Setting the Conditions for Transition

18 Dec 06

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad (reduce the level of sectarian violence) while helping the GOI regain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?

Overall Classification for this Brief is SECRET/REL-to-USA/MOF/MAR

Purpose tonight is to brief the audience on the Offensive Concept as it stands now.

The problem we’ve identified involves changing the dynamics in Baghdad – specifically, how do we reduce sectarian violence in and around Baghdad while helping the GOI make progress toward security self-reliance

Agenda
- Conditions
- Mission and intent
- Concept sketch by phase
- Associated risk

It’s important before we begin to provide some context to this planning effort, particularly since it represents a something of a shift from where MNC-I appeared to be heading with the Transition Bridging Strategy
The commander sees this operation as a pre-cursor to the accelerated transition contemplated by the bridging strategy; as we progress through the phases, it should become clear that the escalation of offensive activity is intended to set the conditions for the successful implementation of the bridging strategy; in fact, the endstates of both are very similar.
SPM Agenda

- Operational Timeline
- Intelligence Assessment
- Proposed Mission
- Proposed Intent
- Initial Concept of Operation
- C2 Relationships – MND-B / MOI / MOD
- Initial Concept of Support
  - Political LOO
  - Economic LOO
  - IO
  - PAO
  - ISF
  - Fires/Effects
  - ALO/Air
  - CMO
  - Engineering
  - Sustainment
  - Force Generation
  - Legal
  - SOF
  - Signal
- Way Ahead / Planning Timeline
- Proposed Names for the Operation
Page 4 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(5)
**MNC-I Threat Environment**

**Sunni Extremist Goals/OBJs:**
- Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
- Ignite civil war
- Create terrorist safehaven
- Control T&FF LOCs
- Establish global Jihad platform

**Kurd Goal/OBJs:**
- Greater Kurdistan
- Kirkuk oil resources
- Historic Kurdish cities
- Kirkuk (future Capital)
- Tal Afar
- Mosul

**Shi'a (OMS) Goal/OBJs:**
- Expel CF
- Control Baghdad and South
- Protect pilgrimage LOCs
- Secure patronage
- Defend Shi'a population

**Sunni Resistance Goals/OBJs:**
- Sunni-rulled Arab Iraq
- Baghdad Capitol
- Control Baghdad Belt
- Protect Sunni population
- Secure Key Resources: Kirkuk oil

**Shi'a (SCIRI) Goal/OBJs:**
- Shi'a dominated GOI
- Shi'a Southern State controlled by SCIRI
- Control of Shi'a Holy Cities
- Control of Southern Oil, LOCs
- Protect against Ba'athist resurgence
MNC-I Current Threat Situation

- AQ/I/NBP challenging ISF for control of Mosul
- AQ/I/NBP challenging local ISF and govt to prevent Kurdish control of Kirkuk
- JAM/Badr interest in protecting Shiite shrines in Sunni city
- JAM protecting Shia in Balad against surrounding Sunnis and AQ/I/NBP
- AQ/I/NBP challenging ISF for control of Baqubah
- AQ/I/NBP fighting JAM for control of Baghdad Belt

- AQI pressured by SAA, TAA
- JAM challenging CF authority
- Badr = JAM competing for control via local govt and ISF
AQI conducts HP attacks against Shia civilians, who then seek both protection and retaliation. JAM provides retaliation thru EJKs against Sunni civilians, which causes Sunni civilians to tolerate AQI's activities, to the point of offering safehavens in their homes in exchange for protection against JAM.

As the violence continues, Sunni and Shia ethno-sectarian identities are hardening, undermining the chance for Reconciliation.

JAM benefits from the instability in Iraq because it justifies its reason for existence as the Defender of the Shia.

AQI benefits from the instability in Iraq because it allows T&FF sanctuaries to exist and provides both the motivation and the opportunity for new recruits to join the jihad.
Proposed Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, fully implement the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to Iraqi security self-reliance.

This a pre-decisional mission statement.

It encapsulates the commander’s vision of conducting offensive operations focused in and around Baghdad and later shifting to the implementation of the Bridging Strategy – accelerating transition to the ISF once the conditions have been better established to do so.
Proposed Commander's Intent

- Purpose
  - Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; stabilize the security situation in those areas
  - Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation

- Key Tasks
  - Reduce sectarian violence
  - Neutralize VBIED networks and illegal militias that conduct EJKs
  - Establish the ISF as a capable force, legitimate in the eyes of Iraqi citizens
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance

- Endstate
  - Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF
  - Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  - Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire
  - MOI reform underway; improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated
  - Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation, enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place

The commander's intent is pre-decisional as well

It reflects the dual purposes of reducing sectarian tensions while facilitating the GOI's transition to security self-reliance

There are four key tasks leading to an endstate that reduces violence to a manageable level, enhances GOI and ISF legitimacy, and sets both on the path to security self-reliance

At endstate, CF are positioned outside of urban areas, covered down on the ISF with enhanced transition teams, and postured to perform strike operations
The commander's intent is pre-decisional as well

It reflects the dual purposes of reducing sectarian tensions while facilitating the GOI's transition to security self-reliance

There are four key tasks leading to an endstate that reduces violence to a manageable level, enhances GOI and ISF legitimacy, and sets both on the path to security self-reliance

