Multi-National Corps - Iraq

OPORD 07-01 Brief

1 June 2007

The overall classification of this briefing is:
SECRET
REL to USA and MCFI

Approved for Release
Situation – “Filling the Gap” – b 3 b 6
Threat Environment – (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNF-IUSM-I Mission and Intent – (b)(3), b 6
MNC-I Mission and Commander’s Intent – b 3 b 6
MNC-I Key Judgments and Vision for 2007 – b 3 b 6
Operational Framework and Phasing – (b)(3), (b)(6)
Concept of Operations (by LOO)
Secure Environment
- Developing ISF Capability
- MTT Coverage – Near-Term
- IA Expansion
- ISF Development
- DBE Development and Support
- IPS Development – (b)(3), (b)(6)
Legitimate, Capable SF
- Civil-Military Operations – b 3, b 6
- Reconstruction – (b)(3), (b)(6)
- Economic Development – b 3, b 6
Effective Communications
- Information Operations – (b)(3), (b)(6)
- Public Affairs – b 3 b 6
Assessment Framework – b 3 b 6
Concept of Support
- Logistics – (b)(3), b 6
- ISR – (b)(3), b 6
- Aviation – b 3 b 6
- Signal – (b)(3), (b)(6)
Command Relationships – b 3 b 6
Future BCT Sets – b 3 b 6
The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts:

- Terrorism, counter-occupation, insurgency and a communal struggle for power and survival
- Occurring in the context of failing state
- Complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian and Arab civilizations
### Threat Categories and Groups

#### Sunni Extremists
- **Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)**
  - HP attacks: TAF, SVEST, YBIED
  - Targets CF, ISF, BCA, infrastructure, Shia/Sunni civilians
  - Seeks to create a failed state and establish Caliphate
  - May be shifting strategic emphasis to northern Iraq

- **Ansar al Sunna (AAS)**
  - Seeks CF withdrawal and Sharia law in Iraq
  - Disagrees with AQI over targeting of Muslims, true nature of jihad and global instead of Iraqi focus

- **Ansar al Islam (AAI)**
  - Kurfish Islamist extremist that founded AAS
  - Withered after OIF in 2003, may be resurging

#### Shia Miltias
- **Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)**
  - Military wing of GMIS
  - Primarily poor, young, uneducated Shia
  - Support base in Sadr City
  - Banks to Defend Shia populace and expel CF
  - Responsible for vast majority of EFP attacks

- **Badr Organization**
  - Political party... and SCIRI's de facto militia
  - Integrated into ISF
  - Disciplined and organized
  - Historical rivalry with Sadrista

#### Sunni Reactionists
- **1920a Revolutionary Bde (1920RB)**
  - Seeks increased Sunni power and influence
  - Majority from the Zabul tribes
  - Recent split over ceasefire negotiations with CF

- **Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI)**
  - Self-identified defenders of the Sunni populace
  - Moving towards cooperation with CF
  - Increasingly Anti-AQI

- **Jaysh Mujahidin (JMJ)**
  - Seeks to re-establish Sunni dominance
  - Possibly merging with JAI and elements of AAS

#### Shia Splinter Groups
- **Army of Guardians**
  - Led by radical Shia cleric Mahmud al Saeedi
  - Cult-like armed group opposed to political process

- **Thar Allah**
  - Moved from Iran into Basra after OIF in 2003
  - Heavily involved in smuggling
  - Not recognized as a political party by GOI

- **Office of the Lord of Martyrs (OLM)**
  - Formed with IRGC assistance to oppose former regime
  - Historical ties with SCIRI and Badr in Basrah

- **Jund al Samad**
  - Small apocalyptic cult opposed to Najaf religious leadership
JAM mainstream will stay on the defensive in Baghdad, responding locally to Sunni attacks but not pursuing coherent expansion. JAM Special Groups will conduct limited offensive operations to extend their influence. Intra-Shia rivalries will flare up occasionally, especially in the Shia South between JAM and Badr, but will be kept in check by the Hawaiz's emphasis on Shia Unity. Sunni Rejectionists will remain decentralized, with group splitting against AQI but not coalescing into a unified Sunni opposition movement. AQI will continue high profile attacks to deepen Shia-Sunni sectarian divisions, especially in Baghdad and Diyala. AQI will also attempt to instigate an Arab-Kurd ethnic conflict, focusing on Mosul and Kirkuk. AQI's efforts will be frustrated by a lack of popular support as well as by Sunni Rejectionist tribal and Kurdish opposition.

