Provide Commander with a detailed view of the operational environment and force structure both in October 2007 and 31 July 2008, determine risks to achieving irreversible momentum, and recommend changes to mitigate that risk.
Intro
- Methodology
- Background
- Facts
- Assumptions

Operational Environment: 1 October 2007 and 31 July 2008
- Threat Environment
- Information Environment
- Governance/Economic Environment
- Provincial Progress
- ISF Capabilities
- Force Lay-down
  - Basing
  - Coalition Troops
  - Enablers by War Fighting Function
- Task Analysis
  - By Phase
  - By Region

Proposed Course of Action
Operational Risk
Commanding General Comments
Methodology

- PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION
  - Force management overview

- ESTABLISH BASELINE FUTURE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
  - Describe future threat environment (July 2008)

- ESTABLISH BASELINE FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
  - Describe future governmental, economic, ISF, etc. environment (July 2008)

- ESTABLISH BASELINE FRIENDLY FORCES DATA
  - Account for all MNC-I forces (October 2007)
  - Account for all MNC-I forces in future set (July 2008)

- FUSE LAYERS OF FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
  - Identify potential risk
  - Prioritize risk

- PROPOSE MITIGATIONS
Phasing construct acknowledges diverse conditions throughout the country

- Different parts in different phases
- Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition Force posture in a given area
- The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time

In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retain approach in partnership with the Iraqis

In Phase 3 – efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under ISF lead; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for COIN operations

In Phase 4 – ISF independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs

In Phase 5 – All elements of the ISF performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities
1. President stated in 13 SEP 2007 press release that forces in Iraq will decrease by 5,700 (1 BCT + MEU) before the end of the year.

2. During congressional testimony GEN Petraeus stated that Iraq would return to "pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams," not troops.

3. Many senators and representatives stated that GEN Petraeus planned to have 130K in ITO by 31 July 2008. This assertion was never made by GEN Petraeus, who defined the surge in numbers of BCTs, not personnel.

4. Surge increase of 26,662 has been accompanied by a 4,781 increase in forces, both directly and indirectly related to the surge.

5. Requests for an additional 3,200 forces are pending either submission or approval.

6. During the surge, there were no enduring increases to sustainment forces.

7. The JCS published MOD 6 to 1003V to re-posture forces in the CENTCOM AOR and set conditions for long-term security in Iraq.

8. ISF Officer and NCO force generation capacity is extremely limited.

9. CENTCOM FRAGO 09-1301 directs the reposture of US OIF forces from 20 to 15 BCTs.

10. CENTCOM FRAGO 09-1301 directs that 2 USMC Infantry Battalions depart MNF-W without backfill by May 2008.
Assumptions 1 of 2

1. Iraq will face no serious conventional threat from a neighboring state.
2. Main effort will remain security of the population of Baghdad.
3. A constitutionally established Iraqi government will remain in power, but not achieve reconciliation or significant political/economic development in the near term.
4. Coalition will retain legal authority and GOI approval to conduct COIN, CT, and Force Protection operations under renewed UNSCR mandate or other negotiated agreement.
5. Regional partners will continue existing support to coalition operations and basing.
6. Inter-agency efforts to advance political and economic lines of operation will be sustained.
7. All provinces (less Kirkuk – Art. 140 dependent) will be at PIC NLT Jul 08.
8. MNF-I initially will realize a 500 military personnel reduction from its HQ and other subordinate units.
9. CJSOTF and TF IAG will maintain same force levels.
10. MP requirements will not decrease.
Assumptions 2 of 2

1. BCTs will deploy at 92% assigned strength
2. MNF-I and CENTCOM force levels (minus changes from estimated reductions and RFFs) will remain constant
3. There will be no increase in externally-sourced transition teams
4. CENTCOM will establish PTDO brigade equipment set by July 2008 in Kuwait
5. The UK will maintain a brigade sized force of ~2,500 or greater with a two-star headquarters in Southern Iraq through 2008
6. MND-CS and MND-NE HQs will remain in ITO at least through 2008
7. Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition until July 2008
Operational Environment

1 Oct 07 vs. 31 Jul 08
The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: counter-occupation, terrorism, insurgency and a communal struggle for power and survival, occurring in the context of failing state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

Solving just one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse, so our solution set should be as complex as our problem set.

Counter-occupation is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to at least passively support attacks against Coalition Forces and contributes to Iraqi youth vulnerability to recruitment by more violent elements.

Terrorism in Iraq is connected to Al Qaeda’s global jihad that aims to create a virtual caliphate which is facilitated by regional terrorist and foreign fighter networks. The primary terrorist organizations in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to a lesser extent, Ansar Al Sunnah (AAS). Sunni Extremist brutal and excessive tactics such as the use of suicide bombers, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and targeting fellow Muslims have eroded its popular support base. Sunni Extremist terrorism overlaps with the Sunni Rejectionist insurgency. Their intermediate objectives of weakening the Shia-dominated government coincide. However, the Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Rejectionist objective of re-establishing a Sunni-dominated Government of Iraq that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.

The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Rejectionist movement aimed at regaining former power and influence. The principal Sunni Rejectionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of Ansar al Sunnah. The Sunni Rejectionist goal at restoring Sunni power is just one part of the ongoing communal struggle for power and survival.

The communal struggle for power and survival is occurring both between and among the various ethno-sectarian groups. The major Shia groups of SCIRI, Badr, OMS and Fadilah are working together to prevent the Sunni resurgence, but fight among themselves for Shia dominance. The primary Kurdish groups: the KDP and PUK are working to increase Kurd autonomy and extend the limits of Kurdistan where possible. The potential expansion of Kurdistan is opposed by both Sunni and Shia Arabs, as well as by minorities such as the Turkomen. Sunni tribes are banding together to fight AQI, but may pose a challenge to Sunni provincial and national politicians as the tribal influence grows.

The government’s capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts is hindered by its current condition as a failing state. The
Gol is struggling to develop the governmental, ministerial and security capacity to deal with the threats that confront it. The external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian and Arab civilizations increase the complexity of Gol's situation and reduce the likelihood of solutions agreeable to all actors.
Sunni Extremists:
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Changes in context:
• Long-term CF presence
• Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
• Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

AQI objectives:
• Intimidate Sunni Arab populace along the TRV and DRV to maintain footholds to launch high profile attacks against minority populations and sectarian targets of opportunity
• Conduct M&A campaign against anti-AQI tribal organizations and ISF to regain freedom of action
• IOT ignites civil war and cause a failed state
Changes in context:
• Longterm CF presence
• Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
• Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

Rejectionist objectives:
• Recruit members disillusion with extremist groups into rejectionist groups
• Merge disparate armed factions that are torn between targeting CF or AQI
• Organize united negotiating position
• Exploit former AQI members for intelligence and isolate NBP

From insurgency to inclusion
The Sadrists and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)

Changes in context:
- Longterm CF presence
- Emboldened PI with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements

From emerging power to damage control

Sadrists/JAM objectives:
- Stand-down and reorganize JAM to reverse the decline in popular support
- Conduct political maneuvers to reverse decline in influence and counter Party of Four
- Adjust counter-Occupation stance

1.4b, 1.4d
Tribal Awakening and Concerned Local Citizens (CLC)

**SUNNI AREAS**
- GDI groups more mature
- Integrated with OFISF
- Some ISF recruitment, but GOI resistance
- Economic factors (jobs) and political inclusion key
- Reconciliation is not a done deal – GOI paralysis on key issues could cause failure.

**SHIA AREAS**
- Not the same dynamic as Anbar
- Little CF presence
- Shia "awakening" based off more individual community dynamics
- JAM a threat, but not like AQI
- Political equation more complex

From Sunni provincial focus to Iraqi national focus

Tribal Awakening/CLC objectives:
- Establish broad-based tribal organizations to protect the population from AOI and JAM
- Integrate members into ISF or other employment opportunities
- Develop a competitive political party leveraging local/tribal councils
- Ensure inclusion in GOI
Threat Courses of Action

MLCOA
- Local, isolated CLC tensions with GOI/ISF and other CLCs over perceptions of sectarianism
- Sunni Reactionists increasingly join CLCs and tribal movements
- Tribal movements focused on political inclusion
- AQI remains isolated as common enemy
- Badr-JAM tensions flare-ups localized and temporary
- JAM continues stand-down

MDCOA
- CLC frustration revives Sunni Reactionists
- AQI exploits rift between CLCs and GOI
- Tribal movements sympathetic to CLCs
- Kurd-Shia alliance fragments
- ISF fractures and GOI fails

1.4b, 1.4d

Local Badr-JAM flare-ups in Southern Provinces
Sunni tribes turn away from GOI, towards Arab neighbors
AQI Reactionists - CLC leaders blame tactical cooperation
Sectarian violence:
- Baghdad, belts and Diyala River
  Valley mixed areas
- AQI diminished
  capability/limited HP attacks

Potential flashpoints are:
- Samarra - Golden Shema
- Kirkuk - Normalization (Art. 140)
- AQI attempt to establish
  sanctuary in West/North
- Kurdish/Arab Tensions
- CLCs clashing with ISF in
  mixed areas - return to Nationalist
  insurgency

Positive Trends to Reinforce
Insurgency shift from urban to rural
Migration from Sunni Extremist to Reactionist groups
Increased Reactionist interest in Reconciliation
GoI solution to intra-Shia competition
Distancing of Shia Extremists from Shia populace

