Multi-National Corps - Iraq

OPORD 08-01
14 Dec 07

- This version incorporates corrections emerging from the 14 Dec orders brief
Orders Brief Agenda

- Situation
  - Bridging the Gap – MAJ Powell
  - Environmental Assessment – LTC Miller
  - Outlook – MAJ Powell

- MNF-I/USM-I Mission and Intent – MAJ Powell
- MNC-I Mission and Commander's Intent – MAJ Powell
- Operational Framework and Phasing – MAJ Powell

- Concept of Operations (by LOO)
  - Secure Environment
    - Force Array and Scheme of Maneuver – MAJ Powell
    - Reconnaissance and Engagement – COL Stoneman
    - Priorities for ISF Development – COL Metcalfe
  - Capable, Credible ISF
    - DBE Development / Border Security – COL Metcalfe
    - Logistical Support Development – COL Metcalfe
    - IPS Development – LTC Allen
    - Transition Team Way Ahead – LCDR Gorman
  - Legitimate, Capable Government
    - Civil-Military Operations – MAJ Howard
    - Rule of Law – CPT Berglinko
    - Reconstruction – COL Hawley
    - Infrastructure Security – COL Smith
  - Effective Communications
    - Information Operations – MAJ Gutierrez
    - Public Affairs – MAJ Crum

- Concept of Support
  - Logistics – MAJ Prekker
  - Medical – MAJ Van Steenwout
  - ISR – LTC Miller
  - Aviation – MAJ Arnold
  - Signal – MAJ Myers

- Way Ahead – MAJ Powell

- Orders brief for OPORD 08-01 – commonly known as the campaign plan
- Agenda
- Opening slides on the general concept
- More detail on the concept of operations by line of operation – as indicated
- Conclude with concept of support
• How we visualized the problem in early 2007
• We saw the conflict as a communal struggle in which the GOI’s legitimacy was challenged
• A key dimension of this struggle was the existence of a gap between the GOI and the people of Iraq
• Many groups were trying to fill this gap and exert control over the population in order to achieve their goals
• Over the course of 2007, the environment has changed and so has our depiction of the problem
• Although its long-term vision is still the same, AQI has lost much of its ability to fill the gap
• Instead, extremists – Sunni as well as Shia – are exploiting the gap in the near term
• Elements of other groups depicted as competing to fill the gap largely through violence and intimidation are instead attempting to increase their power and influence through the political process or through the GOI itself
• This doesn’t necessarily make things any easier; it actually requires a deeper understanding of the problem and a more nuanced approach
• So the gap still exists, but it is no longer accurate to say simply that groups are trying to fill it in lieu of the GOI
• We try to capture this dynamic in the next slide
• Our view of the problem
• The gap between the GOI and its people remains but has closed somewhat
• A communal struggle continues, involving those seeking to exploit the gap as well as those competing for a stake in the new Iraq
• The GOI can bridge the gap and meet the needs and desires of its people by improving Iraqi institutions
• The Coalition cannot fill the gap; rather, it supports the GOI and assists in a number of ways
  • Working to make the communal struggle less violent
  • Helping to develop legitimate Iraqi institutions
  • Mitigating the negative effects created by those exploiting the gap
• While bridging the gap is a long-term undertaking, OPORD 08-01 – and what we discuss in this briefing – will focus on our approach and actions in the near-term – that is, between now and late summer 2008
(S//REL) Threat Situation. The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: terrorism and insurgency - which are diminishing, counter-occupation - which is an implicit cultural norm and therefore diminishing more slowly, and the communal struggle for power and survival - which is shifting from primarily occurring between sects to increasingly taking place within them. These interacting conflicts are set in the context of a fragile state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

(Terrorism in Iraq is linked to Al Qaeda's global jihad that seeks to create a virtual caliphate. Over the past year, however, Al Qaeda reduced its support for Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This reduction in support has manifested itself in both reduced funding for AQI and reduced foreign fighter flow. The terrorist organizations in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the hard-line remnants of Ansar al Sunnah (AAS). Sunni Extremists' brutal and excessive tactics have drastically eroded their popular support base and caused an exodus of Iraqi members. The Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Reactionist objective of re-establishing a Sunni-dominated Government of Iraq that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.

(INSURGENCY) The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Reactionist movement aimed at regaining former power and influence. The principal Sunni Reactionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, Iraqi Hamas, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of Ansar al Sunnah. These groups have failed to produce any tangible results and their members have an increasing array of other options for inclusion, representation, and security. Many Reactionists are turning away from armed insurgency and joining concerned local citizens groups, neighborhood watches, and tribal movements.

(Counter-occupation) is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to at least passively support attacks against Coalition Forces and contributes to Iraqi and contributes to Iraqi youth vulnerability to recruitment by more violent elements. The counter-occupation sentiment has reduced as the population learned that Muslim extremists conducted the most heinous crimes, not occupation forces.

(The communal struggle for power and survival between sects has diminished. The struggle is increasingly occurring within the various ethno-sectarian groups. Sunni tribal elements, former insurgents, and local citizens turning against AQI characterize the intra-Sunni conflict. The primary intra-Shia competition is between ISCI/Badr and its...
The GOI is a fragile state with limited capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts. The GOI is slowly developing the governmental, ministerial and security capacity it requires to deal with the various threats.
Environmental Assessment
Dec 07 (1 of 2)

The communal struggle for power and survival is the fundamental threat to security and stability in Iraq
  • Intra-Shia competition for local, provincial and national power
  • Intra-Sunni competition for political power and influence
  • Sectarian violence reduced, but tensions remain; political competition continues
  • Arab-Kurd tensions escalating

Criminal threat – inflames the communal struggle
  • Institutional corruption present at all levels of the GOI
  • Significant regional and local organized crime

Terrorism and insurgency – diminishing threat to security and stability
  • Support for AQI in decline; reduced funding, reduced foreign fighter flow, and eroded popular support base due to excessive tactics
  • OMS ceasefire and JAM split has led to a reduced number of Shia extremists; these groups are turning to Iran for support
  • Leaders of the Sunni insurgency have failed to produce tangible achievements or cultivate a unifying ideology; the Sunni Awakening and tentative rapprochement with CF should be viewed as alternate means of increasing their political power

Counter-occupation – an implicit cultural norm that will diminish more slowly
  • Unmet basic needs and unemployment create an environment where Iraqi youth are vulnerable to recruitment by more violent elements
  • Counter-occupation sentiment has begun to decrease where the population has learned of extremist and criminal acts
Environmental Assessment
Dec 07 (2 of 2)

- External influences contribute to the communal struggle for power by perpetuating intra- and inter-sectarian violence
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
  - Turkey’s pursuit of its interests in the region could potentially destabilize the KRG’s relationship with the GOI (PKK issue, Kurdish expansionism)

- Iraq is a fragile state and will remain so for years
  - GOI’s inability to make decisions on key issues limits its capability to respond to the interacting conflict; no strong executive and a weak coalition ruling majority
  - Effects of past ethno-sectarian violence linger, making compromise and reconciliation difficult; GOI willingness to reconcile questionable
  - Lack of progress on national reconciliation threatens security; GOI fears Awakening Movements as threat to their power
  - Lack of opportunities for greater political representation
  - GOI’s immature criminal justice system
  - Subversion, whether Sunni or Shia in origin, is an emerging concern
The multiple threat groups in the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall into four broad categories: Sunni Extremists, Sunni Rejectionists, Shia Militias, and Shia Extremist. Sunni Extremists are characterized by both their brutal methods and their fanatical religious ideology. Primarily AQI and AAS, who as previously mentioned have reduced support by remain a credible threat.

Sunni Rejectionists are insurgent groups which seek to undermine the current Shia-dominated G0t and restore Sunni political power. The memberships of Sunni Rejectionist groups overlap and merger negotiations into umbrella organizations are a recurring theme. Their failure to provide a unifying ideology and leader have not allowed them to achieve tangible results.

Shia Militias are illegal armed groups aligned with political parties which seek to maintain Shia dominance and advance their particular political party’s interests. Currently the largest and most dangerous are the JAM-SGs. Although, some are adhering to the freeze order, confusion among its members create opportunities for attacks against CF and ISF.

Shia extremist are armed groups that reject the political process and seek to further their limited goals through violent means. The JAM SGs that have split away from JAM are currently the most threatening group. The refuse to adhere to the freeze order and continue to receive lethal aid.
**Political Influences**

**ISCI/Badr**
- Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq/Badr
  - Rule a Shia-dominated GOI, prevent Sunni return
  - Near-term CF alliance while reducing CF footprint
  - Integrates Badr into ISF leadership; counter JAM excesses
  - Use Popular Committees & Shahid al Mihrab to gain Shia support
  - Top-down approach; Weak GOI enabling ISCI powerbase; Control S, ISF 1st
  - Badr Organization is separate political organization; takes direction and loyal to ISCI
  - Shift center of Shiaism from Qom to Najaf

**Rule GOI thru Federalism Alliance**

**Dawa**
- Iraqi Dawa Party (PM Maliki)
  - Rule a strong Shia-dominated GOI
  - Control CF actions and limit CF interference
  - Centralize control of ISF and install loyal commanders
  - Gain support thru improving GOI capacity for services
  - Exploiting opponents' failures and fears to remain in power: divide & conquer

**Strengthen position thru collaboration**

**OMS/JAM**
- Office of the Martyr Sadr/Jaysh al-Mahdi
  - Defend Shia, Institute Shia Sharia Law; dominate GOI post-CF
  - Force CF withdrawal while avoiding direct conflict
  - Integrates former militia into ISF; retain grassroots loyalty
  - Defend Shia communities, selectively provide services
  - Bottom-up approach to power/influence
  - Reach accord with ISCI/Badr
  - Haeri is source of emulation

**Rule GOI thru central Islamic gov’t**

**Fadilah**
- The Fadilah Organization
  - Establish Basra as southern capital and maintain control of Basra
  - Control local security forces and limit central GOI interference
  - Regional approach to power and influence; profit motive

**Secure control of Basra, oil, ports**
### Political Influences (2 of 2)

**Tawafiq/IIP**
- Tawafiq Iraqi Front
  - Restore Sunni influence, protect against Shia domination
  - Use CF to fight AQI and pressure
  - Counter Shia ISF corruption and domination thru CLCs
  - Defend Sunnis from AQI and JAM M/Idisplacement
  - Pressure Shia GOI for greater Sunni inclusion

**Gain Sunni over-representation in GOI**

**KDP/PUK**
- Kurdistan Democratic Party/Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
  - Semi-autonomous, economically viable Kurdistan at peace with neighbors
  - Secure CF strategic alliances: long-term U.S. base
  - Integrate with ISF; retain regional guard
  - Protect Kurdish population and reclaim historical territory
  - Strengthen and support GOI IOT protect Kurdish interests