JAM and Badr intra-Shia rivalry escalate to the point of fragmenting Shia Unity. JAM rises up against CFC and ISAF support. Sunni Tribes and Sunni Rejectionists unite to take advantage of the vacuum and restore Sunni dominance. The G floats. The ISF fragments along sectarian and intra-sectarian lines. Shia Spinster Groups seize the opportunity to pursue their interests, especially power, and possibly in Najaf. AQI resurges in northern Iraq, concentrating its operations on Kurdistan. JAM shift initiatives allow AQI to establish its own control over a population that is not Arab, alleviating much of the current tension between the Sunni Rejectionists/Tribes and AQI. The Kurds become the common enemy rather than AQI.
Assumptions
(1 of 2)

- By Sep 07, the MNC-I commander will assess that conditions in Iraq have sufficiently improved and will make a recommendation to continue the current approach.
- External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraq.
- The USG will continue to support the current GOI.
- Absent external influences, the GOI will edge toward a pattern of sectarian-based behavior that destabilizes Iraq.
- The GOI will continue to accept the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq, but after UNSCR 1723 expires, those forces will operate with reduced authorities.
- The GOI will not request that the UN mandate for MNF-I be terminated prior to 31 Dec 07.
- MNF-I will be able to maintain twenty U.S. BCTs in ITO for several months, with a reduction in force beginning no earlier than Nov 07.
- Once the reduction of U.S. BCTs begins, force levels in ITO will not rise again; there will be no more "plus-up".
- The long-term security arrangement between the USG and GOI will involve the presence of at least four U.S. BCTs on Iraqi soil for a period of five to ten years.
Assumptions

2 of 2

- MARECENT will provide a MEF (Fwd) in ITO through 2009
- OCF-I operations will continue through 2009 against AQ/AQ
- CJSOTF-AP will retain the equivalent of one Special Forces Group in ITO through 2009 to conduct FID, direct action, and special reconnaissance
- The UK will maintain a division headquarters and, at a minimum, a brigade-sized force in southern Iraq through 2009
- MND-CS headquarters will remain in ITO at least through Dec 07
- MND-NE headquarters will remain in ITO at least through Dec 08
- Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition – a commitment beginning in Fall 2007 and lasting until Jun 08
- Ten embedded PRTs will remain in ITO for as long as U.S. force levels stay at ten BCTs or higher
The Coalition, in partnership with the GOI, employs integrated political, security, economic, diplomatic, and informational means to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the spring of 2009 and to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.
The intent by the spring of 2009 is to have reached a point where sustainable security has been established nationwide and reconciliation and political and economic development are being advanced. This will be achieved in two phases.

In the near term, the downward spiral of sectarian violence will be halted by further developing existing security lines of operation to protect the population and render irreconcilable groups less effective while concurrently developing and employing political, economic, and diplomatic policies and initiatives that will move reconcilable groups and the political establishment of Iraq towards political accommodation.
During the intermediate term, the emphasis will shift from suppressing violence to creating sustainable security through the emerging effects of improved governance, political accommodation, and economic development while still maintaining security operations. Throughout the period, we will work to develop the ability of the GOI to fulfill its governance and security obligations through capacity development, security sector reform, and neutralizing malign sectarian elements. These operations will be conducted in partnership with the GOI and transfer of control will continue in accordance with conditions-based understandings developed over the near term. We will also work through national Coalition Governments to create and maintain an effective international support network that will help the GOI to counter subversive interference by malign neighbors and support economic and political development.

Success over the long term will be characterized by the ability to move to subsequent operations in which the GOI incrementally assumes self-sufficiency while the Coalition contributes in accordance with security, political, and economic agreements and helps Iraq achieve the long-term goal of: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order, defend Iraq's territorial integrity, and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GOI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish improved stability and create irreversible momentum, leading to wide-ranging political accommodation and sustainable security by Spring 2009 and to the ultimate goal of self-reliance in the longer term.
Commander’s Intent

**Purpose:**

The purpose of our operations is to bring stability to Iraq and then to sustain it in order to create time and space for the Iraqis to make progress toward political accommodation, continued political and economic development, and ultimately self-reliance. We accomplish this first by securing the population of Iraq, with priority to Baghdad, followed by the nine strategic cities and the rest of the country. Additionally, we must continue to support the development of a capable GOI and ISF so that both are viewed as legitimate and credible in the eyes of Iraqis. In order to sustain stability over time, we help build governmental capacity, strengthen GOI legitimacy, reduce sectarian behavior in Iraqi security institutions, and deliberately transition security responsibilities to the ISF as they demonstrate appropriate readiness to assume them. All of this leads to Iraqi self-reliance, creating the conditions for a peaceful, stable Iraq, led by a representative government subscribing to the rule of law, able to provide security for its people, and denying its territory as a terrorist safe haven.
Commander’s Intent

Key Tasks:

- **Protect the population**, with priority to where ethno-sectarian violence undermines the security situation; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and address local grievances; rekindle hope among the people by making progress toward a secure environment, sustained increasingly by a more capable, credible ISF

- **Facilitate reconciliation** among key internal actors competing for power in Iraq; conduct engagement with potentially reconcilable factions and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means as leverage to support negotiations leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI; at local and provincial levels, promote dialogue across sectarian lines

- **Defeat AQI and extremists**; kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development

- **Continue to develop ISF capacity** through partnership, enhanced transition teams, and advisory / assistance units; we must work to make the ISF more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders – to include commissioned officers and NCOs
Commander's Intent

Key Tasks (cont.):

- Assist efforts to build and improve GOI capacity, focusing on essential services, accountable local governance, and sustainable economic development; in careful coordination with this support, promote non-sectarian behavior while contributing to efforts to remove GOI officials who adhere to sectarian agendas.

