MNC-I Operational Concept
Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence
14 Jan 07

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad (reduce the level of sectarian violence) while helping the GOI gain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?

Overall Classification for this Brief is SECRET REL to USA-WH"
Agenda

- Threat Update
- Friendly Forces
- Mission and Commander's Intent
- Concept of Operation
  - Phasing
  - Critical Conditions
  - Scheme of Maneuver (through Phase II)
  - Command and Control Arrangements
  - Tasks to Maneuver Units
- PAO Concept of Support
- Conclusion
The major flashpoints in Iraq are occurring where the competing goals of the different threat groups overlap.

The T&FF LOCs that the Sunni extremists’ need, as well as their planned borders for the Islamic State of Iraq coincide with the territory that Sunni resistance groups desire to control. These groups may cooperate locally to achieve their immediate objectives, but tend to fight each other when not confronting a common enemy.

AQI and the New Baath Party are working together to challenge ISF authority in Mosul, down thru the Sunni triangle, in Baqubah and down into the Sunni Belt around Baghdad.

They are also challenging the Kurds for control over Kirkuk.

JAM’s interest in the Sunni triangle includes protecting the Shrines in Samarra, and defending the Shia population in Balad, both of which are surrounded by Sunnis. JAM is also competing with AQI for control of the Baghdad belt.

Badr and JAM are competing for control of the Shia South. JAM is challenging CF authority through demonstrations in urban areas such as Diwaniyah and al Kut and IDF attacks on CF FOBs, especially in Basrah and Baghdad.

Every threat group has an interest in controlling or influencing Baghdad.
Pages 4 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4g
1.4b, 1.4d
MNC-I Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with the ISF to secure Baghdad and its population in order to reduce sectarian violence and facilitate the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan and the continued transition to Iraqi security self-reliance.

We began this planning effort with the problem of Baghdad’s sectarian violence in mind. The question we asked ourselves was “How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad – that is, how do we reduce the level of sectarian violence? – while helping the GOI gain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?”

This is the mission statement the MNC-I commander approved following our mission analysis. It identifies securing Baghdad and its population as our task and reducing sectarian violence as our immediate purpose for doing so. We also see the task of securing Baghdad leading to the implementation of an Iraqi-led unified security command in Baghdad and the continued transition to security self-reliance throughout the country.

It’s important to note that, while the focus is obviously on Baghdad, the corps sees this as a multi-divisional operation with outlying MNDs responsible for critical supporting efforts. The MNC-I commander has made this clear in his intent. We also recognize that this is much more than a military operation. It has economic and political components as well.
Commander’s Intent
(1 of 3)

- Purpose
In order to break the current cycle of sectarian violence, we must set the conditions for the ISF to emerge as the dominant security force, able to protect the population and provide security in a fair and impartial manner. This operation will be Iraqi-led with Coalition support. Much more than a military operation alone, it must include a combination of military, economic, and political actions.

Militarily, we must interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence emerging from Southern Salah ad Din, Eastern Diyala, Western Anbar, and the Southern Baghdad Belt, exploiting recent successes in these areas to continue the transition to Iraqi security self-reliance and enhance the prospects for reconciliation. A key will be our ability to neutralize VBIED and EFP networks. Within Baghdad, we must move deliberately and maintain a robust, combined presence in each administrative district until we have firmly established Joint Security Stations manned by CF alongside ISF that are loyal to the GOI and can provide adequate protection for the population. Our operations must be deliberate, our goals achievable and sustainable. We will only be decisive when security is sustained over time with Iraqis fully in charge.

Economically, we must create a combination of near-term and long-term employment opportunities and improve basic services in order to generate economic growth in poor neighborhoods.

Politically, we must set benchmarks to address the dismantling of Shia militias, deal with de-Baathification, and move towards provincial and local elections.

1st of 3 slides outlining the MNC-I commander’s intent
(Pause)
Key to the purpose is the reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and placing the Iraqis in the lead as we transition.

This is a combined operation, with the Iraqi lead increasing over time.

