Iraq’s borders and to defend Iraq.

b. (S//REL) Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team. The Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team mentors and assists the Iraqi Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in order to become capable of exercising effective national command and control of the IAF, contributing to the IAF capability development process and, in partnership with Coalition Forces, contributing to improving the internal security situation within Iraq.

2. (S//REL) Police. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) organizes, trains, and equips the Iraqi Police Forces and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) forces and Ports of Entry (POE) personnel; and monitors, advises and certifies the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) forces in order to develop capable and credible Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

(c) (S//REL) TF 14a. In partnership with the GOI and other USG agencies, TF-14a progressively transfers Theater Detention Operations to the GOI for the temporary detention of insurgents by training Iraqi government personnel and transferring facilities to the GOI consistent with international standards to promote Iraqi sovereignty while protecting the rights of all detainees.

(d) (S//REL) OCT-I. In partnership with the GOI and other US agencies, is principally responsible for targeting AQIZ.

(e) (S//REL) Gulf Region Division (GRD). Assists in the reconstruction of Iraq by providing engineering services to MNF-I and the GOI in order to rebuild critical infrastructure and provide essential services throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations.

2. (S//REL) Mission. NO CHANGE from OPORD 06-01. MNC-I conducts operations to restore order, using predominantly non-kinetic means, to transition security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq and support the development of its emerging institutions to enable national self-reliance; O/O and by province, MNC-I transitions to operational overwatch.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Commander’s Intent.
(1) (S//REL) Purpose. MNC-I must regain the momentum created by the successful seating of the Government of Iraq, steady improvements in the IA, the gains made in developing the IPS, and the beginning of Iraqi civil authorities resuming responsibility for security at the provincial level. This momentum is essential for us to continue transitioning provinces back to civil control and secure Baghdad; this will only be possible if we stop the wave of sectarian violence that plagues Iraq but is most serious in Baghdad and Diyala. MNC-I will continue to place greater emphasis on the other necessary non-kinetic tools required to combat insurgents while forestalling the spread of sectarian violence. These tools include the delivery of basic services, capable provincial governments, income generated from the export of oil, and a capable IPS equipped with the command and control relationships and facilities that will allow them to assume the lead for domestic security throughout Iraq. Addressing these issues will set the conditions for the full restoration of civil authority in Iraq, which remains contingent upon the Iraqis viewing their national government as a legitimate national unity government. Although there is much fighting ahead, MNC-I will assume tactical risk as ISF take the lead through process of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Iraqi Army Lead (IAL); we will become the supporting command and Iraqi formations will become the supported command as we progressively move further into Operational Overwatch. Less directly involved in COIN operations, MNC-I will have greater operational flexibility to pursue intelligence-driven offensive actions that further assist the GOI’s movement to self-reliance.

(2) (U) Method. Four principles guide MNC-I’s efforts this year.

(a) (S//REL) MNC-I will sustain its focus on the conduct of non-kinetic rather than kinetic operations. Intelligence-driven operations will limit the number of Iraqi citizens adversely affected by our presence in their country. Although we have made great strides in reducing incidents resulting in an escalation of force (EOF), we must redouble our efforts to prevent the perception of unwarranted violence or breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict. Our actions must not push neutral Iraqis into the embrace of AQIZ, insurgents, extra governmental armed groups (EGAG), and militias. Information Operations must articulate the GOI’s plans for the future of Iraq and the positive measures being taken to realize it. That future must include the hope of a better life in which the GOI delivers basic services, economic enablers that spawn enduring job opportunities, and a sense of security. The GOI must gain the confidence of Iraqis to reverse the descent into sectarian violence and stamp out the sense of hopelessness and apathy that sustains those fighting against a better future.

(b) (S//REL) Transition functions, facilities, and responsibilities to the Iraqis; help them run their country. Within its capability, MNC-I must help spur the growth of non-security ministries as they play a critical role in achieving Iraqi self-reliance. MNC-I will continue to develop non-security ministries such as Oil, Electricity, Transportation, and Justice through the support of Ministerial Assistance Teams (MAT). Our full support of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is unwavering because they are capable of enhancing the development of local and provincial government; I view this important process as a MNC-I responsibility until Non-governmental and Governmental Organizations (NGO and
GO) are prepared to assume a greater role, especially in those provinces that have achieved Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). We will solidify the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) as the primary instrument for maintaining domestic security while inculcating the ideal of subservience to the democratically elected government to all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Given their ethno-sectarian diversity and when held accountable, the Iraqi Security Forces can provide an enduring vehicle for the promotion of Iraqi patriotism. Successful provincial elections focused on issues, not identities, are the next step the Iraqis must take on their journey to self-reliance; the GOI will determine when these elections occur, confident that we will support their efforts.

(c) (S//REL) As ISF take on greater roles and responsibilities we will reduce our presence. We must assume some tactical risk as we pass responsibility to the ISF for security in the 9 key cities and the nation’s capital. The ISF will lead the effort against the death squads, which are responsible for sustaining the cycle of sectarian killing. With Iraqis progressively in the lead, our military responses must be measured. The disciplined application of the rules of engagement and rigid enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict are the bedrock of our more limited kinetic operations. Base reductions will continue with a goal of no more than 30 bases by the end of 2007. With fewer bases to maintain and with ISF increasingly in the lead, MNC-I will have greater operational flexibility, which is a necessary condition as the preponderance of our forces complete the transition to operational overwatch.

(d) (S//REL) Maintaining an offensive mindset underpins all we do in the AO. Setting the conditions for the GOI to defeat AQAM and neutralize the insurgency demands that we continue to capture or kill anti-Iraqi forces using violence. We will assist the GOI in their efforts to Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegrate (DDR) armed groups and militias operating outside the rule of law. Our Corps remains at war and that will not change even as force levels decrease. A drawdown mentality is unacceptable; a change in focus will inevitably endanger our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. Only we can give away our honor in the pursuit of victory; commanders at every echelon must maintain accountability for the welfare and actions of all CF operating in their respective AOs.

(3) (S//REL) End State. In the next 12 months Baghdad will be secured and the current wave of sectarian killing will be ended. The IA assumes the lead in most of Iraq with the majority of units having attained TRA 1 or 2 and grows as a national institution. CF operate from a reduced footprint (30 or less US bases) and overwatching positions—predominantly operational. In the majority of provinces, IPS have assumed the lead and PIC has been established with the remaining provinces well on their way to attaining PIC. The GOI has ratified an amended constitution and assumed a greater role in delivering basic services and security, establishing the rule of law, and providing economic opportunities to all Iraqis. Conditions are set for the transition to the MNF-I Campaign Plan’s Phase III—Support to Self-Reliance.
(4) (S//REL) Risk. As we shift our focus to Baghdad there is an inherent risk that the enemy will reappear or increase his efforts in other provinces; we must resist the temptation to shift our resources from the main effort. I fully accept that as ISF responsibilities increase, they will periodically stumble. We cannot allow them to fail to a point that causes disintegration, but we must allow them to discover their own weaknesses and learn from the experience. I am prepared to accept some operational risk in those provinces where insurgent and terrorist activity has been low and ISF have demonstrated their ability to secure the people. I am unwilling to assume any strategic risk that might threaten the integrity of the Coalition; each allied nation plays a unique and vital role in restoring Iraqi self-reliance. At the tactical and operational level I am unwilling to accept any risk that jeopardizes our embedded Transition Teams and remote elements of our major subordinate commands; they must be covered by the umbrella of our support or the risk assumed is carefully measured and mitigated to a lower level.

b. (U) Concept of the Operation.

(1) (S//REL) General.

(a) (S//REL) To ensure simplicity and unity of effort, MNC-I adopts the phasing convention of MNF-I Campaign Plan. MNC-I’s focus and efforts will migrate from Phase I to Phase II during 2007, but provinces will progress at different rates creating overlap between the phases.

(b) (S//REL) This order is aligned with MNF-I’s logical Lines of Operation (LOO). LOO provide the commander a tool to synchronize his forces and their capabilities in time, space and in relation to the enemy or desired end state. Because the end state for OIF is a self-reliant functioning GOI rather than a defeated enemy, the process of reaching it is more complex than defining the disposition of friendly and enemy forces in time and space. Traditionally, the attainment of intermediate objectives along a particular LOO had the cumulative effect of attrition and exhausting the enemy’s capability to continue. In the case of OIF, with the exception of those activities focused on AIF, the intermediate objectives along the LOO represent necessary building blocks required to form a self-reliant Iraq. As in the past, commanders must synchronize myriad resources required to achieve a positive end state built on a series of interrelated intermediate objectives.

(c) (S//REL) The value of LOO are their ability to depict the need to simultaneously achieve multiple effects, since all LOO are inter-dependent; unless all LOO are successfully navigated, the end state will remain unattainable.

(d) (S//REL) Matters are further complicated in Iraq because there are a host of enemy forces, but the defeat/neutralization of each only represents the attainment of an intermediate objective, not the end state itself. The end state for OIF is far more dependent on success achieved on LOO not directly related to enemy formations or physical locations. Nonetheless, the end state is dependent on the reduction of
hostile forces as a means to an uncommon end for a military organization—the creation of a legitimate government, the GOI.

(e) **(S//REL)** This order uses an Effects Based approach. Thus, intermediate objectives are roughly translated as the effects (changes in the environment) that must occur to accomplish the operational objectives. An Effects Coordination Board (ECB) bridges the gap between long term planning and current operations by synchronizing all LOO at the six week planning horizon. Furthermore, the ECB presents current assessments of each of the operational objectives (listed below), as well as their corresponding effects, measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), and indicators. The ECB provides the MNC-I commander the necessary information to adjust and modify the trajectory of ongoing operations. There is no requirement to apply the Effects Based approach at the division level and below.

**Figure 10, (S//REL) MNC-I Lines of Operations**

(2) **(S//REL)** MNC-I Operational Objectives. In support of the US Mission and the MNF-I Campaign Plan, OPORD 06-03 completes MNC-Is tasks in support of Phase I and Phase II of the MNF-I Campaign Plan and Joint Campaign Action Plan for 2006, and sets the conditions needed to transition to Phase III. The following Effects directly support the achievement of their corresponding Operational Objectives; in many cases Effects cross-cut more than one Operational Objective. Each Effect, and the tasks executed to achieve the desired Effect, has secondary and tertiary impacts that will improve the Iraqis' perception of GOI and legitimacy of the GOI.

(a) **(S//REL)** Operational Objective 1: Iraqi Police Services are in the Lead. The IPS is properly organized, trained, equipped, led, and synchronized (intra and inter-ministry and between the provincial and national governments command and
control structures) to provide for the security needs of the Iraqi people on a daily basis under normal conditions; CF postured in overwatch (usually operational for PIC) prepared to assist the IPS / IA in a security crisis that exceeds the capability of the IPS / IA; CF prepared to reenter provinces that have been transitioned to PIC to support transition teams.

1. (S//REL) Effect 1A: IPS elements effectively conduct provincial, district and station operations. IPS at TRA Level 2 or higher at the provincial, district and station level. IPS units operate in assigned areas or responsibility with limited CF or ISF assistance.

2. (S//REL) Effect 1B: Iraqis have confidence in Iraqi Police Services (IPS) to provide security, law and order. Iraqis perceive IPS as professional, capable, responsive and fair. IPS has visible presence.

3. (S//REL) Effect 1C: National police are capable and professional. NP increases in readiness and are mission capable. Iraqis trust in the professionalism and capability of the NP.

4. (S//REL) Effect 1D: MOI enforces professional behavior and daily accountability of IPS actions. Internal Affairs capabilities increased, then applied and the populace perceives an improvement in Iraqi Police standards of conduct.

(b) (S//REL) Operational Objective 2: Develop Local and Provincial Governance. The majority of major ethnic and religious groups are confident that local, provincial governments will provide security, economic growth, essential services, and the rule of law. Confidence in local and provincial governance will underpin overall confidence in the national government of Iraq resulting in the people viewing it as a legitimate institution.

1. (S//REL) Effect 2A: Judicial systems demonstrate increased primacy of the Rule of Law. GOI develops and maintains effective and accountable judicial processes, judiciary and penal institutions are functioning adequately with an Iraqi perception of a legitimate working judiciary system.

2. (S//REL) Effect 2B: Iraqis participate in government. Iraqis are aware of and freely choose to participate in the electoral and constitutional referendum processes.