- Protect the force through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against indirect-fire and IED networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats.
**Commander’s Intent**

**End State:**

In the near term, an *improved level of stability* is achieved; the population is secure and conditions are set for the *restoration of civil authority in Iraq, with priority to Baghdad*; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. Iraqi Security Forces, while continuing to build capacity, are in the lead – for the most part – with CF in tactical or operational overwatch. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent CF and ISF pressure. Their freedom of action is limited; their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation where ceasefires exist.

In the longer term, Iraq is *self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources it needs to govern justly*, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.
Key Judgments and Vision for 2007

- MNC-I understands that time is not on our side. We must make visible progress soon in order to generate momentum and buy time for the Coalition to meet its long-term goals in Iraq. "Filling the gap" with a legitimate GOI will only come through a combination of security, improved governance, and economic development. Security constitutes the visible progress we need in the coming months and creates momentum and space for the GOI to take meaningful steps forward in those areas that require a longer period to yield results. Security synchronized with effective governance and economic development can succeed, but it will take great political effort on the part of the GOI, as well as a serious commitment to reconciliation.

- The time in which we can apply maximum leverage – between now and the end of 2007 – is the critical period. MNC-I will direct its efforts in the near term toward achieving an improved level of stability, attained during Dec 07 and characterized by a significant reduction in sectarian violence (principally in Baghdad) and substantial progress toward reconciliation. This improvement in the near term will set the conditions for increasing stability further over time, creating an environment whereby security for the population is sustained, advances in Iraqi governance and economic development can proceed, and progress toward a negotiated political settlement can be made.
MNC-I Objectives

**Legitimate, Capable GOI LOO (1 of 2)**

**Objectives**
- Representative local and provincial governments established
- GOI capacity enhanced to provide essential services and strategic infrastructure maintenance and security

**Near-Term Conditions**
- Improved Level of Stability
  - Provincial Powers and Provincial Elections enacted
  - Data for provincial elections announced
  - All provincial financial accounts open; GOI dominating funds, and provinces executing budgets
  - Afghan provincial council meeting in Ramadi

- End State Conditions
  - Provincial elections turn occurred
  - Keep provincial control established and sustained throughout Iraq

**End State Conditions**
- Self-Reliance
  - GOI provides consistent, adequate essential services to Iraqis
  - Refined hydrocarbon products supply Iraq with adequate levels of fuel to meet public needs and generate revenues on par with pre-war infrastructure's potential
  - Existing power generation installations expanded and provides electricity to Baghdad and strategic cities in amounts sufficient to meet basic needs and sustain small industrial and service sector
  - GOI removes duty to support reconstruction and development initiatives
Phases

Phase 1: Setting Key Conditions
- Coordination effort to sustain coalition QD to provinces and districts
- Enhancing political dialogue, including senior leadership
- Mobilizing and coordinating

Phase 2: Clear, Control, Retain
- Phase 3: Tactical Overwatch
- Seamless transition to the next phase in a phased manner

Phase 3: Tactical Overwatch
- Basic security and DF
- Securing area

Phase 4: Operational Overwatch
- Independent SF operations
- SF taking responsibility for all security functions

Phase 5: Strategic Overwatch
- SF retaining all responsibility

End of 2007

This is a five-phased campaign. Although the campaign is phased, operations do not transition from phase to phase in a linear fashion; rather, areas transition from phase to phase based upon conditions being met at local and provincial levels.

These phases will progress at different rates at different times throughout Iraq and perhaps within Baghdad itself.

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Secure Environment
20 U.S. BCT Set
Disposition of Forces at Completion of Plus-Up
~15 June 2007
Capable, Credible ISF
Developing ISF Capability
MNC-I Commander’s Philosophy

- MNC-I develops ISF capability through a variety of means
  - Partnership
  - Enhanced Transition Teams
  - Advisory / Assistance BDEs

- MNC-I maintains a flexible posture to develop ISF capability
  - “One size does not fit all”
  - No set or pre-determined progression – posture shifts as ISF capability and security situation improve

- Approaches to developing the ISF must be tailored to local conditions to account for differences in:
  - Capability of ISF units
  - Enemy situation
  - Ability of provincial and local governments to coordinate security forces

- MNC-I will be at different stages of ISF development throughout the AOR, based on operations, ISF capability, and enemy situation
Military Transition Teams

- Flexible posture to develop ISF Capability
  - Tailored to local conditions
    - Teams with IA Division and Brigade HQs.
    - BN coverage IAW CDR’s METT-TC analysis.
      - Unit suspected of sectarian behavior
      - Newly formed units
      - Units in urban areas
    - CDR, MNC-I approval to permanently "un-MITT." 
  - Attached to MNDs
    - Effective at graduation from Taji Training.
    - Supports unity of command and unity of effort.
    - Reattached to MNC-I at completion of RIP/TOA.
  - Fixed resources
    - Requirements surpass total team resources.
    - Only replace currently sourced teams.
    - No harvesting for allocation outside the MND/F.