The operation has multiple components – it is not simply a military operation but one that is complemented by economic and political dimensions.
(Pause)

Near-term economic opportunities: use of CERP funds, USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP), high employment projects / low tech
Building toward long-term: micro-finance, VOTECH education, state-owned enterprise improvement
The commander's key tasks

(pause)

Economic development initiatives: engagement with select state-owned enterprises (SOEs), vocational education improvements, and better access to credit for small businesses
Commander’s Intent
(3 of 3)

- Endstate
  - Baghdad secure and considered so by Sunni and Shia alike; violence in Baghdad reduced to a manageable level
  - ISF viewed by Iraqis as the dominant security force in Baghdad
  - Iraqi-led C2 structure for Baghdad in place and functioning
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance initiated IAW the Bridging Strategy and making steady progress throughout Iraq
  - Enhanced capacity of GOI to provide essential services and infrastructure maintenance
  - Foundation laid for self-sustaining economic growth
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place

The endstate envisioned by the commander, addressing the state of security in Baghdad, how the GOI and ISF are perceived by Iraqis, transition (with respect to capability and C2 arrangements in Baghdad), and Coalition Force posture.

(Pause)

- Economic growth to occur in state-owned enterprises and private sector
This slide depicts the phasing of the operation, which we see as lasting several months—perhaps even the duration of the corps’ rotation in Iraq. As such, it would form the basis for MNC-I’s long term concept of operations.

The operation consists of four phases with significant overlap. Key tasks in each phase are listed.

There is a general progress through the phases toward operational overwatch, as well as an acknowledgement that MNDs differ in how far they’ve progressed along that path. Nevertheless, all support the main effort.

Phase 1 is currently underway. It is marked by continuing operations against anti-Iraqi forces, the preparation of Iraqi and Coalition Forces for more aggressive operations in Baghdad (including the commitment of another BCT to MND-B), and the pursuit of a set of critical conditions that we’ll address in a few slides. Attaining these conditions will facilitate as well as exploit the momentum generated by operations conducted to secure Baghdad.

MND-B’s effort to secure Baghdad begins in Phase 1 with clearing operations in limited areas. In addition, MND-B partners with the Iraqis as they establish an initial command and control structure designed to facilitate combined operations initially but setting the stage for the gradual emergence of Iraqi-led command and control in Baghdad.

In Phase 2, there are three sub-phases that frame MND-B’s effort to secure Baghdad. We will go into more detail regarding those sub-phases later in the brief. Suffice it to say that MND-B, in conjunction with the ISF, will clear areas of Baghdad, expand their control of those areas, and hold them—synchronizing military operations with efforts to improve governance and economic development. In support of MND-B, outlying MNDs conduct operations to interdict accelerants to Baghdad sectarian violence—by this, we mean that they will focus on Sunni and Shia extremists who employ VBIEDs and conduct extra-judicial killings as a means of fueling the cycle of violence. The idea here is to synchronize the corps in an effort to secure Baghdad. This not only involves operations in Baghdad itself but also in key areas throughout the country.

The relationship between the main and supporting efforts can be seen not only in the ability of outlying MNDs to interdict accelerants but also in their efforts to exploit prior successes and to continue the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. This transition is a key task in Phase 3. We recognize that some MNDs are realistically in Phase 3 now due to the security conditions in their areas of operations—thus the overlap of phases. It is crucial for us to sustain progress in the area of transition, and success here does have an impact on the security of Baghdad. The connection is clear. Generating an increasingly capable ISF through transition efforts leads to additional forces that can deny enemy sanctuary and interdict accelerants.
themselves.

Phase 4 exploits the improved security situation as MNC-I and the Iraqis continue the fight against extremists. The transition to Iraqi security self-reliance continues with the goal of attaining operational overwatch.
Critical Conditions

Beginning the Operation

- Concurrency from GOI on the concept of operations and the endstate – Start, stay, and finish together
- GOI must publicly announce and display their support until endstate achieved
- GOI must give the proper support and authority to its security forces without undue interference and influence
- GOI must support a “balanced” targeting approach, allowing operations throughout the city – to include Shia areas
- GOI extension of existing state of emergency, with measures including at a minimum:
  - Banning vehicles from selected locations
  - Controlling access into, and internal to, the city as required
  - Random searches of vehicles, people, businesses, and homes
  - Full enforcement of the weapons ban
- GOI must seriously consider declaring a cease-fire, institute a mid-term amnesty program, and – with reconciliation in mind – determine a policy defining the endstate for all militias
- GOI must release all DFI funds to Anbar, Tal Afar, and Samarra to cultivate Sunni trust and confidence
- In coordination with the GOI, the Coalition must have a coordinated and synchronized reconstruction and beautification plan as it clears, controls, and retakes districts in Baghdad
- GOI must pass legislation and announce a timeline for local and provincial elections as soon as possible
- GOI must develop, announce, and implement a reasonable de-Baathification program
- USG must engage GOI and encourage GOI to endorse and fund state-owned enterprise reinvigoration initiatives proposed by the Brinkley Group

We mentioned earlier that there was a political component to this operation. This component is best captured by the list of conditions we believe are necessary in order for this operation to achieve substantial strategic gains.