3. (S//REL) Effect 2C: Iraqis have confidence in GOI to build capacity for viable and accountable government. Iraqis believe local, provincial and national governing bodies are fair, impartial.

(c) (S//REL) Operational Objective 3: Complete the process of putting the Iraqi Army in the Lead. The IA is properly trained, equipped, led, and sustained to conduct COIN; CF are postured in overwatch (usually tactical for IAL) and prepared to assist in a security crisis, to support transition teams, or to prevent IA mission failure that exceeds the level of risk the MNC-I commander is willing to accept.
1. [(S/REL)] Effect 3A: IA assumes responsibility of areas of operation. IA battalions, brigades and divisions at TRA Level 2 or higher. IA units plan, conduct and C2 COIN operations in assumed areas of operation with CF enablers.

2. [(S/REL)] Effect 3B: IA independently executes COIN Ops. IA units plan, execute and sustain military operations without CF enablers. IA units are capable of conducting coordination with higher, subordinate and adjacent headquarters and receive the majority of the CSS from higher IA headquarters or the IGFC.

3. [(S/REL)] Effect 3C: Iraqis gain confidence in IA and support reduction in CF. Iraqis are confident in the ability if the Iraqi Army to maintain security in assumed AO. IA successes are evident and Iraqis understand the transition from CF lead to IA lead and eventual independent operations is tied to capability and responsibility of the IA.

(d) [(S/REL)] Operational Objective 4: Develop Strategic Infrastructure. Strategic infrastructure is enhanced as required, operational, maintained and secured from AIF interdiction; improved strategic infrastructure increases the government’s capacity to deliver basic services and generate revenue from the export of petroleum products.

1. [(S/REL)] Effect 4A: The GOI establishes a robust strategic infrastructure. The GOI is able to export oil and provide national and regional power generation and transmission. The GOI and PJCC employs, commands and controls and sustains infrastructure security forces. Rapid repair, structural redundancy and management efficiencies improved.

(e) [(S/REL)] Operational Objective 5: Increase Availability and Capacity to Deliver Basic Services. Local, provincial, and national governments are capable of distributing basic services using existing infrastructure and are capable of integrating new infrastructure into the distribution plan.

1. [(S/REL)] Effect 5A: Capable local governments provide reliable essential services. Legitimate local governments provide water, sewage disposal, electricity, telephone, and retail fuel services in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the people.

2. [(S/REL)] Effect 5B: Iraqis have confidence in the GOI to improve basic services. Iraqis are satisfied with the progress made by the GOI with regard to increasing provision of basic essential services. Populace is satisfied in provision of water, sewage disposal, electricity, telephone, and retail fuel services by the GOI and have confidence services will be available in the future.

(f) [(S/REL)] Operational Objective 6: Develop Economic Opportunities. Economic incubators are emplaced to spawn sustain economic growth across all
sectors of the economy; the creation of new jobs will reduce the level of unemployment.

1. (S//REL) Effect 6A: GOI develops private sector and generates economic self-reliance. The GOI provides an environment capable of providing sustained employment and fosters an environment at the provincial level that allows NGOs to participate in provincial development. National ministries are represented at the provincial level and interact with the private sector. The GOI promotes local economy and increases new business and employment opportunities.

2. (S//REL) Effect 6B: Iraqis are confident of improvement in economic and employment opportunities. Iraqis are confident in the GOI’s ability to provide increasing employment and stable economic growth. Iraqis are confident in the IA and IPS ability to provide the security necessary to conduct a free-market economy and to seek new employment in private and state-owned enterprises.

(g) (S//REL) Operational Objective 7: Iraqis control the borders. Department of Border Enforcement forces, backed by IA and IPS, are able to interdict T&FF movement, logistics, and funding (that support T&FF and insurgents) from abroad.

1. (S//REL) Effect 7A: Iraqi POEs operational and under GOI control. POEs provide security, but not at the expense of international trade.

2. (S//REL) Effect 7B: DBE and IA units control the borders. DBE at TRA level 2 or higher are capable of planning and conducting border security operations in conjunction with PJCCs.

3. (S//REL) Effect 7C: Iraqis are confident of border security, free-trade and freedom of movement. GOI has established policy and rule of law with regard to border economies. DBE forces accommodate historical tribal customs and tribes support the GOI and Iraqi laws.

(h) (S//REL) Operational Objective 8. Insurgency neutralized/AQIZ defeated. Insurgents are incapable of interfering with CF and ISF operations, and unable to deny basic services, intimidate Iraqis, or conduct sustained operations. The GOI and CF use kinetic and non-kinetic operations to change the environment that causes Iraqis to support (active and passive) insurgents.

1. (S//REL) Effect 8A: Iraqis do not support insurgency. Iraqis reject insurgent activities and propaganda in favor of legitimate participation in government. Potential insurgent recruits unwilling to participate in acts of violence.

2. (S//REL) Effect 8B: Insurgency lacks ability to conduct effective operations. Insurgent leadership unwilling to coordinate insurgent activity.

3. (S//REL) Effect 8C: Iraqis reject AQIZ ideology. The Iraqi populace is unwilling to actively or passively support the presence of AQIZ. AQIZ Information Operations are ineffective at swaying Iraqi perceptions and tolerance of AQ in Iraq.
(i) (S/REL) Operational Objective 9: Enable the GOI to Break the Cycle of Sectarian Violence and Prevent Its Spread.

1. (S/REL) Effect 9A: Iraqi clerical, civic and political leaders denounce sectarian violence. Leaders at all levels call for restraint, denounce sectarian violence and support the GOI as the only legitimate providers of security.
2. (S/REL) Effect 9B: Militia criminal activity reduced. Militias incapable of sustaining violent agendas. Populace rejects extra governmental armed force and supports the GOI as the provider of security. GOI supports elimination of armed groups.
3. (S/REL) Effect 9C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized. Kinetic removal of known perpetrators of sectarian violence results in reduction of Extra Judicial Killings and attacks on civilians. Populace takes an active role in aiding the GOI in their efforts to bring sectarian criminals to justice.
4. (S/REL) Effect 9D: Populace in urban centers secure. Violence and criminal activity is decreased. Population perceives GOI as willing to provide equal and adequate security to all sects.

Figure 11. (S/REL) MNC-I Effects Linked to Operational Objectives

(3) (U) Operational Framework and Phasing.

(a) (S/REL) Phasing Construct. The phasing construct for MNC-I OPORD 06-03 mirrors the MNF-I Campaign Plan. Phase I is the main focus for this OPORD.
although it will increasingly address Phase II objectives as an increasing number of provinces achieve Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Three characteristics describe each phase in a macro sense: the capability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); the ability of the national government and provincial governments to assume responsibility for their citizens’ needs; and the posture of CF in varying degrees of overwatch (tactical and operational). The conditions necessary for progress in each of the three broad categories are directly linked to improving conditions across Iraq. The delivery of basic services, the rule of law, growing security, reductions in unemployment, better understanding of GOI and CF actions, and an overall sense that the GOI is a legitimate institution will change the environment that allows the terrorists and insurgents to sustain their operations. There are three phases in the MNF-I Campaign Plan.

1. (S//REL) Phase I – Stabilization (2006 to Early 2007)

2. (S//REL) Phase II - Restoration of Civil Authority (Early 2007 to Early 2008)

3. (S//REL) Phase III - Support to Self-Reliance (Early 2008 to 2009)

(b) (S//REL) MNC-I Battlespace Organization. The MNC-I battlespace is physically organized into 6 X Multi-National Division/Force AOs. This organizational construct will evolve as additional IA Divisions are passed to the command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), which has its own AO. CF will eventually transfer security responsibility for large portions of the AO to the GOI. As this occurs, MNC-I may reapportion the battlespace, taking into account the changing composition of Coalition forces and their respective capabilities, and the evolving threat situation. Each phase will be defined by its decisive, shaping and sustaining operations. For Phase I, the MNC-I decisive operation is securing Baghdad, the operational CoG; on order, the process of transitioning provinces to PIC will become the corps’ decisive operation. MNC-I will set the conditions for ISF to secure Baghdad using kinetic and non-kinetic means. This process is inextricably linked to developing a capable IPS, as is the process of PIC. MND-B is the Main Effort force. Attainment of PIC across Iraq is the objective of Phase II.
(c) (S/REL) Phase I: Stabilization (2006 – Early 2007). Initially, MNC-I will enable the GOI to improve the capability and capacity of ISF. These efforts will be focused in Baghdad until its citizens have been secured; this is the decisive operation for OPORD 06-03. Efforts to enable the GOI to secure Baghdad using ISF will be matched with non-kinetic efforts to create enduring conditions for stability and security. On order, MNC-I’s decisive effort will be the continuation of the process of transitioning to PIC. MNC-I will continue to develop Iraqi Security Forces and transition them into the lead for security responsibilities across Iraq. This will include passing the remaining IA divisions to the control of the IGFC while assisting other IA units in their climb to TRA 2. Efforts related to the “Year of the Police” will continue. MNC-I will assist the GOI reform the National Police (NP) using a phased approach. As IA units assume a greater role in conducting COIN under the direction of the GOI and as more provinces achieve PIC, CF will increasingly move to tactical and operational overwatch, postured to provide support and joint capabilities as required. This will allow MNC-I to reduce the footprint of CF. Achieving PIC is a necessary step for the GOI to attain self-reliance. Shaping operations will create the conditions necessary for the long-term security of Baghdad and the process of transitioning to PIC, which will set the conditions for Iraqi Security Self-Reliance (ISSR) and support the attainment of MNF-I’s Strategic Effects. Sustaining operations, such as assured freedom of movement for CF and ISF and base closure and handover, enable MNC-I to attain greater operational flexibility to conduct continuous decisive and shaping operations. Phase I ends when all IA units are garrisoned in their end state.
locations and as necessary, lead independent COIN operations with CF postured in operational and strategic overwatch. The start of Phase II is condition based; it will begin and proceed at different times and rates across the MNC-I AO based on conditions unique to each province.

1. (S//REL) Phase I Decisive Operation. Secure Baghdad. MNC-I will enable the GOI to establish long-term security in their national capital. Coalition efforts will address Shia and Sunni extremism equally while not neglecting the role that terrorists and insurgents play in perpetuating the self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence. We must also be mindful of the role are playing as they seek to expand their influence in Baghdad and throughout Iraq. Securing Baghdad will depend on our ability to synchronize and orchestrate all elements of Iraqi national power while ensuring the other elements of the Coalition’s power are commensurate with the ongoing military effort. We must assist the GOI in their efforts to gain the confidence of Baghdad’s citizens, confidence that will allow them to reject violence. MNC-I will do this by enabling the GOI to protect its citizens in their neighborhoods by the end of the year. Long-term success will be underwritten by the successful implementation of economic programs and the imposition of professional police forces capable of securing Baghdad’s residents.