Potential Setbacks
Himping of intra-Shia restraint
Tribal model emerges as GoI competitor
CLCs grow beyond GoI's ability to control or integrate
OE '07: Information Operations

Media Events / Incidents / Polls

**Objective**
- CBS Poll (Sep 2007)
  - 72% believe CF at least somewhat motif to compel Islamic Lands; Down 12% from Dec 06
- CBS (Nov 2007)
  - Over 75% want SF and CF offer best security: Up 22% from Mar '07; Neutrals show steady upward
    following start of the Iraq buildup

**Negative Iraqi Perceptions**
- Blackwater Incident
- Iraqui Assassinations
- Iraqi Death Squads
- I.D. to Iraqis

**Positive Iraqi Perceptions**
- Soccer Victory
- Anbar Awakening
- US Senate Vote

**Subjective**
- Media Reporting
  - High Profile Attacks on Iraqis
  - Assassination
  - IO

**Adversary Propaganda**
- IO to USA and MNC-V, Inc

Assissinations:

Approved for Release
### Possible Perceptions of the Iraqi Populace after US Draw-Down

**Negative:**
- Less joint ops / less oversight of ISF (sectarian concerns)
- Economic loss for Iraqis conducting business with CF
- Anti-Sal forces (AQI, JADHAF) gaining/outsatnded CF
- CF lacks availability strength to protect key locations
- Kurds under greater pressure to resolve Kirkuk issue before CF depart completely
- US military succumbed to US political pressure / loss of popular support
- Summits feel CF have abandoned them, not finished the job
- Taken withdrawal (CF still here): draw-down is a deception / conspiracy

**Positive:**
- ISF/ISF capabilities effective enough to take over
- CF keeping their word and leaving a sovereign Iraq
- Iraqis are taking control of their lives and their country
- CF can still help if the situation / ISF/ISF calls for it
- Attacks may decrease; some hostile groups stated they are attacking because CF are in Iraq

**Unknown / Indecisive:**
- Less troops = less presence; affects vary on different audiences
- Infrastructure impact? More / Less interdiction and attacks will occur

---

### Predicted Perception Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral concerns of ISF</th>
<th>Drawdown is a deception / conspiracy</th>
<th>Effects of fewer CF vary on different audiences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic loss with less CF</td>
<td>CF keeping their word and leaving a sovereign Iraq</td>
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<td>CF have abandoned them, not finished the job</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US political pressure forcing draw-down</td>
<td>Taken withdrawal (CF still here): draw-down is a deception / conspiracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Negative**

**Positive**

**IO So What: IO will mitigate negative perceptions by shaping the information environment far in advance to facilitate the draw-down**
**MND-N**

**KIRKUK / DIALA**

**Governance / Economics**

Current Status:

- Efforts to end the Turkmen/Iraqi friction (Kirkuk) have met opposition from all parties who have requested every negotiated offer to favor of the Sunni counter proposal. PC, however, continues to hold meetings, offshore with boycotting members to move forward.
- FROG Chairman "UC's remain out of the.Box" - Kirkuk/Sulaymaniyah
- RSL 5P's from Kirkuk (resettlement)
- Administrative staff PC doesn't represent the interest of the people

Diala:

- The Province is making progress, slowly but moving forward. Reliable economic and essential services are key to continued support from the population. The Provincial Council is beginning to function like a government.
- PC continues to achieve progress
- PC, Governor Inspects Reestatization No-Wall facility
- Projects of interest provide many jobs to community
- FST and TRH set Diawa Electric Industries

**Imports**

- Article 148 resolution may destabilize the region
- UNF reduction and leveled to DIA may negatively impact movement
- Stability of UNF within Kirkuk
- Provincial elections in Kirkuk may change relationship and may result in improvements in capacity building
- Central Ministries maintain control of provincial security and Q & M budget

**Supporting Actions**

- Vocational Training
- Job Fairs
- CERP (Micro Grants)
- Local Govt Engagement
- State owned enterprise revitalization
- Diala Electric plant refurbishment
- TRH (2nd Floor and first floors) start up

**Partner Agreements**

- USAID programs
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP), Grants/Employment
- Micro-finance, Loans
- Business Development, Training
- Local Governance Program (LGP)
- Tims agriculture development program

**Projected Outcome**

- Kirkuk: Slow forward progress but will maintain a level of violence and armed until Article 148 is resolved.
- Diala: Infrastructure and economy are likely to improve in wake of improved security situation, Kirkuk may fulfill previous made at Diala Forum to maintain credibility. Interfacing USA will drive progress. Local elected and CF relationships improved.
MND-N
NINAWA / SALAH AD DIN
Governance/Economics

Current Status:
Ninawa Economic and political recovery have positioned the province for increased growth. The central Government's lack of financial support and 30 years of essential services neglect has hampered positive growth development.

- Tikrit City Council executes S3FM Off funding
- Menor airport funding approved by the MoF
- Ninawa MOC Panel 6 to start
- Massawa PRT meets PC chair on budget topics

Salah ad Din:
Although some progress is being seen economically, the high rate of unemployment and large unskilled labor force hampers progress. The provincial leadership is struggling but arranging cooperation with the PCT's and PRVs to develop capacity building

- PRV working with GRM to identify power issues in a critical factory
- Sur PC members waited at PC meeting

Supporting Efforts:
- Vocational Training
- Job Corps
- CERP Micro Grants
- Local Govt. Engagement
- State-owned enterprise assistance
- Flour mill providing for PDS
- Ninawa Pharmaceutical Co., Bazi
- Fertilizer, Food Ready-to-Make
- Factories

Future Agendas:
- USAID increasing programs into Tal Afer, Tal, Balkit, Tarm, Samarra
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP), Growth
- Employment
- Micro-Finance, Loans
- Business Development Training
- Local Governance Program (LGP)
- Local agricultural development programs

Projected Timeline (July 06):
Ninawa: Provincial Government needs ESC support to improve infrastructure and develop long-term jobs.

Salah ad Din: Mixed assessment between the major cities with Tarm functioning but Habbaniya and Bazi marginally affected.
MND-SE
Muthanna
Mayyitin/Basrah
Governance/Economics

Current Status:
Basra
Basra's Provincial Council and DQAs are functioning but are impacted by the uncertainty of the Governor's status. The Governor has lately demonstrated a willingness to join the governmental process. The economy in Basra is dominated by oil, with retail, agriculture, and the ports becoming a more significant resource for economic growth.

- Governor of Basra attempts to bolster his popularity

Muthanna
- PC unified the Provincial Development Strategic, a comprehensive five-year plan for all sectors of government.

Mayyitin
- Mayyitin's government continues to ensure their leaders increase their capacity to govern.

Supporting Efforts:
- Vocational Training
- Job Fairs
- CEEP Micro-Grants
- Local Gov Engagement
- State-owned enterprise assistance
- Basrah Petrochemical plant

Partner Agencies:
USAID increasing programs into Zuhair
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP), Grants/Employment
- Local Governance Program (LGP)
- Irrigation development program

Projected Status (July 66):
Basra PC and DQAs continue to work effectively and attempt to increase foreign investment in the city.

In Muthanna, Conditions slowly improve. Significant investment will still be required to boost the economy and improve both employment and infrastructure.

In Mayyitin, the DQAs will continue to increase capabilities among a significant change of leadership due to elections.
MND-NE
Tameem/Erbil
Governance/Economics

Current Status:
KRG's maintaining significant impact on the Provincial Government's decision making process. However, due to the stable security situation, the potential for growth in the province has increased and will continue to show movement:

- Kurdistan digital government system to be designed
- KRG publishes Kurdistan region oil and gas law
- Youth groups see political party interference
- New Prison opens in Dohuk

Supporting Efforts:
- Votech Training
- Job Fairs
- Local Gov. Engagement

Partner Agencies:
USAID increasing programs into Zakho and Koycegiz
- Local Governance Program (LGP)
- National and international business development conferences.

Projected Status (July 08):
The KRG aggressively pursuing outside investors for oil and economic development.

Impacts:
- Article 140 resolution
- Potential conflict with GOI over Hydro-Carbon Legislation
- Provincial elections in summer 08 may change relationships and may negate gains made in capacity building.
MND-CS
Casistan
Governance/Economics

Current Status:
With the change of provincial leadership, Dhiwaniyah’s new governor has shown an unexpected willingness to engage with the CF and PET. He is aware of those who did not participate in the last election and will include them in the political process. Currently, neither government nor corporations find it attractive to invest in the area. Agricultural programs are key to economic growth.

- Tribal conference in Dhiwaniyah
- New Governor of Dhiwaniyah displays interest in engagement

Supporting Efforts:
- Job Fairs
- CERP Micro Grants
- Local Gov. Engagement
- State-owned enterprise assistance
- Agricultural association formation and support

Partner Agencies:
- USAID increasing programs in Dhiwaniyah
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP), Grants/Employment
- Local Governance Program (LGP)
- Intra-agricultural development program

Projected Status (July 06):
Tribal leaders continue to build CF relationships. IA takes on more responsibility. New governor working with CF but some DPs remain ineffective.
Sir,

This chart shows the current Provincial Security Transition Assessment on the left, with the color rating for each of the four PSTA conditions: Threat activity, Governance, Iraqi Security Forces, and MNF-I Posture. Projected PIC dates are listed in the center, and on the right all provinces except Kirkuk are projected to be PIC by 31 July 2008. PIC for Kirkuk province is not projected until Article 140 resolution. In Kirkuk, the legitimacy and transparency of the provincial government is reduced due to the ongoing Arab and Turkoman boycott of the provincial council. Transition of security in Kirkuk prior to Article 140 resolution would be perceived as handing the province over to the Kurds, and could push minority sects into the insurgency, igniting the latent tension surrounding the article 140 issue.
My aim is to examine the capabilities of the ISF now and in the Aug 08 timeframe in order to identify those factors upon which we should concentrate in order to minimize risk as we move to a reduced force structure.