Most are related to GOI actions and require coordination through the embassy and MNF-I. The key takeaway is that we are nesting this operation with a larger initiative on the part of the GOI to enhance its legitimacy through expanded control and political reconciliation.

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State of emergency measures (specifically)

Impose curfew during evening and early morning hours in threat areas

Suspend all weapons permits indefinitely; only CF, ISF, and security contractors would be permitted to carry weapons in public places

Authorize military and security forces under Baghdad Commander to employ the following measures:

- Question, detain, search, and/or arrest persons suspected of violating Iraqi law;
- Conduct searches of public and private property;
- Seize contraband;
- Control movement (i.e., establish and enforce check points);
- Clear routes;
- Freeze assets of those accused of committing grand crimes;
- Apply preventive measures to all packages, mail, and to all wire and wireless communications;
- Impose restrictions on public places, places of business, clubs, etc., as necessary for the safety and good order of the population; and
- Conduct counter-terrorism operations against members of illegal armed groups
Here is a graphical summation of the operation.

In the top blue box, we've identified the major efforts specific to regions. #1 is the main effort to secure Baghdad. Working outward from Baghdad, you can see the areas marked by red ovals and labeled with the number 2. These are the areas where MNDs will focus on interdicting the accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence. Not surprisingly, these areas correspond with those identified in the threat assessment shown on earlier slides. Closely tied to these efforts are efforts to increase Coalition oversight of Iraq's border security, with primary efforts indicated by the ovals labeled with the number 3. The corps is refining its plan to the support GOI border security in a separate but related effort.

The lower textbox lists the major tasks the corps will undertake throughout Iraq as part of this operation. I'd like to emphasize that the effort to secure Baghdad will take the form of combined operations with the Iraqis and will be carried out without jeopardizing our progress in the area of transition. Indeed, we hope to exploit the gains already made in support of the main effort.

Our efforts include fostering economic improvement in the near and over the long term, principally by supporting PRTs and our interagency partners. We see the synchronization of these economic efforts with military operations as crucial to the long-term success of the operation.
The purpose of this slide is to discuss briefly the concept of operations specific to Baghdad.

In conjunction with the Iraqis, we are working to establish a unified security command for Baghdad. There will be two division-sized subordinate commands underneath this organization – one controlling east of the Tigris River and one to the west. These subordinate commands will include a combination of Iraqi Army brigades and National Police brigades. The command arrangements at the highest levels of these organizations will be balanced as well.

Initially, Coalition presence will be more pronounced, but we anticipate the Iraqis to increasingly take the lead. Here you see the array of forces – in a general sense – organized around the nine administrative districts of Baghdad. We expect the districts to be divided up among four Coalition brigades (as per the color-coding of the unit icons), with U.S. battalions partnering with Iraqi brigades in their sectors. It’s important to note that this partnership will last throughout the clear, control, and retain phase. This implication here is that Coalition forces will maintain a permanent presence in each of the districts for a sustained period of time – albeit that presence may decrease in terms of quantity depending on security conditions. While this slide illustrates the partnering concept, clear and control operations will most likely involve additional U.S. battalions not depicted on the map, as well as the use of mobile, flexible strike forces – whose unit icons are shown in the white box. Outside of the administrative districts, there are additional Iraqi units occupying battle space, as well as moving to Baghdad to participate in operations.

A couple of points on clear, control, and retain operations. The concept involves securing the administrative districts of Baghdad gradually over time, with clearing
operations taking place in only 1-2 districts simultaneously. The commander's intent specifies that this effort is to be deliberate, achievable, and sustainable. Deliberate in that we carefully consider decisions to begin new clearing operations. Achievable in the acknowledgement that our operations must demonstrate both real and perceived success. And sustainable in that we must avoid overstretch so that we can prevent the re-infiltration of districts once they have been cleared.