2. (S//REL) O/O Decisive Operation. On Order, the decisive operation for Phase I is the process of transitioning provinces to PIC IAW Appendix 17 Annex C. The purpose of PIC is to complete the transition of security responsibility from being led by MNF-I to Iraqi civil authorities. PIC involves the provincial governor, as the senior civil authority in a province, assuming full responsibility for security within his province. Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces have achieved PIC. Daluh, Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil provinces have been recommended for PIC, but remain under consideration by the GOI.

a. (S//REL) There are two ways that a provincial governor can assume PIC. In the first method, the governor assumes responsibility for the security of his provincial capital while the security responsibility for the remainder of the province rests with MNF-I or the IA. In the second method, the governor assumes full responsibility for the entire province.

b. (S//REL) The role and disposition of IA units changes when a province achieves PIC. By definition, the threat level in a province that has attained PIC has diminished to levels that the provincial police can contain without the routine assistance of the IA. Until this condition exists, the province will not be able to assume full responsibility for security. The IA provides support as directed by MNF-I using authority derived from OPCON. In the case of those IA Divisions that are under the control of the IGFC, the IA actions are prescribed by Iraqi law.
c. (S//REL) There is currently a declared state of emergency in Iraq; this allows the Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) the authority to enact Anti-Terrorism Measures (ATM) and to direct Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) to implement ATM. The PM retains broad powers to act during crisis situations. Even so, the PM and the Iraqi President must jointly request that the declared state of emergency continue. This declaration must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote in the Council of Representatives (CoR). The state of emergency shall be declared for a period of 30 days, which may be extended in 30 day increments upon approval by the CoR. Provincial Governors may request the enactment and implementation of ATM within their provinces. The PM may direct the MoD or the MoI to support the Provincial Governors. CF may support implementation of ATMs at the request of the PM.

d. (S//REL) The eventual end state for all Iraqi Armed Forces should be within garrisons and permanent basing locations throughout the provinces; the missions of these forces reorients on national security against external threats. In the interim, there is the possibility that the provincial governor may occasionally need MoI or MoD support. The provincial governor has the flexibility to coordinate through the Provincial Security Council (PSC), Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) and National Joint Operations Center (NJOC) for the use of small elements of MoI or MoD forces. In these instances, IA forces may assist in resolving crises at locations near their garrisons.

e. (S//REL) The GOI retains the right to re-station ISF, based on MoD and MoI requirements. When possible, the MoD will leave enough residual force in each province to reinforce the PDoP or National Police (NP) when warranted. MNC-I, in conjunction with MNF-I and the GOI, will transition those provinces that meet the criteria (ANNEX U) for PIC. MNC-I will focus its resources on those provinces that given more attention—PTT priority, PRT, additional economic assistance, IA support—will be able to attain PIC in the near term. MNC-I will sustain its efforts in those provinces that have more enduring developmental and security needs.

f. (S//REL) In MND-N the priority for moving provinces to PIC is: Diyala, Ninawa, Salah Ad Din, and Kirkuk.

g. (S//REL) In MND-B the priority for moving provinces to PIC is: Najaf, Karbala, Babil, and Baghdad.

h. (S//REL) MNF-W will prioritize districts within Al Anbar in order to achieve PIC in 2007.

i. (S//REL) In MND-SE the priority for moving to PIC is: Maysan and Basrah.
j. (S//REL) In MND-NE, Irbil will transition to PIC at the discretion of the GOI.

k. (S//REL) In MND-CS, the priority is to transition Wasit and then Qadisiyah.

l. (S//REL) The IA will play an important role in securing Baghdad and attaining PIC across Iraq. In Al Anbar and Baghdad, the 7 IA, 6 IA, and 1 IA Divisions will continue to receive resources at the current level of support. The 9 IA Division will be provided greater attention given its role in securing Baghdad; it is also being considered for an expeditionary role to provide the GOI with an operational response to emerging threats. Greater emphasis on the 5 IA, 4 IA, and 3 IA Divisions will support the transition to PIC in Diyala, Salah Ad Din, and Ninawa. Prioritization is the only practical course of action; MNC-I and MNSTC-I cannot simultaneously develop all ISF. Adjustments to the aforementioned priorities will continue to be a function of emerging operational needs. The widespread distribution of transition teams is the principal limiting factor to a reduced CF presence, especially the CS and CSS forces.

m. (S//REL) Fielding of Police Transition Teams (PTT) will continue IAW TAB B, Appendix 1, Annex C. Reprioritization of PTT will be addressed in a subsequent FRAGO.

3. (S//REL) Phase I, Shaping Operations. Shaping Operations create and preserve the conditions necessary to secure Baghdad and achieve PIC. MNC-I resource priorities for shaping operations are based on the commander’s operational assessment. The MNC-I priority for resources is confirmed weekly through the Effects Taskings Order (ETO), in the Operational Priorities Slide presented at Senior Plans Meeting (SPM), verbally through the Battle Update Assessment (BUA), and during the Commanders’ Conference Call. Enabling the GOI to end the cycle of sectarian violence and prevent its spread is critical if Baghdad is to be secured. Developing a capable IPS and reforming the NP are prerequisites for securing Baghdad and achieving PIC across Iraq. Furthermore, professional police forces should be the face of the government in the daily lives of the Iraqi people. As such, the IPS plays an instrumental role in building confidence in the legitimacy of the GOI at all levels.

a. (S//REL) Enable the GOI to break the cycle of sectarian violence and prevent its spread.

(1) (S//REL) Current Operations. MNC-I will continue to conduct named operations to secure the keys cities in Iraq, foremost Baghdad. These named operations, such as Together Forward will be conducted in the context of the precepts directed in this operations order. As the
IGFC assumes greater portions of the AO, MNC-I will support them in their efforts to achieve the effects associated with breaking the cycle of sectarian violence (Effects 9A-9D). These operations must address all lines of operations.

(2) (U) Disarm, Demobilize, Reintegrate.

(a) (U//FOUO) A key component to bringing security and stability to Iraq is the abolition of militias. The GOI and its security arms must be the only providers of security and users of armed force. The continued existence and influence of militias and armed groups in Iraq threatens the rule of law and erodes public confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. Dealing with the militias remains a critical security challenge for the GOI. Iraqi leaders have voiced their concerns and their commitment to seek durable solutions regarding the negative influence of the militias. Ultimately, the continued existence of armed groups outside of the regulation of legitimate GOI authority jeopardizes the mission end-state of the Coalition in partnership with the GOI: an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

(b) (U//FOUO) Achieving lasting results in DDR programs has proven to be innately difficult. The long-term success of DDR programs relies on the sustained reintegration of ex-combatants. The goal of reducing violence in a society cannot be reached unless the government and the members of the unlawful armed groups largely agree to the process. Even with the commitment of Iraq’s leaders, DDR promises to be a difficult and long road involving predominantly political and economic measures to restore a functioning civil society. The commitment of the government’s leaders is but one requirement. To transform those with deep ethno-sectarian prejudices who are engaging in violence into peaceful and productive members of the community requires the support and acceptance of these same individuals. The most difficult portion of DDR is in the setting the conditions. The following table cites 5 pre-conditions necessary to predict a successful DDR process. All five are deemed necessary under ideal conditions. DDR may proceed without all five pre-conditions having been met; in that case, mitigation for a lack of a necessary pre-condition must be considered.
(c) (U//FOUO) Currently in Iraq none of the pre-conditions have been met. Progress can be measured along all five of the desired conditions but a lack of security, high unemployment and sectarian and T&FF spoilers continue to derail the GOI’s efforts at unity and reconciliation. As mentioned, DDR cannot be coercive, it must be a voluntary process undertaken by the government and illegal armed groups.

(d) (U//FOUO) Success is unlikely unless the GOI eliminates the political, security, and economic drivers of conflict – the very reasons that militias and armed groups exist in Iraq. These three key lines of effort will be developed using the following construct.

1) (U//FOUO) Prosperity (Economic)- Availability of economic resources to ensure militia and armed group members have viable economic opportunities (training, education, jobs, etc.), that funding is available to rapidly implement DDR once agreed to by political and armed group leaders, and that security forces are appropriately resourced to maintain order. TASK AND PURPOSE: Provide alternatives to militia or insurgent affiliation in order to reduce militia numbers and influence and reduce illegal armed challenges to GOI legitimacy. METHOD: A comprehensive effort to draw fringe militia and insurgent members away from militia and insurgent membership and into mainstream Iraqi society. Groups will not be drawn into any one source of employment. The focused employment effort must draw numbers into the ISF, government service, scholarly and vocational education, private business and State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Incorporate the resources available through the Focused Stabilization Program (Annex G) to develop and implement employment centers. MNC-I C9 synchronizes efforts between the MNDs, Interagency Focused Stabilization Task Force and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. DESIRED EFFECTS: Effect 6A: GOI develops private sector and generates economic self reliance. The GOI provides an environment capable of providing sustained employment and fosters an environment at the provincial environment that allows NGOs to participate in provincial development. National ministries are represented at the provincial level and interact with the private sector. The GOI promotes local economy and increases new business and employment opportunities. Effect 6B: Iraqis are confident of improvement in economic and employment opportunity. Iraqis are confident in the GOIs ability to provide increasing employment and stable economic growth. Iraqis are confident in the IA and IPS ability to provide the security necessary to conduct a free-
market economy and to seek new employment in private and state owned enterprises.

### Supporting Pillars for DDR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Pillars for DDR</th>
<th>Key Observation</th>
<th>Cautions</th>
<th>Best Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>DDR cannot drive a peace process; it must occur in context of a negotiated settlement</td>
<td>DDR cannot precede the agreement of all parties to the process</td>
<td>Amnesties and reconciliation policies support successful DDR programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>A safe, secure environment is necessary to build the trust allowing all parties to disarm and return to civil society</td>
<td>Unilateral violations of the peace agreement can undermine the entire effort</td>
<td>Credible deterrent forces are necessary, but cannot always end hostilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of All Parties</td>
<td>All parties must be included and disarmed at the same time</td>
<td>Discrimination against specific parties in disarmament permits retribution by those groups who remain armed</td>
<td>If all parties have equal access to reintegration program benefits, they are more likely to have a sense of ownership of DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated Approach</td>
<td>A national plan must be supported by local reintegration and economic opportunities</td>
<td>Plan for orientation, food, education, and health care for demobilized ex-combatants and their dependents</td>
<td>Establish a national institution to plan, implement, and oversee DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Sufficient funds are essential to complete DDR implementation</td>
<td>Failure to complete DDR planning can easily fuel frustration—and new provocations</td>
<td>Resources made available for contingencies can mitigate risk</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 13 (FOUO), Supporting Pillars of DDR

2) (S//REL) Security – Civilian oversight and administrative support to oversee and manage security forces, requiring sustained support to the security sector, in terms of both funding and capacity-building, reliable, impartial government forces or outside “third party” forces to fill the security gap and ensure the resulting DDR of rival factions is visible and simultaneous. TASK AND PURPOSE: Provide alternatives to the real or perceived need to maintain standing militias or insurgent groups. In accordance with the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Reconciliation Plan the GOI provides security in order to deny the leaders of illegal armed groups the justification to maintain standing militias and to deny insurgent leaders opportunities to subvert GOI legitimacy. METHOD: Consolidate IPS gains in successful IP jurisdictions and support joint and combined operations to reestablish IPS control in areas where IPS are overmatched by militias or insurgents. Exploit successful IPS enforcement of the Rule of Law with IO. Support viable police operations with CERP and Focused Stabilization funds. At the Strategic level the GOI calls for national unity among all groups and defines incentives and repercussions associated with the plan for national unity. MNC-I supports GOI pressure with IO and engagements to
encourage holdouts to negotiate. MNDs will BPT support limited kinetic operations to enable the IPS to enforce the law and establish the GOI as the legitimate provider of security. DESIRED EFFECTS: Effect 1A: IPS elements effectively conduct provincial, district and station operations. IPS at TRA Level 2 or higher at the provincial, district and station level. IPS units operate in assigned areas or responsibility with limited CF or ISF assistance. Effect 1B: Iraqis have confidence in Iraqi Police Services (IPS) to provide security, law and order. Iraqis perceive IPS as professional, capable, responsive and fair. IPS has visible presence. Effect 1C: National police are capable and professional. NP increases in readiness and are mission capable. Iraqis trust in the professionalism and capability of the NP. Effect 1D: MOI enforces professional behavior and daily accountability of IPS actions. Internal Affairs capabilities increased, then applied and the populace perceives an improvement in Iraqi Police standards of conduct.

3) (S//REL) Unity (Political) – A credible government with the capacity and capability to reassure the various factions that their expectations can be addressed through non-violent means, agreement by government and militia political front leaders, and a legitimate political process to address longer-term grievances. TASK AND PURPOSE: Support and Shape the GOI and armed group leaders’ reconciliation efforts in order to reduce militia and insurgent numbers and capabilities to a level that enable the ISF to defeat those who refuse to comply with reintegration efforts. METHOD: Support reconciliation efforts and steadily increase pressure on militias and insurgent groups to participate in negotiations. Exploit successful reintegration with IO. Engagements transition to ultimatums for dissenters. Support the GOI with resources and forces to enforce the rule of the law, reintegrate willing armed groups and defeat irreconcilable groups. DESIRED EFFECTS: Effect 2C: Iraqis have confidence in GOI to build capacity for viable and accountable government. Iraqis believe local, provincial and national governing bodies are fair, impartial. Effect 9A: Iraqi clerical, civic and political leaders denounce sectarian violence. Leaders at all levels call for restraint, denounce sectarian violence and support the GOI as the only legitimate providers of security. Effect 9B: Militia criminal activity reduced. Militias incapable of sustaining violent agendas. Populace rejects extra-governmental armed force and supports the GOI as the provider of security. GOI supports elimination of armed groups.
The continued existence and influence of armed groups in Iraq remains a critical security challenge for the Government of Iraq (GOI). They threaten the rule of law and erode public confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. Ultimately, the continued existence of armed groups operating outside legitimate GOI authority jeopardizes the mission end-state of the MNC-I, MNF-I and ultimately the GOI. Iraqi leaders have voiced their concerns and their commitment to seek durable solutions regarding the negative influence of the militias. Failure along any of the three Lines of Effort will likely result in apathy and paralysis (as with the CPA TRIC process), failure and a continuation of conflict, or, at best, the pursuit of criminal enterprises by former armed group members.

b. (S//REL) IPS Development. (See Tab B, Appendix 1, Annex C).