At endstate, CF are positioned outside of urban areas, covered down on the ISF with enhanced transition teams, and postured to perform strike operations
Concept Sketch
Phase I: Set Conditions

Set conditions for clear and control operations in Baghdad

Decisive Operation
MND-B: (T) Disrupt EFP networks
(P) Enhance CF and ISF FOM

Shaping Operations
MND-N: (T) Disrupt AQI IVO Bayji-Tikrit-Zab Triangle, Samarra-Balad-Baqubah, and Lake Thar-Thar
(P) Reduce accelerants to sectarian violence
MNF-W: (T) Disrupt AQI IVO Falluja-Ramadi and AO DENVER
(P) Stabilize Anbar Province; interdict flow of AQI fighters
MND-CS: (T) Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
(P) Enhance GOI legitimacy and ISF capability
MND-SE: (T) Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
(P) Enhance GOI legitimacy and ISF capability
MND-NE: (T) Conduct non-kinetic ops
(P) Sustain conditions contributing to current stability
CJSTF: (T) Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
(P) Reduce the level of sectarian violence; enhance CF FOM
OCF-I: (T) Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
(P) Reduce the level of sectarian violence; enhance CF FOM
Concept Sketch
Phase II: Clear, Control, Retain

Conduct combined offensive operations in focus areas to reduce levels of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and to facilitate the transition to Iraqi security self-reliance

Where conditions allow, units continue to transition security responsibilities to ISF

Strike operations continue, with a sustained focus on Baghdad

Decisive Operation
MND-B: (T) Conduct clear, control, and retain ops
(P) Reduce sectarian violence; enable GOI to secure Baghdad

Shaping Operations
MND-N: (T1) Disrupt AQI IVO Bayji-Tikrit-Zab Triangle, Samarra-Balad-Baqubah, and Lake Thar-Thar
(P1) Reduce accelerants to sectarian violence
(T2) Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
(F2) Enhance GOI legitimacy and ISF capability
MNF-W: No change
MND-CS: No change
MND-SE: No change

CJSOTF: (T1) Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
(P1) Reduce level of sectarian violence; enhance CF FOM
(T2) Conduct FID with IA BDEs in Baghdad
(P2) Facilitate combined operations
QCF: No change

Operational Reserve: Allows for continued operations in focus areas
Emphasis shifts from Security to Transition, Governance, Economics
With real and perceived reduction in levels of sectarian violence, GOI announces a path to reconciliation
Conditions now allow for the implementation of the Transition Bridging Strategy in Baghdad; units elsewhere continue to transition security responsibilities to ISF
CF and ISF seize opportunity offered by reconciliation to consolidate gains; additional BCT to Wasit border to disrupt flow of EFPs
Strike operations against a diminished AQI threat and irreconcilable militia groups continue throughout ITO

Decisive Operation
MND-B: (T) Transition to security self-reliance
(P) Enhance GOI legitimacy and ISF capability

Shaping Operations
MND-N: No change
MNF-W: No change
MND-CS: No change
MND-SE: No change
CJSOTF: No change

OCF-2: (T) Disrupt VBIED networks
(P) Reduce the level of sectarian violence
Accelerate transition
Exploit the momentum generated by reconciliation to consolidate security gains
Strike operations against a diminished AQI threat and irreconcilable militia groups continue throughout ITO

Decisive Operation
MND-B: (T) Transition to security self-reliance
(P) Enhance GOI legitimacy and ISF capability

Shaping Operations
MND-N: No change
MNF-W: No change
MND-CS: No change
MND-SE: No change
MND-NE: No change

CJSOTF: (T) Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks
(P) Reduce the level of sectarian violence; enhance CF FOM

OCF-I: (T) Disrupt VBIED networks
(P) Reduce the level of sectarian violence
GOI C2 for Baghdad Security Mission
Strategic Level C2

OPCON
COORDINATION
ADCON
TACON
PM Prime Minister
COB Commander of Baghdad
NP National Police

MTT – Train
ODA (as CST) – Embedded Advisors

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Approved for Release
Concept of Support

Political

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I:
- Prime Minister concurrence regarding concept of operation
- Prime Minister public announcement indicating support for operation
- GOI agrees to the Bridging Strategy; signs MOU

Phase II:
- GOI imposition of additional state of law emergency conditions
- Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements

Phase III:
- GOI announcement regarding amnesty and DDR plan
- Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements

Phase IV:
- Timeline for Provincial elections and Referendums announced
- Steady GOI support for the operation, made clear through periodic statements

CG Actions:
- Prompt MNF-I and Embassy to engage PM, President, NSA, MoD, MoI and Political Parties to gather support for Operation and Prime Minister

Resource Requirements:
- N/A

Issues/Risks:
- Operation hinges on strong support from GOI
- Prime Minister has already approved of concept; but will require Political Party support
- MNF-I/EMB should continue high-level GOI engagement plan w/ GOI and Political Parties
- Prime Minister Expectations: ISF in the lead and quicker control/increased training of ISF
Concept of Support by Phase:
Phase I: Continue existing initiatives including SOE engagement, VOTECH, and microfinance development

Phase II: Halt initiatives negatively impacted by kinetic ops. Continue and adapt initiatives to the extent possible. Re-assess economic development plans based on changed economic and security environment.

