MNC-I Update

Purpose: To Inform Distinguished Visitors on MNC-I Current and Future Operations and Intelligence

5 AUG 07
Agenda

- Intelligence Overview
- MNC-I Mission and Intent
- Current Force Disposition
- Campaign Phases and Current Concept
- Operation Phantom Thunder
- Operation Phantom Strike Overview
- Operation Phantom Hammer Overview
- Operation Silver Raven Overview
- Scalable Strike Package Concept
- Summary (Baghdad and Rest of Iraq)
Intelligence Update
Operation Phantom Thunder has had a substantial impact on AQI’s freedom of movement in the focus areas of operations. The majority of AQI fighters who are indigenous to their areas of operation are ceasing activity in the near term, blending back into the local populace and in some instances returning to their smaller, local villages of origin.

JAM is taking advantage of CF operations to retake lost ground; in conjunction with ISF, in both Baqubah and Khalis.

Operation Arrowhead Ripper has caused a significant disruption in the former AQI stronghold Baqubah, forcing AQI elements to conduct operations in other, more permissive locations to include DRV, Muqdadiyah, Balad Ruz.

AQI network in the southern belt is disrupted, but retains capability to conduct limited offensive operations locally and support operations into Baghdad.

Operations spanning from Karmah north to Lake Thar Thar has forced the exodus of AQI leadership and dispersion of fighters into smaller, local villages en route SAD.

Operations disrupt AQI’s ability to conduct spectacular attacks; East Rashid remains heavily contested area; Anti-AQI progress in Mansour.
Attacks remain at lower levels, resources interdicted and destroyed; attacks in AO Anaheim are well planned with unobserved egress
- Enormous caches have been discovered and destroyed as well as large supply trucks that have been interdicted on ASR Golden. Attacks are down 50% on ASR Golden
- Several of the attacks on CF show signs of extensive planning, even for command wire IEDs egress was unobserved, a night SAF attack on 5 x 2 man teams maneuver on a cordon (12 JUL)
- Emerge IEDs to restrict CF freedom of movement

AQLI displacing to northern Thar Thar shores, Salah Ad Din and into Diyala Province; possibly resorting to mobile training teams
- Reporting indicates that AQLI in AO Anaheim does not attempt to blend in but rather moves to an alternate location if forced out by consistent CF operations

AQLI continues to use surrounding areas as a base to support offensive operations into population centers; sanctuary from anti-AQLI resistance
AO Anaheim has b
- Lack of strong tribal network in AO Anaheim attracts AQLI; comfortable operating in open with LN observation; fear of retribution for cooperation with CF after we leave
- M&A from other Anbar areas install fear in AO Anaheim

Movement from Karmah to other support zones in Diyala Province or perceived refuge along Thar Thar Lake northern shores
"Quarries" enemy activity is not in fact located in the quarries;

Operation Fardh al Amin in AO Anaheim displacing AQLI from MNF-W and the Diyala Province into Salah Ad Din and Samarra
- Inefficient atmosphere; no need for AQLI to engage CF because of large battle space
- Expect TIBED attacks on PEs; smaller TIBEDs possibly illustrate at least short supply shortages
- Methane Chemical Complex near center in Anahin for AQLI Operations; possibly revenue producing cell

1.4c
Hindered short term AQI operations and have forced leaders to flee the area, others cease operations until a decrease of CF/ISF presence in their neighborhoods

- AQI forced to operate in more permissive locations including the DRV, Muqdadiyah, and Balad Ruz

  Sunni extremist groups act against AQI and reach out to ISF and CF; Increased interest from Tribal leaders to expel AQI

  Lifting cordon provides opportunity to return to gather hidden caches, attacking CF/ISF using cover of returning civilians; Shia populace moving back to Baqubah due to the detainment and destruction of AQI elements; sectarian violence possibly reemerges as JAM infiltrated ISF asserts control

  JAM conducting attacks from Diyala province into Taji/ Tamliyah; emplacing EFPs to limit CF freedom of maneuver and enable their ability to attack AQI

MND-N: need to check levels of FF in SAD AQI

Operation Arrowhead Ripper has forced AQI elements to conduct operations in other, more permissive locations to include DRV, Muqdadiyah, Khalis, Balad Ruz

The operational importance of these increases as CF denies AQI freedom of movement

Operational successes have been two-fold; they have hindered AQI short term operations while serving to embolden Sunni extremist groups to act against AQI and reach out to ISF and CF

Despite recent ISF/CF operations, it is assessed that AQI still has a large number of caches remaining in

Approved for Release
the region, and retains the ability to conduct harassment attacks in the Baqubah area. AQI and JAM elements will continue to fight for control of the area due to its operational importance to both groups. Much of this area is contested as JAM continues to conduct retaliatory attacks against AQI, who were pushed into the area due to CF operations.