**Secure Kurdistan within Iraq**

**SAA/SAI**
- Sahawa al-Anbar/Sahawa al-Iraqi
  - Transform from an armed force to a political party
  - Multiple Sunni Insurgent Councils attempting to unify resistance:
    - Use CF to equip, train and organize tribal members to defeat AQI
    - Integrate tribal members into ISF/TSFs
    - Protect tribal members from AQI M/I; provide services
    - Develop a competitive power structure based on tribal system

**INL/Independents**
- Iraqi National List/Independents
  - Establish non-Sectarian Nationalist Government
  - Align with CF to ensure long-term stability
  - Restore professionalism to Iraqi Security Forces; against arming tribes
  - Represent the sectarian interests of all segments of the population
  - Form cross-sectarian coalition

**Replace current GOI with secular GOI**

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Approved for Release
Most Likely Threat Course of Action: Shia Militias defensive, Sunni Rejectionists decentralized, and AQI isolated. The most likely threat course of action is an extrapolation of the current trends into the future. The JAM stand-down continues, Sunni rejectionists remain decentralized and continue to lose both support and motivation, and AQI remains isolated as the common enemy. Local, isolated tensions between Concerned Local Citizens groups and the GOI/ISF will persist due to perceptions of sectarianism that will take time to diminish. Former Sunni Rejectionists will increasingly join local and tribal movements. The Kurd-Arab tensions will continue but will not escalate beyond the leaders ability to control the situation. The current agreement between Hakim and Sadr to diffuse Badr-JAM tensions will ensure that any flare-ups remain localized and temporary. Disloyal and criminal elements of JAM will form splinter groups and continue violence against Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, Badr, and former fellow JAM.

Most Dangerous Threat Course of Action: Shia Unity fragments, Sunni Tribes and Rejectionists unite, and AQI resurges. The most dangerous course of action incorporates the worst combination of negative trends. The Sunni tribal and local movements may become convinced that the GOI is irredeemably sectarian and will never allow any meaningful Sunni inclusion. CLC and Tribal frustration would revive the Sunni insurgency. This would provide AQI with an opportunity to exploit the rift between Sunni populace and the GOI. External support to both AQI and the Sunni insurgency would increase. The GOI would turn towards support, exacerbating Sunni fears of an GOI. The increased pressure on the GOI would worsen the already existing intra-Shia tensions. Badr-JAM violence may escalate beyond their leaders’ ability to control. Would use this opportunity to enhance its control and influence over key terrain-Shia Shrines and Basrah oil, using the most convenient proxies that emerge. Kurdish expansion would exacerbate Kurd-Arab tensions, possibly causing the Kurd-Shia alliance to turn against Sunni Arabs. This might cause the ISF to fracture and the GOI to fail.
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We have seen several positive indicators in the security situation

- Reduction in violence
- AQI threat receding
- Localized security emerging where Sunnis have found common cause with CF and the GOI in the struggle against AQI
- Efforts to persuade Shia communities to distance themselves from Shia extremists showing some promise
- Growth of ISF capacity

Currently though, many factors still threaten security and long-term stability

- Effects of past ethno-sectarian violence linger, making compromise and reconciliation difficult
- Lack of progress on national-level reconciliation
- Those in power are likely to resist provincial elections
- Accountability and Justice legislation stalled
- CLICs are not a sustainable mechanism for localized security: if they are not absorbed into ISF or other formal GOI structures, they could take up arms against CF and the GOI again – this is especially true in the Sunni case
- Organized crime and institutional corruption
- infiltrating and undermining the political process
- Governmental incapacity and malign intent, plus popular resentment stemming from a failure to meet basic needs

Outlook takes the changes of the past year into account and offers an assessment of the challenges ahead

- Progress in the security situation; problems related to sustaining that progress
- Many of these problems stem from and perpetuate the communal struggle
In the coming years, the competition for power and resources in Iraq will be resolved – one way or another

- We cannot simply bring the conflict to an end
- We want to see it resolved relatively peacefully, rather than violently

Resolving the conflict peacefully will take strategic patience and a strategic approach

- We have momentum, but the GOI must capitalize on this opportunity to preserve and expand the progress made thus far in order to secure lasting strategic gains
- MNC-I can contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict by:
  - Facilitating “bottom-up” reconciliation
  - Developing the ISF and assisting with the development of security institutions
  - Supporting the ISF as it protects the population and reduces the accelerants to violence
  - Assisting with efforts to improve governmental performance and economic development at the local and provincial levels

Much of the Coalition’s strategic success will depend on the choices Iraqis make, the ultimate solution to this conflict will be political

- Requires strategic engagement at the national and diplomatic levels
- Requires sufficient GOI support of the Coalition’s efforts, in the face of more evident assertions of Iraqi sovereignty and a GOI desire to limit Coalition authorities
- Requires a substantial improvement of ministerial capacity in order to develop political and economic institutions
- Requires a basic willingness on the part of the GOI and key Iraqi actors to reconcile and work peacefully towards a fair, functional power-sharing arrangement
- Requires a serious GOI effort to take aggressive security and political action against Shia extremists

- Potentially requires a change in the political system, resulting in more representative and accountable governmental institutions

• Communal struggle for power will be resolved one way or another
• Our aim to bring about its resolution as peacefully as possible
• This requires a more sophisticated approach than simply defeating our enemies and helping our friends
• We’ve been aware of the complexity of the conflict for some time; the way ahead involves more of the same
• Due to our security gains, we have momentum; GOI must take advantage of this to secure lasting gains
• MNC-I plays only a part of what will be a strategic effort, requiring resources outside of our control
• Most significantly, our strategic success depends largely on the Iraqis and the choices they make
• Given our current policy of supporting the GOI, the Coalition must – to a large extent – be willing to live the GOI’s decisions; whether or not these decisions will continue to lead to the Coalition’s strategic, long-term success in Iraq and the region is an open question
MNF-I/USM-I Mission Statement

Mission: The Coalition, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, employs integrated political, security, economic, and diplomatic means to, beginning in December 2007:

- Transition from surge operations
- Maintain security in order to transition from lead to partner to overwatch
- Transfer responsibility for population security to the Iraqi Security Forces
- Pursue establishment of a long-term strategic partnership based on a reduced and sustainable Coalition force presence
- Continue to support political and economic development

In order to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

Base document of the JCP approved in late November
JCP covers near-term through July 2008 and the intermediate-term through June 2009, when sustainable security will be achieved
Between now and then, emphasis on maintaining our security gains and transferring responsibilities for security to the Iraqis
OPORD 08-01 will focus on the near term
**Purpose:** To help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009 to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

**Method:** The Coalition will continue to promote political accommodation between the competing factions of the Iraqi population while simultaneously focusing, with our Iraqi counterparts, on the defeat of the extremist enemies of the GOI. The Coalition will employ an integrated engagement approach combining persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means to help the GOI move the various key actors toward political accommodation and reconciliation. The Coalition strategy will focus on establishing a baseline of security for the people and create an environment conducive to political and economic progress leading to reconciliation. As GOI capabilities increase and conditions improve, the Coalition will play a decreasing role and security responsibilities will be transitioned to an Iraqi lead. It will be essential to ensure there is no degradation in the security situation during this transition. Authorities for Coalition operations, currently embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, will eventually transition to multi-faceted, long-term strategic partnerships between the GOI and various Coalition nations. The UNSCR for 2008 will be the last under the provisions of Chapter 7, though a subsequent UNSCR not under Chapter 7 is possible.

- Purpose is to help the Iraqis achieve sustainable security
- Key elements of accomplishing this purpose include:
  - promoting political accommodation – in part through engagement
  - defeating extremists
  - establishing and maintaining a baseline of population security
  - facilitating political and economic progress
  - helping the ISF take the lead in security responsibilities
- Also key is transitioning to a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, which will grant the Coalition authority to remain in Iraq and work toward solidifying strategic, long-term success
Endstate: A stable Iraq:

- Sustained by a developing economy
- Committed to participatory governance under the rule of law and maintaining civil order
- Denied as a safe haven for extremists
- Integrated into the regional and international communities
- Engaged in a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and other Coalition partners and on the road to becoming an effective ally in the War on Terror, and characterized by prosperity, enhanced rule of law, developed security forces and supporting institutions, and fully functioning political and government structures

- End state corresponds with June 2009 or the end of the intermediate term; it does not mark the end of the Coalition’s efforts in Iraq
- It does imply that much of the work will be done, however – makes sense given the planned reduction in forces and the meaning of sustainable security

- Sustainable security: Security that can be maintained over time through Iraqi security, civil, and civic institutions with reduced Coalition involvement
MNC-I Mission

MNC-I conducts *combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces* to secure the population, defeat AQI and other extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and, as local conditions permit, transfer security responsibilities to the ISF *in order to achieve irreversible momentum* by late summer 2008, leading to sustainable security and, in the longer term, *Iraqi self-reliance.*

- Corps mission statement
- Little change in “what” we are doing: secure the population, defeat AQI and extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transferring security responsibilities as conditions permit
- Biggest change relates to “how” we are doing the mission – the primary subject of OPORD 08-01
- Why we are doing it has changed mainly in terms of time: irreversible momentum in the near-term – by late summer 2008; we will explain this term later in the brief
- Irreversible momentum towards sustainable security, leading in the longer term to *Iraqi self-reliance* – a goal which we see as several years away
Commander's Intent – Purpose

The conflict in Iraq is a communal struggle for power and survival. We must focus our efforts on reducing the severity and violent nature of this struggle. This requires an understanding of the interrelated factors that perpetuate it and the likely effects of our lethal and non-lethal actions. Commanders must thoroughly understand the complex dynamics at work in their areas of operations and recognize how they affect (and are affected by) the diverse conditions existing elsewhere. Our understanding of the conflict will be the primary driver of our operations.

My intent is to achieve irreversible momentum towards sustainable security in Iraq. By late summer 2008, we will generate an environment in which the Iraqi people feel safer; have greater access to opportunities; feel more empowered; and increasingly come to rely on Iraqi institutions to fulfill their basic needs.

We will seek this goal in the near-term by: protecting the population; reducing accelerants to violence; building the capacity of professional ISF; brokering local accommodations; facilitating reconciliation; encouraging broader participation in decision-making; promoting police primacy; facilitating equitable distribution of resources; promoting access to justice for all; fostering an environment for economic development; creating jobs; and facilitating the delivery of public services.

Iraq still requires substantial Coalition assistance, but its leaders increasingly assert Iraqi sovereignty. As security and stability improve, we will modify our TTPs to accommodate Iraq’s aspirations. In all cases, we will treat Iraqis with respect and work with them in the spirit of partnership. This partnership extends beyond the military dimension. It involves cultivating the active support of the people and strengthening their commitment to Iraqi institutions. GLDs serve as one example. They temporarily meet a need for security at the local level and become vehicles for reconciliation with their subsequent integration into the ISF or other forms of public service.