Phase III: Re-start economic development initiatives modified to the extent necessary to reflect new security and economic situation.

Phase IV: Transition initiatives to GOI, NGOs, and civilian USG agencies.

CG Decisions:
When do we disengage or redirect BDA team OPS

Resource Requirements:
CERP to counter effects of battle damage on infrastructure and businesses.

Issues/Risks:
Disruption of existing projects and relationships related to development

Economic disruptions may be caused by kinetic ops and increased security measures.
Concept of Support

PSYOP / IO

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I: Reinforce GOI announcements about the operation and calls for a cease-fire / reconciliation using handbills, engagements, and media outlets. Analyze AIF propaganda and misinformation activities in the media and on the internet; be prepared to counter. Continue ongoing operations to reduce violence and militia activities.

Phase II: Conduct engagements to shape expectations and publicize actions the people can take to accelerate a return to a pre-Samarra environment. Continue reinforcement of GOI announcements and calls for cease-fire / reconciliation. Continue propaganda analysis and counteractions as necessary. Influence key AIF leaders to agree to a cease-fire and conduct specifically targeted degradation of communications. Publicize GOI efforts and CMO to rescue efforts of collateral damage. Mitigate loss of public services due to damage. Capitalize on ISF / GOI successes. Focus engagements on key communicators to facilitate transition to ISSR.

Phase III: 1c change.

Phase IV: Continue support to the GOI and reinforce successes of the GOI / ISF in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

C2 Decisions: None

Resource Requirements:

- Additional Tactical PSYOP Detachment per BCT
- Require additional aerial EV platforms (up to three EA-6Bs and one EC-130) with crew

Issues / Risks:

- Populace believes Coalition is acting more unilaterally than at the behest of the GOI.
- Backlash from populace if operation overly disrupts movements during the Hajj / Ashura-Abu’larr
- AIF gain the upper hand in the information environment through increased unrestricted propaganda

Themes: GOI is taking steps to stop sectarian violence

- IO Task and Purpose: Persuade GOI officials to appeal out against all actors involved in sectarian violence.

Theme: ISF is assuming larger role in the security of Iraq

- IO Task and Purpose: Persuade MOI / MNR to support the security plan (moving forces and doing their job)

Sir, we will support
Good morning sir, [b](3), [b](6) senior Public Affairs plans officer. I will be briefing the public affairs concept of support. During phase I of the operation corps public affairs will synchronize a communication plan with STRAFF as well as develop PAG, contingency statements and prepare a detailed press release to be released during Phase II of the operation. During this initial phase we'll look for media opportunities to articulate the need to significantly reduce the level of sectarian violence in Bagdad and reinforce the Coalition's commitment to putting the ISF in the lead thereby setting the conditions for the operation. We expect statements from the GoI and the NCA to nest with Corps statements which we would expect to elude to an increase in forces as already seen in recent reporting of 2/82's movement into Kuwait. Also during this phase Corps will coordinate with MND-B for an embed plan similar to the one executed for the initial phase of Operation Together Forward. During Phase II corps will send out an initial detailed press release and facilitate the embed program with MND-B as planned in Phase I. For embedding, we will focus on US domestic and International media outlets with the assumption that these reports will be picked up in Iraqi media outlets given the constraint that Iraqi media do not embed with Coalition Forces nor are they allowed to embed with ISF. Pan-Arab media will be invited to operational update press conferences and other press events. During this phase it will be critical we ensure the release of timely and accurate information and engage media outlets reporting inaccurate or hyper-editorialized stories. In Phase III we will facilitate media events to reconstruction projects as well as continuing the robust media embed plan. In Phase IV we will highlight operational successes and use combined press conferences to show the ISF's capability to take the lead as we transition to an operational overwatch position. We will continue to engage the media to urge their due diligence in reporting the facts from verifiable sources. PA has no decision points for you at this time. For resource requirements, embedded media may require addition security forces and additional security forces will be needed during scheduled press events such as a media tour through one of the cleared areas. The risk are a perceptions. These perceptions - ISF's inability to control/defeat sectarian violence and that is operation is an act of desperation can be mitigated with a synchronized communication plan; the use of embedded media; the release of timely and accurate information and countering inaccurate media reporting. Pending you questions sir, I will be followed by...
Concept of Support
ISF

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I:
- IA: 6IA & 9IA continue to hold and build
- Reorganize for “Close & Rear” operations
- IPS: N/C
- NP: Cont Re-Bluing/ continue current operations

Phase II:
- IA: 6IA & 9IA (Reinf) Close: Clear & hold, Rear: RASO
- IPS: Active police patrolling in cleared areas
- NP: Provide quick response ISO IPS; recommend NP DO NOT hold battal space

Phase III:
- IA: 6IA & 9IA (Reinf) Close: Hold, Rear: RASO
- IPS: Continue community/neighborhood patrols & Engagement
- NP: Provide quick response ISO IPS

Phase IV:
- IA: 6IA & 9IA (Reinf) Adopt OOW of NP/IPS
- IPS: Continued program development (PDOP assumes responsibility for policing)
- NP: Postured for quick response as required

CG Decisions
- IA: When do we transition 6IA & 9IA to IGFC?
  - Option 1-IAL at Commencement of Phase II
  - OPCON at Commencement of Phase III
  - Option 2-CHOP to IGFC on 1 Mar 07
  - Option 3- Delay till mission completion
  - IPS: When to transition to Phase IV (IPS in the lead)?

