Operation AL AMAN AL AN
"Security Now"

2 Jan 07

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad (reduce the level of sectarian violence) while helping the GOI gain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?

Overall Classification for this Brief is SECRET-REL-USA-MOMWR.
This is the agenda we'll be following during this orders brief.

First up we have a threat update by the C2 planner.
This slide lays out the potential introduction of additional forces that would support this operation over time.

Coalition forces at the top and Iraqi Army units moving to Baghdad at the bottom. I will discuss force flow during the concept of the operation by phase, but for now, it's helpful to go over this snapshot. The operation calls for a gradual introduction of additional forces over a number of months, as you see arrayed on this slide.

The plan calls for an IBCT—which has been identified as the DRB—to arrive in mid-January.

One HBCT arrives in Kuwait and is ready to deploy into Iraq, NLT 15 February.

Three follow-on BCTs are anticipated—each to be committed at one-month intervals, unless it is decided that those additional forces are no longer required for the success of the operation. We expect that those decisions, indicated by the yellow stars, must be made about 60 days prior to their commitment.

We expect a 43-day extension of the 15th MEU. The extension will slide the MEU's departure from Anbar to about 20 Feb, allowing it to meet an outchotch date of 15 March. If the request for extension is not approved, the MEU will have to begin retrograde operations around 7 January, as indicated by the blue dot to the right of the unit icon.

We expect that two Marine rifle battalions will be extended for 90 days beyond their TOA dates, resulting in additional combat power for MNF-W once the units that had been scheduled to backfill them deploy to Iraq.

At the bottom of the chart, we depict the 3 Iraqi Army brigades identified for the move to Baghdad. The unit icons indicate where the units are expected to begin movement. It is expected that all 3 brigades will be FOC in Baghdad NLT 20 February.

4/1 IA begins deployment 4 Jan 07
3/4 IA begins deployment on 10 Jan 07
1/2 IA begins deployment O/O with 96 hours notification NET 1 Feb 07
This is a snapshot of Iraqi Army and National Police units in and around Baghdad, laid over a map of the 9 administrative districts.

It’s important to note that this is preliminary in terms of denoting unit location.

Some bottom-line assumptions we’re making regarding ISF employment:

10 brigades inside Baghdad, 4 outside

Manning of the Iraqi Army is at 60%, and the National Police is at 50%.

4/6 IA is south of Baghdad at Mahmudiyah, while 2/9 IA is at Taji.

One NP Brigade in Balad and one in Samarra.

1/1 NP are due to rotate to Numaniyah for retraining starting 2 Jan 06 along with 3/8/2 NP Battalion.

Strike Force HQ will be 1st NP Bde HQ, 2/9 IA partnered with the Stryker Brigade.

Assume the OPRES will remain above ground.
Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with the ISF to secure Baghdad and its population in order to reduce sectarian violence and facilitate the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan and the continued transition to Iraqi security self-reliance.

MNC-I mission statement

Read once

(Pause)
Commander’s Intent

1st of 3 slides outlining the MNC-I commander’s intent

(Pause)

Key to the purpose is the reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and placing the Iraqis in the lead as we transition. This is a combined operation, with the Iraqi lead increasing over time. The operation has multiple components – it is not simply a military operation but one that is complemented by economic and political dimensions.

(Pause)

Near-term economic opportunities: use of CERP funds, USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP), high employment projects / low tech

Building toward long-term: micro-finance, VOTECH education, state-owned enterprise improvement
Commander’s Intent
(2 of 3)

- Key Tasks
  - In conjunction with the ISF, secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad; as a minimum:
    - Maintain consistent forward presence – 24/7 CF coverage in clear, control, and retain areas until CF shift to the periphery
    - Be deliberate – resist the urge to surge; as the operation progresses, give priority to the retention and control of cleared areas; ensure the right amount of security forces are controlling the districts
    - Achievable – demonstrate real and perceived success, early-on and throughout the operation
    - Sustainable – as ISF and CF control expands, avoid overstretch and prevent re-infiltration; carefully consider the risks of committing to new clearing operations
  - Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
  - Neutralize VBIED networks
  - Neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJPs, IEDs and IDF attacks – balanced operations targeting groups on both sides of the sectarian divide
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
  - Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
  - Support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic development initiatives

The commander’s key tasks

(pause)

