Offensive CONOP

Problem: How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad (reduce the level of sectarian violence) while helping the GOI regain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?

14 Dec 06
Critical Conditions

Beginning the Operation

- Concurrence from GOI, including a strong statement of support from the PM
- Declaration of martial law in Baghdad and in the Baghdad Belts
  - GOI agreement regarding vehicle ban, curfew, random searches, and control of access
- CF available to immediately begin operations ICW ISF in focused areas of the city
  - Authorization to conduct operations in all areas of Baghdad, including Sadr City
- Increased OCF-I focus on VBIED and EFP networks in Baghdad
- Communications plan established; messages ready to be broadcast to target audiences (Iraqi populace, external actors, potential political participants)
- Agreement reached with MOD and MOI regarding C2 relationships (CF – IA unit C2 relationships, MNC-I coordination with MOD and MOI)
Critical Conditions

Achieving the Endstate

• GOI and MNF-I develop an agreeable endstate and way ahead
• GOI must agree to Bridging Concept and sign an MOU that clearly articulates responsibilities in preparation for its execution
• GOI releases statement supporting MOU and explaining importance for all Iraqis
• GOI announces and institutes a plan for the near-term (Cease Fire), mid-term (Amnesty Program), and endstate for all militias
• CF develop a Strategic Communications plan to ensure Coalition and Iraqi people understand the purpose of the Bridging Strategy as the “Logical Next Step”
• GOI institutes genuine and transparent MOI reform and develops a plan for the improvement of ministerial capacity in Industry, Transportation, and Health
• GOI dictates command & control lead for Baghdad and how it should evolve, pursuant to CF relocation to the periphery (e.g., MOD to MOI to PDoP)
• GOI releases DFI Funds to Anbar & Tall Afar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
• Unambiguous agreement concerning CF enabler support and a plan to transition all to GOI
• Agreement on the gradual reallocation of MNC-I’s non-military tasks; guidance specifying support role to PRTs and IRMO (GOI agrees to assume phased responsibility for “build” projects and plans)
Proposed Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts combined operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts from 15 JAN 07 to 15 MAR 07 in order to reduce sectarian tensions and enhance GOI and ISF legitimacy; on order, fully implement the Bridging Strategy in order to facilitate accelerated transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
Proposed Commander’s Intent

• Purpose
  – Reduce sectarian tensions in Baghdad and in other Sunni-Shia fault line areas; stabilize the security situation in those areas.
  – Demonstrate the GOI seizing the initiative and taking offensive action against AIF; change the dynamics in Baghdad in order to exploit momentum along these lines, setting the conditions for a cease fire and paving the way for national reconciliation.

• Key Tasks
  – Reduce sectarian violence
  – Neutralize VBIED networks and illegal militias that conduct EJKs
  – Establish the ISF as a capable force, legitimate in the eyes of Iraqi citizens
  – Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance

• Endstate
  – Violence in Baghdad reduced to a level manageable for the ISF
  – Iraqis view the ISF as the dominant security force
  – GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  – Process of reconciliation initiated under the auspices of a GOI-brokered cease fire
  – MOI reform underway; improvements in the capacity of the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Agriculture initiated
  – Transition to ISSR accelerated IAW the Transition Bridging Strategy
  – CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas, postured to disrupt irreconcilable groups that threaten ISSR and Iraqi reconciliation; enhanced transition teams and dedicated strike forces in place
Concept Sketch
Phase I: Set Conditions

MND-B – Main Effort
T1: Organize forces
P1: Prepare for combined offensive operations to extend control into selected focus areas in Baghdad
T2: Conduct strike operations
P2: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks

MND-N – Supporting Effort
T: Disrupt AQI networks IVO Samara-Balad-Baqubah and Bayji-Tikrit-Zab Triangle
P: Deny the flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad

MNF-W – Supporting Effort
T: Disrupt AQI networks IVO Ramadi-Falluja-Abu Ghraib
P: Deny the flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad

Pre-Conditions
- Concurrence from GOI regarding a balanced surge in Baghdad and the Belts
- GOI announcement
- GOI declaration of “martial law”-like state of emergency (vehicle ban, curfew, controlled movement)
- Agreement reached with MOD, MOI on C2 relationships
- IA BDEs to Baghdad
- Stockpile logistical resources
- Required CF postured to conduct ops
- Sufficient targets for strike ops
- IO campaign
- Consequence management plan
- Reconstruction requirements for selected focus areas defined
- Establish relaxed targeting ROE for Phase I and II
- LOCs secured

OCF-I (Request for Support)
T: Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River
P: Disrupt VBIED networks accelerating sectarian tension

CJSOTF – Supporting Effort
T: Conduct strike operations ICW ISOF in the Sunni Belts and Baghdad
P: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks

MND-SE and MND-CS – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF
**Concept Sketch**

**Phase II: Clear, Control, Retain**

**MND-B – Main Effort**
- T1: Conduct clear, control, and retain ops in Baghdad
- P1: Reduce sectarian violence
- T2: Conduct strike operations in Baghdad and the Southern Sunni Belt