Resource Requirements:
- Continue to engage MNSTCI/GOI to resource the ISF

Issues/Risks:
- Transition 6IA & 9IA on 1 Mar and risk losing unity of command & change of operating ROE
- AIF low during Phase I and II, then reestablish once AO is under IPS control.
Concept of Support
Fires and Effects

Concept of Support by Phase:

**Phase I:** Focus fires to disrupt VBIED/EFP networks, AQI and militia activities in Baghdad belts and threat support areas (including Tahr Thar and potentially Wast areas). Focus engagements on key political leaders in order to gain concurrence for offensive operations and endstate of operations.

**Phase II:** Provide monthly assessment of the impact offensive operations have on the reduction of sectarian violence. Continue to engage political leaders for support of offensive operations and begin to engage to facilitate transition to ISSR in MNF-N, CIE, and SE. Continue providing fires in support of CF offensive operations in Baghdad belts and threat support areas.

**Phase III:** Focus engagements on key political leaders to facilitate transition to ISSR in MNF-W and MNF-B. Provide monthly assessment of the impact operations are have on the enhancement of GOI and ISF legitimacy. Continue providing fires in support of CF offensive operations in Baghdad belt and threat support areas.

**Phase IV:** Continue monthly assessments to identify successes and any trends toward radixes. Continue providing fires in support of CF offensive operations in Baghdad belt and threat support areas.

**CG Decisions:**
- 60 day decision to continue surge operations or begin transition ops
- 180 day decision to continue with transitioning to ISSR
- Split 8thy MLRS operations

**Resource Requirements:**
- Split Ops will require additional comms, logistical, and force protection assets
- Additional EW assets needed

**Issues/Risks:**

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**Transition to Iraqi Self Reliance:**

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<td>CLEAR, CONTROL, AND RETAIN</td>
<td>RETAIN AND REBUILD</td>
<td>TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE</td>
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**Essential Effects by Phase**

- Control the Borders
- Insurgency Neutralized
- Break the cycle of sectarian violence
- IPS in the Lead
- GA in the Lead
- Development of Local and Provincial Gov't
- Develop Strategic Infrastructure
- Increase availability of Basic Services
- Develop Economic Centers
- Develop Economic Centers

15 Jan 15 Mar 1 June
### Concept of Support

#### C3 Air

**Concept of Support by Phase:**

**Phase I:**
- AV force size tailored to maneuver BDE req'ts
- Begin AV mob to match BCT arrival dates
- Begin infrastructure improvements

**Phase II:**
- MNDS and Corps AV flex as necessary to support BCT ramp up
- New AV units arrive in theater
- Max size of new AV structure is a CAB
- CAB conducts shaping and sustaining ops
- AV CAB deploys TF structure to support border/remote operations

**Phase III:** No change

**Phase IV:**
- Possible draw down of AV force structure based upon MNC-I CDR guidance and BCT req'ts

**CG Decisions:**
- Continuation of AWTs in MND-SE
- Approval of AV force structure:
  - COA 1: Force tailored to BCTs (<3 BCTs)
  - COA 2: AV CAB (3 or more BCTs)

**Resource Requirements:**
- Life support and force protection
- Maintenance infrastructure and contract support

**Issues/Risks:**
- Current AV force structure cannot support additional BCT AV req'ts
- CAB structure dependent upon mission req'ts and force gen constraints
- Insufficient infrastructure support (maintenance/life) for new AV CAB
- Potential increase of responsibilities if CF partners redeploy
Concept of Support
ALO

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I: CFACC main effort is interdicting AQI networks IVO Lake Thar Thar to deny flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad and deny sanctuary to extremists displaced by other operations. CFACC supports other efforts with interdiction, CAS, EW, Recon and ISR UAV Corps priorities.

Phase II: Same as Phase I.

Phase III: CFACC supports ongoing ops with interdiction, CAS, EW, Recon and ISR UAV Corps priorities.

Phase IV: Same as Phase III.

CG Decisions:
- Land concept of ops to determine CFACC support plan
- CFACC main effort/priorities to assess resource force requirements

Resource Requirements:
- TBD

Issues/Risks:
- 1.4b, 1.4d
- Potential diversion of OEF assets impact on OEF
- Outcome of RFF for ISR surge

Transition to New AO/OC:
- PHASE I: 15 Jan
- PHASE II: 15 Mar
- PHASE III: 1 June
Concept of Support

CMO

Concept of Support by Phase:
Phase I:
- 358 CA BDE 1 x Function Spt team, 2 x Civil Liaison Tms integrated w/MND-B
- Pre-plan immediate impact projects
- In advance, place contractors under contract for BID
- Identify HA supply requirement, stage
- GOI committed on project funding
- Identify ‘gated neighborhoods’ to include barrier plan
- Interagency prepared to support
  - (BPT) execute IDP plan as needed
Phase II:
  - (PBT) Conduct HA activities
  - (BPT) execute IDP plan as needed
Phase III:
  - Initiate immediate impact projects (CERP)
  - Initiate BD repairs
  - Transition to GOI led projects
  - GOI owned projects initiated
  - Interagency supports projects
Phase IV:
  - Detach 358 BDE teams
  - GOI in the lead for HA and projects (U.S. ends HA SPT)
  - ‘Gated communities’ established
  - Interagency in the lead for U.S. projects