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Economic development initiatives: engagement with select state-owned enterprises (SOEs), vocational education improvements, and better access to credit for small businesses
Commander’s Intent
(3 of 3)

- **Endstate**
  - Baghdad secure and considered so by Sunni and Shia alike; violence in Baghdad reduced to a manageable level
  - ISF viewed by Iraqis as the dominant security force in Baghdad
  - Iraqi-led C2 structure for Baghdad in place and functioning
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance initiated IAW the Bridging Strategy and making steady progress throughout Iraq
  - Enhanced capacity of GOI to provide essential services and infrastructure maintenance
  - Foundation laid for self-sustaining economic growth
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place

The endstate envisioned by the commander, addressing the state of security in Baghdad, how the GOI and ISF are perceived by Iraqis, transition (with respect to capability and C2 arrangements in Baghdad), and Coalition Force posture.

(Pause)

- Economic growth to occur in state-owned enterprises and private sector
This is the overall phasing construct of the operation. It consists of four phases with significant overlap.

Key tasks in each phase are listed.

There is a general progress through the phases toward operational overwatch, as well as an acknowledgement that MNDs differ in how far they’ve progressed along that path. Nevertheless, all support the main effort – including those MNDs that are more advanced in the task of transitioning the ISF in their AOs to security self-reliance.

In Phase 2, there are three sub-phases that frame MND-B’s effort to secure Baghdad. We will go into more detail regarding those sub-phases later in the brief.

FRAGO 179 and this orders brief covers only Phase 1 and 2 with more specific guidance on the later phases to be published.
Critical Conditions

Beginning the Operation

- Concurrency from GOI on the concept of operations and the endstate
  - Start, stay, and finish together
  - GOI must publicly announce and display their support until endstate achieved
- GOI must give the proper support and authority to its security forces without undue interference and influence
- GOI must support a “balanced” targeting approach, allowing operations throughout the city – to include Shia areas
- GOI extension of existing state of emergency, with measures including at a minimum:
  - Banishing vehicles from selected locations
  - Controlling access into, and internal to, the city as required
  - Random searches of vehicles, people, businesses, and homes
  - Full enforcement of the weapons ban
- GOI must seriously consider declaring a cease fire, institute a mid-term amnesty program, and – with reconciliation in mind – determine a policy defining the endstate for all militias
- GOI must release all DFII funds to Anbar, Tal Afar, and Samarra to cultivate Sunni trust and confidence
- In coordination with the GOI, the Coalition must have a coordinated and synchronized reconstruction and beautification plan as it clears, controls, and retains districts in Baghdad
- GOI must pass legislation and announce a timeline for local and provincial elections as soon as possible
- GOI must develop, announce, and implement a reasonable de-Baathification program
- USG must engage GOI and encourage GOI to endorse and fund state-owned enterprise reinvigoration initiatives proposed by the Brinkley Group

These are conditions critical to beginning this operation. Most are related to GOI actions and require coordination through the embassy and MNF-I. The key takeaway is that we are nesting this operation with a larger initiative on the part of the GOI to enhance its legitimacy through expanded control and political reconciliation.

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Impose curfew during evening and early morning hours in threat areas
Suspend all weapons permits indefinitely; only CF, ISF, and security contractors would be permitted to carry weapons in public places
Authorize military and security forces under Baghdad Commander to employ the following measures:
- Question, detain, search, and/or arrest persons suspected of violating Iraqi law;
- Conduct searches of public and private property;
- Seize contraband;
- Control movement (i.e., establish and enforce check points);
- Clear routes;
- Freeze assets of those accused of committing grand crimes;
- Apply preventive measures to all packages, mail, and to all wire and wireless communications;
- Impose restrictions on public places, places of business, clubs, etc., as necessary for the safety and good order of the population; and
- Conduct counter-terrorism operations against members of illegal armed groups.
Concept of the Operations
Phase I: Setting the Conditions

Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks; T2: Clear limited areas

Supporting Efforts:
- MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to Iraq security self-reliance
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MND-S: – T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MND-C – T1: Transition to ISSR
- MND-NE – T1: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSCOTF – T1: Strike ops
- Op Res. 1: Stryker Bn (MND-B); PIP: Secure CF LOCs
- IO – Reinforce GOI in the lead
- Governance/Economics – Pursue and track achievement of political conditions; Identify reconstruction requirements