Northern Cities

Samarra; Confluence of events leads to escalation of tensions

Samarra known waypoint for AQI Operation Arrowhead Ripper and Operation Farad al Amin in AO Anaheim displacing AQI from MNF-W and the Diyala Province into Salah Ad Din and Samarra Baqubah; Operation Arrowhead Ripper displaced AQI into DRV and Breadbasket areas

Traditional support zone in DRV in small villages from Zarganiyah up to Muqdadiyah

Operation Arrowhead Ripper has denied AQI freedom of movement in Baqubah, significantly disrupting AQI’s strategy and hindering AQI short term operations

AQI will conduct harassment attacks in the Baqubah area but cannot return in strength while CF and ISF are securing the city.

Contact west side of TRV is significantly lower. Assess part of it is due to good small unit DA missions.

There’s increased interest with local tribesmen (facilitated by the 4/9 IA) to expel AQI. Yes, we’ve had some previous interest from lower tribal leadership, but nothing I assess as legitimate or fruitful. We’ve recently discovered a potential confederation of Sheiks located between Taji and Tarmiyah and are “source handled” by the 4/9IA S2. Cross-referencing sensitive reports, I feel this may be a break.

Reporting indicates intense fighting between JAM and AQI throughout the Rager AO, specifically in Ranga and Tarmiyah. It makes sense based on reports of gun-battles in labout Tarmiyah which are clearly not 4/2 SBCT. BL - I assess AQI is feeling the pressure.

Enemy activity east of the TRV remains at normal levels, maybe slightly elevated. There are intelligence reports supporting our assessment of JAM defensive prep in Husayniyah.

Commander, 3d HBCT, 1st Cavalry Division

Commanders Assessment: Yesterday I met with the Sunni Waaf Director, Fouad Mahmoud Atiya. He stated that many of the Sunni Tribal leaders would be willing to work with CF, ISF and the government if they saw improvements in security, services and quality of life.

Sheik Hamad Hazber Hasan Abdul Al-Anbak (paramount of Anbakia tribe) and Sheik Abdullah Wahab Ahmad Al-Minideal (Paramount of Ubaidi tribe), to discuss tribal reconciliation and civil defense against AOIZ and JAM in the western side of the DRV/Kahlas/Kahla area. After much discussion, both Sheiks signed a peace treaty between their tribes and promised to unite and defend one another against JAM and AOIZ. If both parties hold true to the treaty, their agreement will influence ridding the area of AQ and JAM influence and activity.

They gave us some interesting information about AQI activities in the greater Kana’an area, and their willingness to work with CF as scouts and fighters. In Kana’an SIGACTS have increased to 35 in the past 7 days, compared to 7 the week prior. The Kana’an leadership also stated that the IA and IP were too weak in the area, and they recommended that we provide more weapons and ammo to the IA’s and that some of the IP organizations were infiltrated by AQI supporters.

Sheikh Anom Karji al Jabori assumed control of the LRF and reclaimed the key terrain of Sheikh Najim Village to hold against counter attacks by AOIZ. I assess the impact from the operation could potentially build the Legitimate Resistance Force’s (LRF) confidence and trust with the ISF’s commitment to assist them and fight side-by-side to defeat AQIZ. I believe this operation could create confidence that will be duplicated throughout the Muqdadiyah Salaa and surrounding areas causing other Sunni Resistance Groups to unite and fight against AQIZ by assisting the ISF.

Dr. Homm, DG Health, made supply runs to Baghdad on June 20 and July 4, and has brought back 20 trucks of supplies and medicine. Yesterday Dr. Homm sent supplies to Khalis, and today he sent supplies to Balad
Ruz. Supplies for Khanquin and Jalula will be sent back with the head of the Provincial Council next week since he is from that area.