CG Decision
1. CA Asset allocation support by BCT
   COA 1: 1 CA CO per BCT
   COA 2: Pull CA TMs from current structure
   COA 3: No CA support to ‘surge’ BCT’s

Resource Requirements:
1. Available theater resources sufficient for CMO Operations
2. Review Troops to task requirement for CA assets based on BCT employment plan

Issues/Risks:
COA 1: RFF for regular Army CA units to support

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
FACILITIES: MND has to submit their engineer requirements / JARB-JFUB packets ASAP / turn around time for approval-funding could be 2 weeks/out of cycle fund request
JARB/JFUB to support FP/construction/repairs/services

EHCC: fields, train, and track all RC equipment within ITO
ONS: 3-buffalo / 20-RG-31 / 8-husky (Jan-June 07)
Basing

- Larger FOBs can accommodate additional BCT at “surge conditions”
  - Less than CENTCOM Sandbook standard of living
  - Less office and living space per capita
- Bases that currently have capacity for BCT with minimal construction
  - MNF-W – Al Asad
  - MND-B – Taji, Stryker, Liberty
  - MND-N – Warhorse
- Office and motor pool space are limiting factors
- MNDs will be executing agency for distribution of troops

Basing is NOT a constraint to future planning
Concept of Support
Force Protection (COIC)

Concept of Support by Phase:
Phase I: Set the Conditions.
- Provide detailed IED-related Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield products to support the scheme of maneuver.
- Synchronize MNC-I operations against the IED Network and influence C-IED efforts at the national, DOD, and theater levels so they best support units in contact.
- Produce actionable outputs to MSCs and IZ forces, allowing them to conduct proactive, focused, continuous, and precise operations against key elements of the IED Network.
Phase II: Clear, Control, Relent
- Synchronize MNC-I operations against the IED Network and influence C-IED efforts at the national, DOD, and theater levels so that they best support units in contact.
- MNC-I COIC provides response to specific MSCs RFI.
Phase III: Retain and Renew
- No Change
Phase IV: Transition and Exploitation
- No Change

CG Decisions
- First opportunity to affect decision on availability of EOD companies in 29 Dec 06

Resource Requirements:
- Access through reach back to JIEDDO for predictive analysis.

Issues/Risks:
- No IMICS connectivity between MNC-I COIC and JIEDDO COIC until IOC.
- Limited initial operational capability will reduce COIC ability to support multiple BCTs.
Concept of Support CBRN

Concept of Support by Phase:

All Phases:

CBRN, MNF-ICG2, MNF-IC2, external Intel assets (incl. DTK Lab), TFG 3/2 BCT NBC PLT's, 1/29th CM PLT, MNF-B's EOD/Decon PLT (1/18th CM PLT) and CONUS reachback work together to:

- Secure and destroy CW munitions and radiological material in conjunction with ongoing operations (this is ongoing now)
- (If AIF counterattack with CBRN ->) Assess, sample, provide Tech Escort support, perform presumptive identification, mitigate, conduct operational and thorough decontamination

CG Decision: If required, RFF to CFLCC for CFLCC CM Co. (44th CM Co.)

Resource Requirements: N/A

1.4g
Sir,

This slide shows the current Logistic support concept to meet the needs as identified of the 4 phases. The headline issues you should be aware of are that the complete Light BCT site for the DRB will not be ready for issue until 15 Jan, however we can feed units through to meet the equipment flow allowing the majority of the BCT to be in the Baghdad AO to meet the 15 Jan deadline.

Phase I:
BCTs draw APS stocks from ARCENT. LBCT set will not be complete for issue until 15 Jan as an equipment set. Equipment flow will be able to meet unit flow if managed in parallel to a 15 Jan deadline.
Prioritize Objective Frag 5 Kit installation for UAH
Build new Ammo Storage Point within MND-B AO

Phase II:
Cross levelling of UAH as necessary to ensure that up armoured UAH are at point of need.
Activate & deploy STRYKER maintenance contracts as necessary.

Phase III:
ROWPU capacity will need to be increased to meet the population supported. Current production rates mean that bulk water production will only become an issue when the extra 5 BCT set is complete in theater

DECISIONS
Cross levelling priorities
Priorities to receive Obj Frag 5 Kits
Controlled supply rates imposed for Aviation and 120mm illum ammo natures
RFF for additional CSS assets – 2 x Convoy Support Centre(?) 4 x Mov Con Teams, 1 x Cargo Transfer Platoon.
Potential for need to exceed Net Explosive Weight in Ammo Storage Points.

RESOURCES:
UAH allocation to meet the 85% fill rate.
BRAT tiles for the Bradley uparmour
Urban area munitions will need to be increased to meet force and patrol activity
Class III B off take expected to rise significantly due to the armoured vehicle increase hence increased contract pull from [1.4 lb] through MNF-W AO and need for increased capacity in tank farms.