Clear, control, retain – proof of principle
- Develop partnerships at multiple levels
- 9 admin districts
- JSDs in selected areas
Concept of the Operations
Phase II-A: Clear, Control, Retain

- POE Closure
  Main Effort
  - MND/B - T1: Clear, control, retain; T2: Partner with Iraqi Commander of Baghdad Security Command
  Support Efforts
  - MND-N - T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
  - MNF-W - T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR; T3: Exploit gains in GRV
  - MND-SE - T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISSR
  - MNH-CS - T1: Transition to ISSR
  - N MND-NE - T: Non-kinetic ops
  - CJOTF - T: Strike ops
  - Op Res. 1: Strykerpn (MND-B), PIP, Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia extremist LOCs, Reinscribe CF ops in Baghdad
  - O - Explain operations, justify capture of RVs
  - Governance/Economics - HA, Consequence management

- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Eliminate AIF support zones
- Combined ops
Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Clear, control, retain; T2: Partner with Iraqi Commander of Baghdad Security Command
- MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISR
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISR; T3: Exploit gains in ERV
- MND-SC – T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISR
- MND-CS – T1: Transition to ISR
- MND-NE – T1: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSCOTF – T1: Strike ops
- Op Res: 1 Stryker Bn (MND-B); PIP: Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia external LOCs; Reinforce CF ops in Baghdad
- IO – Stress ISF in the lead for security
- Governance/Economics – Assist GOI in preparing essential services projects; Assessment of economic conditions

Supporting Efforts:
- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Control
- Combined ops with increasing ISF-lead
- Establish new JSSs
- 24/7 CF coverage continues

Partnership
IAINP Bde, Div, & BSC
Concept of the Operations
Phase II-C: Clear, Control, Retain

Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Clear, control, retain; T2: Partner with Iraqi Commander of Baghdad Security Command

Supporting Efforts
- MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR, T3: Exploit gains in ERV
- MND-S – T1: Secure basars; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MND-CS – T1: Transition to ISSR
- MND-NE – T1: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSCDF – T1: Strike ops
- OP Res 1: Stryker BN (MND-B); PIP: Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia extremis LOCs; Reinforce CF ops in Baghdad
- IO – Highlight infrastructure repairs
- Governance/Economics – Assist local gov't with infrastructure improvements, State-owned enterprise improvement, access to credit for small businesses

- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Retain
- Isolate Sadr City
- IP conduct normal policing
- 24/7 CF coverage, reduced force levels
- Escalation of IA/NP or CF involvement if security conditions deteriorate
The purpose of this slide is to illustrate how the commander envisions the concept of clear, control, retain operations in Baghdad.

Disruption – in the form of strike ops against VBIED and EFP networks – occurs throughout all districts of Baghdad.

The progression of clear, control, retain operations will be deliberate, with clearing operations focused in only 2-3 districts at a time.

It is expected that districts will be in different sub-phases and that sub-phases will vary in length in different districts. It is conceivable that Phase II in Baghdad will last several months, well into the summer.
This is another conceptual slide depicting the requirement for additional forces over time.

It is expected that the requirement for additional forces will increase with the requirement to clear more areas while controlling and retaining ones previously cleared.

At certain decision points, MNC-I should have the flexibility to commit additional BCTs to meet this requirement.

At a certain point, the requirement may decrease as clearing operations subside.

Just how many BCTs will be required is difficult to predict, especially when the conditions in each district vary.

Enhanced ISF capability and the positive impact of economic improvements may offset the demand for additional U.S. forces.
Tasks

MND-B:
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Secure administrative districts in Baghdad
- Oversee ISF security of the Baghdad barrier and Army Canal
- Disrupt AQI/Sunni Extremist activity in the Baghdad Belts/Support Zones
- Isolate Sadr City
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize militias that conduct EJKs
- Disrupt EFP networks
- Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF in Baghdad
- Partner with the Iraqi commander of Baghdad as the Iraqis establish the Baghdad Security Command headquarters
- Establish Joint Security Stations in all nine administrative districts
- Maintain 24/7 coverage and a forward presence in clear, control, and retain areas throughout Phase II
- Designate Brigade Commanders to advise each of the two IA divisions in Baghdad as they prepare to assume the lead; continue in this advisory, coordination, and liaison role throughout Phase III
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives
- Coordinate and synchronize project support in Baghdad through the JROC in support of the GOI
- Provide guidance and technical support to the GOI on IDP and HA activities
- Provide one Stryker Battalion to serve as MNC-I operational reserve; this force will be committed to MND-B with the potential to be employed elsewhere; BPT to release one company plus BN TAC within 48 hours with the balance of the battalion released within 72 hours