I will begin with command and control. The slide shows the current status of PIC and that forecast for 31 Jul 08. I have highlighted the PJCCs because their function and capability is inextricably linked with the security of the Province. Upon it is also imposed the current and future Operations Commands as they can be forecast today. For the IA, it is likely that the MOD, JHQ and IGFC will all function better than now but with some limitations. Those limitations are largely based on the quantity, quality or experience of leaders and therefore demand a human factors solution – in short continued proactive mentoring.

The Operations Commands will continue to be the C2 mechanism of choice and by Aug 08 we will see well established Operations Commands in Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Karbala, Samarra, Ramadi (or certainly somewhere in Anbar) and Mosul. All will continue to face different challenges in the security situation and they will have differing relationships with the IA chain of command and the PM. CF engagement with this level of command will contribute to success. Importantly there must be, by Aug 08, a C2 mechanism in place to address the CSS aspects of units moving into and out of the responsibility of an operational command.

At the tactical level, 8 of 10 IA Divisional HQs are at ORA 1 or 2 and all ten are in IA lead. By Aug 08 it is expected that Headquarters 11 and 14 Divisions will be at or very near IA lead.

Tactical communications will have improved but not to the level required for complex battle-space coordination. In contrast, combined planning, battle-space coordination and liaison will increase in importance as battle-space is ceded to IA and if the IA seeks to deploy the 120mm mortars that it has procured.

The greatest impact on C2 will, however, be the lack of officers and NCOs, notwithstanding the initiative to recruit former regime army personnel.

Although the MOI and its subordinate elements are less advanced, the C2 challenges that it faces are less stark. As with the Army, the greatest impact on C2 for the IP, NP and Border Forces is the lack of officers and NCOs.

In summary, with continued, proactive mentoring, ISF C2 will be sufficiently robust by Aug 08 to present C2 as a manageable risk.
This slide shows the current disposition of IA units and a summary of those in the lead. You will be familiar with the most recent ORA.

Before I turn to the forecast for 31 Jul 08, I would like to draw your attention to the inset graph showing the number of units at ORA 1 or 2. The lack of progression in this area is well known and it may be that the top line is largely a factor of the number of units in battle-space, that is, that units are likely to get to ORA 2 in a given timeframe. The bottom section, however, indicates that little progress is made in getting units to ORA 1, largely due to the systemic issues of personnel numbers, the number and quality of officers and NCOs and the lack of logistic support. It is this area that merits attention over the next ten months. Is ORA 2 good enough or do we have to make a concerted effort to get specific units and formations to ORA 1 in order that we minimize risk in those important areas where CF cede battle-space to the IA?
This slide shows the forecast disposition of the IA on 31 Jul 08. By then the IA will comprise 12 Divisions, 47 Brigades and 153 Battalions at FOC or better. The 1st Presidential Brigade will have been generated and plans for the integration of 2 Peshmerga Divisions will have become a reality. This total includes 9 of the former SIBs that will have completed training and will have transitioned to the IA as IAIB, leaving 8 to train and transition. Finally, the new EOD Regiment and the Infrastructure Repair Battalion will be in place.

Further equipment will have been fielded: Badger fielding will be complete by end 07, 110 BMP 1 will have been purchased to equip 3 IA BNs (probably in 5, 6 and 11 Divisions) and 251 ECM sets will be issued in early 08. M16/M4 fielding to 3, 6, 8, 9 DIV and 3/1 BDE will be complete and fielding of 60mm mortar could be achieved. Finally MRAP delivery may make HWMMV/UAH available for the IA and ~320 x 120mm mortars could be available.

This equipment delivery is not without implications – greater tactical mobility will result in greater demand for fuel; additional BMP battalions may result in a demand for operational mobility that is beyond the IA and 120mm mortars bring obvious requirements for FDC, tactical communications, interoperability and air-space control.

The ML and MDCOA briefed earlier highlighted the implications of sectarianism and militia influence and these will remain the greatest threat to IA acceptability.

Finally, the identified systemic issues (the lack of NCOs and officers and logistic support) will continue to hamper IA development and effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>FOC</th>
<th>Future Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/22 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Kirkuk?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/3 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Ninewah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/3/2 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD (IADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4/2 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Kirkuk?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/3/4 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 IA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Tikrit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5/4 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Al Hiji (IADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5/4 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Al Bashara (IADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/3/4 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Al Ryath (IADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/6/4 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Al Hassar (IADB)</td>
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<td>TBD</td>
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<td>TBD</td>
<td>Al Syitia (IADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/3/6 IDA</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Mahmadiyah (IADB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This slide shows the ORA status of the IP now and a forecast for 31 Jul 08 for the Provinces and for the major cities. The IP currently comprises an authorised strength of 238,209 with 238,681 assigned. Based on current proposals this will increase to at least 288,232 by next July.

Reconciliation will contribute both to an increase in IP and more representational policing, dependent on MOI clearing the names of potential recruits and issuing hiring orders. By 31 Jul 08 the Baghdad IP expansion will have seen the use of expedient police stations and the first of the new stations will be complete.

This expansion is not without risk; financial, training, logistic and sectarian but if successful could be followed by a similar process elsewhere. The scale of effort required for such activity demands that future expansion of this type be prioritised to deliver greatest effect in relation to CF posture and presence.

Sectarianism and militia influence pose the greatest long-term threat to ISF acceptability and the lack of officers will continue to inhibit IP development and effectiveness.
TT will continue to be required and in greater numbers.
A transition to a regionally based force will require a basing concept and CF engagement.
Conduct true combined operations.
Conduct combined exercises in order to refocus and develop ORA1/2 units.
Mentor NP leaders.
Develop robust strategy for dealing with NP leaders and units that demonstrate sectarian behavior.
Expand Officer and NCO training base.
Requirement for NP collective training centre.

Carabinieri Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QRF BN</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 NP BN</td>
<td>22 DEC - 16 FEB 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2 NP BN</td>
<td>23 FEB - 19 APR 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2 NP BN</td>
<td>26 APR - 21 JUN 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-1 NP BN</td>
<td>28 JUN - 23 AUG 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-6 NP BN</td>
<td>30 AUG - 25 OCT 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7 NP BN</td>
<td>01 NOV - 27 DEC 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 NP BN</td>
<td>03 JAN - 28 FEB 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 NP BN</td>
<td>07 MAR - 2 MAY 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 NP BN</td>
<td>09 MAY - 4 JUL 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1 NP BN</td>
<td>11 JUL - 5 SEP 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 NP BN</td>
<td>09 MAY - 4 JUL 09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DBE forces will not be wholly capable of securing border areas without other ISF or CF support, but they will continue to improve.

- POE forces will be more capable of conducting POE procedures with reduced CF support, contributed to by the POE Enhancement Program.

- Militia influence and corruption will continue to be prevalent at POE.

- Current systemic issues will continue to impact DBE development:
  - Personnel Shortages – a lack of Officers and NCOs (compounded by frequent personnel turnover).
  - Lack of Fuel – impacts on training and unit mission operations.
  - Lack of maintenance, logistics and sustainment programs.
  - Poor infrastructure maintenance – DBE facilities are in decay with no money available for repairs.
Sir, the slide on the left shows the current ISF laydown and the current TT shortages which you were briefed on yesterday.

In the TT column the numbers in blue are the internal Transition teams

And the number in red at the bottom of each call out box shows the current TT shortages
Sir, the slide on the left shows the projected numbers for the ISF and the TT shortages as of 31 JUL 08.

The number in purple shows the growth of the ISF during this time.

MND-N, MND-SE and MND-B have the largest amount of growth over this time.

We project that we will be short approximately 128 Transition teams at this point.

Sir the bottom line of this slide is the box highlighted in red in the impacts box.
Sir, the next two slides represent windows of opportunity to transition to some type of advisory BDE. This decision must be based on current conditions on the ground.

In order to implement any type of change to the forces we must notify those units effected early enough so they are prepared to assume the role of an advisory BDE. This requires early Decision Points in the planning process.

In the timeline we have placed a DEPORD to 15 BCTs in the event there is no change to the forces needed in theater while simultaneously issuing a WARNO to three BDEs to prepare to deploy as an advisory BDE. A second Decision point allows the CDR to offramp the forces he will not need based on the conditions on the ground.

In the event there are no changes to the situation in theater, the force level remains at 15 BDEs and the decision cycle starts again in 2009.
Forms of Partnership

Transition Team and Partnership – A 1:1 ratio between TT and ISF units located in a maneuver Battalions AO. The BN is focused on kinetic operations due to high enemy activity.