ISSUES/RISKS
As already highlighted the LBCT set will not be complete for issue until 15 Jan.
ASR ASPEN if activated whilst we are surging forces in will considerably affect our sustainability and ability to surge forces in. Interdiction of the strategic LOC will have significant impact upon our ability to surge forces in and sustain the increased force level.
**Concept of Support**

**Surgeon**

### Concept of Support by Phase:

- **Phase I:** Notify Theater Blood Management of casualty estimate increase for kinetic Operations in Phase II. Prepare Forward Surgical Team and equipment for O/O mission to jump as required to provide interventional surgical capability in surg areas. Coordinate with CENTAF for increase in theater STRATEVAC flights to maintain bed availability.
- **Phase II:** O/O move FST as required. Maintain surveillance of bed utilization at Level III Facilities to determine whether theater evacuation policy needs to be amended.
- **Phase III:** O/O redeploy FST as required.
- **Phase IV:** No change

### CG Decisions: None

**Resource Requirements:** Lift requirement for FST personnel and equipment o/o.

**Issues/Risks:** Casualty estimates are based on April-Sep 04. Should patient admission rates at Level III facilities exceed 32 patients/day for longer than 4 days, the theater evacuation policy would require amendment to "All stable patients evacuated to Level IV UFN". Area security posture during phase II could affect medical resupply of 28th CSH Baghdad. Shift to air delivery as a primary means would increase air traffic in/out of area increasing exposure to aircrews.

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<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>15 Mar</td>
<td>1 June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Control and CAS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Retain and Retain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition to CANRU Key Note</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**C3 Phase – 14 Dec 06**

31

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I: Notify Theater Blood Management of casualty estimate increase for kinetic Operations in Phase II. Prepare Forward Surgical Team and equipment for O/O mission to jump as required to provide interventional surgical capability in surg areas. Coordinate with CENTAF for increase in theater STRATEVAC flights to maintain bed availability.

Phase II: O/O move FST as required. Maintain surveillance of bed utilization at Level III Facilities to determine whether theater evacuation policy needs to be amended.

Phase III: O/O redeploy FST as required.

Phase IV: No change

CG Decisions: None

Resource Requirements: Lift requirement for FST personnel and equipment o/o.

Issues/Risks: Casualty estimates are based on April/Sep 04. Should patient admission rates at Level III facilities exceed 32 patients/day for longer than 4 days, the theater evacuation policy would require amendment to “All stable patients evacuated to Level IV UFN”.

Area security posture during phase II could affect medical resupply of 28th CSH Baghdad. Shift to air delivery as a primary means would increase air traffic in/out of area increasing exposure to aircrews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SET CONDITIONS</td>
<td>CLEAR CONTROL, AND RETAR</td>
<td>RETAIN and REVIEW</td>
<td>TRANSITION TO PATIENT RECEIVERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>15 Mar</td>
<td>1 June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C3 Phase – 14 Dec 05
PTDO Concept of Support

Force Generation

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I: CENTCOM/SECDEF Engagement to shift 3/3 ID LAD and deploy

Phase II: N/A

Phase III:
- 2/3 ID assumes PTDO 22 MAY 07
- 3/3 ID SCHED TO TRANSITION W/ 2/1 ID IN MNB 21 MAY 07

Phase IV: PTDO?

CG Decisions:
- MNC-III/MNF-III REQ LAD shift for 3/3 ID
- MNC-III/MNF-III REQ PTDO to be called forward

Resource Requirements:
- Heavy Motorized BCT additional aviation transportation assets to mitigate surge

Issues/Risks:
- PTDO is gapped until 15 FEB 07
- 3/3 ID less than T-1

C3 Phase – 14 Dec 06

33
Sir,

This slide depicts our concept of legal support. In Phase I, there will be no significant changes in the manner in which the SJA section conducts its business. There will also be no changes to the CF OPCON status of IA BDEs in Baghdad. Consequently, they are required to comply with MNC-I ROE in Phase I. Towards the end of Phase II, however, when the IA BDEs in Baghdad transition to IGFC OPCON status, they will operate under Iraqi ROE.
Phase I: CJSOTF conducts combined precision intel-driven targeting with select Iraqi IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.

Phase II: CJSOTF conducts FID through combined operations advising select IA BDEs in intelligence and operational functions, in order to conduct offensive operations in Baghdad. The select IA BDEs are ones that have assumed battle-space, and are under IGFC control.

The delineation of duties of 1.4a and Transition Teams are depicted in the box as well as described underneath. Primarily the ODA focuses 1.4a, 1.4c

Phase III: CJSOTF continues select FID partnerships.