IA COVERAGE

1:1 Ratio

CF/IA Partnership
Unit Arrangements
National Police Development

Lifecycle & Regeneration
- Develop way ahead for brigade personnel and equipment regeneration
- Leadership Assessment Board to identify and remove ineffective / corrupt leaders
- Continued development of professional and competent leaders and staff
- Minimize force deprecation from unendorsed initiatives

Ongoing PAO / IO Effort

Training
- Mastering Individual and Collective Tasks
- Return to Law Enforcement Bridge

End State
A national rapidly deployable paramilitary police force operating in support of the Iraqi Police Service, under the command of the Ministry of Interior and when appropriate, under the direction or in support of the Provincial Governors in order to provide the Government of Iraq with a proportional response option and bridging capability between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army.
Concept of ISF DBE Support

Tasks

Resources

Risk

- MND / DT / DHS / BSTI
- Contractor Engagement at Ports / DBE Units
- DHS / IAC / Corps Engagement with DBE
- General Officer Engagement

Achieve success through key levels of engagement to ensure unity of purpose & effort among CF & GoI to secure Iraq's borders

Objectives:

- Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and Ports of Entry (POE) achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) – Independent Operations
- CF increased presence to enhance DBE standards at Border / POE
- Developed National / DBE Sustainment, Fuel distribution & Maintenance Programs
- Execution of Authorized DBE Budget / funding program
- Facilitation of Interagency Operations – Unity of effort

Desired End State:

- Empower the Department of Border Enforcement Command to secure Iraqi Borders
- TFF, weapons, and equipment smuggling networks are disrupted
- Land, air, and sea POEs effectively enforce GCI regulations
- Self-reliant ISF are capable of border operations independent of CF
IPS Development Program

- Continues development of the IPS to achieve enduring police capabilities
  - Law Enforcement competencies to apprehend, process, and support investigations, adjudications, and incarcerations
  - Station systems of administration, logistics, maintenance, station refurbishment, and force protection
- Sets priorities for PTT distribution to Baghdad followed by the Key Cities
- Incorporates new Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) changes
- Removes the 90-day Validation Model for transition
- Addresses the utilization of PTTs after PIC
  - Requires MNC-I CG Decision Point
  - Requires Coalition Forces support for basing, force protection, QRPs, and MEDEVAC

Short-Term Program Objectives
Integrated multi-sectarian station, patrol and traffic operations providing freedom of movement and safe and secure communities and neighborhoods in accordance with the rule of law

Long-Term Program Objectives
A quality and enduring Iraqi police force capable of apprehending, processing and supporting the investigations, adjudicating and incarcerating of criminals

LAW rule of law, providing civil order, sustaining public confidence and trust.
Legitimate, Capable
GOI
Reconstruction Support

Legitimate, Capable GOI

Economic Development

Near Term
- Stabilize the Baghdad 400kV
- Essential Services conditions set for future economic growth

Intermediate Term
- Responsibility for maintenance of Essential Services Infrastructure transitioned to GOI
- Completion of the Karkh Sewer Main Trunk Line

Long Term
- Iraq government capable of providing consistent, adequate essential services to the population and maintaining strategic infrastructure in order to ensure long term economic growth

CERP is the primary MNC-I funding source for support of Essential Services Projects

Target Date: Dec 07

Target Date: Dec 08

Target Date: TBD

Essential Services
Effective Communications
**Information Operations**

- IO conducted across all LOOs to influence perceptions, build support, and disrupt hostile actions

**MNC-I IO Tasks:**
- Disrupting sectarian violence with priority to Baghdad, the nine key cities and then the rest of Iraq
- Disrupting the effectiveness of AQI
- Degrading IED networks and their ability to conduct effective attacks
- Promoting the credibility of the GoI while building trust and confidence in economic development and improved basic services

**Perceptions are important; promoting successes of the GoI and ISF will support:**
- GoI credibility and effectiveness
- ISF professionalism and ability
- Reconciliation
- Economic growth and improved basic services

**IO will drive wedges between groups and weaken their effectiveness**
- AQI vs. Sunni tribes
- Mainstream JAM vs. rogue JAM cells
- People vs. "indiscriminate attacks"
- Foreign influences vs. the Iraqi populace and GoI