AI Asad

Anbar/Mosul

Tal Afar

Embedded BN Partnership – Pairs a CF BN with a ISF BDE in areas with high to moderate enemy activity. ISF has lead for kinetic operations. External TT’s are not required. 2-15 FA Model.

Enhanced TT Heavy – 1:1 ratio of TT to ISF. TT’s have ~40 additional personnel and necessary equipment added to allow autonomous activity. Low to moderate enemy activity allows for risk acceptance. 3rd IA Model.

Enhanced TT Light – Ratio of TT to ISF units depends on METT-TC allowing CF CDR flexibility of forces. TT’s have ~40 additional personnel and necessary equipment added to allow autonomous activity. Low enemy activity allows for risk acceptance. 3rd IA Model.

Low Enemy Activity

High Enemy Activity

Baghdad

Sir I believe you have seen this slide before, this is simply a model of the four methods arrayed along a line representing the threat continuum where high represents an area like Baghdad and low is an area like Tal Afar.
Sir, the next two slides lay out a couple of examples of how these models can be applied to battlespace.

In MNF-W out along the western border we use an Enhanced LT model where the threat is lower and as we move towards Fallujah and the threat increases the models change. Around the Haditha area we move to an Enhanced Heavy model.

4/7 IA will be a brand new unit so we used an embark model in an attempt to put more emphasis on rapidly building this unit and finally near Fallujah we use a standard model.
Sir, next we move to MND-N in the Nineawa province.

In MND-N we used a combination of Enhanced Heavy and Enhanced Light to cover the IA units. To cover all the borders and IA units would require 1/3 ACR is dedicated to ISF/TT oversight and 2/3 ACR is centrally located to act as a QRF.

3/3 ACR is free to conduct kinetic operations or could assume additional battlespace
Active Bases
56 MNC-I
09 MNF-I
65 Total
- MNC-I base
- MNF-I base

Base Locations (Current Set)

Produced by (b)(3), (b)(6)
MNC-I Basing Engineer
18 SEP 07
Sir, The next series of slides show what the coalition will look like in AUG 2008. We are still waiting for many of the coalition partners to decide on their future participation, but this information is current as of today.

In MND NE and the US led MND’s. One of the significant changes is Georgia will remove their Brigade from FOB Delta, but maintain 1.4b soldiers in the UNAMI mission.

Additionally, Albania will add a 1.4b soldier infantry company to MND N around JAN 08 thru June 08.

Lithuania will add 1.4b soldiers in NOV 07.
Sir, moving on to MND-CS, Slovakia will withdraw its staff officers by the end of the year.
Denmark will remove their Soldier Helicopter detachment in DEC 07 and they will not be replaced.

And the UK withdrawing down to soldiers by Aug 08.
Sir, 3/25 and 1/10 MTN will be the next Brigade to RIP/TOA. Two things to note on this RIP. First, as we laid out for you Monday night 1/10 MTN is a candidate for sourcing the TF 1-4 mission in January so long as we remain at 20 BCTs. If General Mixon decides to pull a battalion from 1/10 MTN that may preclude detaching a battalion from this Brigade to reinforce 3/1 CD in Diyala. The remaining battalions should replace 3/25 IDs battalions one-for-one.
Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.
Force Enablers
MANEUVER AVIATION
Key Task:
CM2RI
RTE / AREA RECON
CONVOY SECURITY
TIC RESPONSE
TIER / VIP ESCORT

DRRF
AIR ASSAULT
CMD GRP
CARGO
AMR / RING RTE

MEDEVAC
CARGO
AIR ASSAULT
AMR

Mission Capability:
AH-64D and KW AWTs-
MND-N is able to produce 12 AWT's (AH), and 31 SWTs (KW)
MND-B can produce 24 AWTs (AH)
MND-C will be able to produce 12 AWT's (AH), and 15 SWTs (KW)
Corps Avn is able to produce 12 AWTs

UH-60L-
MND-N is able to produce 24 MS
MND-B is able to produce 19 MS
MND-C is able to produce 19 MS
Corps Avn will be able to produce 34 MS

CH-47D
MND-N is able to produce 6 MS
MND-B is able to produce 6 MS
MND-C is able to produce 6 MS
Corps Avn is able to produce 6 MS
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRES DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
Key Task:
CM2RI
RTE / AREA RECON
CONVOY SECURITY
TIC RESPONSE
TIER / VIP ESCORT

DRRF
AIR ASSAULT
CMD GRP
CARGO
AMR / RING RTE

MEDEVAC

CARGO
AIR ASSAULT
AMR
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT

URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
MANEUVER

Civil Affairs
Key Task:
(S//REL) Execution of COIN operations.
(S//REL) Establishing a security environment that facilitates the development of local economies, governance, and the rule of law.
(S//REL) Neutralization of the insurgency and defeat of AQI.
(S//REL) Set favorable conditions for, and facilitate transfer of, area of operations to Iraqi Security Forces and further provincial assumption of PIC.
(S//REL) Support future Iraqi Provincial Elections and the political process.
(S//REL) Support engagement of Iraqi leaders, tribes and clerics.
(S//REL) Support the operations of DoS led pPRTs and ePRTs as directed.
(S//REL) Support provincial and local governments in capacity development.
(S//REL) Assist in increasing primacy of the RoL.
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
Key Tasks:

(S//REL) Execution of COIN operations.

(S//REL) Establishing a security environment that facilitates the development of local economies, governance, and the rule of law.

(S//REL) Neutralization of the insurgency and defeat of AQI.

(S//REL) Set favorable conditions for, and facilitate transfer of, area of operations to Iraqi Security Forces and further provincial assumption of PIC.

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(S//REL) Support provincial and local governments in capacity development.

(S//REL) Assist in increasing primacy of the RoL.
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URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
MANEUVER

Civil Military Operations (PRT)
**pPRT - Provincial level Key Tasks**

Lead for Governance and Economic activities

Mutually supporting with MNDs

Strengthen the capacity of Provincial governments to accelerate the transition to Iraqi self-reliance

Promote reconciliation; increase number of stakeholders

Build sustainable programs to meet the expectations of the Iraqi people

Empower Iraqis to build sustainable capacity at the Provincial level

Implement short term programs with immediate economic and governance impacts to fill the gap while sustainable programs have time to take root
ePRT Tasks - Sub-Provincial level
Bolster moderates and shape the political environment
Support MNC-I counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy
Strengthen the capacity of Local governments to accelerate the transition to Iraqi self-reliance
Promote reconciliation; increase number of stakeholders
Build sustainable programs to meet the expectations of the Iraqi people
Empower Iraqis to build sustainable capacity
Implement short term programs with immediate economic and governance impacts to fill the gap while sustainable programs have time to take root
INTELLIGENCE
2 x 1.4g (STG TM) (50 SM)
1 x Tactical Exploitation TM (13 SM, split into 3 x 4 SM teams w/ 1 OIC)
1 x CI FO 513th HQ (Deutche) (3 SM)
1 x CI Det (12 x SM split into 6 Teams: Victory1, Victory2, Marez, Speicher, Anaconda, IZ)
7 x CREW EWO/Support (269 SM)
1 x 1.4c SPT Section (16 x SM split into 5 Teams: CIOC, US Embassy, MNF-W, MNF-B, CACE)
1 x DOMEX Section (75 SM split into 15 x BCT Teams)
3 x DOMEX HQs (31 SM)
1 x SPACE SPT TM (10 SM split into 2 teams: MNF-W, MNC-I)
3 x Linguist Requirements (SM are contracted and not military sourced)
MNF-I
1 x JIDC (TF 1.4a) (160 SM)
1 x 50 USC § 306 (8 SM)
1 x COMTECH TM (6 SM)
1 x CMT (3 SM)
1 x GOI VETTING TEAM (RFF 772) (12 SM)
1 x SIE (RFF 772) (7 SM)

RFF 719 One time Surge Units Redeploy in FY 08:
-7 x SM MET Teams (MND-B)
-16 x Intel Augementees to the BOC (MND-B)
-9 x [b][3] 50 USC § 3601 Sourced and likely a recurring requirement for BCT’s) (18 x SM)
- 3 x [1.4c] teams (15 x SM)
- 1 x WI Detachment (2 SM)
- 5 x DOCEX teams (25 x SM)
83 x Total SM Redeploy
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
2 x [1.4c] (STG TM) (50 SM)
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1 x DOMEX Section (75 SM split into 15 x BCT Teams)
3 x DOMEX HQs (31 SM)
1 x SPACE SPT TM (10 SM split into 2 teams: MNF-W, MNC-I)
3 x Linguist Requirements (SM are contracted and not military sourced)
MNC-I
1 x JIDC (TF [1.4a] (160 SM)
1 x (3) 50 USC § 363 (8 SM)
1 x COMTECH TM (6 SM)
1 x CMT (3 SM)
1 x GOI VETTING TEAM (RFF 772) (12 SM)
1 x SIE (RFF 772) (7 SM)

RFF 719 One time Surge Units Redeploy in FY 08:
- 7 x SM MET Teams (MND-B)
- 16 x Intel Augementees to the BOC (MND-B)
- 9 x Sourced and likely a recurring requirement for BCT’s) (18 x SM)
- 3 x teams (15 x SM)
- 1 x WI Detachment (2 SM)
- 5 x DOCEX teams (25 x SM)

