Offensive CONOP
12 Dec 06

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad, reducing the level of sectarian violence while helping the GOI regain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?
Purpose

• Purpose
  – To obtain additional guidance from the CG on concept development for offensive operations (date TBD)

• Agenda
  – Threat Assessment
  – Facts, Constraints, Assumptions
  – Tasks and Conditions
  – Concept of Operations
  – Risk
Threat Courses of Action

Most Likely Threat COA

- AQI moves North
  Probe barrier for breach points
  Suicide attacks shift to Diyala, Salah ad Din
- JAM defends Sadr City
  Reinforce Sadr City defenses
  Emplace EFPs along AAs
  Consolidate fighters in Sadr City
  Control movement into Sadr City

Key Red Indicators:
- EFPs concentrated east of Tigris
- Death squads reduced west of Tigris
- Increase in HP attacks in MND-N

Most Dangerous Threat COA

- AQI shifts focus to Sunni Belt
  M&I Campaign against local leaders
- JAM launches January Offensive
  Increase EFPs along LOCs, focus areas
  Increase IDF against CF FOBs
  Incite Shia demonstrations in Baghdad and in south (Diwaniyah, Najaf, al Kut) to disrupt FOM

Key Red Indicators:
- Increased EFPs in focus areas
- Increased Shia IDP out of Sunni Belt
- Shia populace demonstrations

- VBIEDs built inside Baghdad will continue to be emplaced;
  target selection will be limited by CF/ISF operations
- Snipers will focus on barrier checkpoints
- AQI will attempt to attack barrier checkpoints with SVBIEDs and infiltrate SVESTs into Baghdad
# Troop-to-Task

## Current Operations

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<tr>
<th>MNO-N:</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Forces (Coy)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operation SHADOW HUNTER</td>
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<td>Operation BLACK GULCH</td>
<td>Framework 14 Sep-Ongoing</td>
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<td>CO/T-22 Dec-Deploing</td>
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<td>Operation EAGLE THUNDER</td>
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<td>1xBrn</td>
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<td>CO/T-13 Dec</td>
<td>2xCo/1xBrn 3A</td>
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<td>Operation ICE FOG</td>
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<td>Operation WOLF</td>
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<td>Operation ALL MAJIC</td>
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<td>1xRCT/1xA Bda</td>
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<td>Operation Square Play</td>
<td>27 Nov-19 Jan</td>
<td>1xRCT/2xBrn 3Brig 5Brn</td>
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## Log Support

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Still Working
Timeline for IA BDE Movement

**CF Actions**

4/1 IA
- 4/1 IA HQ begins deployment to MNF-I
- 4/111גניל 2/4/1 IA begins deployment to MNF-I
- 4/1 IA FOC
- 11/1 and 24th Bn FOC

3/1/3 IA
- 3-53 IA closes in MNF-I
- 3/13 IA FOC

3/4 IA
- TSC after 3/1/3th, 3/4th IA begins deploying from MNF-N to MNF-I

1/2 IA
- TSC after 2/14th, 1/2nd IA begins deploying from MNF-I to MNF-N

*MNFI asked to deploy 3/1/3, incentive training not ready prior to deployment.*
Facts

- Reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad requires much more than a military solution; military efforts directed at the problem must be synchronized with political, economic, and informational efforts
  - ISF
    - Iraqi population views ISF operating in conjunction with CF as impartial
  - CF
    - MNDs are already conducting operations on a regular basis in the areas under consideration
    - Current mission requirements in MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-SE prohibit the reallocation of combat power from those units to MND-B
    - Existing MNC-I aviation assets already committed to critical missions
    - ISR requirements increase in Baghdad to support offensive operations
  - GOI
    - CoR in recess Feb-Mar 07
Constraints

- Must operate within current basing footprint
- Additional forces committed to Iraq from outside the theater must adhere to existing JRSOI timeline
Assumptions