Sustainable security requires a purposeful effort to transfer security responsibility to the ISF. We will do so as local conditions permit and in conjunction with a gradual, measured reduction of Coalition forces. We will transition deliberately by area and on a unit-by-unit basis, companies at a time if necessary.

Much of our success hinges on the choices that Iraqis make and on the perceptions that shape those choices. Carefully considered information operations must support everything we do.

Several points of emphasis:

- Imperative to understand the interrelated factors that underlie and shape the communal struggle for power and how factors affected the struggle vary by region
- Achieving irreversible momentum, such that Iraqis come to rely more and more on Iraqi institutions to fulfill their basic needs
- Related dynamics of the more pronounced expressions of Iraqi sovereignty, transferring responsibilities to the GOI, and connecting the GOI to the population so that the ability to manage those responsibilities lasts
- Between now and summer 2008, the number of U.S. BCTs in Iraq will gradually reduce to fifteen; this reduction will occur in conjunction with the transfer of security responsibilities to the ISF; the commander’s intent makes clear that this transition will be deliberate and executed area-by-area as conditions permit
Commander's Intent – Key Tasks

Protect the population, with priority to Baghdad and then the nine key cities; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and obtain the active support of the people; work to solidify these gains at the local level as security responsibilities transition deliberately to a more capable, credible ISF.

Facilitate reconciliation among major ethnic, religious, and political factions vying for power in Iraq; use persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means of engagement to separate reconcilable groups from the irreconcilable and to broker local ceasefires, political compromises, and agreements that integrate CLCs into formal GOI structures; combine local successes into broader opportunities and use these as a basis for bringing about longer lasting political and social stability.

Defeat AQI and extremists: kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development.

Develop ISF capacity through partnership, transition teams, and advisory / assistance units; work to make the IA and NP more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders; promote police primacy through the development of sustainable, competent, non-sectarian local police forces.

Transfer security responsibility to capable, credible ISF units as local conditions permit; manage the risk of regression through a deliberate, area-by-area transition that maintains appropriate Coalition Force overwatch posture; in areas that progress to overwatch, adapt collection strategies that preserve situational awareness and help identify emerging threats to stability.

Assist efforts to improve civilian and governmental capacity, with a special focus on essential services; continue to build capacity that enables accountable local governance, rule of law, and sustainable economic development; deepen our understanding of Iraqi systems, processes, and perspectives, particularly as they relate to money and how it is allocated and spent; promote legitimate, non-sectarian behavior among Iraqi officials; along these lines, support efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry operations through Coalition oversight and an emphasis on enforcing GOI regulations.

Protect the force through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against IED and indirect-fire networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats.

Similar key tasks

Reflects continued emphasis on protecting the population but with more explicit goal of transferring security responsibilities to a capable, credible ISF.

We continue to facilitate reconciliation as a means of defusing the communal struggle, and strive to defeat AQI and other extremists who refuse to reconcile.

We continue to emphasize developing ISF capacity but – again – place new prominence on transition with an additional key task.

Improving civil and governmental capacity remains a key task – one that we can expect will have increased emphasis as security conditions improve.

Finally, we continue to protect the force through an effective use of reconnaissance and surveillance systems, focusing on IDF and IED networks.
Commander's Intent – Near- and Long-Term Goals

In the near term (late summer 2008), irreversible momentum towards sustainable security is achieved; the population is protected, at a level sufficient to allow for continuing political accommodation and economic development, with priority to Baghdad and then the nine key cities; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. GOI efforts to reach political accommodation throughout the country begin to bear fruit and advance the process of reconciliation. Transfer of security responsibilities is well underway, with capable, credible ISF units increasingly in the lead. Coalition forces maintain a presence among the population in several places but have assumed overwatch elsewhere based on conditions. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent Iraqi or Coalition force pressure. Their freedom of action is limited, and their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation and sustainable economic development.

In the long term (2-5 years), Iraq is self-reliant and stable, with fully developed security forces and supporting institutions, fully functioning political and governmental structures, and a developing economy. The country is committed to participatory governance based on the rule of law, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

- End state is described in terms of near- and long-term goals
- In the near term – by late summer 2008 – we seek to achieve irreversible momentum
- More specifically ... in conjunction with the ISF, we want to protect the population at least to a point that allows political accommodation and economic development to continue
- And we want to begin to see the fruits of this accommodation as the GOI advances the process of reconciliation
- The transfer of security responsibility should be well underway, with the ISF increasingly in the lead
- AQI and other extremists should be neutralized – that is, unable to derail political and economic progress
- In the long term – several years away – we seek a self-reliant Iraq
Security progress has generated momentum; we aim to make this momentum irreversible by late summer 2008 — reaching a point where the force of our momentum will be strong enough to withstand any likely setback and thus maintain movement on the way to accomplishing longer-term goals.

Generally speaking, we achieve irreversible momentum when Iraqi institutions can preserve the progress made thus far and expand upon it — with gradually diminishing Coalition support.

We should see Iraqi institutions “bridging the gap” between the GOI and the people; likewise, we should see rising public confidence in those institutions; without these two factors — growing capacity of institutions and rising confidence of the people brought on in part by that growing capacity — it will difficult to say that we’ve met our near-term goal.

Though by no means all-inclusive, this slide provides a description of irreversible momentum in terms of key conditions and trends related to the choices Iraqis will make in the coming months; our actions should aim to favorably influence those choices.
• MNC-I maintains similar near-term goals, but changes in the operational environment have caused (and will continue to cause) us to alter the way we pursue them; changes are based largely on the success we’ve had.
• This slide highlights several aspects to the changing dynamic of our operations.
• Here, we are trying to put where we’re going in the context of where we’ve been – using the commander’s key tasks as a framework.
• Timeline and force levels depicting the surge earlier this year and the Coalition’s reduction in force planned for the first half of next year; over time, the level of effort committed to the key tasks has changed and will continue to change.
• With the imminent BCT reductions, responsibility for executing the task of population security will increasingly shift to capable, credible ISF.
• Level of effort committed to facilitating reconciliation will increase; stems from the growing prominence of the struggle’s intra-sectarian dimension; we seek to exploit the widening rift between extremists and Iraq’s major Arab communities; this requires a more nuanced approach – esp. in the Shia case; we want to broker local ceasefires and coordinate local security arrangements, reconciling with former belligerents if such a course has the potential to lead to political accommodation with the GOI.
• Level of effort committed to defeating extremists is declining; due to successful lethal efforts; also due to our increased emphasis on facilitating reconciliation – restricted target lists.
• Level of effort committed to developing the ISF remains high as we prepare them.
for independent operations and assist them as they shoulder more of the burden for local security

- Improving civil and governmental capacity will slightly increase; we expect that the change in emphasis will become more pronounced beyond the near term — after MNC-I achieves irreversible momentum
MNC-I's operational framework with three lines of operation
- Each LOO leads to associated operational objectives in the near term and in the long term
- We've adapted the JCP design and placed it underneath ours to show how the corps framework nests with MNF-I's and the embassy's
- We seek to accomplish our near-term objectives by late summer 2008; these objectives are mutually-reinforcing and together constitute achieving irreversible momentum towards sustainable security and ultimately towards self-reliance, described in part by our long-term objectives
The next two slides provide additional detail on our operational objectives for the near term:

Each objective has a number of supporting conditions that – when considered collectively – help describe the desired state of the operational environment when the objectives are accomplished.

For the near term, we have identified measures of effectiveness to assess changes in the operational environment and to assist in gauging the extent to which MNC-I has achieved the supporting conditions related to each objective.

Here we have supporting conditions and MOEs for “Secure the population” and “Enhance ISF capacity.”
**Objectives Crosswalk**

**Near Term – Late Summer 2008 (2 of 2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Near-Term Objectives</th>
<th>Supporting Conditions</th>
<th>Measures of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhance government capacity at the local and provincial level (such that security progress is reinforced)</td>
<td>Provision of essential services improved</td>
<td>Iraqis increasingly perceive improvements in their quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of law strengthened</td>
<td>Government capacity to provide essential services increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public confidence in local and provincial government increased</td>
<td>Government capacity to undertake reconstruction and infrastructure development increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish foundation for economic development at local and provincial level (such that security progress is reinforced)</td>
<td>Legitimate economic activity in public and private sectors increased</td>
<td>Government ability to execute fiscal responsibilities improving (i.e., budget execution)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased employment opportunities generated</td>
<td>Judicial process improving</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pretrial investigative process improving</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Majority of Iraqis accept the political process as legitimate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governing mechanism increasingly representative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government officials increasingly demonstrate non-sectoral behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional corruption decreasing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- And the same kind of additional detail for “Enhance government capacity at the local and provincial levels” and “Establish the foundation for economic development at the local and provincial levels”
• This is how Coalition forces are arrayed to execute the concept, as of mid-December
• Main effort remains securing the population, with priority to Baghdad
• The principal supporting effort is interdicting accelerants to sectarian violence in Baghdad and denying them sanctuary in the Baghdad Belts
• We sustain adequate Coalition force presence in outlying areas to execute other supporting efforts
• In Anbar, MNC-I continues to exploit inroads made against AQI through tribal engagement, developing and assisting the ISF, and gradually transferring security responsibility
• In the northern provinces, initial priority goes to security efforts in Diyala and Southern SaD; MNC-I sustains security gains in the Mosul area by establishing the Ninewa Operational Command and continuing to develop local ISF; conducts engagement to reduce Arab-Kurd tensions in order to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI
• In the Kurdish region itself, we maintain current levels of stability
• In the south, Coalition forces take measures to ensure intra-Shia conflict remains localized, facilitate the transition to provincial control, or sustain it from an overwatch posture
Integrated engagement throughout the country aims in part to isolate extremists and malign foreign actors from the population.
• In the near term, Coalition forces will undergo a gradual reduction
• Sequence of the U.S. BCT reduction is shown at the bottom of the slide
• It’s important to note that there will be losses in the strength of key Coalition partners as well; to the extent that these losses are known, they are depicted
• This is how we expect forces to be arrayed in summer 2008 – after the 16th U.S. BCT departs without backfill
• Ways of mitigating risk resulting from the reduction – passing responsibility for IZ security to the JASG; two non-standard BDE headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces to facilitate continued progress in governance and economic development, as well as engagement efforts (CENTCOM has approved the N/S HQ for Anbar; N/S HQ for Wasit pending Mar 08 assessment)
• Another way of mitigating risk is through a deliberate transition to capable, credible ISF

• UK: current (4 BG, 14 s/u), mid-Jan 08 (3 BG, 12 s/u), Jun 08 (2 BG, 9 s/u – but decision yet to be finalized)
MNC-I Phases

Late Summer 2008

Phase 2 - Clear, Control, Retain

- Establish security for the population at each phase of the campaign
- Improve local ISF capability and prepare areas for independent control
- CF presence among population continues throughout each phase of the campaign

Phase 1 - Setting Key Conditions

- CF will conduct operations in areas where the population is not secure, providing security
- CF will conduct operations in areas where the population is self-reliant

Phase 4 - Operational Overwatch

Phase 5 - Strategic Overwatch

- CF will conduct operations in areas where the population is self-reliant

Phase 3 - Tactical Overwatch

- CF will conduct operations in areas where the population is self-reliant

Current Situation Near-Term Long-Term

- Phasing construct is really the framework for transferring security responsibility to the Iraqis
- It acknowledges the existence of diverse conditions throughout the country; different parts in different phases; for example, by late summer 2008, we will have made progress – with more areas in overwatch – but other areas will remain in Clear, Control, Retain
- Red shaded area denotes the critical period – where we are now; dotted oval shows forward progress conceptually
- Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition force posture in a given area
- The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time
- In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retain approach in partnership with the Iraqis
- In Phase 3 – ISF conducting independent operations but with substantial Coalition assistance; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for security
- In Phase 4 – ISF sustain independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs
In Phase 5 – All elements of the ISF performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities.
We elaborate on the phasing construct by providing guidance on the tasks Coalition forces conduct in each phase.