Phase IV: CJSOTF disengages FID partnerships as transition takes place and continues precision intel-driven targeting with select IA and IP forces in Baghdad and Baghdad Belt to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks.
The command relationship between the MTT and [1.4a] is mutually supportive.
### Concept of Support

**Signal**

#### Concept of Support by Phase:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Validate network infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate units into current comms architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify and fill communication shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deconflict potential frequency issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase II:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain network connectivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain flexibility within the network</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase III:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain network connectivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain flexibility within the network</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase IV:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain network connectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain flexibility within the network</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### CG Decisions
- NA

#### Resource Requirements:
- NA

#### Issues/Risks:
- NA

---

**Timeline:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I: Set Conditions</th>
<th>Phase II: Clear Control and Retain</th>
<th>Phase III: Retain and Renew</th>
<th>Phase IV: Transfer and Exit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>15 Mar</td>
<td>1 June</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Declassified on:** 201505
Concept of Support

Space

Concept of Support by Phase:
Phase I: Assist in identifying and addressing space
related shortfalls for incoming units
Phase II: Provide Static IR Reporting, confirm GPS
health ISO MLRS tires, assess terrestrial weather affects
on space based IIR, Monitor EMI reporting
Phase III: Assist units in obtaining releasable
imagery ISO RFIRFW operations
Phase IV: Train Gil in the use of space based
products which facilitate transition

CG Decisions:
Resource Requirements: Incoming unit
equipment may not meet need for secure
long-haul communications and BFT

1a, 1.4g

Transition to Final Collection:

PHASE I: SAT CONVERSION
15 Jan

PHASE II: SPACE COMMISSIONING/DEPLOYMENT
15 Mar

PHASE III: SPACE SUPPORT
1 June

PHASE IV: SAT CONVERSION

SECRETEPL-to-USA and MCPSM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>MEETING/BRIEFING</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Dec 06</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Time line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topic: Receipt of Mission</td>
<td>2. Concept slides across LOAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Flow of forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Decision Points (DPs)</td>
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<td>5. Command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Operation naming convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Way Ahead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 06</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>MNF-I presents concept to MOD &amp; MoI</td>
<td>Concept slides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 06</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Briefing to SECDEF</td>
<td>1. Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Force structure requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec 06</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>MNF-I Briefing to GEN Casey</td>
<td>Decision briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Dec 06</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Mission Analysis Briefing</td>
<td>1. Facts &amp; Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Specified and Required Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Prioritize Essential Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Define Theater Strategic and Military Endstate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Initial CCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dec 06</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>CG Planners' Huddle</td>
<td>Mission and Commander’s Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Dec 06</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Service &amp; Commander’s Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec 06</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Decision Briefing: Output:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Approved COA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Refined Cdr’s Intent &amp; Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Dec 06</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>COA Briefing</td>
<td>Decision Briefing: Output:</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Dec 06</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>1. Approved CDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Refined Cdr’s Intent &amp; Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 06</td>
<td></td>
<td>Orders Production</td>
<td>3. Refined CDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 07</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Audience: MNF-Trend &amp; Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topic: Order Brief</td>
<td>Conduct Order Briefing Briefings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jan 07</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Conduct Order Briefing Briefings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jan 07</td>
<td></td>
<td>Order Briefing to Commanders</td>
<td>Conduct Order Briefing Briefings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 07</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Conduct Commander Backbriefs</td>
<td>Conduct Order Briefing Briefings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Timeline**

- Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
- Declassified on: 201505

**SECRET/REL to USA and MGFI/MA**

*Approved for Release*
### Operation Naming Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. مهادننا</td>
<td>Restore Hope and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Altaghyeer Lilafdhal.</td>
<td>Change to Betterness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. أمان الحماية</td>
<td>Security Now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Alsiyada Lana..................</td>
<td>We Are in Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Amaliyat Al Yad Al Wahedah....</td>
<td>One Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Amaliyat Darb Al Aman.........</td>
<td>Pathway to Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Amaliyat Al Arada Al Hura......</td>
<td>Free Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Amaliyat Watan Al Ahrar.........</td>
<td>Nation of Free Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Concept of Support Function

Concept of Support by Phase:

Phase I: Continue to submit requirements as they occur; identify all JARB requests supporting this mission as “Operation Overwatch”

Phase II:

Phase III:

Phase IV:

CG Decisions

Resource Requirements:

Issues/Risks:
Pages 46 through 47 redacted for the following reasons:
1.4a, 1.4c, 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)
## Mission Analysis – CJTF

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

### Facts
1. Currently have 5 Army EOD companies, 7 Joint Service Company equivalents (minus) and 11 WIT Teams Available
2. 78 JERRV/72 M1114a7 M1156a/20 M1116a Available
3. 209 Tarin and PadBot robots available
4. Incoming troops will need CIED Training
5. 439 RTI Dukes on hand; 500 Dukes needed to be delivered in Dec.
6. 675 Dukes to be delivered in Jan/Feb (1350 total)

### Constraints
1. Up to 8 additional EOD companies and 11 additional WITs available by extending current tours beyond redeployment dates: requires SECECF approval.
2. Number of CIED trainers limited: Current POI not possible due to time constraints.
3. Duke Origiical Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces 900 Dukes per month

### Assumptions
1. One modular EOD company or Joint Service equivalent EOD per brigade ISO CIEO operations
2. Current BIN command structure capable of able to command and control EOD companies in the NIN-D area
3. Up to 8 additional EOD Companies and 3-6 WITs may be required
4. Up Removal HMMWVs (HMMWVs) will be extremely limited due to additional force flow
5. Duke Fielding of NIN-D and NIN-E EODs and Corps Separation will be at a minimum HP GRFW Ratio of 1:2
6. At a 1:2 HP CIED ratio, fielding 5 EODs will require approx. 1600 Dukes
Mission Analysis – CJTF
2 of 2
POC (b)(3), (b)(6)

Specified Tasks
1. Provide specialized C-IED forces to support the planned operation
2. Provide WIT and CEXG, IED technical intelligence and forensics support for the planned operation
3. Provide specialized Electronic Warfare (EW) capability to support the planned operation

Issues / Risks
1. If EOD forces are not extended, EOD support will be constrained by the number of companies providing essential force protection to widely dispersed operating bases.
2. If WIT forces are not extended, WIT support will be constrained by the number of WIT (teams) providing technical exploitation to widely dispersed operating bases.

