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Multi-National Corps - Iraq




OPORD 07-01 Brief
CSIS
9 July 2007


The overall classification of this briefing is:
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
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- Our view of the problem
- Conflict in Iraq is a communal struggle for power among rival factions and ethnic and sectarian groups
- From its inception, the legitimacy of the GOI has been challenged, and, for a long time, there has been a "gap" between the government and the people of Iraq
- Many groups are trying to fill this gap and exert control over the population in order to achieve their own goals; complicated by malign external influences as well
- It is in the Coalition's best interest for a legitimate, capable GOI to fill this gap, serving as the protector of its people and the guarantor of their basic needs
- MNC-I must pressure the GOI to take meaningful steps to gain legitimacy; we must also support the GOI as it attempts to fill the gap by defeating or neutralizing those elements it is competing with



Threat Categories and Groups	
Sunni Extremists Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) • HP attacks: T&FF, SVEST, S/VBIED • Targets CF, ISF, GoI, Infrastructure, Shia/Sunni civilians • Seeks to cause a failed state and establish Caliphate • May be shifting strategic emphasis to northern Iraq Ansar al Sunna (AAS) • Seeks CF withdrawal and Sharia Law in Iraq • Disagrees with AQI over targeting of Muslims, true nature of jihad and global instead of Iraqi focus Ansar al Islam (AAI) • Kurdish Islamic Fundamentalist that founded AAS • Withered after OIF in 2003, may be resurging	Shia Militias Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) • Military wing of OMS • Primarily poor, young, uneducated Shia • Support base in Sadr City • Seeks to Defend Shia populace and expel CF • Responsible for vast majority of EFP attacks Badr Organization • Political party... and SCIRI's de facto militia • Integrated into ISF • Disciplined and organized • Historical rivalry with Sadrists
Sunni Rejectionists 1920s Revolutionary Bde (1920RB) • Seeks increased Sunni power and influence • Majority from the Zobai tribe • Recent split over ceasefire negotiations with CF Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) • Self-identified Defenders of the Sunni Populace • Moving towards cooperation with CF • Increasingly Anti-AQI Jaysh Mujahidin (JM) • Seeks to re-establish Sunni dominance • Possibly merging with IAI and elements of AAS	Shia Splinter Groups Army of Guardians • Led by radical Shia cleric Mahmud al Sarkhi • Cult-like armed group opposed to political process Thar Allah • Moved from Iran into Basrah after OIF in 2003 • Heavily involved in smuggling • Not recognized as a political party by GOI Office of the Lord of Martyrs (OLM) • Formed with IRGC-QF assistance to oppose former regime • Historical ties with SCIRI and Badr in Basrah Jund al Samaa • Small apocalyptic cult opposed to Najaf religious leadership



(S//REL) Most Likely Threat Course of Action: Shia Militias defensive, Sunni Rejectionists fragmented, and AQI isolated. JAM will stay on the defensive in Baghdad, responding locally to Sunni attacks but not pursuing coherent expansion. Intra-Shia rivalries will flare up occasionally, especially in the Shia South between JAM and Badr, but will be kept in check by the Hawzah's emphasis on Shia Unity. Sunni Rejectionists will remain fragmented, with each group turning against AQI but not coalescing into a unified Sunni opposition movement. AQI will continue high profile attacks to deepen Shia-Sunni sectarian divisions, especially in Baghdad and Diyala. AQI will also attempt to instigate an Arab-Kurd ethnic conflict, focusing on Mosul and Kirkuk. AQI's efforts will be frustrated by a lack of popular support as well as by Sunni Rejectionist, tribal, and Kurdish opposition.

(S//REL) Most Dangerous Threat Course of Action: Shia Unity fragments, Sunni Tribes and Rejectionists unite, and AQI shifts focus to Kurdistan. JAM and Badr intra-Shia rivalry escalates to the point of fragmenting Shia Unity. JAM rises up against CFs with 1.4b, 1.4d. Sunni Tribes and Sunni Rejectionists unite to take advantage of the disarray and restore Sunni dominance. The Gol fails. The ISF fractures along sectarian and intra-sectarian lines. Shia Splinter Groups seize the opportunity to pursue their interests, especially in Basrah and possibly in Najaf. AQI resurges in northern Iraq, concentrating its operations on Kurdistan. This shift in focus allows AQI to establish its harsh control over a population that is not Arab, alleviating much of the current tension between the Sunni Rejectionists/Tribes and AQI. The Kurds become the common enemy rather than AQI.

The MDCOA requires the following conditions: 1.4b, 1.4d pressure for sufficient Shia unity to ensure a Shia-dominated Gol is undermined, both JAM and Badr experience leadership failures resulting in loss of restraint, and a strong Sunni leader emerges.