Security in Baqubah has been progressively improving since the commencement of Operation Arrowhead Ripper in combination with other collateral force operations. Affected most by these operations were AQI’s C2, and training elements, who are assessed as having dispersed north through the Diyala River Valley into areas such as the breadbasket, Hamrin mountain range region and south of Kirkuk, east to smaller towns and villages, and west into more permissive areas of Salah Ad Din. Lower-level leaders and foot soldiers have reportedly remained in the city, where they have either gone to ground in outlying areas of the region, or have attempted to conduct harassment attacks against security forces. The most tangible effects of AQI relocation can be seen in a line of attacks drawn from Mugdadiyah to Kan'an and spreading east. JAM is maintaining their mobility corridor along the east side of the Tigris River in the Diyala Province centered along ASR Dover and its close proximity villages, and continues fighting Sunni Extremists, especially AQI, for control of Khalis. Currently, reporting indicates that JAM is not actively targeting CF in Diyala, but is authorized to defend themselves if attacked and to then withdraw. This allows the Shia to maintain face but not become decisively engaged with CF. Recent reporting also indicates elements of AQI, 1920 RB and Now Ba'ath Party have formed at least a tactical alliance in Khalis. The extent of the alignment is not known; however, extensive reinforcements could contribute to the fight and sway the balance of power in favor of Sunni Alf in the city.

Recent reporting has detailed the movement of Sunni extremist and former regime elements into areas of Salah Ad Din, to include Bayji. Expect continued violence, as these groups combat AQI in attempts at regional dominance, and both parties target Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.

The security situation in Samarra is fluid, as it remains a potential flash point, with tensions generated from a volatile mix of popular distrust in the ISF, the looming possibility of a mass march, and continued reporting concerning an influx of AQI personnel in the outskirts of the city. The replacement of MG Thabit – respected by the local tribal community – with MG Rashid has left local residents wary of the security forces. The city overall exhibits the apprehensive atmosphere of an expected impending escalation of violence. The anniversary of the 10th Imams birth on the 20th will cause an increase in people traveling to Samarra.

Activity in the northern beltway this week was centered in the vicinity of Khan Bani Sa'ad, which showed an increase of activity. Control of the Baqubah-Khan Bani Sa'ad corridor is critical to AQI’s supply chain in both Baqubah and Baghdad, and violent activity tends to cluster around the highway in populated areas. The northern belt acts as a waypoint for Sunni extremists moving from the West, and provides a staging area for attacks into Baghdad. TF 1-4a assesses that AQI has already started moving from the Taji Tamimiya area to the Abu Ghurib in response to their ongoing operations. JAM will attempt to maintain their foothold in known areas of concentration, such as Hussaynah, in order to ensure control over the region and deny AQI access to historical Shi'a enclaves.
JAM violence localized due to orders from JAM senior leadership; criminal in nature as seen in Khadamiya

Reporting indicates AQI elements are beginning re-supply “5-Acres”
Area located in East Rashid; cleared in early June

Abu Kaldoun, VBIED cell leader in East Rashid, killed by CF on 07JUL
Hajji Hamid, former Security Emir of North Karkh, recently promoted to North Karkh Emir
Sufiyan, AQI cell leader in Rusafa, detained 11JUL
AQI presence has historically been tolerated (often wanted) by the population for protection against JAM and complicit NP forces

Assessment:
South Karkh network expanding territory IOT maintain increased OPTEMPO of VBIED attacks; VBIED activity remain focused in South Karkh; OP Dragon Hammer in East Rashid significantly disrupting AQI activity in Hayy Masafee; increased targeting of CF IOT to disprove MNF efforts
was responsible for the VBIED attacks along the Karadah peninsula
South Karkh network re-supply the area of “5 Acres”, cleared in Early June; increased SVBIED attacks in East and West Rashid as suicide bombers and supplies are restored in the area
Formation of the JARF in Taji / Tarmiyah indicates disruption of AQI influence within 1-1 CD; AQI likely to increase IO campaign as anti-AQI sentiment spreads within MND-B
North Karkh and Rusafa networks remain disrupted, in rebuilding stages; as experience gaps and leadership positions are filled, OPTEMPO and effectiveness likely to increase
A Q I network in Arab J abour is disrupted, but retains capability to conduct limited offensive operations locally and support operations into Baghdad.

Limited AQI leadership movement from Salman Pak, Arab J abour to Yusafiyah, Is kandariy a; many from local area and blend back into populace waiting to regain freedom of movement.

J A I in Jurf Region combating AQI with Coalition aid; stated intent to no longer attack CF.

AQI targeting Shia populace to foment sectarian violence in an attempt to regain Sunni support base.
Page 12 redacted for the following reason:

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AQI Outlook

LEGEND:

- AQI
- AQI INFLUENCE
- MND BOUNDARY
- Buried IED FIC
- Buried IED Exploded

Short-term: go to ground; disperse and rebuild at the cellular level
- Rebuild capacity; coffee; mutually supportive of each other
- Establish the Mandali - Bali - Walla corridor for support
- Utilize havens provided by the mountainous regions
- Occupy majority Sunni areas; expel minority
- Foment sectarian violence; focus on areas in "peaceful" northern areas
- Increase AQ propaganda and focus on Iraq
• Control and secure the border anywhere and smugglers, criminals, AQI, FF will detour to one of many other border crossing locations
• JAM meeting resistance with Tribes creating financial losses
MNC-I Mission & Intent
MNC-I Mission

MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GOI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish improved stability and create irreversible momentum, leading to wide-ranging political accommodation and sustainable security by Spring 2009 and to the ultimate goal of self-reliance in the longer term.