• Threat
  - Disrupting the VBIED network will contribute to a decrease in popular Shia support of JAM
  - Disrupting illegal militia activity will contribute to a decrease in popular Sunni support of AQI
  - JAM led death squad activity west of the Tigris River will attempt to perpetuate the sectarian cycle of violence in Baghdad
  - AQI and JAM will attempt to contest control of the Baghdad Belts to secure LOCs in and out of Baghdad
  - Sunni extremists will attempt to perpetuate the sectarian cycle of violence in Baghdad by attempting to cause mass casualty attacks against Shia
  - Shia extremists will seek sanctuary in areas east of the Tigris River while Sunnis will move outside of Baghdad for sanctuary
  - MOI/MOT vehicles will continue to be used by militant forces to conduct EJK

• ISF
  - NP and IP units are heavily infiltrated by Shia militias; IA units are less infiltrated by militias, but are vulnerable to sectarian influences
  - IA BDE move:
    • Under current timeline, 3 IA Bns and 1 Bde HQ ready for operations In and around Baghdad by mid-January (1-4/1, 2-4/1, 3-1/3, 4/1 HQ)
    • 2 additional IA BDEs (elements from 3/4 IA and 1/2 IA) ready for operations by February at the earliest
  - Strike Force will be available for operations ICW CF
Assumptions

- GOI
  - GOI will not impede or undermine the operation once it is underway
- CF
  - Forces from outside Iraq are available if required
  - Increasing the frequency and pace of CF operations against VBIED and EFP networks may require a decrease in targeting standards
Tasks

- Essential / Specified
  - Reduce sectarian violence in and around Baghdad
- Implied
  - Disrupt VBIED networks that exacerbate sectarian tensions in and around Baghdad
  - Disrupt illegal militia activity, focusing on groups on both sides of the sectarian divide
  - Disrupt EFP networks
  - Employ CF and ISF in combined operations – with CF initially in the lead
  - Partner CF with ISF units operating in and around Baghdad to the fullest practical extent
  - Integrate IA units recently deployed to Baghdad into operations
  - Conduct information operations that highlight the activities and successes of the ISF
  - Continue to build capacity of the ISF
  - Isolate extremists in and around Baghdad
  - Conduct strike operations
  - Clear, control, and retain focus areas in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts
  - Posture forces for the accelerated transition of security self-reliance to the ISF
  - Synchronize and prioritize ISR; determine additional requirements
Critical Conditions
Required for Beginning the Operation

- Concurrency from GOI, including a strong statement of support from the PM
- Declaration of martial law in Baghdad and in the Baghdad Belts
  - GOI agreement regarding vehicle ban, curfew, random searches, and control of access
- CF available to establish an effective cordon around Baghdad in the vicinity of the existing barrier
  - Ability to surge counter-mobility capabilities shortly afterwards to improve the barrier and further control access
- CF available to immediately begin operations ICW ISF in focused areas of the city
  - Authorization to conduct operations in all areas of Baghdad, including Sadr City
- TF focused on VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
- Communications plan established; messages ready to be broadcast to target audiences (Iraqi populace, external actors, potential political participants)
- Agreement reached with MOD and MOI regarding C2 relationships (CF – IA unit C2 relationships, MNC-I coordination with MOD and MOI)
Critical Conditions
Required for Achieving the Endstate

- GOI and MNF-I develop an agreeable endstate and way ahead
- GOI must agree to Bridging Concept and sign an MOU that clearly articulates responsibilities in preparation for its execution
- GOI releases statement supporting MOU and explaining importance for all Iraqis
- GOI announces and institutes a plan for the near-term (Cease Fire), mid-term (Amnesty Program), and endstate for all militias
- CF develops a Strategic Communications plan to ensure Coalition and Iraqi people understand the purpose of the Bridging Strategy as the “Logical Next Step”
- GOI institutes genuine and transparent MOI reform and develops a plan for the improvement of ministerial capacity in Industry, Transportation, and Health
- GOI dictates command & control lead for Baghdad and how it should evolve; pursuant to CF relocation to the periphery (e.g., MOD to MOI to PDoP)
- GOI releases DFI Funds to Anbar & Tall Aftar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
- Unambiguous agreement concerning CF enabler support and a plan to transition all to GOI
- Agreement on the gradual reallocation of MNC-I’s non-military tasks; guidance specifying support role to PRTs and IRMO (GOI agrees to assume phased responsibility for “build” projects and plans)
# Concept of Operations