The premise is that as areas progress through phases, conditions will allow a gradual reduction of Coalition forces in those areas; with that reduction, there will be a corresponding reduction in the tasks Coalition forces perform.

As transition progresses, the major tasks of CF will shift to a different emphasis and generally reduce in scope – as depicted on this slide; in early stages of the transition, we should view the crossed-out tasks as things the Coalition will do largely by exception as the ISF assume primary responsibility for them; at some point though, some of the lined-out tasks will become things we can’t do – based on the limitations that continued Coalition force reductions will impose.

Tasks evolve by phase and show changes in Coalition emphasis and approach.

For example, ISF Development and Support is a major task that CF perform in every phase; however, what CF do to develop the ISF in Clear, Control, Retain is much different than what CF do along these line in Strategic Overwatch.
• The next two slides provide a subjective assessment of where we are currently in terms of phases – provides a snapshot of conditions by area and – in a general sense – the kinds of tasks Coalition forces are performing by area
• It also provides some insight into how we will transition
• The point is really to show that transition will not be as simple as provinces going PIC or entire BCT AO’s passing into the next phase abruptly or all at once
• Transition will occur in a deliberate manner by area as conditions permit
• As complicated as this slide appears, the reality is actually more complicated – particularly in areas where capable ISF units operate in the same area as inexperienced ones
Another subjective assessment – projecting out to summer 2008

Note that while Coalition forces are in tactical and operational overwatch in many areas, we will remain in the Clear, Control, Retain phase in key portions of the country.
Proposed MNC-I Reconciliation Mission, Intent and Endstate:

Mission: MNC-I directs engagement and reconciliation efforts with the local population to mobilize the civilian community in support of the CF and GoI in order to facilitate near-term security and long-term stability.

Intent: Execute a broad-based and integrated reconciliation and engagement effort at all levels utilizing a bottom-up approach with top-down refinement and resourcing. The focus is to engage a variety of groups in order to cause the Iraqis to reject the insurgency, to work with Iraqi Security Forces, to participation in reconstruction and recovery efforts and to become part of the political process, thus leading to the reduction of violence.

End State: Reduction of violence and improved levels of security and stability are sustained. CLCs transition into ISF or non-security jobs. GoI employment and recovery/reconstruction plans in place and effective. The majority of the Iraqi populace rejects violence and begins to enter the political process.
MNC-I Reconciliation Priorities

1. Hiring CLCs into the IP
2. Transition of CLCs into non-security employment
3. Transition of security contracts to GOI

Stages of Development (currently between Stages 1 & 2):
1. CLC contracted and work under direct supervision of CF
2. Contracted by CF and work under direct supervision of ISF and/or CF; CF maintain authority and oversight of CIS contract
3. Work for the ISF or transition to other employment
**CLC Requirements**

**Organization**
- Carefully screened & entered in biometrics
- Sign pledge of loyalty to Iraq and vetted by local authorities
- Not authorized by law to arm CLCs
- Must know who they are – locally recruited
- Temporary in nature – cease when ISF capacity adequate
- Shia & Sunni mix where possible

**Standards**
- Must wear designated CLC uniforms
- May not use/wear rank
- No political party affiliations or symbols
- No paramilitary names or slogans
- No crew-served or large caliber weapons
- Consequences for infractions – removal, detention, probation, contract termination

**Operations**
- Subordinate to ISF in their sector
- Only permitted to perform defensive security measures
- Pre-approval for all actions from ISF Cdr
- Only operate in sector
- Joint operations with ISF where possible
- Recurring reports on activities
- Oversight by Local Committees (IA, IP, City Council, Sheiks)

---

*Strict Coalition forces supervision with transition to the GOI*
CLC Transition Strategy

Transfer control to security-related jobs and other alternatives as ISF increases capacity by Summer 2008

20%
Security-Related Jobs

Concerned Local Citizens

80%
Transition Programs

Iraqi Security Forces
- Iraqi Police
- Iraqi Army
- National Police
- Department of Border Enforcement
- Facility Protection Service

Community Stabilization Program
Civil Service Departments
Joint Technical Education and Reintegration Program

Short-Term Employment
Apprenticeships
Education and Training
- Government Employee
- State Owned Enterprise
- Private Sector
- Micro-Loo Business
Develop ISF Capacity – Logistics

- Continued engagement with ISF units to develop new logistics structures. Assist in the development of robust logistics procedures for life support, sustainability, and equipment repair/replacement in order to reduce dependence of MOD and MOI forces on CF.
- Work with IA Logisticians to develop new Base Support Units and Log Support Battalions dedicated to each Division.
- Track status of IA Force Generation equipping and materiel readiness via the monthly and quarterly IA equipment status report process. Develop and implement a single consistent inventory tracking process.
- Mentor ISF leaders and technicians to find organic solutions to logistics problems.
- Be prepared to supplement (if necessary) intra-theatre operational mobility for IA Mech Forces.
- Monitor the utilization of all classes of supply, services, and maintenance and provide guidance or emergency distribution to resolve logistics shortfalls.
- Assist the GOI to develop MOD and MOI self-sufficient maintenance capability.

NLT December 2008, MOD Iraqi Security Forces will be self-reliant in logistics at the tactical and operational levels. Coalition Forces will provide limited emergency logistical support and continue to assist with the development of logistics capability as required. MOI logistics will continue to mature, though at a slower pace due to aggressive IP expansion. Work to influence an aggressive MOI logistics improvement commensurate with IP expansion.
Develop ISF Capacity – IPS Development Program

- Continues development of IPS to promote police primacy and to achieve enduring capability
  - Law Enforcement competencies to apprehend, process, and support investigations, adjudications, and incarcerations
  - Station systems of administration, logistics, maintenance, station refurbishment, and force protection
- Shift focus from the Station/Shurta to PDoP/District, focus will be on systems, process, and SOPs based on the Police Essential Task List (PETL)
  - Focus will be on 7 critical tasks: Leadership, Administration, Operations, Logistics/Sustainment, Investigations, Facilities, and Training
  - PTTs with IPAs will focus on developing Iraqi counterparts at Provincial and District Headquarters IAW the PETL; PT Ts will continue to cover stations as required
- Iraq Expansion Plan will increase quantity and quality of infrastructure and personnel required by each province
  - Requires MND/IPs to evaluate their provinces and determine additional IPS and stations required
  - Enables IPs to maintain security in their assigned neighborhoods creating an enduring law enforcement capability
  - Provides another opportunity to integrate CLCs into more sustainable employment as part of Iraq's formal security apparatus

**Short-Term Program Objectives**
Integrated multi-sectarian station, patrol and traffic operations providing freedom of movement and safe and secure neighborhoods in accordance with the rule of law.

**Long-Term Program Objectives**
A quality and enduring Iraqi police force capable of apprehending, processing and supporting the investigations, adjudicating and incarcerating of criminals IAW rule of law; providing civil order; sustaining public confidence and trust and developing processes and procedures to create an enduring Law Enforcement capability for the future of Iraq
There is no “one” solution for Transition Team coverage

The major change to 08-01 by IAG was the addition of the previously briefed and approved transition team concepts and models.

This slide is presented to reintroduce the recommended transition team models and the overarching ideas for the coverage concepts.

TT coverage is driven by the CDR’s assessment of the environment, with the triggers and criteria shown in the cloud. This allows for increased flexibility to adjust transition team coverage according to a varied set of conditions.

Around the trigger/criteria “cloud” are boxes that represent each TT model and provide a brief explanation of each.

The stars represent operational environments that could support a specific model.

- For example, Baghdad OE is representative of an area that has until recently supported 1:1 Standard Coverage.
- On the other hand, an area such as Tal Afar in MND-N may offer conditions where Enhanced Light coverage may be appropriate.
The improvement of security and ISF capability in various areas of Iraq provided the opportunity to re-look current transition team concepts. IAG developed three new transition team models, presented in the previous slide, to take advantage of the differing environments throughout the theater of operations. These models are designed to build on the advisory and transition momentum created by the legacy transition team concept.

The new models were introduced to the ground commanders as recommendations to allow them the ability to provide coverage and mitigate the growing shortages. The developed coverage plan will cover 85 of 89 projected shortages, with the remaining 4 shortages filled by the ultimate sourcing of RFF 648 mod 3.

In the long term, we expect the transition team concepts laid out in 08-01 to provide inherent flexibility as environments change, act as the bridge to the next transition team strategy and allow the ground commanders the ability to adjust strategies based on shifting phases of over watch.
MNC-I and its subordinate units will continue to support PRTs and ePRTs in building capacity at provincial and local levels in support of the overall goal of improving the Iraqi capacity to govern with transparency and accountability, provide essential services, and develop economic, political and social systems.

That support is defined according to the relationships shown here and outlined in detail in the DOS/DOD MOU of 22 February 07. That support will include, but is not limited to providing life support, QRF, transportation, medical, security, and communications. Operationally, the PRTs and MNDS work together as a team to support the Joint Common Plan agreed to by the COM and MNF-I.

The MSCs will conduct key leader engagements to encourage local and provincial government interaction and to facilitate local and provincial awareness of available capacity building programs.

As local and provincial governments improve in budget execution and become more financially self reliant, there should be a corresponding reduction in CERP utilization.
Depicts the linkage of various efforts that together will assist Iraq in meeting the objectives of self-sustaining economic growth and enhancing government capacity at all levels. At the Provincial and Local level, MSCs ICW the PRTs and ePRTs, employ a number of different programs and initiatives to address economic and governance challenges specific to their AO. Most of the key government-enhancing initiatives are supported by the PRT through programs such as Local Governance Program II and the Community Action Program. Both of these programs are sponsored by USAID and provide advisors to the Director Generals as well as consultation, key leader engagement and training to improve capacity of the ministers at Provincial Level.