(1) The IPS Program Development is designed to achieve the following objective:

(a) Short-Term: Integrated multi-sectarian station, patrol, and traffic operations providing freedom of movement and safe and secure communities and neighborhoods in accordance with the rule of law.

(b) Long-Term: A quality and enduring Iraqi police force capable of apprehending and processing along with supporting investigations, adjudicating and incarcerating criminals IAW rule of law; providing civil order; sustaining public confidence and trust.

(2) To achieve Phase I stabilization of Iraq during the remainder of 2006 and into 2007, it is imperative that credible local law enforcement agencies operate in compliance with Iraqi law and within internationally recognized human rights standards. IPS capability and public confidence in that capability are important and necessary pre-requisites to achieve PIC. Moreover, an effective IPS should be the GOI’s first instrument of choice for providing domestic policing within the rule of law and thereby reduce the requirement for emergency measures. IPS in the security lead in key cities and provinces is required to transition to PIC. For the IPS to take on these responsibilities it must be professionally competent, adequately resourced and have the confidence and trust of the people.

(3) The IPS Development Program is supported by multiple commands and staffs to include MNSTC-I Civilian Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT), MNC-I PMO and C3 ISF staffs, 89 MP BDE and MSCs. CPATT is responsible for providing
equipment, manpower, and individual training. MNC-I PMO ICW C3 ISF is responsible for MNC-I IPS Development Program and Police Transition Team (PTT) policy oversight. The MP BDE is the executive agent (EA) for the PTT Development Program and provides technical oversight and support to the MSC for the execution of the program. As such the EA MP BDE provides training and certification of the PTTs. The PTTs comprise military police, International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) and linguists.

(4) (S//REL) The IPS is a civil authority under the MOI that serves its constituencies (local communities) rather than holding battle space and it is essential that the citizens of each community have confidence and trust in their police. The IPS will hold all persons, regardless of position, status, wealth, or creed, subject to the rule of law. The IPS Development Program will leverage media opportunities and information operations to enhance the profile and reputation of the IPS.

(5) (S//REL) The objective of the PTT template is to develop provincial headquarters, district headquarters and local police stations throughout the 18 Iraqi provinces. The PTT template is implemented under the following programs:

(a) (S//REL) The MND-SE initiated Security Sector Reform (SSR) program for the 4 Southeastern provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan and Muthanna and the key city of Basra.

(b) (S//REL) The PTT program covering the remaining 14 provincial headquarters, district headquarters and stations within the 9+ key cities of Baghdad/Taji, Fallujah, Ramadi, North Babil (Musayyib Police District including the urban areas of Al Haswah, Iskandariyah, Musayyib, and Jurf as Sukr), Mosul, Tal Afar, Najaf, Baqubah, Kirkuk, and Samarra. The expansion of the PTT program to additional key cities is predicated on templating PTTs at districts and stations.

(6) (S//REL) Reporting and assessment standards for the SSR are identical to those used for the IPS Development Program.

(7) (U) The PTT template is contingent upon prevailing security conditions, and will expand to district headquarters and stations within provinces dictated by MNC-I’s priorities.

(8) (S//REL) It is essential to balance IPS operational capabilities with administrative and logistics support. However, PTTs must work to inculcate self-reliance among the IPS. The objectives are to deliberately reduce CF support to IPS (all ISF), for ministries to assume all life support contracts, and to develop policies to limit CF
intervention to emergency support such as fuel, ammunition, and medical support in order to prevent degradation of capabilities.

(9) (U) The allocation of responsibilities and specific directives for the conduct and implementation of the IPS Development Program are at Tab B to Appendix 1 of Annex C to this OPORD.

c. (U) National Police (NP) Reforma tion. (See Tab D to Appendix 1 to Annex C)

(1) (S//REL) The National Police (NP) were originally formed under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as the Special Police Commandos (SP CDO) and Public Order Brigades (POB) to bridge the gap between the Iraqi Army (IA) and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). They were renamed the NP in April 06 and are presently almost exclusively Baghdad based. Originally trained and employed as additional light infantry units within the COIN fight, their present status is now incompatible with the desired CF endstate of the NP and is now undergoing a program of reform.

(2) (S//REL) The CF desired endstate for the NP is: A national rapidly deployable paramilitary police force operating in support of the Iraqi Police Service, under the command of the Ministry of Interior and when appropriate, under the direction or in support of the Provincial Governors in order to provide the Government of Iraq with a proportional response option and bridging capability between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army.

(3) (S//REL) In common with many MOI institutions there is considerable evidence of NP corruption and militia alliance, the levels of corruption vary from passive acceptance of militia activities within NP units to active involvement in militia activities. This level of corruption has led to an extremely low public perception of the NP by Iraqi citizens. In order to move the NP from their present precarious position within the Iraqi security architecture to a position where they can be used in accordance with the CF endstate a 3 main phases NP reformation program was developed:

(a) (S//REL) NP “Quick Look” Inspections. An initial quick look to assess the utility and operational effectiveness of all NP units which highlighted some generic problems with the NP.

(b) (S//REL) NP Leadership Assessment Boards. A joint MOI and CF board to identify and remove ineffective or criminal NP BN Cds.
(c) (S/REL) NP BDE COHORT Training. A concentrated training package focusing on police skills training that will start to refocus the NP IAW their future endstate.

(4) (S/REL) The future of the NP hinges upon the population of Iraq placing their trust in the NP. It is vital that the NP are trusted by the population and fulfill a trusted role within the country. The new NP Mission Essential Task List (METL) reflects the capabilities required from the NP in order to fulfill their desired endstate.

(5) (S/REL) The BDE COHORT training will focus on the “Rule of Law” and tasks that support police operations and will be the cornerstone of NP reformation.

(6) (S/REL) It is planned that in the NP will be regionally based in the future however; there is a current reluctance of the regional governors to accept the NP into their regions.

(7) (S/REL) The NP are being mentored by National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) deployed to all NP BNs, BDEs, DIVs and the NPHQ. Along with the COHORT training, the embedded NPTT will provide the NP with the skills training and mentorship that the NP needs to reach the specified endstate.

(8) (S/REL) The primary method for measurement for NP progression will be the Transition readiness Assessment (TRA). Monthly TRAs will be conducted by the NPTT and submitted via MSCs to MNC-I on a monthly basis.

(9) (S/REL) As the training and ability of the NP closes with the specified endstate MSCs will change the employment of the NP from light infantry focused operations to operations in accordance with the NP endstate. Upon stability the NP will take on the additional tasks identified in their METL.

(10) (S/REL) The allocation of responsibilities and specific directives for the conduct and implementation of the NP Development Plan are at Tab D to Appendix 1 of Annex C to this OPORD.

d. (S/REL) Iraqi Army Lead. In September 2006 the command lines between MNF-I and the Iraqi JHQ dissolved. At the same time, the IGFC assumed command and control of 8 IA Division IAW plans to progressively assume command of all IA divisions by July 2007. IGFC and the divisions it commands have their own AO and IGFC has become the supported command, though it will retain its MiTT until it achieves TRA 1. Paragraph 5 of this order will address the revised command and control relationships between Iraqi Defense Forces and CF. Appendix 1,
Annex C will address the details of how MNC-I will pass the remaining IA divisions to the command of IGFC. Less the IA units that have already been passed to IGFC command, MNC-I will retain command and control of brigade and division IA units until they attain TRA 2 and formally transition to the IGFC. IA battalions will remain OPCON to their Iraqi brigade regardless of TRA or IAL status during transition to IGFC. MiTTs will remain embedded in IA units until they achieve TRA 1 and are remissioned, regardless of whether the commanding headquarters is the IGFC or a CF division. In many provinces, achieving Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) is a necessary first step to create the conditions that will allow for PIC. IAL (See Appendix 1, Annex C.) proceeds through three distinct stages that describe the conditions and increasing capability of IA units as well as the level of overwatch CF provide. These stages are specific to IAL and are not associated with the overall phasing construct for this OPORD. IAL is a term of reference that applies to IA units that may require some form of CF support, regardless of command relationship.

(1) (S//REL) Stage I (Operating in CF AO). During Stage I, IA units are at TRA Level 3 or 4 and conducting operations within MNC-I AO. The CF unit is responsible for leading COIN operations and is the supported command. MNF-I and IA like units from battalion to division establish a full partnership program with MNF-I conducting training and leading operations (“Coach, Teach, Mentor”). MNF-I partnership unit responsibilities during this stage include assigning tasks, clearing fires, assigning boundaries and positioning authority for the IA unit. Full Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) are embedded within IA units at battalions, brigades, and divisions. MiTTs will provide access to the majority of MNF-I enablers, including joint fires, intelligence, aviation and specified logistical sustainment. IA units are under tactical control (TACON) of their partner unit, report through the partnership unit, and do not have an AO. The IA is responsible during this stage for providing administrative support to its subordinate units. Once an IA unit achieves TRA Level 2, it will begin a validation process to assume its own AO at the discretion of the MSC commander or it will be transitioned to the command and control of its parent headquarters under the command and control of the IGFC. The CF and IA higher headquarters of this unit will determine jointly the time and transition tasks required to execute the assumption of a designated AO. This process should last approximately 30 days or as long as the Division Commander deems necessary. This stage ends when the IA unit has completed its required transition tasks, is validated as ready, and is prepared to assume its own AO.

(2) (S//REL) Stage II (Assuming AO). In this stage, an IA unit assumes responsibility for its assigned AO. (See the IAL Model in Annex C.)
(a) (S//REL) Stage II begins when an IA unit assumes responsibility for its AO. The IA unit is at TRA Level 2 and leads COIN operations in its own AO with the support of its CF partnership unit. The IA unit commander assumes responsibility for the security of his AO and for the activities and actions of his forces within that space. As IA units assume AOs, partnerships begin to migrate to the next higher headquarters. Company commanders no longer partner with IA battalions, but CF battalion commanders and staff periodically check on IA battalions. The partnership program evolves during this stage from one of daily interaction to one of less frequent interaction. Full MiTTs remain embedded within IA battalions, brigades and divisions throughout this stage. MiTTs continue to provide the IA unit access to some CF capabilities; throughout this stage CF will reduce the capabilities provided to IA units, a further measure to transition them to fully independent operations. MiTTs assume the majority of partnership responsibilities and assist IA units in their climb to TRA Level 1. The IA unit remains TACON to its CF partner until its higher IA headquarters reaches TRA Level 2 and assumes TACON of all its subordinate IA units that have assumed an AO. CF assume tactical overwatch, which insures their ability to reenter the places that have achieved IAL under the following conditions: to shape the AO; to support partnered IA units; for tactical intervention during a crisis; to support transition teams (MiTT, PTT, BTT, NPTT) with quick reaction forces (QRF) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); and to prosecute CF high-value targets (HVT). The IA unit’s higher headquarters (CF or IA) is responsible for assigning tasks, positioning units, and assigning boundaries throughout this stage. The IA unit commander assuming lead during this stage is responsible for planning, coordinating, training and executing counterinsurgency operations within his AO, to include command responsibility for the actions of his unit. The IA provides administrative support to its subordinate units. This stage ends when the IA unit is assessed as TRA Level 1 and is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining COIN operations. [Note: A fully functioning Iraqi national logistics system is not a prerequisite for IA battalions and brigades to achieve TRA Level 1, only that the unit is able to plan, requisition, receive, distribute and manage sustainment from a viable logistical source such as a higher IA unit, a contractor or coalition support.]