- Corps mission statement
- Secure the population, defeat or neutralize our enemies, and then transition security responsibilities
- With the purpose of stabilizing Iraq and enabling self-reliance
- We will achieve these purposes sequentially – with improved stability in the near term and self-reliance in the longer term
Commander’s Intent

Purpose:
The purpose of our operations is to bring stability to Iraq and then to sustain it in order to create time and space for the Iraqis to make progress toward political accommodation, continued political and economic development, and ultimately self-reliance. We accomplish this first by securing the population of Iraq, with priority to Baghdad, followed by the nine strategic cities and the rest of the country. Additionally, we must continue to support the development of a capable GOI and ISF so that both are viewed as legitimate and credible in the eyes of Iraqis. In order to sustain stability over time, we help build governmental capacity, strengthen GOI legitimacy, reduce sectarian behavior in Iraqi security institutions, and deliberately transition security responsibilities to the ISF as they demonstrate appropriate readiness to assume them. All of this leads to Iraqi self-reliance, creating the conditions for a peaceful, stable Iraq, led by a representative government subscribing to the rule of law, able to provide security for its people, and denying its territory as a terrorist safe haven.

- Commander’s intent – first of four slides
- Purpose of bringing stability to Iraq, sustaining it over time, and setting the conditions for Iraqi self-reliance
- We improve stability first by securing the population, with priority to Baghdad
- Establishing security is synchronized with helping to build capacity and legitimacy in the ISF and GOI
- As we sustain stability over time, we transition security responsibilities to the Iraqis in a deliberate fashion as elements of the ISF become ready
- Long-term purpose of self-reliance
Commander’s Intent

Key Tasks:

- Protect the population, with priority to where ethno-sectarian violence undermines the security situation; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and address local grievances; rekindle hope among the people by making progress toward a secure environment, sustained increasingly by a more capable, credible ISF.
- Facilitate reconciliation among key internal actors competing for power in Iraq; conduct engagement with potentially reconcilable factions and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means as leverage to support negotiations leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI; at local and provincial levels, promote dialogue across sectarian lines.
- Defeat AQI and extremists; kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development.
- Continue to develop ISF capacity through partnership, enhanced transition teams, and advisory / assistance units; we must work to make the ISF more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders – to include commissioned officers and NCOs.

- MNC-I has 6 key tasks
- The first is protect the population
- Facilitate reconciliation through engagement with potentially reconcilable factions, using the leverage we have to bring about local ceasefires
- We will defeat those groups deemed irreconcilable, with the goal of rendering their efforts to political progress ineffective
- We place an emphasis on developing ISF capacity, which includes reducing sectarian behavior, improving combat effectiveness, and preparing the ISF for the long term through leader development.
Commander’s Intent

Key Tasks (cont.):

- Assist efforts to build and improve GOI capacity, focusing on essential services, accountable local governance, and sustainable economic development; in careful coordination with this support, promote non-sectarian behavior while contributing to efforts to remove GOI officials who adhere to sectarian agendas

- Protect the force through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against indirect-fire and IED networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats

- Assist with the effort to improve GOI capacity and help the GOI build legitimacy by promoting non-sectarian behavior

- Last but not least – protect the force through an effective use of the reconnaissance and surveillance systems we have – focusing on IDF and IED networks
Commander’s Intent

End State:

In the near term, an improved level of stability is achieved; the population is secure and conditions are set for the restoration of civil authority in Iraq, with priority to Baghdad; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. Iraqi Security Forces, while continuing to build capacity, are in the lead – for the most part – with CF in tactical or operational overwatch. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent CF and ISF pressure. Their freedom of action is limited; their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation where ceasefires exist.

In the longer term, Iraq is self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources it needs to govern justly, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

• Again, the end state is characterized in both the near-term and the longer term
• In the near term – around Dec 07 – we seek an improved level of stability, defined most prominently by a significant reduction in violence and progress toward political accommodation
• We exploit this stability by synchronizing the security effort with improvement in governance and economic development
• Leading to Iraqi self-reliance in the longer term, characterized by political stability, security from internal and external threats, denied as a safe haven for terror, and integrated into the community of nations
• We envision the end state to be several years away
Our view of the problem

Conflict in Iraq is a communal struggle for power among rival factions and ethnic and sectarian groups.