Economic growth will continue through a number of programs such as VoTechs, Micro Grants, and other CERP-funded initiatives. Through reconciliation efforts, we are beginning to transition CLCs and other community-based security organizations into the ISF and CSC for longer term employment opportunities. Iraqi Based Industrial Zones will continue to set local conditions for economic growth at the MSC level by adding local enterprises to the base support infrastructure. MSCs will continue to identify Safe Market areas for rehabilitation in support of local economies and will emphasize VoTech enrollment as a means of producing skilled laborers.
Finally, TF-BSO will focus on the rehabilitation of State Owned Enterprises nationwide in an effort to employ the greatest number of Iraqis in a cost-effective and timely manner. At the same time, they will work through diplomatic channels to promote Iraqi products regionally and internationally.
Rule of Law

Overarching Goal:
- MNC-I improves the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Iraqi criminal justice system in order to increase the primacy of the rule of law

Objectives:
- Improve judicial throughput for major crimes cases (i.e., terrorism)
- Reduce detention overcrowding
- Ensure due process for detainees

MNC-I will focus on two primary axes to accomplish the stated objectives:
- Measures to improve the Judicial Process
  - Establish secure judicial complexes in key locations of Iraq (priorities: Ramadi, construction due to begin in Mar 09); then Mosul, Baquba, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Basra)
  - Local improvement projects for courthouses with a focus on the key cities
  - Collect statistical data regarding functioning and infrastructure of the criminal justice system
- Measures to improve the Investigative Process
  - Create traveling Investigative Training Team to provide on site training to police, police investigators, and judicial investigators in order to improve the sufficiency of criminal packets
  - Improve coordination between Investigative Judges and Police/Judicial Investigators to ensure proper completion of criminal packets
  - Improve the flow of detainees from point of capture to investigative hearing and trial
At the Provincial level, MNC-I supports local government efforts to improve quality of life for Iraqi citizens through improvements in essential services and support for economic development. CERP is the primary tool to repair infrastructure and increase Government of Iraq (GOI) capacity to provide essential services in Iraq at the provincial level. Battle space owners coordinate projects with local GOI governments, Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDC), local ministerial Director Generals and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to identify requirements in order to increase GOI capacity. This coordination is critical and ensures the project has a transition plan to be supported and maintained by the GOI upon completion.

For Essential Services, priority of effort is to the population of Baghdad and then the nine key cities. MNC-I supports the GOI efforts to improve essential services in Baghdad by supporting efforts of the Joint Planning Commission/JROC and recently formed Iraqi Service Providing Commission. These organizations provide a forum for coordination among all levels of the GOI, USG Interagency and Coalition Forces to improve GOI capacity to provide essential services to the Citizens of Baghdad. In Baghdad, the priorities are:

- Shift priority of effort for sewer from West to East of Tigris River
- Enable Government Water Treatment and Distribution efforts (The City has requested $573M for water projects in 2008)
- Micro-generation will continue to be necessary while the Minister of Electricity works to improve power generation capabilities to bridge the gap between demand and supply.

In the nine other key cities, MSCs support PC, PRDC efforts to provide essential services to the population including sewer, water, electricity and trash.

For Economic Development, MNC-I supports local economic development initiatives which improve employment opportunities for Iraqis. Engineers support the Civil Service Corps, an MNC-I economic development and employment initiative by providing technical training, engineering planning and design, construction quality control and partnering with organizations involved in this initiative.
Agricultural Development: MSCs support agricultural development efforts through cleaning and refurbishment of canals, drainage systems and pump stations.
For Transportation infrastructure, priority shifts where appropriate from infrastructure that has operational impact to roads and bridges which connect rural areas to markets and support industrial and agricultural development and access to markets.
Infrastructure Security

Enabling Iraq's Transition to an Increased Focus on Services

MINC-I continually reassesses the balance between resources enabling population security and resources that enable security of Iraq's infrastructure.

As demand continues to increase for Iraqi services, CF will continue to partner and support Iraqi-led initiatives that enable the GOI to provide more for the people.

CF will continue to support ISF operations that enable:

Combined Initiatives
- Improved distribution of fuel
- Electrical services to the people of Iraq
- Baghdad 400 KV Loop
- Baghdad Product Ring
- Exclusion Zones – Bayji to Kirkuk and Bayji to Baghdad
- Fuel to Power Plants
- Maintain Strategic Oil Infrastructure
- Iraqi Railroad Operations

Ministry Initiatives
- Ministry of Electricity
  - Support development / installation of incremental generating capacity
  - Plan for 2009 and 2010
  - Incorporate private generators
- Ministry of Oil
  - Increase crude exports
  - Capture associated natural gas
  - Provide fuel for electricity generation
  - Fix product pricing

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Information Operations

Integrates influence strategies and shaping operations across all LOOs to:
- Influence perceptions
- Disrupt hostile actions

Shapes the perceptions of the Iraqi populace towards the GOI and ISF, reinforced by Iraqi-led efforts

MNC-I Critical IO Tasks:
- Disrupt Shia extremists and criminals
- Disrupt AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals
- Degrade malign foreign influence
- Promote GOI credibility
- Shape perception, communicating that CF presence serves Iraqi interests

IO objectives are nested with the MNC-I Commander's Intent to continue progress in the following areas, ultimately enabling conditions that support Iraqi self-reliance:
- Security
- GOI/ISF capacity, effectiveness, and representation
- Reconciliation
- Improved essential services
- Sustained economic growth

- Information operations plays a key role in effective communications and is integrated across all LOOs IOT dominate the Information Environment. To support influence efforts in the operational environment, Corps IO will integrate Effective Communications laterally across the staff, as well as from the tactical through strategic levels, to ensure relevant and timely coordination of Information Operations.

- We will plan IO to influence primarily the perceptions of the populace – focusing on the fence-sitters and “undecided” – to build support for the Gol and ISF, while disrupting the actions of extremists, militias, and criminals.

- IO will coordinate and synchronize appropriate activities and resources to support Iraqi-led actions that demonstrate Gol/ISF effectiveness and credibility nationally, provincially, and locally.

- IO has 5 assigned critical tasks that support Corps near-term objectives --- (listed above). Execution of these tasks will require close coordination and synchronization with MNF-I and USM-I.

- Our IO Objectives are nested with your Commander's Intent and support these areas --- (listed above).

- In the current COIN environment, the key capabilities impacting populace perceptions are Public Affairs, PSYOP, CA / CMO, lethal ops and engagements.

- IO cell is simultaneously conducting long-range planning, projecting 12-18 months out IOT offensively shape the Information Environment, allowing MNC-I to maintain a position of influence advantage and forcing adversaries
into defensive postures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINI-CRITICAL IO TASKS</th>
<th>IO OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>IO TASKS TO MSCs and Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure the population</strong></td>
<td>(1) Iraqi populace rejects Shi'a extremists and criminals</td>
<td>(1) Disrupt Advisory Operations &amp; Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Disrupt AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals</td>
<td>(2) Disrupt IED / IED Networks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Disrupt Malian foreign influence</td>
<td>(3) Promote Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enhance ISF capacity</strong></td>
<td>(1) Iraqi populace perceives there is effective security</td>
<td>(1) Disrupt Advisory Operations &amp; Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Disrupt AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals</td>
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<td>(3) Disrupt Malian foreign influence</td>
<td>(3) Promote ISF Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Promote ISF credibility</td>
<td>(4) Promote Reconciliation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Shape perception to serve Iraqi interests</td>
<td>(5) Promote ISF Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enhance government capacity at local and provincial level</strong></td>
<td>(1) Iraqi populace perceives all levels of government as effective in providing essential services</td>
<td>(1) Disrupt Advisory Operations &amp; Capabilities</td>
</tr>
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<td>(2) Disrupt Malian foreign influence</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establish foundation for economic development at local and provincial level</strong></td>
<td>(1) Iraqi populace perceives there is steady economic growth</td>
<td>(1) Disrupt Advisory Operations &amp; Capabilities</td>
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<td>(2) Disrupt AQI / Sunni extremists and criminals</td>
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<td>(3) Disrupt Malian foreign influence</td>
<td>(3) Disrupt Economic Development at the Provincial Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Promote ISF credibility</td>
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<td>(5) Shape perception to serve Iraqi interests</td>
<td>(5) Promote Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
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Approved for Release
Public Affairs Operations

- **MNC-I conducts public affairs across all LOOs**
- **Desired effects**
  - Increase Western, Iraqi, and Pan-Arab audiences
  - Understand Coalition goals
  - Emphasize improvements in basic services
- **Desired means of delivery**
  - Engage key “opinion-makers” across a wide spectrum
  - Media “embeds”
  - Senior leader engagements
  - Increase number of Soldier engagements in market outreach
  - Internal information program
- **Concept**
  - Broad public affairs guidance
  - Aggressive leader engagement
- **Guidelines for media interaction**
  - Stay in your lane
  - Don’t criticize the Iraqis

Public Affairs transcends across all Lines of Operation highlighting successes and countering misinformation and propaganda. The desired effects will be that western, Iraqi and Pan-Arab audiences will increase, there will be an understanding of Coalition goals, and we will emphasize improvements in “basic” services. The desired means for delivering these messages will be thru media embeds, senior leader engagements, soldier engagements focusing on specific markets and a robust internal information program......... We will continue PA operations by focusing on past successes such as Pentagon Press Brief and senior-leader interviews with the major media outlets. We will also promote BCT engagements with medium and larger media outlets.

The overarching concept of MNC-I Public Affairs operations is to 1) issue broad public affairs guidance and talking points and 2) promote aggressive MNC-I leader engagement with media outlets, and use their good judgment and experience to tell the MNC-I story, being mindful to stay in their lane of expertise and not criticize Iraqis in front of the media.
- ARC: Provides EAC CSS, JRSO, & TF X support to MNC I
- 314 ESC provides general common item support to all services & coalition forces as required AW ACSA
- 314 ESC provides general support on an area basis from the GS/DE Log Hubs
- 314 ESC provides GS to non-divisional Army units and GS reinforcing to divisional units as required.
- MILG provides GS to MEF units in MW/AF with MARCENT coordinating Marine-specific supply throughout areas as required.
- Transition Teams are supported on an area basis.
Continuous Medical IO
Campaign:
Coordination and collaboration are necessary from the local to national level to ensure the quality of Iraqi health services is optimized.