(b) (S//REL) Tactical Overwatch. CF provide overwatch at the tactical level during IAL. CF will posture tactical-level response reaction forces in close proximity and within quick response times for IA with their own AO. The purpose of these forces is to: prevent the defeat of ISF units; reestablish local security control in
situations that exceed ISF capabilities; and provide emergency support to transition teams. CF maintain transition teams to provide enabler support and partnerships to provide for the support and sustainment of IA units, and to continue assisting IA units improve from TRA 2 to Level 1. CF will coordinate with ISF when intervening in areas where IA units have assumed their own AO.

(c) (S/REL) Characteristics of Tactical Overwatch. Tactical Overwatch is generally characterized by daily interaction with ISF and embedded transition teams. CF support ISF operations as required and work in close proximity to ISF as they fully take the lead. ISF are incapable of conducting fully independent operations. CF will continue to provide CSS support, MEDEVAC, joint fires, emergency logistics, EOD, and QRF support for embedded transition teams. IA units will begin using IA QRFs before requesting CF assistance. Transition Teams will remain the conduit for intelligence sharing; LNOs will fulfill the same role at IGFC. Tactical Overwatch does not define a command and control relationship.

(3) (S/REL) Stage III conditions are met as IA units achieve TRA 1. At TRA 1, IA units are sufficiently organized and equipped to plan, execute and sustain independent COIN and security operations. Stage III requires a mature, multi-layered IA logistical structure, reflecting the ability to independently provide strategic, operational and tactical level CSS enabling support. As IA units achieve TRA 1, CF partnered units assume operational overwatch. IA units may remain TACON or OPCON to CF units, or may be OPCON to IGFC units, depending on the progress of transition of IA units to the command and control of the GOI. The achievement of Stage III is not necessarily related to PIC. TRA 1 units may be garrisoned in PIC provinces, where the responsibility for domestic security has reverted to the IPS; or, alternatively, they may be engaged in COIN or security operations in areas proclaimed to be under a GOI issued State of Emergency Measure.

(a) (S/REL) Operational Overwatch. CF provide overwatch at the operational level for IA units at TRA 1 under IAL and for provinces that have attained PIC. During operational overwatch, CF will provide area coverage for areas under PIC and IAL; CF response times will be relatively longer. The purpose of these forces is to: prevent the defeat of ISF operational level units; reestablish conditions for IAL or PIC; and to provide emergency support to transition teams, PRTs, CF transiting the PIC province, and LNOs to JCCs and the PJCC. CF maintain transition teams to coordinate enablers and partnership units to provide emergency
sustainment to ISF units. The use of operational overwatch forces will be coordinated with the GOI, ISF, the provincial governor, and CF.

(b) (S//REL) Characteristics of Operational Overwatch. CF move to Operational Overwatch as ISF become more capable and achieve TRA 1 or when the conditions in a province satisfy the conditions for PIC. Having moved to Operational Overwatch, CF no longer maintain daily presence with ISF, and in many instances will provide overwatch from more geographically distant locations. Transition teams are generally found at the BDE and higher level headquarters for the IA and DBE and provincial level in the case of PTTs. Partnership contacts will be less frequent as CF restructure and reduce their overall footprint. ISF will provide its own enabler support and CF will only provide CSS and life support under extreme conditions; MoD and MoI will be responsible for all contracting. CF will retain a QRF capability for residual transition teams, and CF/PRTs operating in area being overwatched. ISF will maintain their own QRF capabilities commensurate with the local threat conditions. Intelligence sharing will occur at the IGFC. CJSOTF will continue to advise IA and ISOF units to include the prosecution of HVI.

(4) (S//REL) Develop capable IA to Conduct Independent COIN Operations. (See Appendix 1, Annex C). MNC-I will complete the process of passing all IA divisions to the IGFC. MNC-I will sustain its efforts to develop capable IA units through partnership and transition teams. During Phase I, the primary focus is to develop IA battalions, brigades and divisions to TRA 2 in order to enable IAL for COIN operations. MSC commanders determine the timeline IAW IAL validation model for an IA unit to assume its own AO once it achieves TRA 2. capable IA to Conduct Independent COIN Operations. (See Appendix 1, Annex C)

d. (S//REL) Neutralize The Insurgency. Neutralizing the insurgency and defeating AQI were separate operational objectives because the ROE prescribes different constraints for kinetically engaging them. Less these distinctions, the overarching themes for addressing insurgents and AQI are the same and thus they have been combined into a single objective. Although MNF-I has specifically tasked OCF-I with defeating AQI, MNC-I will continue to support this MNF-I objective. MNC-I conducts intelligence-driven offensive operations to neutralize the insurgency and defeat AQI. Operations focus combat power, kinetic and non-kinetic, on the enemy to neutralize their capability to a level that allows battlespace transition to ISF. Undoubtedly, the leadership of AQI must be killed or captured, but MNC-I’s success hinges on changing the environment that
has allowed the insurgency to proliferate and AQI to operate in the midst of the Iraqi people.

(1) (S//REL) MSCs focus on insurgents, AQI, AIF organizations and leadership, and sanctuaries within their battlespace. Insurgents and AQI have sought sanctuary where CF presence was minimal and along seams created by CF boundaries. CF must prevent sanctuaries from emerging inside Iraq. When a new sanctuary develops, CF will assist ISF efforts to destroy it. Destroying the AIF sanctuaries is a multi-dimensional process that cannot ignore local governance, basic services and economic conditions. CF must constantly assess the benefit of the means used to eliminate a sanctuary in relation to the number of Iraqis driven further away from or closer to the Iraqi government.

(2) (S//REL) MNC-I will periodically coordinate limited boundary shifts and/or cross-boundary operations developed from coordinated tactical planning between MSCs. MNC-I’s involvement in these operations will be limited, primarily publishing updated operational graphics, providing necessary support, conducting coordination with MNF-I as a conduit to the GOI, and issuing coordinating instructions.

(3) (S//REL) ISF and the GOI must be included in all phases of planning and execution. A synchronized information operations effort is critical to success at all levels. The integration of non-lethal effects will exploit MNC-I’s ability to isolate insurgents and AQI from the Iraqi people, thus denying them their most valuable base of active and passive support. These operations maintain constant pressure on AIF, attrit its leadership and military means, and erode their base of support by denying them access to Iraqi people. Kinetic operations combined with non-kinetic efforts, which change the environment that has allowed AIF to grow and flourish, will set the conditions for ISF to defeat AQI and neutralize the insurgency.

e. (S//REL) Iraqis Control the Border. (See Appendix 3, Annex C). MNC-I develops capable DBE units and Ports of Entry (POE) through Border Transition Teams (BTT) and partnership with CF while MNSTC-I continues to provide trained and equipped border security forces. The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) forces, POEs, and IA units will integrate tactically to coordinate operations and synchronize effects within their battle space. MSCs will identify the echelon, location and method for tactical integration. DBE regional headquarters will integrate their efforts with IA division headquarters and POEs in order to coordinate operations and synchronize effects within their battle space. Ports of Entry (POE) will be fully operational with coordination and synchronization of all ministries involved. Finally, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and MOD integration will be completed as well as coordinated
with other ministries responsible for POE functions. The end state is DBE and IA forces and Ports of Entry fully capable of exercising control over Iraq’s borders.

f. (S//REL) Strategic Infrastructure Security. (S//REL) Strategic Infrastructure Security. (See Appendix 4, Annex C). MNC-I is developing a comprehensive approach to resolve infrastructure security challenges. This approach aims to improve the integration of security along with rapid and coordinated responses to all incidents involving critical infrastructure. The procedure to facilitate coordination among the stakeholders was first demonstrated along the Kirkuk to Bayji Corridor in November 2005. Due to ongoing attacks on linear and nodal infrastructure, MNC-I continues full spectrum operations to disrupt suspected criminals/AIF IOT break-up the network of those involved in attacks.

(1) (S//REL) Operations will focus on securing key infrastructure, developing the capability of the GOI to assume responsibility for assigned elements with infrastructure security functions, and identifying and disrupting criminal/AIF cells conducting the attacks. The strategic infrastructure of the Basrah to Al Faw export oil pipeline remains vital for future Iraqi economic development as the primary means of Iraqi revenue generation. The current stability and limited threat in the south have allowed MNC-I to focus efforts on areas of greater infrastructure threat and vulnerability. Based on current threat activity and instability, infrastructure security operations will be conducted IAW the following priorities: 1) Kirkuk-Bayji pipelines and electrical lines including the Al Fathah Crossing, 2) Bayji-Baghdad product pipelines and electrical lines, 3) Baghdad electrical ring, and 4) Mussaib to Salman Pak electrical lines. The Government of Iraq (GOI) assigned responsibility for infrastructure protection to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The MOD is accountable but not fully capable due to insufficient organization, accountability, resources and authority.

(2) (S//REL) Currently infrastructure security is the responsibility of each MSC and the IA. The infrastructure security situation is complicated by numerous security organizations working for the various ministries and is different in each AO. Each ministry has Facilities Protection Services (FPS) personnel who secure ministry buildings and key nodes. The Ministry of Electricity (MOE) forces consist of FPS and Electric Protection Security Services (EPSS). The Ministry of Oil (MOO) forces consist of Oil Protection Force (OPF), FPS, Tribal forces, and contractors (e.g., Parsons). The Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIB) are funded through the MOD and report through IA BDEs. The MSC has primary responsibility to assess security of key infrastructure and coordinate the physical security effort of the various forces in their AO IAW TAB C of Appendix 4 to
Annex C (Strategic Infrastructure Matrix). Where critical infrastructure is vulnerable or security efforts are insufficient, the MSC will assign IA units or Coalition Forces (CF) as required. Partnership and mentoring programs with Iraqi forces assigned to infrastructure security will be applied, but balanced against capabilities and operational requirements. MSC operations will include targeting corruption and building transparency and integrity into the energy distribution system. In addition, hardening will be applied to critical linear infrastructure and nodes to enhance security by making criminal/AIF interdiction efforts increasingly difficult. END STATE: Infrastructure effectively secured using primarily SIBs and ministerial forces, while CF/IA augment as required and provide critical enablers (ISR, targeting, engagement, etc.). The Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) and the Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCC) serving as the coordination hubs for emergency response to attacks/failures in order to facilitate rapid repair.

g. (S//REL) Develop Provincial and Local Government. (See Annex G). MNC-I establishes the security environment and provides the required assets and support that allows MNF-I/USEMB Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to assist provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern; to promote increased security and the rule of law; to promote political and economic development; and to provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population. Although the PRTs will assume primacy for developing the provincial governments the MSCs will still be responsible for coordinating with and assisting the PRTs in this endeavor as well as maintaining primacy for local governance capacity development.

(1) (S//REL) Support the Political Process. (See Appendix 12, Annex C). MNC-I establishes a security environment that allows the International Election Commission-Iraq (IECI) to conduct safe provincial elections and the constitutional referendum. MNC-I relies on actionable intelligence to guide operations that limit and mitigate disruptions prior to provincial elections windows. These operations are preceded and followed by political engagement operations. MNC-I provides resources and enablers that allow MNDs to help the GOI set conditions for successful elections, which lends greater credibility to the legitimacy of the government. Election operations are synchronized across four lines of effort: security, logistics support, information operations, and command and control.