83 x Total SM Redeploy
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
2 x (STG TM) (50 SM)
1 x Tactical Exploitation TM (13 SM, split into 3 x 4 SM teams w/ 1 OIC)
1 x CI FO 513th HQ (Deutche) (3 SM)
1 x CI Det (12 x SM split into 6 Teams: Victory1, Victory2, Marez, Speicher, Anaconda, IZ)
7 x CREW EWO/Support (269 SM)
1 x SPT Section (16 x SM split into 5 Teams: CIOC, US Embassy, MNF-W, MND-B, CACE)
1 x DOMEX Section (75 SM split into 15 x BCT Teams)
3 x DOMEX HQs (31 SM)
1 x SPACE SPT TM (10 SM split into 2 teams: MNF-W, MNC-I)
3 x Linguist Requirements (SM are contracted and not military sourced MNF-I)
1 x JIDC (TF 160 SM)
1 x 50 USC § 36 (8 SM)
1 x COMTECH TM (6 SM)
1 x CMT (3 SM)
1 x GOI VETTING TEAM (RFF 772) (12 SM)
1 x SIE (RFF 772) (7 SM)

RFF 719 One time Surge Units Redeploy in FY 08:
- 7 x SM MET Teams (MND-B)
- 16 x Intel Augementees to the BOC (MND-B)
- 9 x Sourced and likely a recurring requirement for BCT’s) (18 x SM)
  - 3 x 1.4c teams (15 x SM)
  - 1 x WI Detachment (2 SM)
  - 5 x DOCEX teams (25 x SM)

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1 x DOMEX Section (75 SM split into 15 x BCT Teams)
3 x DOMEX HQs (31 SM)
1 x SPACE SPT TM (10 SM split into 2 teams: MNF-W, MNC-I)
3 x Linguist Requirements (SM are contracted and not military sourced)

MNF-I
1 x JIDC (TF 1.4a) (160 SM)
1 x (b)(3) 50 USC § 360 (8 SM)
1 x COMTECH TM (6 SM)
1 x CMT (3 SM)
1 x GOI VETTING TEAM (RFF 772) (12 SM)
1 x SIE (RFF 772) (7 SM)

RFF 719 One time Surge Units Redeploy in FY 08:
- 7 x SM MET Teams (MND-B)
- 16 x Intel Augementees to the BOC (MND-B)
- 9 x Sourced and likely a recurring requirement for BCT's) (18 x SM)
  - 3 x teams (15 x SM)
  - 1 x WI Detachment (2 SM)
  - 5 x DOCEX teams (25 x SM)

83 x Total SM Redeploy
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
FIRES
FA
- Fires BDE HQ (-) – MND-B, MND-N, MND-C
- MLRS BTRY – split ops – 1 x PLT at FOB Hammer & 1 x PLT at FOB Normandy
- Radars – all EAD radars now Q36 and located at following FOBs:
  - MND-N (13) – Brasfield-Mora, Palwada, 2 x Warrior, Marez, Sykes, Speicher, Warhouse, Summerall, 4 x Anaconda & TAB HGs
  - MND-B (3) – Str kor, 2 x Liberty & TAB HGs
  - MND-C (1) – Delta
  - MND-W (1) – Falluja

ADA
- CRAM
  - Intercept BTRYs at LSA Anaconda & VBC
  - Sense & Warm batteries located at 14 priority FOBs in all MNDs.
- Traditional - Avenger Btry – VBC and LZ locations & Sentinel – 2 x PLTs – (VBC/Tikrit)

EWO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EWO</th>
<th>MND</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>BDE</th>
<th>BN</th>
<th>FSOperator</th>
<th>FSI leader</th>
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<td>LNOs (6) at OCFI, CJSTOF, CTEWCC, ARCENT, Kuwait (7) Training and Depot</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key Task:
Plan, direct, develop intelligence, execute and supervise the Div’s counterfire fight and radar operations. Provide supervision, training, and overwatch for Field Artillery and fire support operations within the Division. Plans, coordinate, and integrate Joint and Coalition lethal and nonlethal tactical level fires in support of Div operations. **Fires BDE HQ (-)**

Provide Close Air Support, EW Support, and responsive TIC/SD coverage ISO CF, to include transition teams. Provide joint fires ISO the ISF as required to prevent operational failure. **MLRS/Joint Air**
Combined-arms Counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response operations; protect force and FOBs with C-RAM Sense & Warn and Intercept capabilities. C-RAM
Provide Counterfire RADAR support ISO MNC-I and subordinate units. EAD radars
Advise, plans, and conducts Corps, Div, BDE, and BN level electronic warfare operations. Oversees the fielding, employment, and sustainment of ground CREW systems and CREW personnel. EWOs
Conduct analysis and provide weekly, monthly, and quarterly assessments on CDR objectives.
Assessments Cell

1.4a, 1.4g
MNC-I
31 JUL 08
Fires

MNF-W
1 X Q36 (6 SM)
1 X ADA C-RAM S&W BTRY (52 SM)
42 X EWOs (CMD Element)
Total SM: 100

MND-B
1 X HHB, FA BDE (-) (40 SM)
1 X TAB HQ (34 SM)
3 X Q36s (18 SM)
1 X ADA AVENGER BTRY (78 SM)
1 X ADA SENTINEL PLT (25 SM)
1 X ADA C-RAM INT. BTRY (137 SM)
1 X ADA C-RAM S&W BTRY (52 SM)
84 X EWOs (CMD Element, field site leaders)
Total SM: 468

CORPS CONTROL
1 X EFFECTS ASSESSMENT CELL (27 SM)
1 X FA ROCKET BTRY (120 SM)
41 X EWOs (JCSS-1 HQs & other LNCOs)
Total SM: 138

MND-N
1 X HHB, FA BDE (-) (40 SM)
Augment FA BDE HQ (17 SM)
1 X TAB HQ (24 SM)
13 X Q36s (78 SM)
1 X ADA SENTINEL PLT (8 SM)
46 X EWOs (CMD Element, BDE, BN, & field site leaders)
Total SM: 226

MND-C
1 X HHB, FA BDE (-) (40 SM)
1 X Q36 (5 SM)
31 X EWOs (CMD Element, field site leaders)
Total SM: 77

Impact:
- No Impact

Note: Pending review/analysis for FOIA
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
NOTES AT LEAST)
Combat and Combat Support

FIRES

PSYOP
Key Tasks:

**PSYOP Task Force (POTF) HQ**
Conducts MNC-I's operational level PSYOP
Assists the TPCs when needed
Provides C2 from the Corps as necessary and assists in repair / replacement of PSYOP specific equipment and PSYOP personnel
A Regional PSYOP Co (-) is part of the POTF and provides regional expertise in PSYOP development

**Tactical PSYOP Co (TPC) HQ**
Provides planning assistance to the Div HQ
Provides C2 for the TPDs in the MND's AO
Has a TPDD which conducts target audience analysis, PSYOP development and limited production

**Tactical PSYOP Det (TPD)**
Provides C2 of Tactical PSYOP Teams in the BCT's AO
Provides staff support to BCT-level HQ
Coordinates with the TPC for PSYOP support requirements
Conducts face-to-face communications, loudspeaker operations, and dissemination of print products and novelty items to target audiences
Comprised of a HQ and three or four teams, which support maneuver BNs

**IO FST**
Provides operational-level planning, targeting and execution support
Provides IO-focused, multi-disciplined expertise
Coordinates and synchronizes IO intelligence
Develops and nominates IO targets
Provides interoperability within the IO community and CENTCOM

**COMCAM HQ**
Provides COMCAM planning and C2 for Multi-Service COMCAM Teams
Manages collection, storage and distribution of all COMCAM imagery in Iraq

**COMCAM TM** - Provides a directed imagery collection capability within MNC-I
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRES DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
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URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
NOTES AT LEAST)
Combat and Combat Support

FIRES

PAO
Key Tasks:

Public Affairs Assets

Public Affairs Detachment (PAD)
Broadcast Operations Detachment (BOD)
Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC)
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)

Provide media facilitation capabilities:
Ensure leaders and troops are capable and trained to engage civilian news media.

Provide print and broadcast products:
Produce digital photographic images and audiovisual products in support of the CI program.

Operate Coalition Press Information Center:
Provides a Joint Public Affairs capability to MNF-I.
Operate the Digital Video and Imagery
Distribution System (DVIDS):
 Transmit digital products for broadcast to local, national and international
media outlets.
 Conduct live interviews from remote locations.

Monitor the global and information environments:
Provide strategic information guidance and theater-level coordination for all
PAO operations.

Conduct PA planning and analysis
Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
NOTES AT LEAST)
Key Task:

**Public Affairs Assets**
Public Affairs Detachment (PAD)
Broadcast Operations Detachment (BOD)
Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC)
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)

Provide media facilitation capabilities:
Ensure leaders and troops are capable and trained to engage civilian news media.

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Monitor the global and information environments:
Provide strategic information guidance and theater-level coordination for all PAO operations.