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Operational Assessment



The Goal: *A stable Iraq*

Key reads:

- Recognize there are different threats in different areas
- Realization that there is an sectarian and ethnic problem
- Understanding sub-agendas of multiple groups/actors
- Each area requires multiple approaches based on multiple threats
- The greatest threat to stability is escalating sectarian violence
- The greatest sectarian violence is occurring in Baghdad, Baghdad Belts

Key requirements:

- Reduce sectarian violence and promote non-sectarian behavior
- Stop displacement of population, particularly in Baghdad
- *Main effort:* establish security in mixed Sunni and Shia areas in order to protect against Shia intimidation/displacement/violence against Sunni
- *Supporting efforts:* maintain security in Shia areas-protect against AQ accelerants and Sunni reprisals

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Assumptions

(1 of 2)



- △ *By Sep 07, the MNC-I commander will assess that conditions in Iraq have sufficiently improved and will make a recommendation to continue the current approach*
- △ *External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraq*
- △ *The USG will continue to support the current GOI*
- △ *Absent external influences, the GOI will edge toward a pattern of sectarian-based behavior that destabilizes Iraq*
- △ *The GOI will continue to accept the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq, but, after UNSCR 1723 expires, those forces will operate with reduced authorities*
- △ *The GOI will not request that the UN mandate for MNF-I be terminated prior to 31 Dec 07*
- △ *MNF-I will be able to maintain twenty U.S. BCTs in ITO for several months, with a reduction in force beginning no earlier than Nov 07*
- △ *Once the reduction of U.S. BCTs begins, force levels in ITO will not rise again; there will be no more "plus-up"*
- △ *The long-term security arrangement between the USG and GOI will involve the presence of at least four U.S. BCTs on Iraqi soil for a period of five to ten years*

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- In order to take a long-term view of our operations in Iraq, MNC-I is making the first assumption; implicit here is that GEN Petraeus will render a positive assessment, allowing us to continue the current approach of supporting the GOI and maintaining a substantial CF presence at least through 2008
- Key assumptions about the GOI – acknowledging the Shia-dominated GOI as part of the problem but a GOI that we support in part because we view it as responsive to the leverage the Coalition can apply
- There is a limited period in which we can apply maximum leverage – captured in other assumptions
- Finally, an assumption in the absence of political guidance on the long-term security arrangement

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Assumptions

(2 of 2)



- △ MARCENT will provide a MEF (Fwd) in ITO through 2009
- △ OCF-I operations will continue through 2009 against AQ/AQI
- △ CJSOTF-AP will retain the equivalent of one Special Forces Group in ITO through 2009 to conduct FID, direct action, and special reconnaissance
- △ The UK will maintain a division headquarters and, at a minimum, a brigade-sized force in southern Iraq through 2009
- △ MND-CS headquarters will remain in ITO at least through Dec 07
- △ MND-NE headquarters will remain in ITO at least through Dec 08
- △ Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition – a commitment beginning in Fall 2007 and lasting until Jun 08
- △ Ten embedded PRTs will remain in ITO for as long as U.S. force levels stay at ten BCTs or higher

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•Assumptions on force levels – Special Operations Forces, Coalition partners, PRTs

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MNC-I Mission



MNC-I conducts *combat and stability operations* in coordination *with the Iraqi Security Forces* to *secure the population*, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GOI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish improved stability and create irreversible momentum, leading to wide-ranging political accommodation and sustainable security by Spring 2009 and to the ultimate goal of self-reliance in the longer term.

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- Corps mission statement
- Secure the population, defeat or neutralize our enemies, and then transition security responsibilities
- With the purpose of stabilizing Iraq and enabling self-reliance
- We will achieve these purposes sequentially – with improved stability in the near term and self-reliance in the longer term

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Commander's Intent



Purpose:

The purpose of our operations is to bring stability to Iraq and then to sustain it in order to create time and space for the Iraqis to make progress toward political accommodation, continued political and economic development, and ultimately self-reliance. We accomplish this first by securing the population of Iraq, with priority to Baghdad, followed by the nine strategic cities and the rest of the country. Additionally, we must continue to support the development of a capable GOI and ISF so that both are viewed as legitimate and credible in the eyes of Iraqis. In order to sustain stability over time, we help build governmental capacity, strengthen GOI legitimacy, reduce sectarian behavior in Iraqi security institutions, and deliberately transition security responsibilities to the ISF as they demonstrate appropriate readiness to assume them. All of this leads to Iraqi self-reliance, creating the conditions for a peaceful, stable Iraq, led by a representative government subscribing to the rule of law, able to provide security for its people, and denying its territory as a terrorist safe haven.