Near-Term Objectives:
- Conduct Conditions-Based Planning to Restructure HSS as per Basing Strategy
- Reshape the Footprint per Basing Strategy
- Repurpose to provide Detainee Healthcare
- Coordinate CEIs as part of a Continuous Medical IO Campaign

Enhance ISF HSS capacity
Self-Reliance

Enhance GEO capacity healthcare system

Long-Term Objectives:
- Retraining; the HSS footprint is smaller and posture to reinforce ISF and the Ministry of Health
- ISF HSS capabilities increased
- Improved Iraqi civilian healthcare system; better utilized by the Iraqi people and supports the legitimacy of the Iraqi government
Purpose - Provide actionable intelligence and relevant operational level analysis to support MNC-I decisions and enable MSC combat and stability operations.

Key Intelligence Tasks:
- Support Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), to include Key Leader Engagements (KLE)
- Support Counter-terrorism (CT), to include HVT/HVI Tracking and Assessment
- Support Iraqi Partners
- Support Force Protection (FP)
- Support Information Operations (IO)

Endstate - Integrated Corps Intelligence coherently supports the achievement of Corps objectives.

The MNC-I C2 will coordinate and synchronize intelligence operations of the staff, MSCs, and national agency activities in support of the MNC-I commander’s intelligence requirements. MNC-I C2 will direct the employment of EAD collection assets and will coordinate theater, national, and multi-national collection operations with MNF-I to maximize collection efficiencies and effectiveness across the Corps. Recognizing that collection assets requirements will exceed capacity, they will be allocated based on the mission and weighted to support the MNC-I Commander’s priorities. To further support operations, MNC-I will synchronize multi-disciplined collection.

MNC-I C2 will decentralize ISR to the fullest extent possible IOT provide maximum flexibility to the BCT Commanders conducting the COIN fight. As MNC-I transitions from Clear, Control, Retain to Tactical and Operational Overwatch, robust intelligence support to BCTs becomes increasingly important.

MNC-I C2 ISR Priorities are:
- Counter-IED/Cache/ERW
Target Development (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic)
Sectarian Violence
Border Monitoring
MNC-I C5 MISSION: Provides signal and information systems planning and integration to ensure reliable, robust, and redundant voice, data, and video services to all MNC-I activities, Coalition forces, and other agencies operating in the ITO.

- Transition from 07-01 to 08-01 reduced signal footprint by 1 battalion.
- IMPACT/ MITIGATION (57th SIGNAL BN): Replaced 3 TSIBs with 2 ESBs augmented with commercial signal equipment (SSPR), Points of Presence (SPOPs), AN-30, AN-56, and Orthagon Radios.
- VSAT JUONS was also initiated to offset loss of 57th Signal BN, tentative arrival date for equipment 1 Mar 08.
- Non-Standard BDE HQs (RFF 14B), currently does not include a request for signal assets to support the BDE HQs.

SPEICHER
1 X 57th SIG BN (495 pax)

BALAD
1 X 63d ESB (214 pax)

BAGHDAD / CAMP VICTORY
1 X 11th SIG BDE (141 pax)
1 X XVIII ARC BRIDGING STRATEGY
SIG CO (196 pax)
1 X 44th ESB (515 pax)
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
Way Ahead

- 14 Dec 07 – Orders brief to MSCs and Separate Commands
- 16 Dec 07 – Order published

MSC Briefings to CG, MNC-I
  - MND-C – 8 Jan
  - MND-N – 10 Jan
  - 315 ESC – 13 Jan
  - CJSPOTF – 15 Jan
  - MND-B – 16 Jan
  - MND-CS – 17 Jan
  - MNF-W – 20 Jan
  - MND-SE – TBD
  - MND-NE – TBD

Briefings to DCG (US), MNC-I
  - 7 Jan – 20th EN BDE; TF 4 A VN
  - 8 Jan – 18th MP BDE; 525th BFB; 11th SIG BDE
  - 9 Jan – TF 1-4a JCCS-I
  - 10 Jan – 62d MED BDE; TF 1-4a 360th CA BDE

- We expect the order to be published in a couple of days
- The next related milestones are the MSC briefings to the Commanding General and the separates’ briefings to MG Simmons
- Dates depicted here are what we are currently tracking
The backbrief on your plan to execute OPORD 08-01 should include, at a minimum:

1. An environmental assessment of your AO; both now and in August 2008.
2. How your plan accomplishes key tasks listed in the MNC-I Commander’s Intent.
3. What is your plan to execute a deliberate, area-by-area transition to tactical and operational overwatch?
   Where? When? How?
4. How will you control, vet, monitor, and execute the CLC programs and then support the GOI as they transition CLCs to the ISF or the civil sector?
5. How will you support the MNC-I information operations objectives in OPORD 08-01?
6. How will you continue to develop and assist the ISF and help build ISF capacity sustainable over time?
   - Partnership / TT Coverage
   - Logistical Capacity
   - Equipping / Manning
   - Leader Development
   - Collective Training
7. How will you support and enable PRT/ePRTs to improve governance and economic development?
8. How will you fulfill requirements for detainee release operations to reinforce local Iraqi reconciliation initiatives?
9. Provide a detailed brief on the employment of corps- and theater-level ISR assets apportioned to your organization.

- Backbrief guidance provided in the DTU entry published a week or so ago
- More guidance required from the corps on detainee release
- #9 reflects an update to the original DTU entry – does not pertain to MND-N, 316 ESC, MND-CS, and MND-NE
Comments
BACK-UP

- CLC Information
- Assumptions
- Long-Term Supporting Conditions
- Phasing Construct
- Sub-Tasks by Phase
- PRT and ePRT Laydown
- Tasks to Subordinate Units
Concerned Local Citizens

Definition of CLC: A person is part of an organized group working with CF/GOI under a CERP/CIS contract or GOI contract or a security volunteer receiving no payment. CLC must take an oath to be a law-abiding citizen, is processed through BAT/HiIDE, and is registered with CF as a CLC.

Not active: All other individuals willing to participate in a security activity, but due to operational needs or constraints, are not currently used. These individuals may be considered for transition into future civil service programs.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSC (cap)</th>
<th>CLCs</th>
<th># enrolled in BATS</th>
<th># contracted for security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MND-N (30,000)</td>
<td>16,592</td>
<td>11,740</td>
<td>11,577</td>
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<td>MND-B (33,000)</td>
<td>23,363</td>
<td>21,657</td>
<td>18,838</td>
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<td>MNF-W (8,000)</td>
<td>7,684</td>
<td>7,968</td>
<td>7,684</td>
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<td>MND-C (32,000)</td>
<td>26,211</td>
<td>28,223</td>
<td>23,917</td>
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<td>MND-SE (3,000)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (163,000)</td>
<td>75,855</td>
<td>69,888</td>
<td>63,331</td>
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CLC Way Ahead: In early 2008, the first transition “test case” will occur in West Rashid (MND-B) with a CLC group becoming an unarmed CSC. Operations for full-scale transition will be underway in summer 2008, with the aim of having all CLCs transition to other employment by the end of 1st QTR CY-09. Planning and coordination for full-scale transition of CLCs to ISF service, GOI non-security employment, GOI security contracts, or CF employment programs (CSCs) / job training programs (JTERP) will be ongoing.

MND-N:
In Diyala, continue existing CLC operations and transition of CLCs into ISF/ non-security jobs; Expand reconciliation efforts in Ninewa and Salah ad Din; Monitor the effects of Kurdish expansionism in Kirkuk.

MNF-W:
No further expansion of CLCs; Transition CLC to IP/ non-security jobs; Facilitate increased Sunni political integration/ employment; Continue efforts to transition CLCs to IP/ non-security jobs.

MND-B:
Engage key leaders; Expand Shi’a into CLCs; Transition CLCS into non-security jobs.

MND-C:
Continue CLC efforts in Baghdad belts and Babil Province; Transition CLCs into non-security jobs; No CLCs in Karbala and An Najaf.

MND-CS:
Sustain CLC in Qadisiyah along MSR; Limited CLC in Diwaniyah.

MND-SE:
Limited CLC effort: Continue to conduct engagements with key Shi’a leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shi’a extremists
and malign foreign actors.

CJSOTF:
Engage local leaders, coordinate with MNDs to ensure unity of effort.
Assumptions
Assumptions

1. External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraqi sovereignty
2. Absent external influences, the GOI will continue its sectarian behavior at levels that destabilize Iraq; however, local political accommodations and a baseline of security will help reduce sectarianism
3. The Coalition will be able to alter the behavior of the GOI by capitalizing on local initiatives through the application of incentives and disincentives
4. The USG will continue to support the current GOI
5. The GOI will desire a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S. and thus will continue to accept the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq for several years; this acceptance will be contingent on the Coalition’s acknowledgement and support of increasing Iraqi sovereignty
6. The GOI will make halting progress toward national reconciliation as different sects and factions continue to compete for power
7. Throughout 2008, Coalition forces will operate under an UNSC that preserves the authorities necessary to accomplish key Coalition goals
8. PIC agreements will grant Coalition forces the freedom of action necessary to accomplish key Coalition goals
Assumptions

(2 of 3)

9. Provincial elections will occur no earlier than summer 2008
10. With Coalition help, ISF capacity will mature sufficiently to maintain adequate security as Coalition forces draw down gradually and by area
11. Any U.S. force reductions beyond the planned withdrawal of the “surge” units will be deliberate and conditions-based, allowing Coalition force missions to shift gradually to overwatch
12. MNF-I will be able to maintain ten to fifteen U.S. BCTs in ITO at least until summer 2009
13. A long-term strategic partnership between the USG and GOI will involve the presence of at least five U.S. BCTs on Iraqi soil for a period of five to ten additional years
14. The U.S. Army will maintain three division headquarters in ITO through summer 2009
15. MARCENT will provide a MEF (Fwd) (including a two-star headquarters) in ITO through 2009
16. OCF-I operations will continue through 2009 against AQ/AQ
17. CJSOTF-AP will retain the equivalent of one Special Forces Group in ITO through 2009
Assumptions
(3 of 3)

18. The UK will maintain a brigade-sized force of approximately 2,500 or greater, with a two-star headquarters in southern Iraq at least through 2008.
19. Poland will maintain a force of approximately 900, with a two-star headquarters in Qadisiyah Province through Nov 08.
20. MND-NE headquarters will remain in ITO at least through 2008.
21. Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition through Jan 09.
22. USM-I will continue its efforts to fully man PRTs and embedded PRTs, reaching a level of thirteen and fifteen respectively by Jul 08 and sustaining those numbers through at least summer 2009.
23. Private security companies will retain the authorities to operate in Iraq, but there will be additional coordination mechanisms and oversight.
24. The Coalition will occupy existing bases in ITO and will not establish new ones.
Long-Term Conditions
Objectives Crosswalk
Long Term – Multiple Years (1 of 2)