4. (S//REL) Sustaining Operations. MNC-I sustaining operations enable the MNC-I shaping operations to create conditions to transition provinces to PIC and to continue to allow ISF to assume the lead for security operations.
a. (S//REL) Assured Mobility and General Engineering. (See Annex AA). Engineers at the MND and Corps level provide assured mobility on routes, construct and expand coalition bases, construct temporary IA bases, and provide reinforcing prime power, topographic, design and reconstruction support. Assured mobility is achieved with route clearance operations to counter the IED threat and tactical bridging to support MSC and MNC-I operations. Each MND and the Corps Engineer Brigade is organized with combat and construction engineer units to complete internal and Corps directed missions. MNC-I provides construction program management and environmental expertise to facilitate base construction, transfer or closure. The Facilities Section administers the MILCON Program in Iraq on behalf of all MNC-I units. Risk is mitigated by utilizing coalition engineer construction assets in less permissive areas and maximizing the use of contracted construction effort in more permissive ones.

b. (U) Reconstruction. (See Annex AA). MNC-I plays a pivotal role in the Reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The MNC-I C7 Reconstruction Cell is the lead staff agent in the corps for reconstruction and conducts Reconstruction Program Management (PgM) for all MNC-I units. The MNC-I Reconstruction Program is focused in support of the Corps Commanding General’s priorities and synchronized with MSC Commanders to create non-lethal effects that enable the Corps to transition provincial control to the Iraqis. MNC-I elements are responsible to synchronize the reconstruction effects within their battle space. In order to synchronize the reconstruction effects, each unit must track reconstruction efforts in their battle space regardless of the funding source or executing agency. While there is no command or control relationship with many of the agencies conducting reconstruction activities in Iraq, synchronization of effects and influencing decisions can be achieved through engagement at all levels.

c. (S//REL) Base Consolidation and Transfer. (See Appendix 5, Annex C). The MNC-I basing plan is designed to support the operational requirements of CF as we transition from tactical to operational overwatch and as ISF assume responsibility for their own areas of operations. Base consolidation and transfer is a critical component to the decisive operation of transitioning to Provincial Iraqi Control. Base transfer is a conditions-based process that is both dependent on the security of the AO and the ability of the ISF to control an area of operations. It is also affected by operational and strategic requirements and constraints. The priority for base transfers is first to the ISF and then to the Ministry of Finance—which determines the rightful owners of the property. As MNC-I reduces the number of bases from which it operates, forces will move to consolidation bases. As such, it is expected that several bases will grow in population and support requirements prior to their transfer to the GOI, though any future base reductions must be tied to a reduction in CF
population in Iraq. The long-term basing endstate calls for the reduction to final Contingency Operating Bases (COBs). The final COBs have been designated as Al Asad, Anaconda, Speicher and Victory Base Complex for US forces with Basrah and Irbil remaining for coalition members. There will also be four convoy support centers (CSCs) located at Adder, Scania, Korean Village and Q-West. As MNC-I transfers bases and reduces its footprint, MNC-I must plan for the continued support to Transition Teams, Regional Embassy Offices, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

d. (S//REL) Joint Fires and Effects. (See Appendix 8, Annex C). MNC-I employs lethal and non-lethal enablers to support MNC-I and MSC operational priorities along the five LOOs in order to facilitate Coalition and ISF efforts to achieve the objectives and effects outlined in the Corps' operational design. The synchronized application of all assets resident in the MNC-I task organization, made available through HHQ and contracting will shape the conditions for ISF to take the lead for COIN operations and facilitate the transition to PIC. MNC-I Effects plans, coordinates and synchronizes its activities IAW established Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Work Groups enacted at the Corps level.

(d) (S//REL) Phase II: Restoration of Civil Authority (Early 2007 – 2008). Phase II will overlap with Phase I in some provinces as selected Iraqi provinces and provincial capitals begin to meet the conditions for transfer to PIC. MNC-I’s Decisive Operation is the process of transitioning provinces to PIC, leading to the IPS assuming the security lead in the 18 provinces. The phase is conditions-based and proceeds at varying rates across the battlespace. As IPS assume full responsibility for security lead, CF will continue moving to operational overwatch. MNC-I shaping and sustaining operations continue unchanged from Phase I. Phase II ends when 16 of 18 provinces achieve PIC.


2. (U) Shaping Operations. No change.

3. (U) Sustaining Operations. No change.

4. (U) Joint Fires and Effects. No change.

(e) (U) Phase III – Support to Self Reliance (Early 2008 - 2009). MNC-I’s concept of operations to support Phase III will be the subject of subsequent MNF-I Campaign Action Plans and Strategic directives.

1. (S//REL) Draft Definition of Strategic Overwatch. CF will transition to Strategic Overwatch when the GOI is capable of maintaining domestic order throughout Iraq and sustaining ISF (Iraqi Security Self-Reliance (ISSR) is defined in Joint Campaign Plan, 28 APR 2006). IAW bilateral and multilateral agreements, CF will assume a posture to defend Iraq from
external threats. ISF will conduct combined exercises that are mutually beneficial to the signatures of the aforementioned security agreements. These exercises will demonstrate credibility and interoperability.

2. (S//REL) Characteristics of Strategic Overwatch. Strategic Overwatch will begin while there are still CF in Iraq, but is intended to mature into a force posture that resides outside of Iraq. The transition to Strategic Overwatch will probably begin as CF move to the final set of Consolidation Operating Bases (COB, Speicher, Al Asad, Victory Base Complex, Anaconda, and Basrah) and Convoy Support Centers (CSC, Q-West, Korean Village, Scania, and Tallil). Strategic Overwatch forces will primarily orient on threats that are external to Iraq. The move to Strategic Overwatch will be preceded by or coincide with a restructuring of the headquarters within Iraq, e.g. MNF-I and MNC-I combine into a single headquarters while MNSTC-I transforms into an Office of Security and Cooperation (OSC). Forces remaining in Iraq for the purposes of training Iraqi Defense Forces will not constitute the Strategic Overwatch force.

c. (U) Risks. The following risks are derived from the most likely threat adaptations. Although many of the mitigating actions for these risks must occur at the GOI and MNF-I level, MNC-I will use its resources to influence activity at the operational level.

(1) (S//REL) The GOI becomes mired in political intransigence resulting from its inability to unifying the country and provide basic services. Fractured along sectarian lines, the GOI remains incapable of taking a unified stance. Any initiative that appears to support one group over another is immediately opposed by other political parties. This results in paralysis fueled by vitriolic rhetoric from most political actors. Because Iraqis view power as a zero sum game, political compromise on contentious issues such as federalism and the constitutional amendment process could easily lead to political deadlock.

(a) (S//REL) Effect: The GOI is not a national unity government and the Iraqi people place even greater dependence and lend greater support to their sectarian networks for security and support.

(b) (S//REL) Mitigation: MNC-I will sustain efforts to increase the security in Baghdad; MNC-I, within its capabilities, assists the GOI in the uniform distribution of basic services (uniform in respect to sectarian affiliation); Transition Teams will sustain their efforts to maintain the national character of ISF; IO operations will target especially contentious sectarian fault lines; MNC-I will focus its efforts in Baghdad, Diyala, Mosul, Kirkuk, and North Babil.

(2) (S//REL) Sectarian violence remains unabated. Sectarian and social groups are attempting to regain or consolidate political power. In the six months since the Golden Mosque bombing, the indicators trending toward civil war have remained constant or increased, indicating an increased risk of a larger and more open civil war. However, the slow and uneven escalation of sectarian violence lends itself to stopping and then reversing this trend. The self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence must first be suspended and
current measures that have successfully prevented large-scale civil war must be sustained. The reduction of sectarian attacks, especially in Baghdad, is critical to diminishing tensions between sectarian and social groups, and improving the overall security environment.

(a) (S//REL) Effect: Sectarian violence remains elevated in Baghdad and Diyala, resulting in increased violence in other key cities on sectarian fault lines such as Mosul and Kirkuk.

(b) (S//REL) Mitigation: The complex social fabric of competing Iraqi loyalties to various ethnic, religious, political and economic networks retards a rapid slide into nation-wide conflict. Politician, religious, tribal, and business interests and venues will continue to provide alternative means for the necessary discourse needed to suspend the violence. Using engagement, MNC-I must encourage dialogue between the factions in conflict. Continuation of the Baghdad Security Plan will help limit civilian murders in order to ease sectarian tensions, and allow the political process to move forward. The GOI must be encouraged to continue implementation of the DDR process. Transition Teams will continue to play an important role in mentoring ISF to remain Iraqi institutions, units preparing to openly defect to one particular sectarian agenda must be the focus of IO efforts.

(3) (S//REL) AIF, pressured by increased CF and ISF activity in Baghdad, will likely to ‘go to ground’ or move to safer areas outside of Baghdad. Sunni extremists will flee to eastern Anbar province, the Baghdad Belt, and Baqubah; Shi’a extremists may be pushed out to Diyala, Babil and south into Shi’a dominated areas. The influx of extremists into Diyala will further exacerbate tribal, political, and sectarian divisions in the province. By the end of 2006, MNC-I should anticipate threat groups to renewing their focus on Baghdad.

(a) (S//REL) Effect: Sunni and Shia extremists move out of Baghdad and there is an increase in threat activity and attacks in Diyala and eastern Anbar province.

(b) (S//REL) Mitigation: MNC-I must take advantage of the enemy operational pauses to build ISF capability and capacity. Efforts of the 5 IA Division will address the increasing threat in Diyala through the Diyala Security Plan. Al Anbar remains the focus of CF operations second only to Baghdad. The Baghdad Berm will disrupt the flow of enemy fighters and material in and out of Baghdad. Use of the MNC-I operational reserve will enable the corps to sustain its main effort, yet be able to respond to enemy challenges outside of Baghdad. As the NP are reformed, they may assume a more expeditionary capability to deal with threats that emerge outside of Baghdad.

(4) (S//REL) Sunni insurgents choose to align with AQI/AS rather than responding to political inducements, largely because of Shia attacks. De-Ba’athification remains the single biggest obstacle to full Sunni participation in the political process. Sunni Arabs benefited during Saddam’s rule and maximized their benefits by becoming members of the Ba’ath party. Shi’a politicians continue to leverage de-Ba’athification as a means to keep mainstream Sunni Arabs out of lucrative, honorable, and influential positions. Many Sunni
Arab technocrats have been displaced by neophyte Shi’as in the majority of ministries; the GOI would benefit from the reinstatement of Sunnis with the necessary skills to run the ministries more effectively. Sunni insurgents are at crossroads between continued insurgency, political engagement, or radicalization towards AQI/AS. The Sunni led insurgency will continue if they continue to be excluded from meaningful participation in the political process. Sunni insurgents will align with AQI/AS out of necessity and expediency to combat Shi’a militias and Shi’a death squads.

(a) **(S//REL)** Effect: GOI reconciliation plan stalls leading to further Sunni exclusion, and Sunni insurgents turn to AQI/AS to combat Shi’a militia attacks.

(b) **(S//REL)** Mitigation: MNF-I must continue to engage the GOI and encourage them to announce the dissolution of the De-Baathification Committee. Continued censure should only extend to the highest levels of the Ba’ath party. The Reconciliation Plan must be advanced. At the BCT level, local engagement must be used as the mechanism to encourage Sunnis to resist alignment with AQI/AS. Sustained efforts on the border and particularly the POEs will disrupt the flow of external support necessary to foster the collusion of Iraqi Sunnis and AQI/AS. Continued HVI targeting and ongoing efforts to neutralize death squads will further mitigate the number of disenfranchised Sunnis from joining with AQI/AS and help restore their confidence in the GOI and political process.

(5) **(S//REL)** Terrorists and Foreign Fighters remain an enduring component of the Iraqi human landscape. Terrorists and Foreign Fighters like AQI/AS have established a decentralized terrorist network in Iraq and despite the elimination of senior leaders their cellular network enables them to achieve significant effects with spectacular attacks. A wedge has developed between AQI and other Sunni rejectionist groups because very few Iraqis are attracted to AQI’s ideology or its vision of the future. Nonetheless, attacks continue and a rebranded AQI (portrayed as a relentless and capable defender of Sunni interests) continues to grow because Sunnis feel threatened, disenfranchised, and unable to reverse increasing Shi’a dominance through non-violent means.

(a) **(S//REL)** Effect: AQI/AS operating from sanctuaries have freedom of movement to sustain their campaign of terror and intimidation.

(b) **(S//REL)** Mitigation: Currently, AQI is not driving the conflict in Iraq. Their senior leadership is in disarray and is unable to assert command and control over indigenous Iraqi cells. AQI is able to sustain its ideology by resisting the occupation, providing economic opportunities (mostly illicit) and ruling through fear and intimidation. Defeating AQI remains nested in the corps’ effects, which address the conditions that have allowed AQI to maintain sanctuaries and operate in Iraq.

d. **(U) Tasks to Subordinate Units.**

(1) **(U) MND–B**
In conjunction with ISF, secure Baghdad to protect the population and deter sectarian violence; use the terms and definitions used in the Provincial Security Transition Assessment to determine when Baghdad City is secure.

Neutralize the insurgency in Baghdad and North Babil.

Support GOI efforts to transition Karbala, An Najaf, Babil, and Baghdad provinces to PIC.

Build capable IPS focused on Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Babil.

Employ Weapons Inspection Teams (WIT) to assess infrastructure attacks.

Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in MND-B.