Conduct PA planning and analysis:
Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN
NOTES AT LEAST)
Combat and Combat Support

FIRES

EASOG
Key Task:

Plan, request, and control CAS, ISR, EW ISO MNDs (ALOs/JTACs)
Prioritize & distribute CAS, EW sorties among MNDs (ASOC)
Provide weather support to all ITO aviation (WX)
Provide C2 & airspace deconfliction to all joint air/firepower (CRC)
Communicates, facilitates, advises, coordinates & supports synchronization between CFACC & MNF-I (ACCE)

Balad
10xC-130E/H3
12xF-16CG
12xF-16C+
15xF-16CJ
05xHH-60G
54

Al Asad
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URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
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URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
COMMAND AND
CONTROL

Headquarters
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
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Key Task:

SIG BDE:
- Provide C2 for SIG BN/ESB.
- Provide appropriate voice and data Signal support to U.S. and Coalition Forces.
- Establish, maintain and operate a system Control Cell to monitor network health, track, control, engineer, and source all telecommunications service requests.

SIG BN/ESB:
- Plan, engineer, install, operate, maintain and restore Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology (C4IT) Nodes in support of U.S. and Coalition Forces.
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Key Task:
CORPS SIG CO
Provide communications support to the Corps TAC.
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SUSTAINMENT
Logistics
There are 26 SSAs located in Iraq, 10 are task organized to the 316th ESC 14 are organic BCT BSBs, and 2 are class IX air SSAs. Of the 26 SSAs, 22 are multi-class SSAs, one is a class IX ground SSA, 2 are class IX air SSAs, and 1 is a class II, IIIp, IV SSA. Included in the multi-class SSA count is LSAA's Forward Redistribution Point (FRP), which serves as an excess collection point for serviceable excess class II, IIIp, IV, and IX, goes on the shelf and is not immediately excessed out as retrograde to Kuwait.

**DISTRIBUTION FLOW:** Multi-Class supplies are delivered via air and ground into Iraq. Supplies are routinely delivered via air primarily through Kuwait, Balad/LSAA, BIAP, and Al Asad and via opportune air to the other Iraqi airfields. Theater trucks deliver general supplies from Kuwait to Tallil, VBC, TQ, LSAA, and Speicher, 1/82 BCT provides gun truck escorts for theater trucks. 106 Trans Bn, 213th ASG, delivers supplies from the LSAA to Taji, Speicher, Q-West, and TQ. CSG and SB trucks deliver from the GS/DS hubs to BCT SSAs at the major FOBs and outlying camps and combat outposts. MEF trucks deliver USMC specific items from TQ and Al Asad to MEF camps in the MNF-W AO.

Central Issue Facilities are located at LSAA and Baghdad and provide direct exchange for CIF items managed by 316th ESC
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Central Issue Facilities are located at LSAA and Baghdad and provide direct exchange for CIF items managed by 316th ESC.
SUSTAINMENT
SECFOR
SIR

This is the SECFOR set, comprising of Base Security and Convoy Security, in addition to the 1/82 Theater Security Brigade.

The numbers reflect the movement of some CSS assets to SECFOR, and the way that CSC units are resourced.
SUSTAINMENT
AG
Key Task:
- Provide direct personnel service support to commanders and soldiers within AOR from all components
- Operate personnel service support systems - CAC, eMILPO, TOPMIS, DTAS; support casualty operations
- Provides standard, accountable, and casualty mail services to supported population
- Provides reception, return to duty, replacement, R&R and redeployment accountability support and Fixed wing APODs
- Provide 24/7 operations in support CSHs, Mortuary Affairs Collection Points, ASCC headquarters and the HRSC Casualty Operations Division.
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Key Task:
Provides standard, accountable, and casualty mail services to supported population.
Provides reception, return to duty, replacement, R&R and redeployment accountability support and Fixed wing APODs
Provide 24/7 operations in support CSHs, Mortuary Affairs Collection Points, ASCC headquarters and the HRSC Casualty Operations Division.
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Combat and Combat Support

SUSTAINMENT
Medical
PM Med Det: Provides preventive medicine support throughout Iraq to include inspections of MWR facilities, unit food sources, etc…

Ground Amb CO: Provides ambulance transport assets and personnel for all EAD units. Augments CLPs and units short medics.

Optometry teams: Provides optometry support to the entire ITO, to include exams, glass prescriptions and health related eye injuries.

Blood Det: Provides distribution and handling of all blood products in theater.

Med Log CO: Receives, sorts, and distributes all Medical Logistics to EAD and Divisional assets.

Vet Det: Provides food inspection and animal care for all military working dogs in theater.
**Dental CO:** Provides area support dental services to units without organic dental assets

**SB Aug Det:** Provides PM and CSC assets to the SB that were lost during transformation—see CSC and PM breakout for key tasks.

**Eye Surgical & Neurology Det:** Provides care to Soldiers with facial trauma to include eyes/nose/mouth/ear trauma. Provides Neuro Surgery to spine injury victims.

**CSC:** Provides Mental Health/combat stress control to units without organic CSC assets.

**Key Tasks:**
Provide Health Service Support and Force Health Protection (FHP) to US and Coalition Forces. Provide life, limb or eyesight care for Iraqi Civilians.

**LV III Combat Support Hospital (CSH):**
Provide level III medical care to stabilize and sustain Casualties until RTD or evacuated out of theater.

**Multi-Functional Medical Bn (MMB):**
Provide operational and technical supervision and administrative assistance for functional medical units operating the BCT and or Division areas.

**Area Support Med Company (ASMC):**
Provide Echelon I and II FHP and ground evacuation to the units located in area of
operations of the ASMC. Provide C2, administrative and clinical support of Troop Medical Clinics throughout the ITO.

**Forward Surgical Team (FST):**
Provide forward trauma surgical support, preoperative care, urgent lifesaving surgery and post–anesthesia recovery until evacuation within the ITO.
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Impact:
CSC: Risk of not sourcing is increased suicides and DNBI casualties within the theater
ASMC: Risk of not sourcing will result in longer lines of evacuation and degraded forces due to longer travel times for necessary medical support.
FST: Risk of not filling would cause significant surgical degradation at the LV III facilities that they have been augmented with.
PM Med Det: Risk of not filling loss of MWR type facilities on the FOB (the PM assets inspect these facilities and ensure sanitary working conditions to prevent PM disease breakouts).
Ground Amb CO: Risk of not sourcing would
degrade ground Medevac transport on FOBs.

**Optometry teams:** Risk of not sourcing would be loss of spectacle production, routine eye exams and a lack of ability to treat eye injuries.

**Blood Det:** Risk of not sourcing would result in the inability to provide blood products in ITO.

**Med Log CO:** Risk of not sourcing would result in no medical supplies for all medical units in theater.

**Vet Det:** Risk of not sourcing would jeopardize the health and preventive maintenance of over 500 military working dogs as well as the food sources of all food served to coalition forces.

**Dental CO:** Risk of not sourcing will be DNBI casualties that cannot perform their mission due to dental emergencies.

**SB Aug Det:** See PM and CSC comments.

**MMBs and C2 elements:** Risk of not sourcing would limit force health protection capabilities and command oversight and planning efforts for all medical units in ITO.

**Eye Surgical & Neurology Det:** Risk of not sourcing is the lack of specialized spinal injury and facial trauma in the critical hours that will significantly improve a casualties survivability.

**LV III Hospital:** Risk of not sourcing would be longer lines of evacuation potentially resulting in higher casualty rates.
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PROTECTION

Engineers
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PROTECTION
CBRN
Key Tasks:
- Decon
- Recon / HAZMAT ID
- CW munitions characterization, handling and destruction
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PROTECTION
MP
Key Task:

MP BDE:
- Advise MND-B on IP development and PTT employment
- Provides Provincial-PTT to teach and coach IP leadership and management systems
- OPCON of MP BNs

MP BN:
- Advise BCT/DIV on IP development and PTT employment
- Provides District-PTT to teach and coach IP leadership in management systems
- ADCON of MP COs

MP CO:
- PTT population
- Teach and coach the 5 Police Competencies and Holistic Station Management

L&O Det: Provides Law and Order of FOB

MP Augmentation Team: Advise DIV and BCT Cdrs on pre-TIF Det Ops

PEDD/SSD/EDD: Explosive Detection Dog
**PNDD:** Narcotic Detection Dog

**CD:** Remains Detection Dog

**CTD:** Trail Detection Dog
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Assumptions:
92% manning: 44 x 0.92 = 41 SM per CO
36 x 0.92 = 35 SM per BN

Key Tasks:
Integrates & exploits tactical and technical intelligence, conducts specialized C-IED operations to achieve strategic, operational & tactical effects
CJTF 1.4a HQ plans and synchronizes specialized C-IED operations for MNC-I.
3 EOD BN synchs C-IED mission support w/ MSCs, commands & controls EOD COs
19 EOD COs integrate & synchronize EOD support to BCTs; execute EOD operations
1.4c assists CJTF 1.4a with C-IED Fusion; commands & controls WI sections, WITs
4 WI LNO Teams coordinates WIT support with MSC HQs, commands & controls WITs
18 WITs conduct Post-Blast Analyses, C-IED Strike Planning, IED Cell Profiling
CEXC Exploits IED evidence, derives IED tech intelligence, coords Interagency exploitation
C-IED Training Team promotes and trains MNC-I forces on new and emerging C-IED TTP
TEU exploits CBR weapons; samples, packages & escorts items for further exploitation

Approved for Release
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INTERAGENCY
MND-N

Conduct assured mobility patrols route sanitation; culvert protection; and crater and/or culvert repair to allow freedom of maneuver (FOM) for all CF, ISF and Iraqi civilians. Conduct off Forward Operating Base (FOB) general engineering construction in support of BCTs and ISF. Defeat the IED network ICW Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and BCT assets to conduct combined arms Counter IED (CIED) missions. Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership). Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan. Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.