Along with clear, control, retain operations, MND-B has also been assigned the task of isolating Sadr City and overseeing ISF efforts to secure the Baghdad berm.

As stated earlier, crucial to this effort are economic development initiatives – which will be addressed in a later brief.
The purpose of this slide is to illustrate how the commander envisions the concept of clear, control, retain operations in Baghdad.

Disruption – in the form of strike ops against VBIED and EFP networks – occurs throughout all districts of Baghdad.

The progression of clear, control, retain operations will be deliberate, with clearing operations focused in only 2-3 districts at a time.

It is expected that districts will be in different sub-phases and that sub-phases will vary in length in different districts. It is conceivable that Phase II in Baghdad will last several months, well into the summer.
This is another conceptual slide depicting the requirement for additional forces over time.

It is expected that the requirement for additional forces will increase with the requirement to clear more areas while controlling and retaining ones previously cleared. At certain decision points, MNC-I should have the flexibility to commit additional BCTs to meet this requirement.

At a certain point, the requirement may decrease as clearing operations subside. Just how many BCTs will be required is difficult to predict, especially when the conditions in each district vary.

Enhanced ISF capability and the positive impact of economic improvements may offset the demand for additional U.S. forces.
Concept of the Operation
Phase I: Setting the Conditions

Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks; T2: Clear limited areas

Supporting Efforts:
- MNO-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MNO-SE – T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MNO-CS – T: Transition to ISSR
- MNO-NE – T: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSCOTF – T: Strike ops
- Op Res: 1 Stryker Bn (MND-B); P/P: Secure CF LOCS
- IO – Reinforce GOI in the lead
- Governance/Economics – Pursue and track achievement of political conditions; identify reconstruction requirements

- Clear, control, retain – proof of principle
- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Develop partnerships at multiple levels
- 9 admin districts
- JSSs in selected areas
**Concept of the Operation**

**Phase II-A: Clear, Control, Retain**

- **Main Effort**
  - MNO-B – T1: Clear; control, retain; T2: Partner with subordinate elements of the Baghdad Security Command
  - Supporting Efforts
    - MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
    - MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR; T3: Exploit gains in ERV
    - MND-S – T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISSR
    - MNO-CS – T: Transition to ISSR
    - MNO-NE – T: Non-kinetic ops
    - CJSTF – T: Strike ops
  - Op Res: 1. Striker BN (MND-B); PIP: Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia extremist LOCs; Reinforce CF ops in Baghdad
  - IO – Explain operation; justify capture of HVs
  - Governance/Economics – HA; Consequence management

- **Oversee barrier and Army Canal**
- **Clear**
- **Eliminate AIF support zones**
- **Combined ops**

**POE Closure**

3-4 days, mid-JAN
Concept of the Operation
Phase II-B: Clear, Control, Retain

Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Clear, control, retain; T2: Partner with subordinate elements of the Baghdad Security Command

Supporting Efforts:
- MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR; T3: Exploit gains in EHR
- MND-SL – T1: Secure Bases; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MND-GS – T: Transition to ISSR
- MND-NW – T: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSPF – T: Strike ops
- Op Res: 1 Stryker Bn (MND-B); PIP: Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia extremist LOCs; Reinforce CF ops in Baghdad
- IO – Stress ISF in the lead for security
- Governance/Economics – Assist GOI in preparing essential services projects; Assessment of economic conditions

- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Control
- Partnership
  IA/NP Bde & Div
- Combined ops with increasing ISF-lead
- Establish new JSSs
- 24/7 CF coverage continues
Main Effort:
- MND-B – T1: Clear, control, retain; T2: Partner with subordinate elements of the Baghdad Security Command

Supporting Efforts:
- MND-N – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MNF-W – T1: Interdict accelerants; T2: Transition to ISSR; T3: Exploit gains in ERP
- MND-S – T1: Secure Basra; T2: Transition to ISSR
- MND-SE – T: Transition to ISSR
- MND-NE – F: Non-kinetic ops
- CJSOTF – T: Strike ops
- Dp Res: 1 Stryker Bn: PIP: Secure CF LOCs; Interdict Shia extremist LOCs; Reinforce CF ops in Baghdad
- IO – Highlight infrastructure repairs
- Governance/Economics – Aid local govt with infrastructure improvements; state-owned enterprise improvement; access to credit for small businesses