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- Commander's intent – first of four slides
- Purpose of bringing stability to Iraq, sustaining it over time, and setting the conditions for Iraqi self-reliance
- We improve stability first by securing the population, with priority to Baghdad
- Establishing security is synchronized with helping to build capacity and legitimacy in the ISF and GOI
- As we sustain stability over time, we transition security responsibilities to the Iraqis in a deliberate fashion as elements of the ISF become ready
- Long-term purpose of self-reliance



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Commander's Intent



Key Tasks:

- ⚡ **Protect the population**, with priority to where ethno-sectarian violence undermines the security situation; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and address local grievances; rekindle hope among the people by making progress toward a secure environment, sustained increasingly by a more capable, credible ISF
- ⚡ **Facilitate reconciliation** among key internal actors competing for power in Iraq; conduct **engagement** with potentially reconcilable factions and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means as **leverage to support negotiations** leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI; at local and provincial levels, promote dialogue across sectarian lines
- ⚡ **Defeat AQI and extremists**; kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development
- ⚡ **Continue to develop ISF capacity** through partnership, enhanced transition teams, and advisory / assistance units; we must work to make the ISF more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders – to include commissioned officers and NCOs

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- MNC-I has 6 key tasks
- The first is protect the population
- Facilitate reconciliation through engagement with potentially reconcilable factions, using the leverage we have to bring about local ceasefires
- We will defeat those groups deemed irreconcilable, with the goal of rendering their efforts to political progress ineffective
- We place an emphasis on developing ISF capacity, which includes reducing sectarian behavior, improving combat effectiveness, and preparing the ISF for the long term through leader development

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Commander's Intent



Key Tasks (cont.):

- Assist efforts to build and *improve GOI capacity*, focusing on essential services, accountable local governance, and sustainable economic development; in careful coordination with this support, *promote non-sectarian behavior* while contributing to efforts to remove GOI officials who adhere to sectarian agendas
- Protect the force* through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against indirect-fire and IED networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats

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- Assist with the effort to improve GOI capacity and help the GOI build legitimacy by promoting non-sectarian behavior
- Last but not least – protect the force through an effective use of the reconnaissance and surveillance systems we have – focusing on IDF and IED networks



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Commander's Intent



End State:

In the near term, an *improved level of stability* is achieved; the population is secure and conditions are set for the *restoration of civil authority in Iraq, with priority to Baghdad*; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. Iraqi Security Forces, while continuing to build capacity, are in the lead – for the most part – with CF in tactical or operational overwatch. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent CF and ISF pressure. Their freedom of action is limited; their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation where ceasefires exist.

In the longer term, *Iraq is self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources it needs to govern justly*, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

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- Again, the end state is characterized in both the near-term and the longer term
- In the near term – around Dec 07 – we seek an improved level of stability, defined most prominently by a significant reduction in violence and progress toward political accommodation
- We exploit this stability by synchronizing the security effort with improvement in governance and economic development
- Leading to Iraqi self-reliance in the longer term, characterized by political stability, security from internal and external threats, denied as a safe haven for terror, and integrated into the community of nations
- We envision the end state to be several years away

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Key Judgments and Vision for 2007




▲ MNC-I understands that *time is not on our side*. We must make *visible progress soon* in order to generate momentum and buy time for the Coalition to meet its long-term goals in Iraq. "Filling the gap" with a legitimate GOI will only come through a combination of security, improved governance, and economic development. *Security constitutes the visible progress* we need in the coming months and *creates momentum and space* for the GOI to take meaningful steps forward in those areas that require a longer period to yield results. *Security synchronized with effective governance and economic development* can succeed, but it will take great political effort on the part of the GOI, as well as a serious commitment to reconciliation.

▲ The time in which we can apply maximum leverage – between now and the end of 2007 – is the *critical period*. MNC-I will direct its efforts in the near term toward achieving *an improved level of stability*, attained during Dec 07 and characterized by a significant reduction in sectarian violence (principally in Baghdad) and substantial progress toward reconciliation. This improvement in the near term will set the conditions for *increasing stability further over time*, creating an environment whereby security for the population is sustained, advances in Iraqi governance and economic development can proceed, and progress toward a negotiated political settlement can be made.