The next several slides outline the tasks assigned to subordinate maneuver units.
Tasks

MND-N:
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize militias that conduct EJiks
- Deny extremist group sanctuaries
- Disrupt AQI/Sunni Extremist activity in the Zab Triangle
- Neutralize AQI/Sunni extremist activity in Northern TRV
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
- Interdict AQI financing/financiers
- Support IA efforts to secure the northern Iraqi national oil infrastructure
- Support GOI efforts to disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity that funds AIF
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
- Assist with the movement of IA BDEs to MND-B as required
### Tasks

**MNF-W:**
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Continue to exploit the gains made in Falluja, Ramadi, and Central Western ERV
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize AQI/Sunni extremists activity along the Central Western ERV
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
- Interdict AQI financiers
  - 1.4b, 1.4d
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives
- BPT release one M240A1 platoon from C/2-4 FA ITO provide GMLRS fires ISO the MNC-I main effort
- BPT extend two rifle battalions to generate additional combat power in MNF-W
- Assist with the movement of IA BDEs to MND-B as required

**MND-SE:**
- Sustain civil primacy in PIC provinces
- Secure Basra
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Secure CF LOCs in the MND-SE AO
- Continue to support PRTs in the implementation of economic initiatives

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**SECRET/REL TO USA and MOD/NRR**
### Tasks

**MND-CS:**
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
  - 1.4b, 1.4d

**MND-NE**
- Sustain non-kinetic operations that have contributed to current level of stability
- Support RRT in the implementation of economic initiatives

**CJSOTF-AP**
- Conduct combined operations with ISOF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Disrupt militias that conduct EJIKs
- Disrupt EFP networks
- Disrupt extremist group sanctuaries

**Operational Reserve: (Priorities for planning)**
- Secure southern CF LOCs
- ICW 8 IA Div interdict Shia extremist LOCs into Diyala
- Reinforce CF operations in the Baghdad Belts/Support Zones
- Reinforce Iraq’s border with 1.4b
Sir,

This chart illustrates the effects to Endstate Crosswalk.

The left column lays out the elements of your endstate.

Across the top are effects that support the achievement of the endstate.

The X’s are critical to achieving that specific element of the endstate and the back slash represents a supporting effect.

Achieving and exploiting CF and GOI successes is critical, the continuous assessment of these effects enables the Corps to identify areas to exploit and identify areas of no progress or negative trends requiring a a change.

These effects run through each LOO and are supported by IO/PAO/and engagements.
These areas will layout their concept of support and how they sync with the overall concept of operations in follow on slides.
Pages 27 through 28 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4c, 1.4g
**IO Support**

### Setting the Conditions (Disrupt)
- Cycle of Violence: Anti-Militia, AQI, CIED
- Reinforce GOI & ISF in the lead
- Gain & maintain unity of support from GOI & key leaders
- Monitor propaganda; counter as necessary

### Clear
- Continue “Disrupt” themes
- Explain Operation
- Justify capture of high profile individual (HPI)
- Influence AIF leaders to end violence

### Control
- Continue “Clear” themes
- Exploit success into uncleared areas
- Stress ISF in the lead for security
- Future of Iraq – Econ, Security, Gov

### Retain
- Continue “Control” themes
- Highlight infrastructure repairs
- Iraqi C2 lead in Baghdad

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**ITO Tasks (outside Baghdad):**
- Disrupt accelerants to sectarian violence
- Disrupt VBIED / EFP networks
- Support CII and POE security
- Exploit success in Baghdad

**Issues / Constraints:**
- 1.4a, 1.4c, 1.4g

**Purpose:** Shape the Information Environment to support the Main Effort
Sir, I’m [(b)(3), (b)(6)] and I will be briefing the PAO’s concept of support. Through all phases of the operation, the coalition’s commitment to the transitioning security responsibility to the ISF is the central theme that must resonate throughout all the media even as reporters attempt to elicit coalition responses to that support their own diagnosis. Promoting this central theme can be accomplished through marketing a synchronized communication plan and nested messages that support the core message that we are setting the conditions for transition and that we will transition security to the Iraqis. Marketing this theme will be done through the use of embedded media, combined press conferences, timely release of information and a command information campaign. Pending your questions I will be followed by...
Sir,

This slide shows the continuum of Civil Affairs support to operations across all phases.