- Oversee barrier and Army Canal
- Retain
- Isolate Sadr City
- IP conduct normal policing
- 24/7 CF coverage, reduced force levels
- Escalation of IA/NP or CF involvement if security conditions deteriorate

Employment options in Baghdad, S. Salah ad Din / W. Diyala, Anbar, or Wasit
Tasks

MND-B:
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Secure administrative districts in Baghdad
- Oversee ISF security of the Baghdad barrier and Army Canal
- Disrupt AQI/Sunni Extremist activity in the Baghdad Belts/Support Zones
- Isolate Sadr City
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize militias that conduct EJKs
- Disrupt EFP networks
- Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF in Baghdad
- Partner with the Iraqi commander of Baghdad as the Iraqis establish the Baghdad Security Command headquarters
- Establish Joint Security Stations in all nine administrative districts
- Maintain 24/7 coverage and a forward presence in clear, control, and retain areas throughout Phase II
- Designate Brigade Commanders to advise each of the two IA divisions in Baghdad as they prepare to assume the lead; continue in this advisory, coordination, and liaison role throughout Phase III
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives
- Coordinate and synchronize project support in Baghdad through the JROC in support of the GOI
- Provide guidance and technical support to the GOI on IDP and HA activities

The next several slides outline the tasks assigned to subordinate maneuver units
MND-N:
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize militias that conduct EJJs
- Deny extremist group sanctuaries
- Disrupt AQI/Sunni Extremist activity in the Zab Triangle
- Neutralize AQI/Sunni extremist activity in Northern TRV

  1.4b, 1.4d

- Interdict AQI financing/financiers
- Support IA efforts to secure the northern Iraqi national oil infrastructure
- Support GOI efforts to disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity that funds AIF
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives

  1.4b, 1.4d

- Assist with the movement of IA BDEs to MND-B as required
Tasks

MNF-W:
- Conduct combined operations with the ISF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Continue to exploit the gains made in Falluja, Ramadi, and Central Western ERV
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize AQI/Sunni extremists activity along the Central Western ERV
- 14b, 1.4d
- Interdict AQI financing/financers
- 14b, 1.4d
- Continue to support PRTs and interagency partners in the implementation of economic initiatives
- BPT release one M240A1 platoon from C/2-4 FA ITO provide GMLRS fires ISO the MNC-I main effort
- BPT extend two rifle battalions to generate additional combat power in MNF-W
- Assist with the movement of IA BDEs to MND-B as required

MND-SE:
- 14b, 1.4d
- Sustain civil primacy in PIC provinces
- Secure Basra
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Secure CF LOCs in the MND-SE AO
- Continue to support PRTs in the implementation of economic initiatives
Tasks

MND-CS:
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- 1.4b, 1.4d

MND-NE:
- Sustain non-kinetic operations that have contributed to current level of stability
- Support RRT in the implementation of economic initiatives

CJSOTF-AP:
- Conduct combined operations with ISOF
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Disrupt militias that conduct EJKs
- Disrupt EFP networks
- Disrupt extremist group sanctuaries

Operational Reserve: (Priorities for planning)
- Secure southern CF LOCs
- ICW 8 IA Div interdict Shia extremist LOCs into Diyala
- Reinforce CF operations in the Baghdad Belts/Support Zones
- Reinforce Iraq’s border with Iran
Through all phases of the operation, the coalition’s commitment to the transitioning security responsibility to the ISF is the central theme that must resonate throughout all the media even as reporters attempt to elicit coalition responses to that support their own diagnosis. Promoting this central theme can be accomplished through marketing a synchronized communication plan and nested messages that support the core message that we are setting the conditions for transition and that we will transition security to the Iraqis. Marketing this theme will be done through the use of embedded media, combined press conferences, timely release of information and a command information campaign. Pending your questions I will be followed by...
Discussion and Comments

Differences between SECURITY NOW and Operation Together Forward
- Emphasis on critical conditions, many of which are dependent on GOI support and cooperation
- Clear, control, retain – emphasis on retain; commander’s priority on the retention of cleared districts; deliberate, gradual approach – request for additional forces to support this approach
- Efforts to synchronize economic development initiatives in Baghdad with military operations