MND-B
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Handbook standards appropriate to the contingency operating site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

30 NCR

Conduct survivability operations at designated Camps IOT increase force protection levels and survivability of the force

BPT construct or assist in the construction of, border forts IOT enhance the force protection of the Border Defense Forces

Conduct MSR/ASR maintenance IOT allow for continued sustainment operations along key GLOCs

Conduct general engineer support IOT provide improved life and camp support

BPT maintain AND improve existing APODs

BPT conduct mobility or security operations in support of MNC-I bridging missions

BPT partner with Iraqi Engineer formations IOT mentor Iraqi engineers in engineer operations

BPT provide engineer support to the Iraqi Security Forces IOT enable ISF
operations
BPT Conduct Counter-mobility Operations ISO MNF-W forces.

20th ENG BDE
Focused route clearance
Route sanitation and culvert denial
Crater and culvert repair on corps MSRs and ASRs
Tactical bridging, rafting, and riverine operations
Tactical construction of JSS/COP/ECP/TCP/patrol bases, HLZ, FARP, Rapid Refuel Point (RRP) and initial T/O structures
Operational construction and enhancement of bases and facilities to temporary and expeditionary standards
Master planning and design
Project and program management
Prime power operations
Theater Class IV construction material management
Train, develop, and partner with ISF Engineers
Transition engineer missions to ISF Engineers
Assist interagency organizations with reconstruction and economic development
Conduct Information Operations to build understanding and support of GOI and Coalition operations
Creatively undertake unorthodox missions and tasks to exploit the full potential of this joint engineer team
Provide topographic survey, analysis, and production support
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Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.

MND-B
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operatin site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

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Provide C2 for TF missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MCRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

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Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

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MND-B
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operations site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

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Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.

MND-B
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operating site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

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MND-N

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MND-B
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbox standards appropriate to the contingency operating site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition; and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

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Conduct off Forward Operating Base (FOB) general engineering construction in support of BCTs and ISF. Defeat the IED network ICW Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and BCT assets to conduct combined arms Counter IED (CIED) missions.

Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.
Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operating site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF 1-4a missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSR operations IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

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Prime power operations
Theater Class IV construction material management
Train, develop, and partner with ISF Engineers
Transition engineer missions to ISF Engineers
Assist interagency organizations with reconstruction and economic
development
Conduct Information Operations to build understanding and support of GOI
and Coalition operations
Creatively undertake unorthodox missions and tasks to exploit the full potential
of this joint engineer team
Provide topographic survey, analysis, and production support
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRFs DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
Major Tasks by Phase

- Phases apply to a designated locale or area – not necessarily unit AOs or entire provinces
- Tasks by phase vary depending on local conditions, generally reflecting improving ISF capability
- Depending on the size of their AOs, BCTs and perhaps battalions could be in one or more phases and thus may execute different mission sets
- Several sub-tasks fall under each major task
- Sub-tasks by phase reflect a shift in emphasis over time

Coalition Force Major Tasks
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Leading
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Partnering
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Tactical Overwatch
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Operational Overwatch
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Strategic Overwatch
- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Clear, Control, Retain
Proposed Course of Action: Full Mission Set (15 BCT)

MNC-I reduces total number of BCTs from 20 to 15. Economies in personnel are achieved where possible, while not threatening security gains made from Fardh al Qanoon.

1. 2 Reserve Infantry Battalions perform security in IZ to allow COIN trained forces to conduct operations in Adhamiyah/Sadr City
2. Forces retain ability to clear, control, and retain only in select areas
3. 2 Non-Standard Brigade Headquarters in Al Qut and Ramadi provide leader interaction with ISF, as well as local/provincial government, tribal and other local leaders
4. Where conditions are appropriate, forces conduct tactical, operational, or strategic overwatch
5. Where appropriate, partnership, enhanced transition teams and transition teams further develop ISF capability
6. March assessment will determine the composition of US forces in Iraq after July 2008
Demonstrate to Sunnis they will be included
Reinforce with at least 3 of 5 returning IA BNs
BG Muthaa promoted to MG
Provincial elections conducted early
Resist temptation to reinforce with US BNs
Support 2nd and 3rd IA DIVs and IPs with enablers
Prevent sectarian revenge to inevitable AQI provocation
Need GoI/US embassy help advancing Art. 140 process
Use Tribal Security Companies as bridge to Sunni inclusion/reconciliation
Strengthen Institutions
Stay strong in Baghdad Belt - all of 4-2 SBCT and additional Battalion
Hussaniyah back to MND-B
Need help from HHQ and US Embassy to push GoI reciprocation of Sunni reconciliation gestures
IFCNR results needed
**Reduction from 14 to 6 Battalion from Sep 07 to May 08**
- Return of 2-2/3 IA Bns from MND-N to regain its parent Bde in AO SAKAR
- Iraqi Police fielding equipment for up to 30,000
- Generation of 4th Bde, 7th IA Div: Support for construction of facilities
- Return of 4th Bde, 1st IA Div or its regeneration
- Vehicle fielding to 1st and 7th IA Div to support expanded operational environment

**Transition from CERP to DoS and Gol funding will limit flexibility and timeliness**
- Work with Gol (National, Provincial, and Municipal) to develop budget processes and budgets that are complementary and for Iraqi needs
- Work with DoS to adjust either ESF or QRF regulations to mirror flexibility of CERP

**Force Drawdown may provide a perceived window of opportunity for AQI resurgence.**
- Gol must be perceived to be bringing the Sunni minority back in the mainstream of Iraqi society
  - Increased emphasis on national reconciliation/reform de-Baathification law
  - Engage Gol for provincial elections NLT summer 08
- Monitor the commitments and build on the successes of ANBAR Forum II

**Replacement of BCT (five maneuver battalions, Brigade Troops Battalion and Brigade Support Battalion) with a Non-standard Headquarters and shifting the BCT's tasks and AO to an RCT without any other increase in capability risks RCT's ability to provide requisite support to coalition forces.**
- Non-standard HQ come with coalition SECTOR for CAMP RAMADI (250 X 2M) and for State Dept personnel in RAMADI area (PRT/EPR) if private contractors are not authorized
- Non-standard HQ come with coalition to support sustainment of small dispersed coalition and potentially DoS elements (Transition Teams, FRT) located throughout RAMADI area.
MND-B: Risk

- Significant impact on Sadr City JSS expansion; incur risk in other security districts to retain
  - Reduce number of JSS’s relative to MND-B projected troop levels
- Loss of 2/82 ABN in February compels MND-B re-posturing as early as December
  - Set conditions with IZ transfer to JASG and early decisions on departure dates of combat power (2/82ABN, 2 SCR) IOT effectively orient units during upcoming BCT RIP/TOA’s (avoidance of future double-RIPs)
- Redrawing boundaries with MND–N cedes Baghdad provincial areas, directly impacting ability to gain synergy across multiple LOOs and transition to Phase III
  - Close cross boundary coordination of ISF, governance and essential services LOOs, IOT enhance CF effectiveness across Baghdad Province.
- Emphasis on transitioning responsibility to ISF based on time rather than conditions while simultaneously drawing down coalition forces, limits ability to maintain FAQ security gains in the event of ISF regression
  - Immediate bolstering of partnership opportunities and selective Phase II/III transition to reduce risk associated with a loss of CF (Maximum Partnership, Intermediate Engagement and Minimum Engagement methodology).
- Departure of 2SCR to backfill 4/2SBCT requires regeneration of strike force and OPRES and alternate sourcing of Sadr City JSS expansion
  - Requires MNC-I assistance to mitigate a further loss of combat power in MND-B (2/82 ABN, 2 SCR, and three additional battalions).
Loss of Georgian Brigade w/o backfill as well as Fires Brigade HQ (-) conducting a non-standard mission jeopardizes security and engagement operations in Wasit (unless RFF approved for Non-Standard Brigade HQ; does not address loss of Georgian Brigade)
- Partner with IA at checkpoints
- MiTT the 3GB/1GB with 3/8 IA IOT prepare to transfer checkpoints to IA

Limited ability to interdict / disrupt weapons and personnel traffic from Madai‘n and Wasit
- Close cross boundary coordination of ISF, governance and essential services
- LOOs IOT enhance CF effectiveness across provinces

Responsiveness of Army air support for MND-C is degraded after departure of 3CAB (beginning Jul 08)
- Develop Army air support plan with MND-B for supporting MND-C

Possibility of JSS and COP closures
- Reduce number of JSS’s relative to MND-C projected troop levels

Loss of BCT(-) reduces MND-C reach into Shia south provinces
- Develop 8th IA and IP SWAT capabilities for operations in key southern cities
Decreased presence of CF along provincial borders could trigger increased traffic of weapons and personnel

Drawdown of CF may embolden JAM / BADR to regroup and conduct renewed attacks in MND–CS
MND-SE: Risk

- Ability of the ISF to control the Security situation: increasing over time but still a risk.
- Re-intervention threshold post PIC: needs defining

CJSOTF & other SOF operations require careful ROE and coordination in PIC provinces.