## Phase I: Offensive
- Control access through the Baghdad barrier
- Improve the barrier, making it a viable obstacle
- CF-led operations in focused areas of Baghdad, including Sadri City
- Increased focus of OCF-I against targets east of the Tigris
- Increased focus by CJSTF on EFP and VBED networks in Belts, barrier, and city
- Partnership with IA and IPS

16 Jan – 31 Jan 07

## Phase II: Expand on OIF II
- Clear and secure focus areas in the Baghdad Belts and in Baghdad itself – Coalition responsibility
- Build in those areas – GOI responsibility
- Expand on the concept of “gated neighborhoods”
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF

1 Feb – 15 Mar 07

## Phase III: Declared Cease Fire
- Announce reconciliation plan
- Implement Bridging Strategy: enhanced TTs, fading partnerships, movement to the periphery, posturing of forces for strike ops
- Battlespace handover to IA
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF

16 Mar – UTC (overlap in phases)

## Phase IV: Exploitation and Transition
- CJSTF/I OCF-I/ISOF – sustained strike against EFP and VBED networks
- Strike ops
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF
- Accelerated transition from robust TTs, reduction in scope of CF missions
### Concept of Operations

#### Phase I - Set Conditions
- **Required political conditions achieved preparatory to a surge in Baghdad security ops**
- **GOI-CF agreement on endstate agreement on political package as an incentive for reconciliation**
- **Reconstruction requirements for selected focus areas defined**
- **Information operations**
- **Supporting military operations**:  
  - MNF-W dissects AQI networks in Ramadi, Falluja, Abu Ghraib in order to deny the flow of destabilizing Sunni forces into Baghdad  
  - MNF-N dissects AQI networks in Samarra-Balad-Baquqah in order to deny the flow of destabilizing Sunni forces into Baghdad  
  - CJTFTF conducts strike operations ICW ISOF in the Sunni Bases and Baghdad in order to disrupt EF and VBIED networks  
  - Requested support for increased GCF-I focus against targets east of the Tigris  
  - MND-SE continues efforts to transition to Iraqi security self-reliance

#### Phase II - Clear, Control, and Retain
- **MND-B conducts clear, control, and retain ops in Baghdad in order to reduce sectarian violence**
- **CF-led combined operations in focused areas of Baghdad, including Sadr City**
- **Information operations**
- **Implementation of reconstruction projects in focus areas – increasing GOI responsibility**
- **Expand on the concept of "gated neighborhoods"**
- **Continue to build capacity in the ISF**
- **Supporting military operations**:  
  - No change – required to ensure momentum in MND-B as security situation improves
**Concept of Operations**

**Phase III - Return and Renew**
- Announce reconciliation plan, incorporating incentives to maximize broad participation in the reconciliation process
- Cease fire as a basic for making progress on the path to reconciliation
- Combined security and response outposts in Baghdad
- Implement Bridging Strategy: enhanced TTs, fading partnerships, movement to the periphery, posturing of forces for strike ops
- Battlespace handover to IA
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF
- Continue reconstruction projects in focus areas
- CJTF-OIF/I SOF conduct sustained strikes against EFP and VBIED networks

**Phase IV - Transition and Exploitation**
- Transfer of security responsibilities in Baghdad – reorganized C2 relationships, alignment of IA boundaries with police districts
- CJTF-OIF/I SOF conduct strikes against EFP and VBIED networks
- MNF conduct strike ops against EFP and VBIED networks
- Continue to build capacity in the ISF; accelerated transition
- Continue reconstruction projects in focus areas
Concept Sketch
Phase III: Declared Cease Fire