From its inception, the legitimacy of the GOI has been challenged, and, for a long time, there has been a “gap” between the government and the people of Iraq.

Many groups are trying to fill this gap and exert control over the population in order to achieve their own goals; complicated by malign external influences as well.

It is in the Coalition’s best interest for a legitimate, capable GOI to fill this gap, serving as the protector of its people and the guarantor of their basic needs.

MNC-I must pressure the GOI to take meaningful steps to gain legitimacy; we must also support the GOI as it attempts to fill the gap by defeating or neutralizing those elements it is competing with.
• Operational framework with MNF-I's draft framework below
• MNF-I LOOs, goals, target dates for achieving goals
• Sep 07 Interim assessment, Dec 07 decision point
• MNF-I has three primary LOOs with a fourth supporting the others
• LOOs guide our actions toward the near term and the end state
• The near term and the end state are both defined by sets of conditions
• MNF-I has nine objectives that correspond to the LOOs
• We make progress toward these objectives through the near term and on through to the end state
• The end state conditions describe what the environment will look like when the objectives are accomplished

- Sep 07 Interim Assessment: 5 conditions indicating that trends toward political accommodation headed in right direction – GOI progress on reducing sectarianism; passage of key legislation (de-Baathification, revenue management or election law); Sadr movement toward compromise; local ceasefires; Kirkuk (Coalition and GOI efforts to delay referendum until after 2007)
- Dec 07 Decision Point: 7 conditions showing that the Coalition and GOI are on track – further GOI progress on reducing sectarianism; reduced violence; further Sadrist movement toward compromise; provincial elections held; realized local ceasefires;
Kirkuk referendum postponed to 2008; international authorities (UNSCR rollover)
**Campaign Phases**

- Phase 1 - Setting Key Conditions
  - Initial efforts to create national SOF in provinces and districts
  - Work ongoing to solidify legislation, end kidnapping behaviors
  - Establishing infrastructure
  - Security already weak;脸面 until Baghdad and Mosul deemed secure

- Phase 2 - Clear, Control, Retain
  - Security and ISF in the lead
  - Sustained security and ISF in the lead

- Phase 3 - Tactical Overwatch
  - Improved security and ISF in the lead

- Phase 4 - Operational Overwatch
  - Independent ISF operations
  - ISF taking responsibility for all security functions; CF consolidation outside of urban areas

- Phase 5 - Strategic Overwatch
  - ISF and ISF authorities fully responsible for security

**End of CF**

- Phasing construct acknowledges diverse conditions throughout the country
- Different parts in different phases
- Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition Force posture in a given area
- The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time
- In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retain approach in partnership with the Iraqis; continuous CF presence among population remains in place throughout the phase, but Iraqi-led operations gradually increase in frequency throughout
- In Phase 3 – This phase is focused on enabling coalition forces to assume tactical overwatch. Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but now under ISF lead; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for COIN operations; support to ISF continues through employment of transition teams, with the goal of providing 24/7 coverage where possible
- In Phase 4 – In this phase, MNC-I assumes operational overwatch. ISF conducts independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; in conjunction with growing IP lead for maintaining law and order, IA units increasingly take on CT ops and COIN in less populated areas; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs
- In Phase 5 – Still not definitive guidance from MNF-I; OPORD 07-01 characterizes Strategic Overwatch generally as the phase where all elements of the ISF in a given area are performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities; very reduced scope of missions for CF – CT ops in coordination with GOI, security assistance and combined exchange training with IA units; limited # of bases in key locations away from major population centers to deter malign external actors while assuring U.S. allies in the region
• Snapshot of MNC-I’s concept overlaid on a map
• Main effort – securing the populace of Baghdad
• Key supporting effort of interdicting accelerants in the Baghdad Belts
• Exploiting recent successes against AQI in the west
• Exploiting success related to transition in parts of the north
• Supporting the transition of security responsibilities in the southern provinces
• Efforts to improve border security
Sir, this chart represents the RIP between 3/2 SBCT and 2 SCR which takes place on 16 Sep. The impact of this RIP is that the responsibility for the Corps Operational Reserve will pass from 3/2 SBCT to 2 SCR on 16 Sep. Although not addressed on this slide this RIP represents the first effort to realign Brigades. Also significant is the departure of 13th MEU from MNF-W on 16 Sep to meet their 7 Oct OUTFCHOP of the CENTCOM AOR. One other action of significance to note, the day preceding the Stryker Brigade RIP 1-10 FA will be released from Bucca and return to their parent organizations control.