**MND-N – Supporting Effort**
- T1: Disrupt AQI networks IVO Samara-Balad-Baqubah and Bayji-Tikrit-Zab Triangle
- P1: Deny the flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad
- T2: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- P2: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF

**MNF-W – Supporting Effort**
- T: Disrupt AQI networks IVO Ramadi-Falluja-Abu Ghraib
- P: Deny the flow of destabilizing extremist elements into Baghdad

**OCF-I (Request for Support)**
- T: Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River
- P: Disrupt VBIED networks accelerating sectarian tension

**CJSOTF – Supporting Effort**
- T: Conduct strike operations ICW ISOF in the Sunni Belts and Baghdad
- P: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks

**MND-SE and MND-CS – Supporting Effort**
- T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF

**Pre-Conditions**
- Shape negotiations and engagements
- GOI initiates periodic statements of support for ops
- GOI postured to assume gradual and increasing responsibility for reconstruction projects in focus areas
- ISF ready to participate in combined ops; CF enablers in place to facilitate build-up of ISF capability
- IO to emphasize balanced approach
Concept Sketch
Phase III: Retain and Renew

MND-B – Main Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF

MND-N – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF

MNF-W – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF

Pre-Conditions
• GOI and CF develop an agreeable endstate
• Violence is reduced to pre-Samara levels; cease fire announced; in Baghdad, conditions set for est. of combined security and response outposts
• As part of a political package, GOI announces path to reconciliation, addressing militia endstate and including incentives for broad appeal
• Timeline for provincial elections announced
• GOI releases DFI Funds to Anbar & Tall Afar in order to build trust and confidence of Sunnis
• GOI institutes genuine and transparent MOI reform
• GOI develops a plan for the improvement of ministerial capacity in Industry, Transportation, and Health
• GOI agrees to Bridging Concept and signs MOU
• Enhanced TTs covered down on ISF units
• Unambiguous agreement concerning CF enabler support; plan to transition all to GOI
• Iraqi-led Strategic Comms plan established

OCF-I (Request for Support)
T: Conduct strike operations east of the Tigris River
P: Disrupt VBIED networks accelerating sectarian tension

CJSOTF – Supporting Effort
T: Conduct strike operations ICW ISOF in the Sunni Belts and Baghdad
P: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks

MND-SE and MND-CS – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF
Concept Sketch
Phase IV: Transition and Exploitation

MND-B – Main Effort
T1: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P1: Enhance ISF legitimacy and capability
T2: Conduct strike operations
P2: Disrupt EFP and VBIED networks

MND-N – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF
T2: Conduct strike operations
P2: Disrupt EFP and VBIED networks

MNF-W – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF
T2: Conduct strike operations
P2: Defeat AQI

OCF-I (Request for Support)
T: Conduct strike operations
P: Disrupt VBIED networks accelerating sectarian tension

CJSOTF – Supporting Effort
T: Conduct strike operations
ICW ISOF in the Sunni Belts and Baghdad
P: Disrupt VBIED and EFP networks

Pre-Conditions
- MNF-I and GOI agree on timeline for key facility security transfer, assuming responsibility of detention of Iraqi criminals, and assuming responsibility of health care of ISF
- MOD, MOI agreement on C2 relationships in anticipation of ISF lead in Baghdad
- Reconstruction projects ongoing

MND-SE and MND-CS – Supporting Effort
T: Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
P: Enhance the legitimacy and capability of the ISF
Risk

- Overplaying the importance of the operation from an IO and PA perspective may lead to a quicker degradation of GOI and ISF legitimacy if it fails to visibly reduce sectarian violence.
- Escalation of U.S. involvement in kinetic operations will appear to contradict our stated intent to transition control to the Iraqis – even if that remains our ultimate objective.
- Collateral damage resulting from a surge in kinetic operations in urban areas may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunni and Shia perceive CF and ISF operations as biased or unbalanced.
- The declaration of martial law may exacerbate sectarian tensions and alienate the GOI from sections of the populace, particularly if Sunnis perceive a partial GOI as clamping down overbearingly in Sunni areas.
- GOI interference may hamstring CF activity and result in the perception of an unbalanced operation.
- Manpower-intensive operation will limit CF operational and tactical flexibility (i.e. the ability to surge against cross-border activity).
- Failure to commit enough forces to the operation may result not only in a misuse of combat power but may also exacerbate sectarian tensions (i.e. declaring martial law without delivering on enhanced security).
Risk

- Imposition of martial law and tighter access controls may have a **negative economic impact** on certain communities and may also result in a more sustained **disruption of basic needs**
- The escalation of kinetic operations may lead to **negative global media coverage** and result in the imposition of constraints
- The escalation of ISF activity in and around Baghdad will expose these forces to more frequent attacks, perhaps resulting in the unstoppable **disintegration of certain Iraqi units**
- **Interdiction of CF LOCs**
- Surge in CF activity may trigger a **parallel surge in**
- Conducting major operations at the end of the **Hajj** and during **Ashura/Arba’een** may intensify Iraqi resentment against CF presence – aggravating Iraqi reaction to tighter population controls while complicating the task of controlling movement in and around Baghdad