On the right are specified tasks to CA elements and MND-B. These tasks are above and beyond the regular tactical Civil Affairs activities and support.

On the left are those tasks nested within the proposed conditions based phases.

Flexibility is built into the plan allowing for CMO efforts to be focused on an Administrative District as soon as the security situation allows.

All CA efforts throughout the operation will be focused on reaching Transition and the end state of operational over watch for Coalition Forces.
Reconstruction Support

Ph I-SET CONDITIONS
- JROC works with FRCC, PRT, and Baghdad GOVT to develop PPL for restoration and improvement of essential services infrastructure (SWET) in Baghdad
- JROC identifies contractors and establishes contracts for execution of Ph II projects, to include both long-haul projects (experience and established AEC firms) and quick fix initiatives (smaller construction companies)

Ph II A- CLEAR
- Execute US Battle Damage repair projects and consequence management measures
- Begin identification of high-labor quick-fix projects with a short duration (approx 2-weeks)
- Begin engineering studies of large scale infrastructure improvements

Ph II B- CONTROL
- Continue executing Ph II A agenda
- Assist GOI in preparing essential services project identification for Phase III
- Begin engineering designs of large scale infrastructure improvements

Ph II C- RETAIN
- JROC continues to assist the local GOVT to refine and develop their PPL for SWET-centric infrastructure capital improvements

Ph III- RETAIN AND RENEW
- CF assumes a reach back supporting role
- Begin transition of responsibility for capital improvement project execution to the Iraqi Government
- Local GOVT takes lead on maintenance of pre-existing and Ph II projects

ISSUES AND CONCERNS
- Immediate effects from critical infrastructure projects (SWET) cannot be expected due to long “Flash to Bang” time for design and construction
- Immediate deliverables to Iraqi people limited to quick-fix projects
- Focus must be on the Capacity Development of the GOI to develop & execute projects not necessarily the actual completion of all the SWET projects
- All SWET projects must be developed and executed (contracted) by the local government with the assistance of the PRT and JROC

The immediate effects from SWET reconstruction projects can not be expected during the period of the operation. The long Flash to Bang time for projects to be planned scoped, contracted and then completed makes the eventual effect from the project long in the future. The average time taken to complete a SWET project from start to finish, not including the planning, design and contracting of the project, has been approx 3 months. After removing the small point break projects the avg time climbs to over 6 months and the larger one well over a year.

The only projects that may have any immediate effect for the residents are those that repair “point” breaks and leaks. Without an assessment of the current condition of the SWET infrastructure it is impossible to know which repairs will have any effect on the overall availability of SWET services to the people.

The focus for SWET projects must be on developing the capacity of the local government to plan, develop and execute projects that repair and maintain the infrastructure of their city. The CF can repair the infrastructure or develop the government, but can not do both at the same time effectively. It must be noted that capacity development is not a fast process but that to achieve a lasting effect it must be done. During OTF II, MND-B focused mainly on the repair of
the infrastructure with no real coordinated effort with the GOI and no assessment of the systems and achieved very marginal, at best, effects.

During **Phase I, Setting the Conditions**, MND-B along with the JROC should be working with the PRT and local government officials to develop a prioritized project list of critical system nodes that need to be repaired or replaced. Prior to the initiation of a rebuilding effort, a coordinated plan must be completed for the repair of the infrastructure from a “systems” approach and not just “spot” repairs as was done during OTF II.

During **Phase II A, Clear**, MND-B executes contracts for the repair of battle damage caused during the clearing operations and begins to identify any immediately executable “point” projects that might have a positive effect in the area. Where possible an assessment of the condition of the infrastructure needs to be conducted in order to facilitate the effectiveness of the longer term SWET projects and help to tie the system together.

During **Phase II B, Control**, MND-B continues the execution of PH II-A projects and the JROC/MND-B coordinates with the GOI in the execution of longer term SWET projects.