DCI (Request for Support)
- Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River (redacted commitment)
- Disrupt VBIED networks accelerating sectarian tension

MND-A
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Enhance legitimacy and capability of the ISF

Other MNOs
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- Enhance legitimacy and capability of the ISF
Options / Considerations

• Partnership Ratio (as a means of determining force requirements)
  – 1 x U.S. Company partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier
  – 1 x U.S. Battalion partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier
  – 1 U.S. Company partnered with each IA Bn within the Baghdad barrier; 2 U.S. Strike Bns – 1 on each side of the Tigris River

• Baghdad Barrier
  – Analyze the impact of improving the barrier and manning it with CF

• Border Operations
  – Relatively small, light force committed to border operations in Wasit Province
  – 1 x U.S. Battalion (Stryker) committed to border operations in Wasit Province
  – No shaping operation on the border

• Boundary Change
  – Expansion of MND-B AO to the north, to include Baqubah and perhaps Balad

• C2

• "Hot-seating" equipment to sustain the surge

• Basing implications as a result of receiving additional forces
Options to Generate Additional Maneuver Capability

• Potential Maneuver Capabilities

  1.4a, 1.4g

• Issues
  – Basing
  – Sustainment
  – TPE sets (APS-3/5 ?)
  – Crew
  – Heavy Machine Guns
  – BFT/FBCB2/Comms
  – Strategic transportation
  – Intra-Theater transportation
MNF-I Reinforcing Effects

- Gaining GOI concurrence with the operation
- Achieving agreement with the GOI on a legislative agenda addressing:
  - Militias
  - Reconciliation
  - Provincial elections
  - Ceasefire, followed by some form of disarmament policy
- Exploit the execution of Saddam as a springboard for reconciliation; mark the event with a GOI announcement on a new approach to de-Ba'athification
- Focusing TF I.4 on VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
- Assisting with MOI reform and the continued development of the industry, agriculture, and health ministries
- Achieving agreement with GOI on the release of DFI Funds to Anbar and Tall Afar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
Risk

- Overplaying the importance of the operation from an IQ and PA perspective may lead to a quicker degradation of GOI and ISF legitimacy if it fails to visibly reduce sectarian violence.
- Escalation of U.S. involvement in kinetic operations will appear to contradict our stated intent to transition control to the Iraqis – even if that remains our ultimate objective.
- Colleteral damage resulting from a surge in kinetic operations in urban areas may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunni and Shia perceive CF and ISF operations as biased or unbalanced.
- The declaration of martial law may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunnis perceive a partial GOI as clamping down overbearingly in Sunni areas.
- GOI interference may hamstring CF activity and result in the perception of an unbalanced operation.
- Manpower-intensive operation will limit CF operational and tactical flexibility (i.e. the ability to surge against cross-border activity).
- Failure to commit enough forces to the operation may result not only in a misuse of combat power but may also exacerbate sectarian tensions (i.e. declaring martial law without delivering on enhanced security).
Risk

- Imposition of martial law and tighter access controls may have a negative economic impact on certain communities and may also result in a more sustained disruption of basic needs.
- The escalation of kinetic operations may lead to negative global media coverage and result in the imposition of constraints.
- The escalation of ISF activity in and around Baghdad will expose these forces to more frequent attacks, perhaps resulting in the unstoppable disintegration of certain units.
- Interdiction of CF LOCs.
- Surge in CF activity may trigger a parallel surge in 1.4b, 1.4d.
Guidance
This slide depicts the areas that the MSCs will be conducting shaping operations and coordinating support for OCF-I targeted Ops.

**MND-N**

- In Bayji, which is quickly becoming a focal point in MND-N, the MSC has suffered a significant blow to its leadership picture as well. The normal composition of the Bayji MSC is 8 voting members (4 representatives from AAS and 4 representatives from AQIZ). Due to recent operations the leadership has been cut in half with 4 members KIA or detained. In lieu of pressure being put on the MSC’s, significant AQ figures are still active in the AO. Most notably is [1.4c] who has direct ties with AAM. Reporting indicates that [1.4c] operates mainly in the Tikrit River Valley (TRV) while making trips to Baghdad) to meet with other senior AQ officials.