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- The reason we have a near-term focus is because we have a near-term imperative to show visible progress
- We must show visible progress soon to generate momentum and to buy time for the Coalition to meet its long-term goals
- The most compelling form of visible progress will be the reduction of violence and the establishment of a more secure environment – recognizing that the secure environment we are striving for must be sustainable
- We have the opportunity to apply the maximum leverage between now and the end of 2007 – this is the critical period in which we must achieve an improved level of stability




- Operational framework with MNF-I's draft framework below
- MNF-I LOOs, goals, target dates for achieving goals
- Sep 07 interim assessment, Dec 07 decision point
- MNC-I has three primary LOOs with a fourth supporting the others
- LOOs guide our actions toward the near term and the end state
- The near term and the end state are both defined by sets of conditions
- MNC-I has nine objectives that correspond to the LOOs
- We make progress toward these objectives through the near term and on through to the end state
- The end state conditions describe what the environment will look like when the objectives are accomplished


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- **Sep 07 Interim Assessment:** 5 conditions indicating that trends toward political accommodation headed in right direction – GOI progress on reducing sectarianism; passage of key legislation (de-Baathification, revenue management or election law); Sadr movement toward compromise; local ceasefires; Kirkuk (Coalition and GOI efforts to delay referendum until after 2007)
 - **Dec 07 Decision Point:** 7 conditions showing that the Coalition and GOI are on track – further GOI progress on reducing sectarianism; reduced violence; further Sadr movement toward compromise; provincial elections held; realized local ceasefires;

Kirkuk referendum postponed to 2008; international authorities (UNSCR rollover)


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
- The next several slides list the conditions I referred to in the previous slide
- They are categorized first by LOO, then by objective, and by near-term and end state as well
- Categorizing the conditions in terms of near and end state provides guidance for priority of effort and also provides a means of assessing progress
- Again, the near-term conditions in yellow are characterized by an improved level of stability; we aim to meet the conditions by Dec 07; the end state conditions in green are in line with the longer term – and are thus much more extensive
- For the Secure Environment LOO, the three objectives relate to protecting the populace, dealing with violent actors, and border security
- The conditions in the near term reflect our emphasis on protecting the population of Baghdad and making progress in the area of reconciliation through local ceasefires
- Differences between this near term and end state in this LOO are really one of degree




- Two objective fall under the Capable, Credible ISF LOO – developing ISF capability and reducing sectarian behavior in the ISF; and continuing to make progress with a conditions-based transition of security responsibilities
- In the near term, we expect continuing progress in the Iraqi Army while progress in the police services and border forces will likely be seen as we push toward the end state conditions
- Progress in transition is gauged over the near and long term in terms of Coalition Force posture




- The first of two slides on the objectives and conditions for the Legitimate, Capable GOI LOO
- Emphasis in the near term on building governmental capacity in the provinces and improving essential services
- Progressing in the longer term to more noticeable and comprehensive improvements in infrastructure




- Final two objectives on capabilities and perception of the GOI and on economic development
- The near term is geared toward assisting the GOI make progress in the area of reconciliation and making relatively modest gains in setting the conditions for future economic growth



- Phasing construct acknowledges diverse conditions throughout the country
- Different parts in different phases
- Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition Force posture in a given area
- The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time
- In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retain approach in partnership with the Iraqis
- In Phase 3 – efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under ISF lead; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for COIN operations
- In Phase 4 – ISF independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs
- In Phase 5 – All elements of the ISF performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities



- Snapshot of MNC-I's concept overlaid on a map
- Main effort – securing the populace of Baghdad
- Key supporting effort of interdicting accelerants in the Baghdad Belts
- Exploiting recent successes against AQL in the west
- Exploiting success related to transition in parts of the north
- Supporting the transition of security responsibilities in the southern provinces
- Efforts to improve border security



- How we have arrayed forces to execute concept given 20 U.S. BCT set
- Main security effort is protecting the population, with priority to Baghdad and then to strategic cities
- Coalition Forces and ISF secure people of Baghdad while outlying MNDs interdict accelerants to sectarian violence and deny them sanctuary within the Baghdad Belts
- Includes a balanced approach in application of population control measures, as well as in conduct of intelligence-driven strike operations against Sunni and Shia extremists
- CJSOTF – a key role through operations to disrupt EJK networks as well as AQI's ability to carry out high-profile attacks in Baghdad
- Sustaining adequate Coalition Force presence in outlying areas to execute supporting efforts
- In Anbar, MNC-I exploits inroads made with Sunni tribes to improve population security, making progress toward defeating AQI and neutralizing Sunni insurgent groups; deploying the MEU later this summer will contribute to this effort
- In northern provinces, initial priority to protecting populace of Diyala, where effects of CF pressure in Baghdad have resulted in an escalation of AQI activity; continue to deny Mosul as an extremist sanctuary; monitor situation around Kirkuk, conducting engagement to help prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI as a result of Kurdish expansionism
- In the south, CF continue with an ordered transition to Iraqi civil control and take measures to ensure intra-Shia conflict remains localized and does not threaten Coalition lines of communication
- Throughout the country, CJSOTF supports the effort by conducting

tribal engagement, disrupting EJK networks, and disrupting the flow of terrorists and foreign fighters into Iraq

- Security efforts synchronized with other lines of operation, supported by a focus on reconciliation leading to political accommodation

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