Belts Laydown

24 March 2015

Problem: How does MNC-I best employ BCT 19 and 20 to protect the population of Baghdad?
Agenda

- Threat Laydown
- Current Friendly Force Laydown
- Operational Timeline
- Facts & Assumptions
- Recommended Employment Options BCT 19 & 20
Sir, I’ll cover the threat situation along AAs to Baghdad. This slide has been updated since you last saw it. Specifically, we’ve added the mobility corridor from the Ramadi-Fallujah approach, where AQI is under pressure, thru Lake Tar Tar, into the Samarra-Balad approach, which is currently more AQI-permissive. And the corridor from the Muqdadiyah – Baqubah approach south into the southern Sunni belt. The darker the area is shaded, the harder AQI has to fight for freedom of movement.

(Build)

The isolation of JAM in Sadr City will limit its ability to reinforce Shia…up in Balad and in the South. JAM will attempt to observe Coalition and ISF operational patterns and adjust its EFP and EJK attacks accordingly.

The Coalition’s focus on Baghdad and in the North and West may create an opportunity for AQI to conduct HP attacks in Karbala, al Hillah or Najaf.

We can expect OMS to complain to the PM that security operations are creating hardships for the people of Baghdad, and call for CFs to cease
operations and withdraw.

Subject to your question, I will be followed by ...
Assumptions:
- AQI Base of Ops in Baqubah is disrupted
- MND-C/N interdict accelerants
- HP/EJK attacks in Baghdad are reduced to criminal level
- IVM remains offensive

Assessment:
- Sunni Belt moves outward
- Baqubah, Salam Alak LOG denied
- Primary AQI movement out of Anbar to SaD/Ninewa, resulting in Sunni internal power struggle
- AQI in North is focused on CS ISF and Kurds, with Kirkuk and Mosul as key targets
- AQI in South is focused on CP, ISF and Shia population, with Hillah, Najaf and Karbala as key targets
C2 portion will cover three characteristics of the threat environment that will be relevant through at least Spring 07: continuing sectarian violence, potential flashpoints and persistent issues. This map shows the density of attacks against civilians, which is highest in and around Baghdad, in Diyala along the Baqubah-Muqdadiyah corridor and in Balad, and up in the Mosul-Tal Afar area.

Baghdad’s sectarian lines will continue to harden, as each sect finds safety in ethnically pure neighborhoods. The mixed neighborhoods will continue to experience high levels of violence as each sect vies for control. Sunni defensive enclaves will be reinforced by Sunni AIF from the Sunni belt. JAM will continue its attempts to expand outward into the Sunni belt and up towards Diyala. JAM’s attempts to expand its influence into Diyala will make the Sunni populace more tolerant of Sunni insurgents, setting the conditions for long-term sectarian violence in the area.

The sectarian violence in and around Mosul is of a different nature. Sunni insurgents are competing with both the each other and the ISF for control. (Build) Potential flashpoints not corresponding to current areas of Sectarian Violence are the proposed Samarra Brigade’s deployment to rebuild the Golden Mosque, Kirkuk with multiple groups vying for control of its oil resources, and Fallujah. Fallujah is a test case for the TBS, with Iraqi police and Army within the city, CFs on the outskirts, and multiple Sunni insurgent groups desiring to re-assert influence.
(Build) Persistent issues that will remain a characteristic of the threat environment for the foreseeable future include:

* the energy blackmarket with Bayji as its Center of Gravity

1.4b, 1.4d

* intra-Shia competition in the South, especially as JAM tests ISF control in PIC provinces

* and Tribes struggling to check the power of extremists, such as SAA acting against AQI

Subject to you questions, I will be followed by...
**Facts & Assumptions**

### Facts Bearing
- 3/3 ID deploys to southeastern Baghdad to interdict southern LOCs on or about 01 Apr 07
- 2 Marine Plus-up battalions are planned to be FOC 05 Apr 07; the arrival of 2-5 Marines allow the repositioning of 5-7 CAV (1/3 ID) to interdict ASR San Juan
- 5-7 CAV will be in position to cover ASR San Juan (vic. Amariyah) mid-April
- 5-20 IN (SBCT) currently committed OPRES to Baqubah

### Key Assumptions
- 5-20 IN (SBCT) will return to MND-B after RIP'ng with a battalion from 4/2 SBCT in Baqubah
- Interdicting accelerants is key to securing the population
4/2 SBCT Employment Options
Assumptions

- 4/2 Stryker has been deployed in part to Diyala and Tarmiyah and the remainder of the SBCT constitutes the Corps Reserve to provide the Commander freedom of action
- The forces applied to Diyala and Tarmiyah have denied extremists sanctuary, forcing them to move into safer sanctuaries
- The Anbar tribes continue to actively seek to expel AQI
- AQI main effort continues to be the northern belts; Yusifiyah is a supporting effort and Salman Pak an economy of force
- The CFs in the southern belt have disrupted accelerants of sectarian violence to Baghdad
- Baghdad still has insufficient forces to Clear, Control and Retain (short 10 Companies by T2T)
Task: Clear, Control, Retain Sadr City

Purpose: To allow MNC-I to secure the population of Baghdad
HBCT to Thar Thar, O/O Baghdad

Task: Clear southwestern Thar Thar Region
Purpose: To deny AGI a sanctuary

Task: O/O 1st CD holds the southern Thar Thar region
Purpose: To prevent AGI reinsertion

Task: O/O CCOR New Baghdad or Sadr City
Purpose: To allow MNF-I to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: MNC-I OPERES
Purpose: IJIT provide the Corps
Commander Freedom of action:
- Southern Oostan
- Baghdad
- Southern Salah al Din
- Southern provinces
- Southern Bilt
Guidance