Security throughout Iraq, sufficient to enable effective civil and civic life

- Iraq denied as a safe haven for terrorists
- AQI and other extremists isolated from external support and rejected by the Iraqi populace
- Eradicate insurgents reconciled with GOI or defeated
- Militias demobilized and integrating into formal GOI structures
  1.4b, 1.4d
- Violent crime reduced to levels manageable by the Iraqi police

Effective, fully developed security forces and supporting institutions in place

- ISF in sufficient numbers and with required capabilities to:
  - UA: Provide for the defense of Iraq against external threats; conduct CON, counter-terrorism operations, and border security operations in support of IP and DISE as required
  - IP: Maintain law and order; in the lead for local security
    - NP: Serve as a regionally based response force for CON and law enforcement operations that exceed IP capacity
    - DISE: Conduct POR and border security operations
  - ISF led by competent and professional leaders
  - ISF able to sustain and regenerate themselves
  - ISF supported by institutions with the capacity to manage the force, build the future force, and ensure compliance with the rule of law
  - ISF manned by personnel committed to the GOI, their organization, and their mission
  - Broad public confidence in the ISF established
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Long-Term Objectives</th>
<th>Supporting Conditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fully functioning participatory government and supporting structures in place</td>
<td>• Broad agreement among Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders reached on the balance of power as it pertains to national, regional, and local authorities</td>
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<td>• Iraqi provincial control established and sustained throughout Iraq</td>
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<td>• A representative, inclusive GOI viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi people</td>
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<td>• Broad public confidence in the GOI established</td>
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<td>• GOI provides consistent, adequate essential services to Iraq</td>
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<td>• Rule-of-law system established and functioning; provincial systems in place</td>
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<td>• for detention, trial, and incarceration operate IAW Iraq's constitution</td>
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<td>• GOI integrated into the regional and international communities</td>
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<td>• Iraq engaged in a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and</td>
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<td>• Coalition partners</td>
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<td>• Iraq an effective ally in the War on Terror</td>
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<td>Foundation for self-sustaining economic development in place</td>
<td>• Opportunities for legitimate, sustainable employment in Baghdad and the key cities compare favorably to those in urban areas of other regional cities</td>
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<td>• Refined hydrocarbon products supply Iraqs with adequate levels of fuel to meet</td>
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<td>• Basic needs and generate revenues on par with existing infrastructure potential</td>
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<td>• Existing power-generation infrastructure provides electricity to Baghdad and the key cities in amounts sufficient to meet basic needs and sustain small businesses and industry</td>
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<td>• GOI programs and revenues able to support long-term infrastructure development</td>
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<td>• Financial systems conducive to growth of a free market in place and supported by GOI policies</td>
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<td>• Select state-owned enterprises reinvigorated, private sector growth underway</td>
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<td>• Vocational training and higher education institutions providing labor to meet</td>
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<td>• Demands of a stable, developing economy</td>
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</table>
Phasing Construct
Clear, Control, Retain

(1 of 2)

**General Concept**
- Purpose is to establish security for the population in areas marked by high levels of violence and to improve local ISF capability and prepare them for independent operations.
- CF and ISF progress deliberately through clear, control, and retain sub-phases; priority is given to the retention and control of cleared areas.
- Iraqi-led operations increase in frequency, but CF presence among the population continues throughout.
- Offensive effort against AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists, coupled with implementation of population control measures and dynamic engagement with local leaders and potentially reconcilable groups.
- Synchronize improvements in local security with the initiation or expansion of economic development and efforts to enhance governmental capacity.
- Toward the end of the "retain" sub-phase, CF begin the shift to tactical overwatch—gradually and by area.

**Conditions for Transition**
- None – initial phase.
Clear, Control, Retain

Description
- Characterized by combined operations
  - Initially planned and led predominantly by CF
  - Progressing to operations planned and led by both CF and ISF, with ISF taking the lead increasingly over time
  - CF encourage "Iraqi lead" whenever conditions permit
  - CF conduct independent operations as necessary
- CF provide direct support to key Iraqi C2 nodes to coordinate operations between ISF elements
- CF maintain ground and air C2Rs
- CF maintain habitual relationships to develop ISF units, providing dedicated coverage in training and operations through partnership and transition teams
- CF provide ISF with combat and combat support enablers on a routine basis, to include:
  - Joint fires
  - ISR assets
  - Mobility support
  - Supplementary communications
  - Intelligence-sharing
- CF provide ISF with necessary sustainment support on a routine basis, including ground and air MEDEVAC
  - Route clearance provided predominantly by CF (but shift to ISF as assets become available)

Tasks Executed by CF
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection
Tactical Overwatch
(1 of 2)

General Concept
- Purpose is to sustain an improved level of security as local ISF increasingly conduct independent operations
- Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under Iraqi lead
- Economic development initiatives and projects to improve infrastructure and essential services increase in scale and scope, given improved security conditions and growing governmental capacity
- CF participation in local security missions is reduced as the ISF assume more responsibility
- As security and ISF capability improves, CF shift gradually and deliberately to operational overwatch

Conditions for Transition
From Clear, Control, Retain to Tactical Overwatch
- ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with Coalition enabler support
- ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population and critical infrastructure – relative to the threat and anticipated threat
- Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning
Tactical Overwatch

(2 of 2)

**Description**
- Characterized by largely independent Iraqi operations
- ISF operations enabled by CF support
- As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations
- CF provide assistance to key Iraqi \( C^2 \) nodes (assistance limited to planning and communications)
- CF maintain ground and air QRFs to prevent ISF failure at the tactical level
- CF maintain habitual relationships to develop ISF units, but they are more limited in some ways
  - Dedicated coverage in training and operations where necessary and as resources allow
  - Rotational coverage provided to ISF units where commanders can assume risk
  - Limited partnership
  - Transition teams; Enhanced TT (Heavy) or Enhanced (Light) model as a guideline
- CF provide ISF with combat and combat support enablers as required, to include:
  - Joint fires
  - ISR assets
  - Mobility support
  - Supplementary communications
  - Intelligence-sharing
- CF provide ISF with air MEDEVAC and level I/II medical support; all other sustainment support by exception
- CF provides route clearance support to ISF on MSRs and ASRs that Iraqi assets cannot cover

**Tasks Executed by CF**
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection
Operational Overwatch

General Concept
- Purpose of this phase is to sustain independent Iraqi operations while expanding ISF capacity to take full responsibility for local security
- Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue primarily under ISF control, with the IP assuming greater responsibility for maintaining domestic order in population centers
- Key to this phase is making progress toward the completion of a functioning ISF logistical support system
- Continuing transition of security responsibilities accompanies a further reduction in direct CF participation with local security missions and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs
- With more CF dispersed, commanders maintain the ability to provide adequate and responsive security to PRTs and advisory/assistance teams; over time though, even these teams are gradually withdrawn as CF in the ITO assume strategic overwatch and the limited mission set that posture entails

Conditions for Transition
From Tactical Overwatch to Operational Overwatch
- ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with specific, tailored Coalition enabler support only
- ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) – relative to the threat and anticipated threat
- Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability
- Capacity to provide essential services is sufficient to generate public confidence in local government
- Local economic development is ongoing
Operational Overwatch
(2 of 2)

Description
- Characterized by largely independent Iraqi operations
- ISF enabled by tailored CF support to critical, planned operations
- As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.
- ISF operations are coordinated through Iraqi CF nodes without CF assistance.
- CF maintain a response force that constitutes an operational reserve, capable of intervening to restore order in the event of a crisis.
- Longer response times; higher threshold of intervention
- Intervention first by air, then by ground as appropriate
- Habitual relationships involve less frequent interaction with ISF units
- Rotational coverage provided to ISF units; commanders retain flexibility to focus coverage where required
- Limited partnership; Advisory/Assistance BDE model as a guideline
- Transition teams; Enhanced (Light) model as a guideline
- CF provide ISF with key combat and combat support enablers during critical, planned operations only; key enablers include:
  - Joint fires
  - ISR assets
  - Intelligence-sharing
- CF provide ISF with air MEDEVAC; all other sustainment support by exception
- CF provides route clearance support to ISF on MSRs that Iraqi assets cannot cover

Tasks Executed by CF
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection
Strategic Overwatch

General Concept
- Purpose is to sustain independent Iraqi operations in a given area while the GOI takes steps to consolidate local and provincial progress on the way toward national reconciliation
- Iraqi civilian authorities have full responsibility for security in their areas and exercise control over local ISF that are able to protect the population and neutralize internal threats through independent operations
- Limited CF mission set
- CF maintain relationships with the ISF through periodic joint and combined exchange training and staff assistance visits to key command and control nodes

Conditions for Transition
From Operational Overwatch to Strategic Overwatch
- ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support (generally by exception only)
- ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable) – relative to the threat and anticipated threat
- Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability
- Capacity to provide essential services is sufficient to generate public confidence in local government
- Sustainable local economic development is ongoing
### Strategic Overwatch

#### Description
- Characterized by largely independent Iraqi operations
- ISF supported by limited CF enablers provided generally by exception
- In coordination with the GOI, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations
- ISF operations are coordinated through Iraqi C^3 nodes without CF assistance
- CF maintain a strategic reserve, capable of intervening in a timely manner in the event of a crisis
- Longer response times; higher threshold of intervention
- CF continue to develop ISF capability in more limited ways and – when most of Iraq reaches this phase – through a robust OMC-like organization
- Staff assistance visits to key Iraqi C^3 nodes, such as JHQ, IGFC, Operational Commands, and POEs
- Combined exercises and maneuvers that enhance collective training at battalion and brigade level
- CF share intelligence with ISF as required; all other combat and combat support enablers provided by exception
- CF provide ISF with sustainment support by exception
- CF provide route clearance support to ISF by exception

#### Tasks Executed by CF
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection
Sub-Tasks by Phase
# Population Security

## Sub-Tasks by Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
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<td>ambushes</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase

** Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
Infrastructure Security
Sub-Tasks by Phase

- Harden critical infrastructure
- Secure infrastructure repair teams
- Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of critical infrastructure
- Conduct show-of-force in the vicinity of critical infrastructure
- Disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity

Border Security
Sub-Tasks by Phase

- Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of likely infiltration routes
- Monitor POEs
- 14b, 14d
- Disrupt cross-border flow of foreign fighters (or foreign-trained fighters)

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase
** Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
Building Civil and Governmental Capacity

Sub-Tasks by Phase (1 of 2)

- Facilitate transition to legitimate local government
- Advise and assist with the development of political, judicial/legal, and economic institutions
- Recommend removal of officials who adhere to sectarian agendas
- Monitor implementation of key legislation
- Monitor governance capacity
- Enable regular meetings of neighborhood, district, and provincial councils
- Advise and assist with budget execution
- Advise and assist with the planning and conduct of elections
- Provide security for election sites
- Assist with the administration of Rule of Law safe zones
- Build Iraqi capacity to manage detainees populations IAW international standards
- Advise and assist with the provision and delivery of essential services
- Advise and assist with the restoration and development of infrastructure
- Monitor economic development
- Enable business development and economic growth
- Advise and assist with efforts related to job creation, industrial revitalization, and improvements in banking and agri-business