During **Phase II C, Retain**, JROC/MND-B continues the assist the GOI in the refinement and development of their PPL and begins to take a much more “overwatch” position in terms of projects.

During **Phase III, Retain and Renew**, Coalition Forces assume a reach back role.
### Orders Brief – Logistics Concept of Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Concept of Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arm</strong></td>
<td>• Units draw ABL from Kuwait, ARCENT will transport ABL north to FOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing stockage objectives by 25% for some types of ammo</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Upgrading Liberty ATHP to meet Class V increased consumption</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Identifying Ammo requirements and ordering now for shipment in April</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Possible CSRs (with 4 additional BCTs):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 120mm mortars</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 30mm HE and illumination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- HELLFIRE rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fuel</strong></td>
<td>• Incrementally increase from 5 to 6 DOS (add fuel bags)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase JP8 stockage objective from 5 to 8 DOS (494,800 gal / day)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase JP8 storage capacity to 4,145M gal (Taji &amp; VBC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increase DF2 storage capacity for 8 DOS: 791.5 K gal (Taji &amp; VBC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Modifying KBR Statement Of Work at Speicher, Taji, VBC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate fuel delivery from Turkey to Speicher (as opposed to Q West)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Relocate existing military/KBR assets to VBC and Taji</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• BPT supply IA with 10K gal of JP8, 30K gal DF2, and 5K gal MCGAS</td>
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## Orders Brief – Logistics Concept of Support 2 of 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Concept of Support</th>
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</table>
| **Fix**  | - Units drew ASL from APS 6 in Kuwait  
  - Units should deploy all STAMIS at TAT (STAMIS gurevry at Buehring)  
  - B3s co-locate with Sustenance Brigade's SSGs  
  - B3s get support from existing SSGs  
    - Prepare to move and set up their own SSGs (APS 5 ASL)  
  - KBR CLSS Maintenance:  
    - Taj: Organizational maintenance only  
    - BIAP Org / DS MST / Track MST  
    - Recovery at BIAP  
  - Relocate KBR and military maintenance as required |
| **Move** | - Theater will move APS, UAHs and unit equipment from Kuwait to FOB  
  - Increase 1 Sustenance Convoy per day (with 2(2) x BCTs)  
  - Mitigation strategies:  
    - Relocate 24 HETs with crews from 45th SB to 15th SB  
    - BPT consolidate HETs for intra-theater moves  
    - Remission POL, Truck Platoon  
    - Relocate 1 x CSS to 1/04  
    - Add MCT or augment MCTs at VBC and Taj |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Concept of Support</th>
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| Sustain  | • Increasing MRE C/B stockage (20K cases) now at LBAA  
    • Programming additional headcount for DIFACx (VSC, Taj)  
    • Increasing Halal & humanitarian meals stockage  
    • Increasing bottled water production and stockage objectives  
    • KBR / LOGCAP evaluating additional base life support at various bases  
    • Increasing KBR Statement of Work (DFAC, bulk water, base life support)  
    • Mitigation strategies:  
      – Increase military ROWPU capacity in MND-B  
      – Anticipate bulk water conservation measures being required  
        • Military planning factor: 20 gpd  
        • KBR planning factor: 40 gpd  
        • Currently using: – 90 gpd (Taj, VBC) |
The FRAGO orders no change to the current task organization. This slide and the next lay out the C2 arrangements as they pertain to the establishment of the Baghdad Security Command. The first depicts the BSC at IOC, the second at FOC.

The arrangement displayed here is what we would expect to see in Phase I and through the beginning of Phase II. It reflects the partnerships and coordination lines in place now, such as the relationship between MNC-I and IGFC.

We see the formation of two subordinate commands in Baghdad, a combination of IA and NP brigades with balance between MOD and MoI reflected in who commands the subordinate commands and their deputies.

Initially, we expect MND-B to have OPCON over subordinate brigades in Baghdad until subordinate commands and the Baghdad Security Command develop the capability to exercise C2 over them.