- In addition to significant pressure being put on AQ leadership, the identification of the financial networks in the MND has begun. With the recent success of the operation conducted on the [1.4a] (Facility has ties to) SSE includes 55 ledgers, 2 computers, and several other pieces of media. Translation of materials complete, exploitation now being conducted. Will take several months before anything is produced from this), CF is beginning to take a look at
how to influence and disrupt the financial network.

CJSOTF

MND-B

MND-B will look to increase offensive operations against Abu Nur and Azhar VBIED networks (Rusafa, New Baghdad, Karada, Doura, and Mansoor districts).

They will continue security operations and will conduct shaping operations in: The Shakariya triangle - YTPP,

MNF-W

Out west, the focus remains Ramadi but they continue to apply pressure along the Hit- Haditha corridor. They will go into more detail on activities in their AO.
ISR Concept of Support

- ISR requirements increase in Baghdad to support offensive operations
  - Support shaping and decisive operations with ISR ISO operations to capture/kill T&FF and Extremist cells/leaders, locate weapons caches, and neutralize IED networks
  - Support CJSOTF operations focused on VBIED networks
  - Provide ISE to DIV MITTs to provide intelligence in support of force protection and intelligence sharing (must be internally sourced)
  - Provide contingency support as required to unplanned events
- Coordinate with MNF CM for ISR reprioritization and synchronization- Initial increase in effort toward target development
- No ISR assets in reserve
  - 1.4c posture focused on target development
  - 1.4c capacity adequate to support CF operations; shift efforts to assist MITT and ISF operations

1.4c
ISR Concept of Support
MITT Teams- Intelligence Augmentation

Current Situation:

Recommendation:
- Augment MITTs with an ISE (Internally sourced by supporting Division BCT)
  - ISE will provide MITTs with force protection Intelligence
  - ISE will provide MITT and Intelligence sharing capability
  - ISE will required communication package and access to interpreter support
- Formalized Intelligence training and standards. Develop Division G2/S2 METL and supporting tasks
Proposed Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, execute the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to ISSR.
Proposed Commander’s Intent

• Purpose
  – Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; isolate extremists
  – Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation

• Key Tasks
  – Conduct predominantly U.S.-led operations in the Baghdad belts and barrier, and against focused areas within the city itself.
  – Use a balanced approach in operations, targeting both Sunni and Shia extremists—particularly those involved in networks employing VBIEDs and EFPs respectively.
  – Maximize the “Iraqi face” on operations and exploit the information operations opportunity stemming from a surge in ISF activity.
  – ICW MNF-I, assist the GOI with the development of a substantial political package leading immediately to a cease fire and, ultimately, reconciliation.

• Endstate
  – Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF
  – Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force
  – GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it.
  – Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire
  – MOI reform underway: improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated.
  – Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy.
  – CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation.
Considerations / Issues

- Consider the use of CJSOTF and OCF-I (as well as ISOF) as a shaping operation
- Role of police?
- Develop an improvement package for DBE and POE forces as part of the Transition Bridging Strategy
- Role of National Police
- Develop options to sustain surge periods in focus areas (i.e. equipment-sharing)
**Concept Sketch**

- Sketch – a multi-divisional effort
- Include task and purpose for subordinate units
- Additional COAs?
  - Strike operations
  - Control with strike ops
  - Clear
  - Combined
- Possible focus areas
  - Southern Sunni Belt
  - Eastern Diyala (esp. Baqubah)
  - Southern Salah ad Din (esp. Taji and Balad)
  - Abu Ghraib
  - Selected areas in Baghdad
  - Others?
- Timeframe: 15 Jan – 15 Mar
Way Ahead

- XXX