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase
** Sub-tasks provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
Building Civil and Governmental Capacity

Sub-Tasks by Phase (2 of 2)

- Secure, move, and distribute critical supplies to the population
- Provide limited medical, dental, and veterinary care to the population
- Provide emergency relief in the event of disasters or health crises

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase
* Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
### Engagement Sub-Tasks by Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct engagement with local leaders (religious, tribal, government)</td>
<td>Promote dialogue across ethno-sectarian lines at local and provincial level</td>
<td>Conduct engagement with potentially reconcilable enemy groups</td>
<td>Support negotiations leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate the implementation of local ceasefires or political agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct engagement to improve horizontal and vertical linkages in Iraqi political and security institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase

** Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
### ISF Development and Support

#### Sub-Tasks by Phase (1 of 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conduct combined operations</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Recommend for removal of ISF leaders who demonstrate sectarian behavior</td>
<td>[As required] Joint Fires IRS</td>
<td>[Tailored to planned, critical ops] Joint Fires IRS</td>
<td>[By exception]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provide combat and combat support enablers</td>
<td>[Ground &amp; air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Provide sustainment support</td>
<td>[Level IR Medical, as required; all others, by exception]</td>
<td>[By exception]</td>
<td>[By exception]</td>
<td>[By exception]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conduct route clearance in support of ISF</td>
<td>[MSEx &amp; AGFs]</td>
<td>[MSRs]</td>
<td>[MSRs]</td>
<td>[MSRs]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ConCell intelligence-sharing</td>
<td>[Ground &amp; air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
<td>[Air]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Provide response forces</td>
<td>[Ground &amp; air QRF]</td>
<td>[Operational]</td>
<td>[Operational]</td>
<td>[Operational]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Provide tactical and technical advice</td>
<td>[Dedicated] [Temporary Partnership] [Embassy Partnership]</td>
<td>[Operational] [Operational Partnership] [Operational Partnership]</td>
<td>[Operational] [Operational Partnership] [Operational Partnership]</td>
<td>[Operational] [Operational Partnership] [Operational Partnership]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Studied areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase.
* Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase.

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84
### ISF Development and Support

**Sub-Tasks by Phase (2 of 2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide security for ISF unit movement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide security for religious and other special events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentor ISF leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct leader training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct individual training</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct collective training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct training in special technical skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide training support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate the activities of Concerned Local Citizens</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor disarmament and integration of former militia members into the ISF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide liaison officers to key command and control nodes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct staff assistance visits</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct joint exercises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement security assistance program</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase
* Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase

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Approved for Release
### Strike Operations
#### Sub-Tasks by Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutralize groups that attack security forces or intimidate the population</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disrupt IJK networks</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutralize VBIED networks</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4b, 1.4d</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neutralize terrorist or extremist networks, such as AQAM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct intelligence-driven raids</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kill or capture HVIs</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct show-of-force</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase

**Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase**
### Information Operations and Public Affairs

#### Sub-Tasks by Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Clear, Control, Retain</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct PSYOP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct electronic warfare</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct computer network operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct military deception</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct OPSEC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct public affairs planning for Coalition forces</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate media operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain positive relations with local civilian communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct combat camera operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase

* Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
Force Protection
Sub-Tasks by Phase

- Neutralize IED, EFP, and IED networks
- Conduct route reconnaissance and route security (MSRs & ASPs)
- Conduct route clearance (MSRs & ASPs)
- Conduct bridge and route repair (MSRs & ASPs)
- Conduct Coalition base construction and force protection enhancement
- Provide security for Coalition convoys
- Provide security for Coalition bases
- Provide security for USAR personnel conducting engagement
- Secure transition teams and PRTs
- Provide security for UNAMI operations
- Provide CRF for Coalition elements operating in AO
- Conduct personnel recovery
- Provide MEDEVAC for Coalition elements
- Conduct counter-rocket and counter-mortar fire
- Provide joint fires in support of Coalition elements

* Shaded areas indicate that the sub-task is performed in that phase
** Sub-tasks are provided as examples to better describe what Coalition force actions occur for each major task by phase
PRT and ePRT Laydown
Tasks to Subordinate Units
**Tasks – MND-B**

- In partnership with ISF, secure the population of the Baghdad security districts
- Defeat AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists in Baghdad and support zones
- Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors
- Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors
- Partner with subordinate area commands of the Baghdad Operational Command
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Baghdad to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
- Secure Victory Base Complex
Tasks – MNF-W

- Defeat AQI and Sunni extremists in Anbar
- Conduct tribal engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and further isolate AQI operating in Anbar
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Partner with the Anbar Operational Command; support its establishment and development
- Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry and border security operations

1.4b, 1.4d

- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Anbar to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
Tasks – MND-N

- Defeat AQI and Sunni and Shia extremists, with priority to Diyala and Salah ad Din (south of Samarra)
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Conduct engagement to reduce Arab-Kurd tensions, with priority to Kirkuk and Ninewa Provinces, in order to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI
- Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors
- Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors
- Conduct lethal and nonlethal operations to disrupt black market and oil smuggling activities that fund AQI, extremists, and insurgent groups, with priority to the Bayji area
- Take the lead in establishing the Ninewa Operational Command (NOC) and enable its transition to full operational capability; partner with the NOC after it achieves FOC
- Partner with the Diyala Operational Command
- Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry and border security operations
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
Tasks – MND-C

- Defeat AQI and Sunni extremists in the Southern Baghdad Belt
- Defeat Shia extremists, with priority to the Southern Baghdad Belt
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors
- Conduct engagement with key Sunni leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject AQI and Sunni extremists and malign foreign actors
- Partner with the Karbala Operational Command
- Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry border security operations, 1.4b, 1.4d
- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Babil and Wasit to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance
Tasks – MND-SE

- In support of ISF and with a focus on Basra, defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert provincial Iraqi control
- Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors
- In conjunction with the Basra Operational Command, maintain situational awareness of the operational environment in the province and provide Coalition force assistance if required
- Support DBE and MOI efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry and border security operations,

| 1.4b | 1.4d |

- Maintain CF freedom of movement along MSR TAMPA and primary ASRs in AO
- Assist the ISF with the protection of critical infrastructure where necessary
- BPT provide a company-sized QRF in support of Camp Bucca should the security situation at the camp deteriorate
In conjunction with ISF and with a focus on Diwaniyah, support efforts to defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation.

- Conduct engagement with key Shia leaders and communicators to persuade them to reject Shia extremists and malign foreign actors.

- Provide support, as required and within the division's capabilities, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.

- Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Qadisiyah to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.
Tasks – MND-NE

- Sustain non-kinetic operations to maintain current levels of stability

Tasks – CJSOTF-AP

- Disrupt terrorist, extremist, and insurgent networks
- Develop ISOF, National ERU, and Provincial Iraqi SWAT into non-sectarian precision strike forces capable of conducting unilateral operations
- Advise and provide specialized or advanced training to selected local ISF units to develop their capability for independent COIN operations
- Conduct engagement with local Iraqi leaders to deny sanctuary to terrorist and extremist networks; coordinate engagement activities with appropriate “ground-owning” MND/Fs to ensure unity of effort
- BPT neutralize extremist and insurgent financing derived from the Bayji Oil Refinery
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs

1. Provide monthly assessments of the operational environment to CG, MNC-I to enhance situational understanding across the corps.
2. Conduct engagement to facilitate cessation of hostilities and accommodation among groups and key leaders willing to renounce violence and enter into dialogue with Coalition forces, ISF, and/or GOI; BPT complement engagement with the threat of force, should it be required to dissuade groups from resorting to violence to achieve their goals.

In conjunction with ISF, control and monitor the activities of CLCs.

Facilitate GOI efforts to transfer CLCs from short-term, CERP-funded contracts to more sustainable GOI or civilian employment as security conditions allow.

Support continued development of ISF by mentoring their leadership and assisting in training their personnel in order to improve unit effectiveness and reliability.

As conditions allow and on a deliberate basis, transfer security responsibilities to local ISF and assume appropriate overwatch posture – company by company if necessary.

Support planned ISF operations to return displaced or internally displaced persons in order to help the GOI advance the reconciliation process; avoid direct involvement in the return of DPs and IDPs to specific residences.
Tasks – Common to All MND/Fs
(2 of 2)

- In coordination with PRTs, facilitate regular meetings among provincial, district, and neighborhood councils to promote dialogue across sectarian lines and help obtain funding for local development priorities.
- In coordination with PRTs, work with local authorities to develop reconstruction and economic development plans that will help channel resources to specific, appropriate needs.
- In coordination with PRTs, implement economic, governance, rule-of-law, and capacity-building programs designed to produce near-term results at the local and provincial level; facilitate GOI efforts to develop sustainable, longer-term programs along these lines.
- In coordination with PRTs, work with local authorities to identify commercial opportunities and channel financial assistance to them for business development.
- In coordination with PRTs, support Iraqi officials or offices that have effectively provided services on a non-sectarian basis.
- Facilitate GOI efforts to provide security for critical infrastructure.
- Continue providing QRF, MEDEVAC, route clearance, convoy net, and sheriff’s net coverage along MNC-I sustainment routes, including areas that have been transitioned to the ISF or have transitioned to PIC.
- BPT support ISF in the distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions.
- BPT provide security to USM-I personnel to facilitate their ability to conduct engagement in a timely and flexible manner.
Tasks – 316 ESC

- Provide EAB sustainment support to forces within ITO IAW Title X responsibilities and IAW agreements with other services, Coalition partners, other U.S. agencies, or UNAMI
- Maintain 7 x FOB-In-A-Box sets and 6 x Corps Contingency Outpost Packages for expeditionary life support capability, pending appropriate funding and spending authorization
- Manage Empty Container Collection Points and Central Receiving Shipment Points for MNC-I
- Provide Contracting Officer Technical Representatives for the Individual Protective Equipment Warehouse at Taji
- O/O support Coalition forces as they adjust their overwatch posture and basing arrangements
- BPT provide movement support to the MNC-I operational reserve if it is committed to another AO
- BPT support CF operations with emergency common-item sustainment (Class I, III, V, water) through aerial resupply; BPT palletize and prepare cargo for rapid movement and delivery through the following means: fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or air drop
- BPT provide emergency support to ISF until their logistical capability is self-sustaining
- BPT provide humanitarian assistance (such as Halal/QTER meals, bottled water, and blankets) to local nationals in the event of a crisis