Partnerships in place: MND-B with the Baghdad Security Command; two BCT commanders to the two subordinate commands; CF battalions to each NP and IA brigade; the Stryker BCT will partner with the GOI Operational Reserve (or Strike Force).
Sometime in Phase II, we expect that the Baghdad Security Command will attain the capability to exercise C2 over its subordinate units. This chart reflects that change with the disappearance of the OPCON line that ran from MND-B to the IA and NP brigades in the previous slide. Partnerships remain in place.
Guidance
MNC-I Commander
Back Up
**Economic Line of Operation**

- **Priorities**
  - Economic Opportunities
  - SWET-F / Reconstruction

- **Focus of Effort**
  1. Baghdad
  2. Ramadi
  3. Fallujah
  4. Baqubah
  5. Kirkuk
  6. Mosul
Phase I (Setting Conditions)

- **Tasks**
  - Provide Specialized C4IED Forces (EOD, WIT, CEXG, EWO) weighted to main effort, MND-B
  - Provide RSOI training (CREW, IED recognition and reaction, search procedures, and cache handling)
  - Provide / install CREW systems

- **Risk**
  - Reduced support to low activity areas (North MND-N, South MND-B)
  - Reduced support to Route Clearance Teams

- **Issues**
  - Facilitate IA Bomb Disposal units operational capability (equipment / unit training)
  - Identification of SSE / cache teams and training requirements prior to RSOL

- **Force Reallocation / Additional Capabilities Required**
  - BOG Extensions may be required of up to 7 EOD COs or Joint Service Eq (14a). Next unit scheduled departure date is 20 Jan.
  - BOG Extension may be required of up to 5 WIT (Teams)
Phase II (Clear, Retain, and Hold)

- Task (No Change) Minus increased RSOI training
- Risk
  - Increased IED Activity; Restricted Mobility
  - Insufficient EOD/WIT Teams to support increased IED activities
- Force Reallocation / Additional Capabilities Required
  - OPTEMPO may require shifts from MND-N to MND-B
- Issues
  - Cache storage and disposal (risk of transport vs. damage to infrastructure)

Phase III (Transition)

- Task
  - Transition to IA Bomb Disposal units
- Risk
  - Baiting and channeling of QRF and other response forces
- Force Reallocation/ Additional Capabilities Required
  - Support "Super MITTs"
- Issues/concerns
  - IA Bomb Techs not able to deal with IED issues
  - Loss of situational awareness and tech/intel of devices
SJA – Recommended Emergency Measures

- Impose curfew during evening and early morning hours in threat areas
- Suspend all weapons permits indefinitely; only CF, ISF, and security contractors would be permitted to carry weapons in public places
- Authorize military and security forces under Baghdad Commander to employ the following measures:
  - Question, detain, search, and/or arrest persons suspected of violating Iraqi law;
  - Conduct searches of public and private property;
  - Seize contraband;
  - Control movement (i.e., establish and enforce check points);
  - Clear routes;
  - Freeze assets of those accused of committing grand crimes;
  - Apply preventive measures to all packages, mail, and to all wired and wireless communications;
  - Impose restrictions on public places, places of business, clubs, etc., as necessary for the safety and good order of the population; and
  - Conduct counter-terrorism operations against members of illegal armed groups
Concept of Support:
MLRS provides general support with GMLRS & ATACMS munitions to support MNC-I ME effort in Baghdad. Focus is the interdiction of accelerants of sectarian violence in Baghdad Belts and threat areas outside Baghdad (including Lake Thar Thar & Wasit areas)

Method:

- Provide MLRS fires:
  - to neutralize VBIED / EFP Networks
  - to neutralize extremist activities
  - to support CF ops & TIC

- Provide radar coverage & counter fire to CF FOEs IOT assist locating, disrupting, & neutralizing AlP IDP cells

- BPT conduct split attrition ops IOT threat support areas outside current position range

Issues:
1.4a, 1.4g
CFACC / ALO Concept of Support

- Phase 1
  - As currently provided
  - ISR/CAS/EW/G3/Airlift ISO MNF-I, OCF-I, CJSOTF and MNC-I
- Phase 2
  - Volume increases as Baghdad ops ramp up
  - Focused Airpower ops ISO MND-B, -N and -W for planned ops
    - Plus against accelerants, squirters and pop-ups
- Iraq-based forces TACON to CFACC; DS to OIF
  1.4a
  Other CFACC Forces supporting OIF
  1.4a
- Iraq-based MEF Forces
  1.4a
- Carrier Strike Group – As available
- Additional support requests
  - 1.4a, 1.4g
Religious Considerations

- Hajj ends 31 December
- Hajj travel begins 1-9 January, but remain open till the 13th of January
- Ashura begins on the 18th January and continues to the 31st
- Arba’een 5-13 March; attendance last year 2 million Shia

Any POE closures are recommended between the return of the pilgrims from Hajj (13 Jan 07) and the beginning of Ashura (18 Jan 07)
Current basing set for MNC-I. This is our best shot at this time.