The first move of this multiple unit RIP/TOA will be made by 1/38 IN who will head North between 14 and 16 August to RIP/TOA with 1-23 IN in Baqubah. This RIP/TOA will take place between 16 and 23 August. Between 21 to 31 August 2 SCR will deploy to Iraq. From 26-29 August 3/2 SBCT Headquarters, BSB and separate companies will CULT to Baghdad to prepare for their RIP/TOA with 2 SCR. From 01-06 September 1-12 CAV will assume control of 5-20 IN operational environment in Old Baqubah and 2/2 SCR will RIP/TOA with 2-23 IN in East Rashid. On 06 September 5-20 IN will GAC and CULT to Taji to RIP/TOA with 1/2 SCR. Between 11-12 September 2-23 IN will deploy to MND-N and upon arrival assume control of Old Baqubah from 1-12 CAV.

The remainder of the 3/2 SBCT units will RIP/TOA between the 6th and 16th of
September. These RIP/TOAs will take place as follows:
2-3 IN will RIP/TOA with 3/2 SCR
1-37 FA will RIP/TOA with 4/2 SCR
1-14 CAV will RIP/TOA with 5/2 SCR Fires
Between the 10th and the 16th of September 3/2 SBCT equipment will be CULT'd to Kuwait.
On 15 September 1-10 FA will return from supporting to the Bucca mission and will rejoin its parent organization, 3/3 ID.
OPERATION PHANTOM THUNDER
Operation Phantom Thunder (15 Jun - 15 Jul)

MND-N
- **OP ARROWHEAD RIPPER** – 3-2 ICW ISF attacks to defeat enemy forces in Baqubah IDT secure the population and enable provincial governance.
- **OP SABER GUARDIAN** – 35 IA supported by TF 6-9 CAV conducts movement to contact to defeat AQON in Shounan.
- **OP ITHACA** – Disrupt IIIF activities in AO Diyala River Valley-West and deny the AO as a safehaven for AQON.

MND-B
- **OP DRAGON FIRE** – 41 I D and the KAG conduct clearance of the Hazara Security District.
- **OP GATES OF FREEDOM** – 21 I D conducts synchronized operations to defeat adversarial and criminal influence in Diwaniyah Security District.
- **OP IRON CURTAIN** – 111 CD in partnership with ISF neutralizes AQON along the western flank of MND-B.

MND-C
- **OP MARNE TORCH** – 23 I D conducts clearing operations in Diwaniyah and Diwaniyah Pesh to disrupt AQON and provide security influence in Baghdad from the southern belt.
- **OP MARNE AVALANCHE** – 23 I D conducts full-spectrum operations to disrupt AQON/ISN and SF’s extremist and IED operations.
## Operation Phantom Thunder
15 Jun 07 – 15 Jul 07

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*Coalition reported murders within the 10 security districts
^Category includes JDAMs, Laser Guided Munitions, and GMLRS
Here we show key tasks for each Multi-National Division. Collectively they are focused on elimination of AQI, disruption of Sunni and Shia extremism, and creating conditions for reduced sectarian violence in Baghdad. Many reflect the importance of enhancing ISF capabilities, influence, and presence within their AORs.

Note MND-B is establishing Joint Security Stations, Safe Markets, and Safe neighborhoods ICW ISF elements, while MNF-W is setting conditions for IP operations in Ramadi and Fallujah.

MNF-W elements continue security operations in support of ongoing cleanup and repair projects undertaken by citizens in the city of Ramadi. In partnership with ISF, MNF-W also continues security operations south of the city following several engagements in the vicinity of Donkey Island.

Tribal engagement has been critical in indigenous security forces generation. Rise of IP and IA elements, tribal elements and attacks against AQI by nationalistic groups have significantly impacted AQI operational effectiveness. AQI is under pressure from a variety of elements they have been historically aligned with. The stand up of Sunni security elements has also allowed CF to pursue AQI into areas historically unreachable.

MNF-W supports the 2nd Director of Border Enforcement Brigade with 4 Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The 3 Border Teams at the Iraqi Border Points of Entry (POE) of Trebil, Waleed, and Husaybah are considered POETTs and have either a DHS customs team or Contract Border Advisor (CBA) Team to provide expertise in this vital area. The POE at Husaybah is under construction and scheduled to reopen this fall.

Build: In Diyala Province, MND-N has been executing Operation Arrowhead Ripper to clear AQI from Baqubah. ISF elements are controlling previously cleared areas as operations continue in Old Baqubah. Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police, ICW coalition forces, are now controlling western Baqubah, and IA and IP elements are manning critical entry control points. Operations continue to clear Old Baqubah on the eastern side.