**AQ and other extremist groups in Iraq are not restricted in their propaganda; Proactive use of IO to shape the information environment is required**

**IO will disrupt and degrade foreign malign influence**
Public Affairs Operations

- MNC-I conducts PA across all LOOs

- **Desired Effects**
  - Increase international support
  - Enhance understanding of Coalition effort
  - Discredit violence

- **Desired Means of Delivery – LEADERS**
  - Pentagon Press Corps Conference
  - All Market Outreach

- **Concept**
  - Minimize Public Affairs Guidance and “talking points”
  - Allow leaders to speak and use best judgment

- **Guidelines for Media Interaction**
  - Stay in your lane
  - Don’t criticize Iraqis
Future MNC-I Concept

- Conditions for stability achieved
- Deliberate reduction from 20 U.S. BCTs

Secure
Sustain Stability and Transition
Defeat AQI and Transition
Disrupt
ISSR and Sustain Stability
Disrupt
SUSTAIN and TRANSITION
Disrupt
Disrupt
Security → Transition

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Concept of Support
Logistics Support

- CFLCC provides EAC CES, JRSO, & Title X support to MMC-I
- 11SCUJ provides general common item support to all services
- 2 SAHI provides general support on an area basis from nine US/DS Log Hubs
- 13 SC(S) provides DS to non-decisional Army units and GS
- MGSS provides DS/SS to MEF units in MRF, W with MARCENT
- GSFAPO provides MILIP support
- Restricted Teams are supported on an area basis

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Future Support Challenges

- Transitioning forces into new division Areas of Operation
  - Fulfilling lift requirements
  - Swapping equipment
    - No overlap between units for RIP/TOA
    - Differing equipment requirements
      - Light vs Heavy vs SBCT
      - Legacy vs Modular
    - Disposition of equipment
  - Modifying array of support units and concept of support

- Anticipating reduction of U.S. BCTs
  - Right-size support structure with number, type, and location of remaining forces
  - Shift to enduring FOBs may cause shift in Logistics HUBs

- Modifying through-put at existing LOCs
  - Enemy interdictions
  - International politics
  - Long-term posturing
Logistics Transformation

- **Single C2 Log Structure** – Legacy Theater Support Cmd & COSCOM-like ESC will RIP/TOA with Modular SC(E) and Theater Sustainment Cmd
  - Emerging doctrine – never implemented before
  - Responsibilities of MMC and STB no longer managed at COSCOM / ESC level

- **Bridging strategy** – Resulting shortage in personnel compensated by RFF’s and migration of tasks to other echelons
  - Augmentation will enable both TSC and SC(E) to ease into transformation
  - Shift to Modular structure will require close collaboration initially

**Bottom Line:** Minimal impact to customers
Page 49 redacted for the following reason:

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Concept of ISR Support

Collection Priority
- Counter IED / Cache / Explosive Remnants of War
- Target Development (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic)
- Sectarian Violence
- Border Monitoring

Priority of Support/Areas of Emphasis:
- Phase II: Support shaping and decisive operations to establish security and gain the confidence of the Iraqi people
  - CJSTF, Baghdad, MND-N, MND-C, MIF-W, MND-SE, MND-CS, MND-NE
  - Baghdad, Belts and SPT Zones
- Phase III and IV Support decisive operations with ISR/ISO operations to capture/all T&FF and Extremist cells/leaders, locate weapons caches, and the IED networks
  - Targeting ACO and Extremist Networks
  - Responsive SPT to Training Teams
  - Support to ISF

Near Term Objectives
- Population secured, violence reduced, with a priority to Baghdad, then the major strategic cities, and the rural areas
- Violent enemy actors defeated, neutralized, or isolated
- Border security improved
- ISR capability enhanced, sectarian violence reduced
- Security responsibilities transitioned to Iraqis
- Representative local and provincial governments established
- GOI capacity enhanced to provide essential services and strategic infrastructure maintenance and security
- OODs perceived as relevant, legitimate, and inclusive, serving national rather than sectarian goals
- Foundations for self-sustaining economic growth established
Aviation 06-03 to 07-01

- Current: 4 CABs (plus Marine and CF) supporting 20 BCTs as of June 07 when 3rd CAB is FOC

- Way Ahead: In Dec 07 the theater will lose 1 CAB with no expected backfill. MNF-W will gain 4 CH-47 MS and 12 MV-22 Ospreys and lose 6 CH-46 MS. MNF-N will gain 12 AWs and 5 UH-60 MS

MNF-W will gain 4 CH-47 MS July 07:
- 12 MV-22 Osprey in Oct 07; MNF-W will lose 6 CH-46 MS Aug 07

CORPS TF Mustang will RIPPTOA with 12 CAB (Aug 07) 1 for 1 swap, no gain in aircraft.