Review for accuracy. If you have a base that is not listed, tell me.

Active 57 Bases…transferred 56.
Sufficient basing available to support Large Surge Option

SOURCE: MNF-I 21 DEC 06
The signal community is postured to receive up to five Bdes entry into the network:

Support by Phase:
- Phase I: Set the Conditions
  - IBCT, SBCT (Bn), Rifle Bn x2
- Phase II: CCR
  - HCT Bde HOs SBCT, SBCT (BN)
- Phase III: Retain & Renew
  - HCT, SSCT (BN)
- Phase IV: Transition and Exploit
  - HCT

Communications Capabilities:

1.4a, 1.4g
Facts

- Reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad requires much more than a military solution; military efforts directed at the problem must be synchronized with efforts along the Governance, Economic, and Communications LOOs
- Gov planning to receive 6 IA and 9 IA under IGFC control; IOC 15 Jan 07, FOC 31 Mar 07
- Iraqi population views ISF operating in conjunction with CF as impartial
- Iraqi units assuming battle space still require Coalition Enablers and QRF
- Current mission requirements in MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-SE prohibit the reallocation of combat power from those units to MND-B
- Existing MNC-I aviation assets already committed to critical missions
- CF enabler requirements initially increase in Baghdad to support offensive operations
- Kinetic operations will lead to a temporary stoppage in economic initiatives in certain areas
- MND-B will require additional CERP funds in order to implement Baghdad CMO plans
- CoR in recess Feb-Mar 07
Assumptions

- [Need ISF force structure laid out to communicate capabilities of ISF in Baghdad]
- NP and IP units in Baghdad are heavily infiltrated by Shia militias; IA units are less infiltrated by militias, but are vulnerable to sectarian influences
- IA BDE moves to Baghdad; under current timeline:
  - 3 IA Drs and 1 Bde HQ FOC in and around Baghdad by mid-January (1-4/1, 2-4/1, 3-1/3, 4/1 HQ)
  - 3/4 IA (-) FOC by 1 February
  - 1/2 IA (-) FOC by 7 February
  - IA BDEs will return to their AOs in the north after 90 days, without replacement
- Gol will not impede or undermine the operation once it is underway
- Deployments / extensions to generate additional forces:
  - DRB – FOC on 15 Jan 07
  - MEU SOC will be extended for 45 days in ITO and will not be repositioned elsewhere in CENTCOM; follow-on MEU available through 15 May 07
  - 2 Marine Rifle Battalions from 5 RCT will be extended to provide additional forces
  - 1 SBCT – 1 Bn FOC 15 Jan 07 (operational reserve); 1 Bn plus BCT HQ FOC 15 Feb 07; balance of BCT FOC 15 Mar 07
  - 1/1 AD will be extended, allowing a net gain of 1 BCT in early February
  - 1 HBCT – FOC on 15 Feb 07 (accelerated timeline for unit slated as BTDO)
  - Afterwards, 1 additional BCT per month through Apr 07
- Deploying BCT enablers will be sufficient to support operations
Assumptions

- GOI will allocate the money it has promised and will coordinate economic projects
- MOD, MOI, and the Coalition will reach an agreement regarding C2 relationships in Baghdad
Constraints

- CF information operations must not target Go!
Doctrinal Terms

FM 3-90, Tactics

- **Defeat**: occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight; the defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted COA, thus yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of the friendly force; results from the use of force or the threat of force.

- **Neutralize**: results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation; duration of neutralization must be specified (event-driven or time-driven); a neutralized enemy may become effective again when casualties are replaced, damage is repaired, or the effort resulting in neutralization is lifted.

- **Disrupt**: a task in which the commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion.

- **Destroy**: physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted.

| Clear: remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area | Retain: ensure a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use |
| Control: maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations |

Now we move to our proposed mission and intent. No change from previous briefings.