Implied Tasks
1. Provide command/control and support of additional EOD forces
2. Provide priority Technical, Forensics and exploitation support
3. Disposal of captured enemy munitions and IEDs
4. As part of RSOI, train all soldiers in C-IED, EW, and Covert exploitation

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Mission Analysis – (Fires/Effects) 1 of 2

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Facts
1. CF-4 FA (MLRS) currently positioned in MNT-W
2. See attached map for MLRS and ATACMS ranges from current position
3. Ammo data: 20LRMS (Iraq - 215, Kuwait - 165), ATACMS (Iraq - 5, Kuwait 9)
4. MLRS batt split ops capability for limited time
5. 4xLIMC and 2xUSN Premiers in ITO
6. Provider - Minutes Present/Requested (467/2729 = 40%)
7. 1.4a, 1.4g

Assumptions
1. 14g
2. IDF will deploy all organic indirect fire support systems and radars

Constraints
1. 1xMLRS batty in ITO, may require batty split ops
2. Batt split ops will require additional resources to augment firing PLT
3. MNOSC policy on counter-fire permits response only if CF "eyes on"
4. Any repositioning of radars will require forces for force protection
## Mission Analysis – (Fires/Effects)

### Specified Tasks
1. Conduct a 90 day assessment on the progress of operations in reducing sectarian violence.

### Issues / Risks
1. Need additional LW assets (19 hours/another provider again)

### Implied Tasks
**Agent Fires:**
1. Provide SMLRS fires to disrupt VBIED and EFP networks around Baghdad and in threat support areas.
2. Provide SMLRS fires to disrupt ADI and militia activities around Baghdad and in threat support areas.
3. BPT to conduct fifty split operations cover more areas in the ITO.

**Engagements:**
1. Engage key leaders (political and religious) to denounce violence and discourage participating in militaries and activity.
2. Engage key leaders to support “martial law” and assist in explaining the imperative of operations.
3. Engage key political leaders to support all specified starting conditions and to facilitate transition to ISCR.

### Essential Effects by Phase:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I: II</td>
<td>Contingent/Barracks Insurgency Neutralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Enable the GOI to break the cycle of sectarian violence and prevent its spread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Development of Local and Provincial Gov't</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessments:**
1. Conduct a 180 day assessment on the progress of operations in the enhancement of GOI and ISF legitimacy.
2. Conduct monthly assessments on all effects, focusing on essential effects by phase.
### Facts
1. Baghdad airspace saturated above coordination altitude
2. By Jan 07, 4 F-15s, 6 F-16s, 6 A-10s, and 2 GR-1s supporting Iraqi
3. CFACC can reposition assets to support focused ops ISO OIF M-18s, P-18s, and surge tankers from possible

### Assumptions
1. Air support requirements continue for existing BCTs via ASRs
2. OCP-I and CJSOTF continue to conduct majority of air ops in Baghdad city
3. Carrier group will augment CENTAF, if required
4. In place Iraqi USAF air C2 system sufficient for task
5. Sufficient number of JPFOs with Transition Teams
6. Increase in kinetic ops
7. RCE relaxed

### Constraints
1. Air refueling tanker limitations, especially for carrier group
2. MNF-SE distance from majority of air ops in Baghdad/North WRT response time and tanker support
Mission Analysis – ALO

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Specified Tasks
- Disrupt VBIED networks in and around Baghdad
- Disrupt EFP networks
- Neutralize illegal militias that conduct EFPs
- Isolate extremists in and around Baghdad

Implied Tasks
- Conduct strike operations
- Synchronize and prioritize ISR; determine additional requirements
- Baghdad Route – Disrupt support and staging areas feeding VBIED and SBVBIED resources to Baghdad
- Lake Thar Thar – Deny AOB training and leasing areas

Issues / Risks
1. CFACC assets, if employed in a focused, synergistic manner can take a major role in the offensive and mitigate ground force number limitations.
2. Given appropriate ROE/ID and with joint force assistance, CFACC could potentially take complete responsibility for the following tasks ranked in order of feasibility:
   - Lake Thar Thar
   - 14b, 14d
3. CFACC force potential for limited duration operation
   - Surge two-based aircraft
   - Reappraise/increase AOB-based assets currently supporting OEF
   - Request one, possibly two, carrier groups
4. Request TF-14A and CABOTF ISR asset usage to optimize and free-up assets for proposed operations

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Options for Interdicting IR
Border: Fallujah

1.4a, 1.4g
Options for Interdicting IR
Border: FOB Delta

1.4a, 1.4g
Options for Interdicting IR

Border: FOB Talil AB

1.4a, 1.4g