Secure Victory Base Complex.

BPT provide Operational Reserve (1 X BN).

Continue to enable the IA to mentor and assist Strategic Infrastructure Brigades and Battalions (SIBs).

Support GOI efforts to secure the Saudi Arabian border. (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

Neutralize the insurgency in Al Anbar.

Consolidate gains in Al Anbar by improving economic systems, employing more people, and helping to establish governance system responsive to the basic needs of the people.

Stabilize Ramadi and Fallujah.

Support GOI efforts to secure the Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi Arabian borders. (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

Build a capable IPS focused on the Ramadi Provincial Station first; the district stations in Fallujah, Ramadi, Al Qaim, and Haditha.

Employ WIT to assess infrastructure attacks.
SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//MR

(a) (S//REL) ICW 4 IA Division, conduct enhanced partnership to train Strategic Infrastructure Brigades/battalions (SIB) and remain partnered with these forces to protect strategic infrastructure to prevent damage or destruction. Focus efforts primarily on oil infrastructure on the Kirkuk-Bayji-Baghdad Corridor; focus on electrical infrastructure along the Kirkuk-Bayji-Haditha line.

(b) (S//REL) Partner with elements of ISF in order to help stabilize Mosul, Tal Afar, Baqubah, Samarra, and Kirkuk.

(c) (S//REL) BPT provide operational overwatch in Irbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah provinces when the GOI grants them PIC status.

(d) (S//REL) Set conditions for transfer of Salah ad Din, Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninawa to PIC.

(e) (S//REL) Support GOI efforts to secure the Syrian, Iranian, and Turkish borders. (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

(f) (S//REL) Monitor and support USEMBIZ efforts to resolve property claims IAW TAL 58 and Article 139, Iraqi Constitution.

(g) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in MND-N.

(h) (S//REL) Employ WIT to assess infrastructure attacks.

(4) (U) MND–CS

(a) (S//REL) Set conditions to transfer Wasit and Qadisiyah to PIC.

(b) (S//REL) Support GOI efforts to secure the Iranian border. (See Appendix 3, Annex C.)

(c) (S//REL) Provide Tactical Overwatch to 8 IA Division units in MND-CS.

(d) (S//REL) Provide support, as required and within the division’s capabilities, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.

(5) (U) MND–SE

(a) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in MND-SE.

(b) (S//REL) Facilitate Basrah oil facilities hardening and development projects. Develop plans and BPT help ISF secure critical infrastructure points of failure in AO.

(c) (S//REL) Support GOI efforts to transition Maysan and Basrah to PIC.
(d) **(S//REL)** Support GOI efforts to secure the Iranian, Kuwaiti, and Saudi Arabian borders. (See Appendix 3, Annex C.)

(e) **(S//REL)** Diminish the presence of militias in Basrah.

(f) **(S//REL)** Provide Operational Overwatch to Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces.

(g) **(S//REL)** ICW 13 SC(E), secure CEDAR II/TALLIL/ADDER.

(h) **(S//REL)** Provide support, as required, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.

(6) **(U) MND–NE**

(a) **(S//REL)** Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI Operations in Irbil and within MND-NE.

(b) **(S//REL)** Sustain non-kinetic operations that have contributed to the current conditions in MND-NE.

(7) **(U) CJSOTF-AP.**

(a) **(S//REL)** Conduct operations to destroy Extra Judicial Killing (EJK) cells by targeting networks specified by MNC-I IOT stop the spread of sectarian violence.

(b) **(S//REL)** Conduct Foreign Internal Defense to develop Iraqi Security Forces’ capability to independently conduct the security aspects of COIN.

(c) **(S//REL)** Conduct operations to provide actionable intelligence for the employment of the ISOF BDE and select ISF units.

(d) **(S//REL)** Conduct tribal engagement IAW MNC-I Effects targeting with emphasis on Sunni tribes in western Al Anbar Province.

(e) **(S//REL)** Conduct other Special Operations (SO) in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) in support of MNC-I, MNF-I and GWOT objectives.

(8) **(U) 13 SC(E)**

(a) **(S//REL)** Partner with and provide Transition Teams to Motor Transportation Regiments as required.

(b) **(S//REL)** Support development (with MNF-I and MNSTC-I lead) of institutional logistics systems and national support capabilities, to include the development of Regional Support Units (RSUs).
(c) (S//REL) Provide Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) and Quality Assurance (QA) Representative at each National Maintenance Contract site.

(d) (S//REL) Provide support to ISF as required IOT prevent ISF Catastrophic mission failure.

(e) (S//REL) BPT support (with MNSTC-I lead) development of National Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs).

(f) (S//REL) Provide General Support and General Support-Reinforcing to BCTs; provides DS/GS to MNC-I Separates.

(g) (S//REL) Provide common-item support and services as required IAW MOUs and Army Contract Service Agreements to other services, coalition partners, other US agencies, or UNAMI.

(h) (S//REL) Retain expeditionary life support and sustainment capability to support forces operating away from fixed sites. 13 SC(E) maintains 3 x Fob-In-A-Box (FIAB) sets, and 2x Corps Contingency Outpost Packages (CCOP). Each set supports 1x BN Task Force for IA and CF units respectively.

(i) (S//REL) Provide movement support to MNC-I OPRES as required.

(j) (S//REL) Establish and maintain the MNC-I container management program as outlined in Appendix 2, Tab B.

(k) (S//REL) BPT Provide aerial delivery of emergency common-item sustainment stocks (Class I, III, V, water) to support maneuver forces and transition teams in outlying areas as required.

(l) (S//REL) Submit CSS reports IAW Annex R, C4 Tab.

(m) (S//REL) BPT provide support to CF and local nationals in the event of a Pandemic Influenza.

(n) (S//REL) Provide personnel for the IGFC Movement Control Cell until they are capable of assuming this responsibility.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Tasks Common to All.

(a) (S//REL) Transition AO to TRA Level 2 ISF accepting moderate risk ISF MNC-I Iraqi Army Lead Transition guidance (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(b) (S//REL) Array CF in overwatch as required to sustain ISF with enablers and joint capabilities until IA units achieves TRA 1.
(c) (S//REL) Assist GOI efforts to diminish the presence of militias.

(d) (S//REL) Assist GOI efforts to end the cycle of sectarian violence and prevent its spread.

(e) (S//REL) O/O, complete the transition to PIC to include signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with provincial governors and transition ceremony (See Appendix 17, Annex C).

(f) (S//REL) Continue providing QRF, MEDEVAC, Route Clearance, Convoy Net, and Sheriff’s Net coverage along MNC-I Sustainment routes including AO that have been transitioned to the ISF or have transitioned to PIC.

(g) (S//REL) Continue partnership to develop ISF units to TRA Level 2 IOT transition AO and security lead. Develop the HSC to ensure they are capable of supporting their IA units.

(h) (S//REL) Continue to embed and support Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and Border Transition Team (BTT), both out-of-hide and external, to continue development of ISF units (See Annex T).

(i) (S//REL) Sustain Police Transition Teams (PTT) at provincial, district and station level IAW MNC-I Building Capable IPS “2006 Year of the Police” Plan (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(j) (S//REL) Accept TACON of IPLOs/IPTs in support of IPS development IAW MNC-I Building Capable IPS “2006 Year of the Police” Plan (See Appendix 1, Annex C).

(k) (S//REL) BPT accept TACON of DBE elements IAW applicable MOUs IOT establish Iraqi control of the Iraqi border (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

(l) (S//REL) Conduct operations to deny AIF sanctuary.

(m) (S//REL) Middle Ring Security is defined in MNF-I FRAMEWORK ORDER, Enclosure 1 to Tab J, Appendix 6, Annex C and consists of the responsibility to escort UNAMI personnel through MNF-I battlespace when moving to and from their places of work in Irbil and Basrah where separate arrangements are provided for their Inner Ring Security. MNC-I issues FRAGOs providing the specific details related to convoy escort responsibilities on a case by case basis.

(n) (S//REL) Conduct operations to restore and maintain Iraqi control of the Iraqi border. (See Appendix 3, Annex C).

(o) (U) Operations near Iraqi borders. All CF units that operate within 5 km of the Iraqi border are required to use map products provided by their local geospatial unit.
IOT ensure the correct delineation of borders recognized by the U.S. Department of State. Refer to paragraph 3.f.(9) of Appendix 3, Annex C (Border Security Operations) for additional information.

(p) *(S//REL)* Conduct IO to drive a wedge between the AIF and the Iraqi population (See Appendix 11, Annex C).

(q) *(S//REL)* Conduct IO to increase Iraqi support of the GOI (See Appendix 11, Annex C).

(r) *(S//REL)* Engage tribal leaders, religious leaders, and other local authorities to influence local populations (See Appendix 6, Annex C).

(s) *(S//REL)* Establish conditions and provide support to allow MNF-I/ PRTs to develop provincial governance and economies (See Annex G).

(t) *(S//REL)* BPT support GOI and ISF as they set conditions for provincial elections and a constitutional referendum; BPT to support the IECI. (See Appendix 12, Annex C).

(u) *(S//REL)* Support GOI and ISF as they establish security conditions ISO religious and special events that draw large populations.

(v) *(S//REL)* Set conditions to allow the GOI to establish/develop the rule of law. Focus operations on developing the following seven pillars: police, prisons, the judiciary, the legal profession, access to justice, transitional justice, and the legal framework. Safeguard human rights.

(w) *(S//REL)* Develop and execute deliberate plans to conduct base consolidation, closure, and handover IAW MNC-I Base Closure Guidance (See Appendix 5, Annex C).

(x) *(S//REL)* Secure key infrastructure; minimize the effects of interdiction.

(y) *(S//REL)* Conduct operations to disrupt AIF and criminal networks attacking critical infrastructure.

(z) *(S//REL)* Provide security for infrastructure repair crews as required.

(aa) *(S//REL)* Sustain engagements with those listed in the CIDNE data base IOT advocate disruption of attacks on infrastructure.

(bb) *(S//REL)* Perform reconnaissance and collection tasks as outlined in Appendix 4, Annex C.

(cc) *(S//REL)* Conduct information operations IAW Appendix 4, Annex C.
(dd) (S//REL) Update and submit strategic infrastructure matrix IAW Tab C, Appendix 4, Annex C NLT the twenty-fifth day of each month.

(ee) (S//REL) Report Excess Class VII to MNC-I C4 IAW Tab G, Appendix 1, Annex D to MNC-I SOP; Retrograde Operations.

(ff) (S//REL) Submit roll up of ESBI / ESAPI / DAPs weekly IAW ANNEX R, C4 Tab.

(gg) (S//REL) Maintain partnership with selected IA commanders IOT reinforce the need to secure infrastructure.

(hh) (S//REL) BPT provide direct support to ISF as required, per MNC-I approval, to prevent strategic mission failure.

(ii) (S//REL) Provide distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions as required.

(jj) (S//REL) BPT to provide support to CF and local nationals in the event of a Pandemic Influenza.

(kk) (S//REL) Coordinate logistical support to transition teams through nearest DS/GS CSS unit. This support may cross MND boundaries; in which case MSC’s coordinate cross boundary support from the closest CSS unit.

(ll) (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) (See Appendix 2, Annex C).

(2) (U) Definitions.

(a) (S//REL) Neutralize the Insurgency. Neutralizing the insurgency describes the integrated tasks of protecting the population, isolating insurgents from the population, denying enemy freedom of movement, sanctuary and external support, building capable ISF and synchronizing political, economic and informational effects. The purpose for these operations is to reduce the level of insurgent violence to a point that can be defeated by the ISF allowing continued political and economic development.

(b) (S//REL) AIF Sanctuary. Sanctuary is a place where enemy forces have freedom of action to refit, plan, and direct operations. With limited centralized C2, the enemy is capable of sustained activity, has some ability to mass, and partially controls the area. The term “safe haven” will not be used as it is a joint doctrinal term used to define a protected area for non-combatants.

(c) (S//REL) Denied Sanctuary. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses that the enemy benefits of sanctuary as defined above no longer exist and a CF platoon can operate in that area at moderate risk.
Control of the Iraqi Border. The following five conditions define Iraqi control of the IZ border:

1. DBE forces deployed in border forts along the entire Iraqi border enforcing border laws and disrupting the cross-border transit of T&FF.