Build: MND-CS ICW MND-C will execute the planned Corps Operation Phantom Hammer with an emphasis on establishment of additional Joint Security Stations ICW Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police elements after clearance operations. This is a sequel to operation Black Eagle, conducted earlier this year against JAM elements. The current concept has a battalion from MND-C, ICW an IA Bn, clearing rogue JAM elements in Diwaniyah. MNC-I will provide enabling support, and a robust engineering package to facilitate construction of multiple Joint Security Stations. The most pressing issue is the need for retraining of some portion of the Iraqi police elements in Diwaniyah; they have been complicit with rogue JAM elements. This will also require an enhance Police Transition Team presence to support training and security requirements at the JSS.
MND-B: *Operation Dragon Hammer (followed by) Dragon Anvil*: 4th IBCT defeats AQIZ cells in Arab Jabour IOT reduce AQIZ influence in Rashid SD and transition to ISF control in Doura.

*Offensive Operations west of Taji Iron Curtain II*: 1/1 CD in partnership with ISF neutralizes AQI/IZR in AO IRONHORSE to Deny AQI/IZR sanctuary in AO STALLION and prevent them from influencing OPN FARHD AL QANOON from AO IRONHORSE.
OPERATION PHANTOM STRIKE
Commander's Intent

Purpose. The purpose of Phantom Strike is to disrupt AQI and JAM SG planning, preparation, and execution of operations in order to prevent AQI and JAM SG from negatively impacting CF and GOI progress and continuing CF and ISF momentum in dismantling AQI and JAM SG networks.

Key Tasks
- Significantly increase the OPTEMPO of offensive operations against AQI and JAM SG sanctuary and staging areas.
- Conduct targeted operations against AQI networks that produce and employ deep buried IEDs.
- Prioritize and employ MND/F and MNC-I level enablers in support of counter AQI and JAM SG operations for maximum impact in disrupting their networks.

Endstate. AQI and JAM SG planning and preparation disrupted, AQI and JAM SG unable to execute a surge in operations, and CF and ISF momentum against AQI and JAM SG networks sustained or accelerated.
Concept Of Operations

While continuing to operate within the framework established in OPORD 07-01, MNC-I will conduct a significant surge in offensive operations to disrupt AQI and JAM SG operations from 15 Aug to 15 Sep 07. CF Operations will include short term raids against AQI and JAM SG sanctuaries / staging areas, targeted operations to dismantle AQI DBIED networks, and operations to kill or capture AQI and JAM SG HVIs. During this time period operations with a high potential to temporarily disrupt AQI or JAM SG operations will be executed even when the forces required to hold and build on gains made are not available. Both MNC-I and MSG Enablers will be fully employed during this time period with increased emphasis on disrupting AQI and JAM SG operations.
• Focus: DRV/TRV
• Conducting Operations IVO Baqubah, Tarmiyah and Balad
• Postured to conduct TSTs ISO emerging targets
• Operational Employment TTPs

CJSOTF
• Operations Planned in Tali Afar, Tuz, Zaab Triangle, Sartajal, DRV, Hamrin Lake/MTE Region, Taji/Saba & J2 area, Mansour, East Rashid, Arab Jabour, & "AO Baghdad"
• Will continue to conduct operations against Time Sensitive Targets as identified
OPERATION PHANTOM HAMMER
Operation Phantom Hammer

BACKGROUND: Diwaniyah is capital city of Qadisiyah province; population 400,000; 99% Shi'a

ISSUES: Police force infiltrated with Militant JAM, corrupt governor, MJAM freedom of action

ENEMY ACTIVITY:
1.4b, 1.4d

CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Clear city, find and remove weapons caches, decapitate leadership with precision strikes
MNC-I Commander’s Intent and Mission Statement for Phantom Hammer

**PURPOSE**
- Reestablish Iraqi Security Force control of Diwaniyah
- Enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment

**KEY TASKS**
- Establish a Joint Planning Cell consisting of MNC-I, MND-C, MND-CS, CJ5OTF, ICFC, and 8th IA staff to develop a CONOP for operations vicinity Diwaniyah.
- On order, deploy MND-C combat forces to a Combined Temporary Area of Operations inside MND-CS IOT posture for operations IVO Diwaniyah.
- On order, conduct clearing operations within the city of Diwaniyah IOT kill or capture extremists and neutralize AIF threat to MND-CS stability.
- Reinforce existing and/or establish new long-term CF and ISF security stations within Diwaniyah to prevent the reemergence of extremists.

