



UNCLASSIFIED



Offensive CONOP

14 Dec 06

*Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad
(reduce the level of sectarian violence) while helping the GOI
regain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?*

Overall Classification for this Brief is ~~SECRET//REL to USA, MCF//MR~~

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Critical Conditions

Beginning the Operation

- **Concurrence from GOI**, including a strong statement of support from the PM
- Declaration of **martial law** in Baghdad and in the Baghdad Belts
 - GOI agreement regarding vehicle ban, curfew, random searches, and control of access
- CF available to immediately begin operations ICW ISF in focused areas of the city
 - Authorization to conduct operations **in all areas of Baghdad**, including Sadr City
- Increased OCF-I focus on **VBIED and EFP networks** in Baghdad
- Communications plan established; messages ready to be broadcast to target audiences (Iraqi populace, external actors, potential political participants)
- Agreement reached with MOD and MOI regarding **C2 relationships** (CF
 - IA unit C2 relationships, MNC-I coordination with MOD and MOI)



Critical Conditions

Achieving the Endstate

- GOI and MNF-I develop an **agreeable endstate and way ahead**
- GOI must agree to Bridging Concept and sign an MOU that clearly articulates responsibilities in preparation for its execution
- GOI releases statement supporting MOU and explaining importance for all Iraqis
- GOI announces and institutes a plan for the near-term (**Cease Fire**), mid-term (**Amnesty Program**), and **endstate for all militias**
- CF develop a Strategic Communications plan to ensure Coalition and Iraqi people understand the purpose of the Bridging Strategy as the “Logical Next Step”
- GOI institutes genuine and transparent **MOI reform** and develops a plan for the **improvement of ministerial capacity** in Industry, Transportation, and Health
- GOI dictates command & control lead for Baghdad and how it should evolve, pursuant to CF relocation to the periphery (e.g., MOD to MOI to PDOP)
- GOI releases **DFI Funds to Anbar & Tall Afar** in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
- Unambiguous agreement concerning CF enabler support and a plan to transition all to GOI
- Agreement on the gradual **reallocation of MNC-I’s non-military tasks**; guidance specifying support role to PRTs and IRMO (GOI agrees to assume phased responsibility for “build” projects and plans)



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Proposed Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, fully implement the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to Iraqi security self-reliance



Proposed Commander's Intent

- **Purpose**
 - Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; stabilize the security situation in those areas
 - Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation
- **Key Tasks**
 - Reduce sectarian violence
 - Neutralize VBIED networks and illegal militias that conduct EJJKs
 - Establish the ISF as a capable force, legitimate in the eyes of Iraqi citizens
 - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- **Endstate**
 - Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF
 - Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force
 - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
 - Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire
 - MOI reform underway; improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated
 - Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy
 - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place




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Concept Sketch


Phase I: Set Conditions





Concept Sketch

Phase II: Clear, Control, Retain






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Concept Sketch

Phase III: Retain and Renew






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Concept Sketch

Phase IV: Transition and Exploitation





Risk

- **Overplaying the importance of the operation** from an IO and PA perspective may lead to a quicker degradation of GOI and ISF legitimacy if it fails to visibly reduce sectarian violence
- Escalation of U.S. involvement in kinetic operations will appear to **contradict our stated intent** to transition control to the Iraqis – even if that remains our ultimate objective
- Collateral damage resulting from a surge in kinetic operations in urban areas may **exacerbate sectarian tensions** and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunni and Shia perceive CF and ISF operations as biased or unbalanced
- The declaration of martial law may **exacerbate sectarian tensions** and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunnis perceive a partial GOI as clamping down overbearingly in Sunni areas
- **GOI interference** may hamstring CF activity and result in the perception of an unbalanced operation
- Manpower-intensive operation will limit CF **operational and tactical flexibility** (i.e. the ability to surge against cross-border activity)
- Failure to commit enough forces to the operation may result not only in a misuse of combat power but may also **exacerbate sectarian tensions** (i.e. declaring martial law without delivering on enhanced security)



Risk

- Imposition of martial law and tighter access controls may have a **negative economic impact** on certain communities and may also result in a more sustained **disruption of basic needs**
- The escalation of kinetic operations may lead to **negative global media coverage** and result in the imposition of constraints
- The escalation of ISF activity in and around Baghdad will expose these forces to more frequent attacks, perhaps resulting in the unstoppable **disintegration of certain Iraqi units**
- **Interdiction of CF LOCs**
- Surge in CF activity may trigger a **parallel surge** in 1.4b, 1.4d
- Conducting major operations at the end of the **Hajj** and during **Ashura/Arba'een** may intensify Iraqi resentment against CF presence – aggravating Iraqi reaction to tighter population controls while complicating the task of controlling movement in and around Baghdad