MND-B 1st CAB supports MND-B
- 1st CAB leaves theater Dec 07. Currently DA is not backfilling this CAB, leaving a void if there is a requirement for 4 CABs

MND-N 2nd CAB will RIPPTOA with 1st ID
- CAB (Oct 07) 1 for 1 swap, no gain in aircraft
- With 4-3 ISO 3rd ACR. MND-N will gain 12 AWs and 5 UH-60 MS Dec 07
- 1-17 Cav will RIPPTOA with 4-6 Cav Jul 07

3rd CAB FOC NLT 15 June. Will support MND-C operations. Scheduled to depart Aug 08 @ 15 month BOS

Air Weapons Teams (AWTs): Mission Sets (MS)
Signal Concept of Support

MNC-I C6 provides signal and information systems planning and integration to ensure reliable, robust, and redundant voice, data, and video services to all MNC-I activities, Coalition Forces, and other agencies operating in the ITO

- Communication enhancements to I-TIG
  - 14g Upgrade to VBC Hub
  - MNC-I Network

- BCT surge support
  - C6 Validation Board (12 mil)
  - VSAT to MITTs & BITTs
  - JSS & COP Communications Standardization
  - Provincial Reconstruction Teams
  - RIPRNET for MSR

- ISF & Iraqi Army surge support
  - Video-Conferencing Capability

MNC-I signal community’s endstate is to ensure our US and Coalition Forces have a robust and flexible network infrastructure along with the appropriate communication assets to effectively C2 their units and aid in MNC-I mission
Command Relationships
BCTs and ePRTs function as one team, following a common plan in their assigned AOR.
Coordination lines between CF and IA units may vary, depending on partnered relationship.
Command and Control
Basic IA-CF
Relationships - Future

Coordination lines between CF and IA units may vary, depending on partnered relationship.
Future BCT Sets
Stability in Baghdad and key cities
- Preserve success in Baghdad with continued
  but lessered presence in Security Districts,
  combined with a "ring" of forces in the Belts
- Continued focus on the key cities
- Increased attention given to key border areas
- CF in Tactical Overwatch in Baghdad and the
  Belts, Anbar, southern SaD, Tamin, and Diyala
- CF in Operational Overwatch in Kurdish region,
  Nineva, portions of SaD, and southern
  provinces
- CJSETF-AP maintains strength and mission set
  engagement, developing ISOF, FID, and
  disrupting extremist networks

4 U.S. Divisions → 3
- Summer 2007, MNF-CS consolidates in
  Caspian: MNF-CS expands to include
  WAZ
- Late 2007, MNF-C AOR potentially expands
  to include Kurdistan
- Early 2008, MNF-R expands northern
  Baghdad, gradually assuming MNFIC
  battlefield
10 U.S. BCT Set Concept

- Sustained security in Baghdad and key cities
- CF in operational overwatch
- Adv/Asst BDEs and Strike BCTs in each division AO
- Force array allows Strike BCTs to provide security and remain postured for rapid, decisive intervention without disrupting focused efforts of Adv/Asst BDEs as they support the ISF
- Adv/Asst BDEs focus on technical and tactical assistance to ISF, emergency CS and CSS, PRT security, local engagement, monitoring ISF and GOI progress and performance
- Strike BCTs focus on CT, route and FOB security
- CJCSO TF-AP maintains strength and mission set; increased importance as economy-of-force
Enduring Security Arrangement Concept

- Enduring Iraqi self-reliance
- GF in strategic overwatch
- BCTs positioned away from major population centers, postured for limited intervention into any region of Iraq at GOI's request
- 1 BCT as Theater Reserve in Kuwait
- Deter/assure neighboring states
- OSC coordinating security assistance, joint and combined exchange training, and partnership programs with GOI
- CT in coordination with GOI
- Enduring bases support strategic airlift
- Maintains key logistical hubs
- CJSTF-AP shifts main effort to CT; continues FID with select units; conducts special reconnaissance for CF

4 U.S. (+1 Theater Reserve)
Way Ahead

- 19 May – Orders brief to CG, MNC-I
- 21-29 May – Staff order
- 30-31 May – Publish order
- 1 Jun – Issue order to MSCs
- 12 Jun – MSC Backbriefs to CG, MNC-I via CPOF
  - MND-N
  - MND-NE
  - MNF-W
  - MND-B
  - MND-C
  - MND-CS
  - MND-SE
  - CJSOTF-AP
  - 13 SC(E)
BACK-UP
Tasks
Tasks – MND-B

- In conjunction with ISF, secure the Baghdad security districts in order to protect the population
- Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad and Taji
- Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence
- Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population
- Neutralize EFP networks
- Partner with subordinate area commands of the Baghdad Operational Command
- Secure Victory Base Complex
- ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction; specifically the Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad petroleum product pipeline; the Bayji-Baghdad crude oil depots; and Doura Oil Refinery
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Baghdad to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
Tasks – MNF-W

- Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in Anbar Province
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks
- Conduct tribal engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and further isolate AQI operating in Anbar Province
- Equip and train local security forces and integrate them into the ISF
- ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Bayji-Baghdad West 400Kv power line
- Support GOI efforts to secure Iraq’s border, with initial priority to interdicting terrorist and foreign-fighter cross-border movement from Syria
- Facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi-run headquarters intended to coordinate security operations in Anbar Province
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Anbar to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
Tasks – MND-N
(1 of 2)

- **Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency, with initial priority to Diyala and Southern Salah ad Din Provinces**
- **Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence**
- **Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence**
- **Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population**
- **Neutralize EFP networks**
- **Conduct engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and isolate AQI**
- **Conduct stability operations to deny Mosul as a sanctuary for AQI**
- **Monitor activity in Kirkuk; conduct engagement to offset the local effects of Kurdish expansionism and to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI**
- **Disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity that funds AQI and the Sunni insurgency**
- **ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction; specifically the Bayji-Baghdad West 400 Kv power line; the Baghdad East Substation-Baqubah-Diyala-Kirkuk 400 Kv power line; the Bayji-Baghdad crude oil depots; the Kirkuk-Bayji crude oil pipeline and natural gas line; and the Bayji Oil refinery and Bayji Power Plant**
Tasks – MND-N
(2 of 2)

- Support GOI efforts to secure Iraq’s borders, with priority first to
  interdicting the cross-border flow of weapons and foreign-trained fighters
  from Syria, then to interdicting terrorist and foreign-fighter cross-border
  movement from Syria.
- Facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi-run headquarters intended to
  coordinate security operations in Diyala Province.
- Provide operational overwatch to Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya Provinces.
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Salah ad Din, Tamim,
  Diyala, and Nineva to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.
Tasks – MND-C
(1 of 2)

- Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in the Southern Baghdad Belt
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence
- Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population
- Neutralize EFP networks
- O/O assume responsibility for Wasit Province and, later, Qadisiyah Province
- Integrate the Georgian Brigade into the operational environment
- Conduct sustained operations to disrupt malign, externally supported actors and networks in order to ensure achievement of Coalition and GOI strategic objectives (upon assuming responsibility for Wasit Province)
- Support GOI efforts to secure Iraq’s borders, with priority to interdicting the cross-border flow of weapons and foreign-trained fighters from Syria (upon assuming responsibility for Wasit Province)
- ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction; specifically the Mussaib Power Plant; Mussaib-Baghdad South 400 Kv power line; and the Basra-Latifiah-Baghdad petroleum product line
- Provide operational overwatch to Najaf Province
Tasks – MND-C
(2 of 2)

Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Babil and Karbala to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance; O/O do the same for Wasit and Qadisiyah Provinces.
Tasks – MND-SE
(1 of 2)

- Defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation, with a focus on Basra
- Conduct sustained operations to disrupt malign, externally supported actors and networks in order to ensure achievement of Coalition and GOI strategic objectives
- Support GOI efforts to secure Iraq’s border, with priority to interdicting the cross-border flow of weapons and foreign-trained fighters from [14b]
- Provide support as required to maintain CF freedom of movement along MSR/ASRs in AO
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Basra to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
- ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction; specifically the ABOT platform and the crude oil and petroleum product pipelines feeding the ABOT platform, and the Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad petroleum product pipeline
- Provide operational overwatch to Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan Provinces
 Tasks – MND-SE  
(2 of 2)  

BPT provide a company-sized QRF in support of Camp Bucca should the security situation at the camp deteriorate; maintain the ability to respond with one platoon within thirty minutes of notification by the Camp Bucca commander, a second platoon within two hours, and a third platoon and company headquarters within three hours.
Tasks – MND-CS

- Provide support, as required and within the division’s capabilities, to defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation, with a focus on Diwaniyah.
- Support GOI efforts to secure Iraq’s border with [1.4] until such time as Wasit Province becomes part of MND-C’s operational environment.
- Provide support, as required and within the division’s capabilities, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.
- Provide support, as required and within the division’s capabilities, to secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad petroleum product pipeline.
- O/O transfer responsibility of Wasit Province, including control of FOB DELTA, to MND-C.
- O/O transfer responsibility of Qadisiyah Province to MND-C [At present, the duration of Poland’s troop contribution to the Coalition is not definitively known. In the event that the Government of Poland extends the mandate of Polish troops beyond Dec 07, MND-CS will retain an operational environment consisting of Qadisiyah Province.]
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Wasit and Qadisiyah to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.
Tasks – MND-NE

- Sustain non-kinetic operations to maintain current levels of stability

Tasks – CJSOTF-AP

- Conduct Foreign Internal Defense with selected ISF units to develop their capability for independent COIN operations
- Develop non-sectarian ISOF capable of conducting unilateral operations
- Conduct tribal engagement to deny AQI and Sunni insurgent sanctuary
- Disrupt terrorist and foreign-fighter flow along the Tigris and Euphrates River Valleys
- Disrupt EJK networks
- Conduct other Special Operations in ITO in support of MNC-I and MNF-I objectives
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs
(1 of 4)

- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Develop ISF capability IAW Appendix 2, Annex C
- Provide tactical or operational overwatch throughout respective operational environments as conditions allow
- In PIC (or RIC) provinces, support PRT operations and continue to engage political, security, community, and tribal leaders to monitor the progress of governance and economic development
- In PIC (or RIC) provinces, assist in the joint selection, development, monitoring, and completion of MNF-I funded reconstruction projects
- BPT forcibly disarm ISF units that continue illegal or destabilizing sectarian behavior
- BPT withhold support from ISF units that continue illegal or destabilizing sectarian behavior
- Set conditions to allow the GOI to establish and develop the rule of law; safeguard human rights
- Implement population control measures as appropriate and IAW Appendix 1, Annex C
- Perform reconnaissance and collection tasks as outlined in Appendix 5, Annex C
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs
(2 of 4)

- Conduct information operations IAW Appendix 7, Annex C
- Engage tribal leaders, religious leaders, and other local authorities to influence local populations and facilitate reconciliation (see Appendix 6, Annex C)
- BPT selectively close or open international border crossing points in support of GOI decisions to do so
- As required, support IGFC initiatives to deploy Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad as part of the Baghdad Security Plan
- BPT support the DDR process by various means, such as monitoring disarmament and integrating former militia members into the ISF
- Support GOI and ISF as they establish security conditions ISO religious and special events that draw large populations
- Provide distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions as required
- ICW PRTs, work with local authorities to develop reconstruction and economic development plans that will help the Coalition and OGAs channel resources to specific, appropriate needs
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs  

ICW PRTs, work with local authorities to identify potential commercial zones, help secure them, and channel financial assistance to them for business development.

Coordinate with PRTs to reduce the financial incentives for Iraqis to participate in militias, primarily through private sector growth and the creation of sustainable, quality jobs.

BPT provide provincial- or local-level capacity building support to individuals or offices that have demonstrated a willingness to provide services on a non-sectarian basis.

ICW PRTs, facilitate regular meetings among provincial, district, and neighborhood councils to promote dialogue across sectarian lines and obtain funding for local development priorities.

BPT provide security to USM-I personnel to facilitate their ability to conduct engagement in a timely and flexible manner.

ICW ISF, provide security for infrastructure repair crews as required.

Continue providing QRF, MEDEVAC, route clearance, convoy net, and sheriff’s net coverage along MNC-I sustainment routes, including areas that have been transitioned to the ISF or have transitioned to PIC.
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs
(4 of 4)

Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in assigned AOs; Middle Ring Security is defined in MNF-I FRAMEWORK ORDER, Encl 1 to Tab J, Appendix 6, Annex C and includes the responsibility to escort UNAMI personnel through the MNF-I operational environment when moving to and from their places of work in Baghdad and Irbil where separate arrangements are provided for their Inner Ring Security; MNC-I issues FRAGOs providing the specific details related to convoy escort responsibilities on a case by case basis.
Tasks – 13 SC(E)  
(1 of 2)

- O/O support Coalition Forces as they adjust their overwatch posture and basing arrangements
- BPT partner with and assume TACON of newly-formed Iraqi Motor Transportation Regiments (MTR) until they transition to IGFC control; receive attachment of externally sourced transition teams for MTRs while those units are TACON
- Continue to provide Technical Assistance Advisory Teams to Iraqi Regional Support Units, as required and IAW MNC-I priorities
- Provide Contracting Officer Technical Representative and Quality Assurance Representative at each National Maintenance Contract site
- Provide support to ISF as required in order to prevent ISF catastrophic mission failure
- BPT support (with MNSTC-I lead) development of National Ammunition Supply Points
- Provide General Support and General Support-Reinforcing to BCTs; provide DS/GS to MNC-I Separates
- Provide common-item support and services as required and IAW MOUs and Army Contract Service Agreements to other services, Coalition partners, other U.S. agencies, or UNAMI
Tasks – 13 SC(E) (2 of 2)

- Retain expeditionary life support and sustainment capability to support forces operating in austere environments away from fixed sites; maintain 2 x Fob-In-A-Box sets (each supporting 1 x IA Bn) and 2 x Corps Contingency Outpost Packages (each supporting 1 x CF Bn), pending appropriate funding and spending authorization.
- BPT provide movement support to MNC-I operational reserve.
- Establish and maintain the MNC-I container management program as outlined in Tab B, Appendix 2, Annex D.
- BPT provide aerial delivery of emergency common-item sustainment stocks (Class I, III, V, water) to support maneuver forces and transition teams in outlying areas as required.
- BPT provide support to CF and local nationals in the occurrence of collateral damage and catastrophic events.
- Manage IPE Warehouse at Taji and ensure contingency stockage achieves 33,000 sets.