2. IA postured in-depth, integrated with DBE forces and prepared to respond to DBE requests for assistance.

3. Roads leading to the Iraqi interior are controlled with ISF using vehicle checkpoints to disrupt T&FF freedom of movement.

4. Accommodation with local tribes.

5. Official POE are open and effectively enforce Iraqi border and immigration laws. (MNSTC-I has the lead for POE).

CF Enablers. An enabler is a critical capability that must be present to allow an organization to accomplish or significantly ease the accomplishment of its assigned missions. Conditions determine the requirement for enablers; not all missions or forces require the same set. Military enablers typically include ISR, fires, aviation, air defense, engineer assets, military police, communications, administration and logistics.

Rules of Engagement (ROE). The established ROE for all forces OPCON or TACON to MNC-I are found in Appendix 7 to Annex C.

Logistics. (See Annex D). MNC-I develops sustainment plans, policies and procedures, and postures logistics assets across Iraq in order to support the development of ISF, while retaining flexibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Key to success is gaining efficiencies in fixed site operations through contracts and LOGCAP support, while maximizing expeditionary capability to support operations as required throughout Iraq without loss of momentum. Also critically important is development of concepts to support transition teams arrayed across Iraq while minimizing the logistics footprint; this may entail non-traditional support arrangements. While tactical level logistical support remains a service responsibility, every effort should be made to maximize efficiencies gained through common item support.

Concept of Coalition Support. CFLCC provides EAC CSS, JRSOI, and Title X support to MNC-I through service channels. 13 SC (E) provides general common item support to all services and CF as required, IAW acquisition and cross servicing agreements (ACSA). 13 SC (E) provides general support on an area basis from nine GS/DS Logistical Hubs: LSA Anaconda (main hub), Tallil (Southern), Al Asad (Western), Taqadum (Western), Q-West (Northern), Marez (Northern), Speicher (Northern), Taji (Central), and Seitz/BIA (Central). 13 SC (E) provides DS to non-divisional Army units and provides General Support Reinforcing to divisional units as required. MLG provides DS/GS to MEF units in MNF-W area of operations. MARCENT coordinates Marine-specific supply.
throughout Iraq as required. Transition teams will be supported on an area basis, from the nearest MND or 13 SC (E) CSS unit. When the nearest logistics unit is across MND boundaries, the two MND Commanders will establish an MOA to allow for cross-border support to the transition teams.

b. (S//REL) Support to ISF. IGFC will progressively take OPCON of IA Divisions; coupled to this is a need for increasing levels of IA logistic self sufficiency. MNC-I in conjunction with IGFC develops IA logistics capability through partnership and doctrine development while providing emergency direct support as required to prevent mission failure. Development of institutional and higher-echelon logistics capability in the ISF is critical to Iraqi self-sufficiency. MNSTC-I and MNF-I lead the establishment of a Ministry of Defense institutional logistics system. 13 SC (E) provides technical and managerial assistance to Regional Support Units (RSUs) as they stand up to support Iraqi Divisions, as required, in accordance with Corps priorities. 13 SC (E) provides partnership and C2 of Motor Transportation Regiments (MTRs), and ensures distribution support to ISF as required. MTRs are then passed from 13 SC (E) control back to the IA Divisions after reaching TRA 2, and are ready to be assumed by the division. IA Headquarters and Support Companies (HSCs) will gain significant capability and will require MSC partnering and mentoring as they assume support roles previously provided by MNC-I units. These units must be utilized to the maximum extent possible to distribute supplies to the IA Companies. Ministry of Interior forces (i.e., police and DBE) will receive support through MOI support systems, generally through local procurement and contracts. MNC-I transition teams supporting MOI units will assist the units in obtaining support through Iraqi channels. MNC-I logistics units will be postured to respond if Iraqi national systems fail, and ISF units are unable to receive support through Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior channels. Iraqi units cannot rely on the Coalition Forces to become a constant logistics provider in lieu of established Iraqi logistical systems.

c. (S//REL) Support to other US agencies. MNC-I may be required to provide common item support, if available, to other US agencies, Coalition Forces or the United Nations, in accordance with applicable MOUs. Coalition support remains a national responsibility. MNC-I provides common item support and services IAW applicable Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA.) MSCs will provide monthly reporting of support required to coalition partners, IAW Annex R C4 Tab. (Reporting).

d. (U) Personnel. (See Annex E)

e. (U) Public Affairs. (See Annex F)

f. (U) Civil Affairs. (See Annex G)

g. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. (See Annex H)

h. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. (See Annex M)

i. (U) Medical Services. (See Annex Q)
5. (U) Command and Control.

a. (S//REL) Command. The Commanding General of MNC-I exercises OPCON or TACON of designated forces as described in Figure 5 below. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory. MNF-W is TACON to MNC-I IAW MARFORPAC OIF 05-07 DEPORD, 220114ZDEC2005. CJSOTF is TACON to MNC-I and has a mutual support relationship when conducting operations in the AO. MNC-I retains TACON of IA units that have not been placed under the Operational Control of the IGFC. The IGFC is an adjacent corps headquarters with non-contiguous battlespace within MNC-I’s AO.

b. (S//REL) Command Relationships. (See Annex J). MNC-I maintains partnership relationships at the division, brigade, and battalion levels to advise and support IA units at the appropriate echelon. MNC-I also establishes partnership with the IPS at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters and Police Station level to develop IPS capacity. Police Transition Teams (PTT) are TACON to the MSC to train, coach and mentor IPS. The IPLO assigned to PTT are TACON to the MSC through the PTT and ADCON to MNSTC-I (CPATT) for administration of all personnel matters with the IPLO contractor. MNC-I retains TACON of IA units at TRA Level 3 and 4, or TRA 2 units that have not achieved IAL. IA units TACON to MNC-I, as per the MOU between MNF-I and the Iraqi MOD, will maintain an ADCON relationship to the IGFC. O/O, IA divisions that are TACON to MNC-I will become OPCON to IGFC. MNC-I retains TACON of NP units operating in MNC-I battlespace.

1. (S//REL) IGFC Command Relationships and Coordination with IGFC.

   a. (S//REL) The IGFC is under the operational control of the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. There is no command relationship between CF and Iraqi forces under the command and control of the JHQ, to include the IGFC. There is no command relationship between MNF-I and the JHQ. JHQ and its subordinate units are the supported command in those AOs they have assumed. The IGFC and its subordinate units is responsible for planning, training for, and conducting counter insurgency operations in their AO; the IGFC will coordinate with MNC-I for moves of battalion or larger units. CF may retain battlespace and FOBs within Iraqi AOs, but must coordinate all movement across Iraqi boundaries—on a case by case basis or through established MOUs that facilitate routine movements along MSRs and within established Joint Operations Areas (JOA). There is no requirement to coordinate for CF overflight of battlespace controlled by the IGFC and its subordinates. CF will provide Tactical or Operational Overwatch to IA units. As required, MNC-I and the IGFC will create JOAs; CF will revert to the supported command for the duration of operations inside the JOA. CF will continue to provide support and force protection for transition teams operating in Iraqi battlespace and will coordinate their actions when possible.

   b. (S//REL) Coordination at the strategic level between the JHQ and MNF-I is facilitated by the LAPD. MNC-I has established a Liaison Cell with the IGFC for coordination. This liaison team is embedded in the IGFC HQ and has computer connectivity to MNC-I. With a Category 2 interpreter present, MNC-I and IGFC
can quickly exchange information. MNDs and the MNF will exchange liaison officers and interpreters with adjacent Iraqi units for coordination. At PIC they will be more dependent on the PJCC as the point of coordination with Iraqi officials.

(2) (S//REL) Command of Transition Teams. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) will coordinate Transition Team issues between MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and the Fort Riley Transition Team training base. The IAG executes ADCON of all U.S. externally sourced U.S. Army transition teams and future external RFF transition teams (less PTTs) attached to MNC-I. The IAG will provide the full range of tasks necessary to receive, train, employ, sustain, and recover externally sourced transition teams throughout their lifecycle to include oversight of team manning, initial team positioning assignment, execution of the RIP/TOA program and policy development for Transition Teams. Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and Border Transition Teams (BTTs) will be TACON to a coalition partner at the Division, Brigade or Battalion level. They will provide partnered Iraqi Army and Border units training, coaching, mentoring, and access to coalition effects. National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) are attached to MNC-I and TACON to the MSC where they are assigned. These teams will provide training, coaching, mentoring, and access to coalition effects to their respective National Police units. PTTs are ADCON to 89 MP BDE and TACON to the MND/MNF where they are assigned.

(3) (S//REL) Succession of Command. CG, MNC-I; US DCG, MNC-I; the senior US MSC CG.
Figure 14, (S//REL) Command Relationships with IA
Figure 15, (S//REL), Endstate C2 Relationship with IA
Figure 16. (S/REL). Command Relationships with MOI Forces

c. (U) Control. Specific to the MNC-I, see ANNEX K.

(1) (S/REL) Annex K (C4I), OPORD 06-03 details the planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of Iraq - Theater Information Grid (I-TIG) services to MNC-I and its subordinate commands, to include SIPRNet, NIPRNet, CENTRIXS, SVOIP, VOSIP, DSN, and Video services.

(a) (S/REL) MNC-I will continue to conduct coalition C2 via CENTRIXS and CPOF terminals deployed to the CF MND level.

(b) (S/REL) Command Post of the Future (CPOF). MNC-I KMO will continue to improve the CPOF program to incorporate an upgraded operating software platform and a new IP radio platform - Wide Area Voice Environment (WAVE). Program expansion efforts are projected to complete BCT/RCT fielding, increase separate MSC CPOF footprints, encompass battalion level task forces, and field CPOF terminals to Iraqi Army Division level transition teams.

(c) (S/REL) Iraqi Forces Ground Command (IGFC) - MNC-I Communications. IAW DoD Information Assurance policies and guidelines, US and Iraqi data...
networks will not be physically or logically connected. IGFC - MNC-I information flow uses the following means:

1. (S//REL) Liaison Office. Both IGFC and MNC-I maintain LNO capabilities at their counterpart headquarters. The MNC-I Liaison to IGFC has access to all I-TIG services, to include SIPRNet and DSN. Properly vetted data can be sent to the MNC-I LNO for release or display to IGFC as required. The respective LNOs serve as a conduit for operational information between the two headquarters.

2. (S//REL) Information Exchange Center (IEC). MNC-I established IECs at both headquarters to facilitate translation and exchange of administrative and non time sensitive information between IGFC and MNC-I. The IECs have access to all I-TIG services as well as dedicated interpreters.

3. (S//REL) Movement Coordination Center (MCC). MNC-I established the MCC at the IGFC headquarters to facilitate the movement of CF through Iraqi Army battle-space. The MCC serves to process all requests for the transit of IA battle-space at the IGFC and IA division level.

(d) (S//REL) Transition Team Communications. In addition to organic tactical single channel communications assets, all transition teams will have access to SIPRNet to meet operational and force protection requirements. MNDs are responsible for the provision of SIPRNet to their applicable transition teams. MNC-I is responsible for the provision of SIPRNet to transition teams beyond the capabilities of the owning MND.

(2) (S//REL) Control under PIC conditions. Control in provinces that have achieved PIC is complex from an Iraqi and CF perspective. CF will retain their command relationships with those IA units that have not been transferred to the command and control of the IGFC. The command and control relationship of the NP will be defined in subsequent Memoranda of Agreement or orders associated with NP Reform. In PIC, the PJCC becomes the primary place that CF conduct coordination for activities within the province as agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed to transfer PIC responsibilities. The PJCC maintains communication with the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC) or National Operations Center (NOC) and has representatives including, but not limited to, IA, IPS, the MOI intelligence representative, DBE, Facilities Protection Services, and the Director of Civil Defense. Where considered appropriate, the relevant ministry should provide an LNO to support the PJCC. The importance of each CF liaison team increases as a province attains PIC, since it serves as the primary conduit of information and provides situational awareness. MSCs will maintain a reliable and constant communications link to PJCCs in PIC provinces IOT facilitate the rapid exchange of information between all CF operating in the province and the local authorities. During crisis situations, the PJCC serves as the hub of command and control at the provincial level. CF committed to a PIC province at the bequest of the GOI / at the direction of the CG, MNF-I will become the supported command and ISF will be supporting.
Figure 17, (S/REL) Control in PIC

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