**END STATE**
- Extremists IVO Diwaniyah neutralized
- ISF (supported by MND-CS forces) in control of Diwaniyah with conditions set for civil-military operations
- Stability restored in the MND-CS operational environment
- MND-C forces redeployed to the MND-C operational environment.

**MISSION**
- On order, in coordination with Iraqi Security Forces, MNC-I cleans the Hayes of Northern Diwaniyah to neutralize militant Jaysh Al Mahdi (MJAM) and secure the populace, in order to stabilize Qadisiyah province and return Diwaniyah to legitimate GOI control.
OPERATION SILVER RAVEN
Commander’s Guidance

"Enhance Capabilities at Iraqis Ports of Entry (POE)"

- 1.4a, 1.4g
- 1.4a operational at each POE w/ increased watch-list capabilities
- Vehicle screening systems for each POE (Backscatter, Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System)
- Reinforce border POE using additional Border Transition Team manpower to achieve 24/7 over-watch

Objective: Enhance abilities of CF and GoI personnel to identify foreign fighters, facilitators, weapons, and munitions at the border POE through employment of additional manpower and technical detection tools.
Pages 45 through 46 redacted for the following reasons:
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1.4a, 1.4g
SCALABLE STRIKE PACKAGE
Pages 48 through 50 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a
1.4a, 1.4g
Summary:
Baghdad and the Rest of Iraq
### Key Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>12-Week Average</th>
<th>28 Jul - 3 Aug 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Total** | 1090 | 898  
|         | 23% | 25%  |
| **CF** | 778 | 643  
|         | 14% | 16%  |
| **ISF** | 196 | 149  
|         | 39% | 39%  |
| **CIV** | 110 | 103  
|         | 56% | 62%  |
| **VBIED** | 11 | 10   
| **SVBIED** | 6 | 5    
| **SVIED** | 2 | 0    |

#### 28 Jul - 3 Aug 07 Weekly Trends Highlights:
- Total attacks fell to 898, the lowest level since November 2005, primarily due to fewer attacks against CF and ISF.
- Attacks continued to trend down in MND Center after peaking in May 2007.
- There were only 41 attacks in MNF West, the least in over three years.
- Total IED attacks remained lower than usual at 317; the IED found and cleared rate was 41%.
- High profile attacks dropped below the 12-week average to 15, including 9 in MND Baghdad and 6 in MND North.
- Of the 9 VBIEDs found/cleared, 6 were in MND North, the most ever in that region.
- Total casualties remained similar to recent weeks and display no noticeable trends.

*High profile attacks: VBIED, SVBIED, and SVIEDs*
### Annual Caches Found/Cleared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All of Iraq</td>
<td>2668</td>
<td>3689</td>
<td>1021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-B</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Sec Dist</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-C</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-CS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND-NE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-W</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Anbar</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>1771</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-SE</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNC-I SigActs 4 Aug 07 - Coalition Reporting
Baghdad is Going Well...

- Safe market construction making good progress
- Safe neighborhood construction making good progress
- Murders are down significantly
- ISF rotation is working
- Cache finds are up significantly
- Spectacular attack casualty rates are down
- Combat Outposts/Joint Security Stations (68 of 75 operational)
- Baghdad Operations Command is effectively controlling operations in Baghdad
- Population is seeing an improvement in security

...But much work remains
Baghdad Future Operations

- Continue COP/JSS construction.
- Continue Safe Market/Neighborhood construction.
- Focused efforts in the “hot spots.”
- Capitalize on and expand the “Ameriyah Freedom Fighters” concept.
- Economic zones and infrastructure repair.
- Continue to improve the professionalism of the ISF.
- Increase the joint intelligence effort against VBIEDs.
- National ID Card System
- Train and employ additional Facility Protection Services (FPS)
- Conduct focused security operations at BIAP
The Rest of Iraq...Going Well

- AQI defeated in southern Diyala - we are in a pursuit operation
- Security and production improvements at the Bayji Oil Refinery
- Al Anbar security and tribal movement against AQI
- Diyala Support Committee and Operational Command
- Dam security in place
- Exporting oil through Turkey
- Tribal engagement in Ninewa and Salah ad Din Provinces taking hold
- Critical infrastructure repair on-going
- ISF handling security issues in most of southern provinces
The Rest of Iraq... Future Operations

- Clear and control the Diyala River Valley
- Clear area south and east of Lake Thar-Thar
- Increased emphasis on border security
- Stand up the Karbala, Samarra, and Basra Operations Command
- Continued aggressive targeting and pursuit of AQI
- Expand tribal engagement effort
- Move towards reconciliation
- Ports of Entry enhancement
- Karbala PIC
- Infrastructure Development