Future reductions in MND(SE) force levels: ability to respond to spike in violence post mid 08.
MNC-I: Operational Risk

- GOI fails to capitalize on opportunity created by FAQ security gains
- ISF does not control and retain areas that have been cleared
- Balancing resources between security districts, Baghdad belts, and outlying areas to mitigate tactical risks
- Rate of ISF force generation too slow to fill security requirements created by departure of CF forces
- ISF force generation exceeds resources available to develop them
- As GOI/Provincial autonomy increases, CF influence decreases
- Proper allocation of resources to protecting the populace and to developing the ISF
BACK-UP
General Background Slides from Enablers
Sir,

This is a new chart for tracking PIC progress through the five key stages in the process.

The dates for Division and Corps level are projected dates when the province will meet the conditions for PIC.

The date on the far right hand column is the projected PIC date.
This is a summary of conditions that inform your recommendation for or against PIC:

**Threat:** AIF activity level at which ISF can maintain internal security

ISF: IPS, IA, DBE, & NP at TRA 2

**Governance:** Governor oversees security operations and criminal justice system is operating

MNF-I: able to support with QRFs, has freedom of movement, and can conduct counterterrorism operations
### Changes in the OE corresponding with PIC

#### 1 of 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-PIC</th>
<th>Post-PIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNF or MNF-W CG has overall responsibility for security in the province.</td>
<td>Governor and Provincial Security Committee (PSC) has overall responsibility for security in the province (or Operations Command).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF has freedom of operations.</td>
<td>CF required to coordinate Counter Terrorism operations anywhere in province with local FM prior to execution (para 4, Implementing Arrangement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF required to coordinate for coalition operations in the province with IA, SNF, and PSC.</td>
<td>CF had CDR for operation is required to coordinate coalition operations with the Governor and the PSC and to interface with the PJC. MNF is also required to coordinate the operation with the Iraqi FM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA unit of ODA &amp; I = CF in operational overwatch; otherwise CF in tactical overwatch. Definitions per references.</td>
<td>IA unit ODA &amp; I = CF in operational overwatch; IA unit under ISFC in a PIC province = CF in operational overwatch. Definitions per references.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various means of security coordination. Limited or no intelligence fusion taking place between CF, IA, IP, and LP.</td>
<td>Simplified security coordination process. PSC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring security operations in the province.</td>
</tr>
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**4c**

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<td>CF maintains lines of communication</td>
<td>CF lines of communication are limited and negotiated in the PIC MOU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF provides necessary CSS to develop IA units to achieve IAL</td>
<td>CF gradually withdraw CSS until fully supported. CSS is provided to IA units.</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSIF is in the lead in increasing numbers of areas throughout the province.</td>
<td>Remaining JSIF units increasingly assume the lead until JSIF is in the lead throughout the province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP provide security in populated areas with heavy IA and CF support.</td>
<td>IP are capable of providing security independently and coordinating with IA and/or CF support if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA conducting security operations throughout province, including heavy support to the IP to secure population centers.</td>
<td>IA shifts to primarily conducting operations in urban areas and interdicting RIF LOCs, while postured to support IP as the cities are required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF in tactical overwatch over IA units with a gradual shift to operational overwatch.</td>
<td>CF gradually completes transition to operational overwatch for all IA units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual transition of CF to the urban periphery.</td>
<td>Continued transition of CF to the urban periphery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO and MoF builds logistical systems to support their forces.</td>
<td>MSO and MoF continue building logistical systems while eventually not requiring US assistance on day to day operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF providing enables support to JSIF units in emergency conditions.</td>
<td>Gradually withdraw enable support until it is provided by OEF, emergency conditions only, some enable not at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA, POTEAs, BTEs; DDE Brooke interdicting illegal traffic bypassing PTEs; increasing traffic lead.</td>
<td>Increasing Iraqi independence in border security ops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI secures the borders at the national level, requesting assistance as needed.</td>
<td>MOF secures the borders at the national level, requesting assistance as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As CF assume a reduced presence QRFs response times gradually increase.</td>
<td>Longer response time for CF QRFs.</td>
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Non-organic BCT Enablers

- b 3.50 USC 3665 (Contractor)
- Document Exploitation Team (DOCEX)
- Interrogator Support Teams (Contractor)
- SIGINT Terminal Guidance (STG) Teams
- Linguists
- ePRT
- IÖAFF

- Manoeuvre
  - Civil Affairs Company
  - Tactical PSYOP Detachment
  - COMCAM
  - Electronic Warfare Officers (JCCS-1)
- Intelligence
  - NONE
- Communications
  - NONE
- Protection
  - EOD Company
  - 1.4c
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<th><strong>Manning</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-organic DIVISION Enablers</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Affairs Battalion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fires BDE HQ</strong></td>
<td>- Crisis Operations Liaison Team (COLT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSYOP Company HQ (with PSYOP development detachment)</strong></td>
<td>- Organization of Regional Assessments Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMCAM</strong></td>
<td>- 1.4c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)</strong></td>
<td>- Law Enforcement Program Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expeditiory Air Support Operation Squadron (EASOS)</strong></td>
<td>- Document Exploitation Team (DOCEX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Warfare Officers and Field Site Leaders (ACCS-1)</strong></td>
<td>- Linguists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAD Radars (Q36)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interrogation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainment / Medical</strong></td>
<td>- pFRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
<td>- IQAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NONE</td>
<td><strong>Diver</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td>- Weather Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EOD Battalion HQ</td>
<td>- Ministry Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1.4c</td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military Police Companies</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military Working Dog Teams</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military Police Augmentation Team</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Horizontal Engineer Companies</td>
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(IF ALL LOCATIONS POP IN)

Sir, there are currently 10 distribution Nodes arrayed across the ITO which provide distribution support. There are 7 JDC Yards, 7 CRSP Yards, 3 A/DACGs and 1 FRP yard.

Next slide please.

(IF Animation by MND):

* Brief by location...
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Next slide please.

(IF Animation by MND):
*Brief by location...
In MND-N: The five locations highlighted are manned by _78_ Army personnel and _115_ KBR workers.

In LSAA: The MCB and MCTs are comprised of _150_ personnel, with _128_ KBR movement control personnel.

In MNF-W: There are _59_ Army personnel and _69_ KBR personnel executing their missions.

In MND-SE, CS and C: The five locations are comprised of _125_ Army personnel and _67_ KBR Personnel.

In MND-B: MCTs are manned by _139_ Army personnel and _77_ KBR workers.

Currently, the 719th Movement Control Battalion commands 23 MCTs with 514 military personnel.

Through Task Order 139, KBR is authorized 487 Log Coordinator “Spaces” with 456 “Faces” filling positions currently.

Total Movement Control personnel in the Iraq Theater are 1110.
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This slide depicts where the HQ element of each maintenance company resides. These maint companies provide an expeditionary capability through MSTs which can go places where KBR cannot or does not perform work. This gives the MND commander flexibility throughout their OE.

In addition to Base Maint and MST's these units provide: M1114/FRAG 5 TOTALS
BALAD: (213) BIAP: (163) RAMADI: (74) SPEICHER: (62)
MOSUL: (52) KIRKUK: (19) TAJI: (46) AL ASAD: (5) TALIL: (23) Q-WEST: (15)
M1151/FRAG 5 TOTALS BALAD: (28)
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1 x CSA (1 x OD Co) LSA Anaconda (213 ASG)
4 x ASPs (3 x ML PLTs)
  MND-N (Q-West ASP) (3 SB)
  MND-W (TQ ASP) (507 CSG)
  MND-CS (Adder ASP) (82 SB)
  MND-B (Liberty ASP) (15 SB)
15 x ATHPs (1 section, 12 SMs)

CAPABILITIES
Each (DS) PLT: 1 ASP
  Each ASP R/I/S: 843 S/T per day
  Total Storage: 7,000 S/T

Each (DS) CO (CSA)
  CSA R/I/S: 2400 S/T per day
  CSA ASP Total Storage: 25000 S/T

THROUGHPUT
- 100% of call forward CL V to IZ ASPs is ground containerized
- TSA pushes requested CL V to LSAA; LSAA pushes to ASPs
- Munitions are supplied from five storage areas in Iraq

Authorized levels & unit prioritization established by MNC-I as reported through MUREP
Munitions pushed from Theater to CSA / ASPs and from CSA to ASPs and unit ATHPs
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**DISTRIBUTION FLOW:** Multi-Class supplies are delivered via air and ground into Iraq. Supplies are routinely delivered via air primarily through Kuwait, Balad/LSAA, BIAP, and Al Asad and via opportune air to the other Iraqi airfields. Theater trucks deliver general supplies from Kuwait to Tallil, VBC, TQ, LSAAs, and Speicher, 1/82 BCT provides gun truck escorts for theater trucks. 106 Trans Bn, 213th ASG, delivers supplies from the LSAAs to Taji, Speicher, Q-West, and TQ. CSG and SB trucks deliver from the GS/DS hubs to BCT SSAs at the major FOBs and outlying camps and combat outposts. MEF trucks deliver USMC specific items from TQ and Al Asad to MEF camps in the MNF-W AO.

Central Issue Facilities are located at LSAAs and Baghdad and provide direct exchange for CIF items managed by 316th ESC.
PROTECTION

Chaplain
Key Task:
Provide religious support
Perform religious worship services, religious education, and pastoral counseling for TT in IA sector
Advise the CDR on matters pertaining to religion and morals and morale as affected by religion
Advise the CDR on the impact of indigenous religious practices, as required
Ensure the free exercise of religion and coordination of religious coverage for all faith groups
THIS IS THE CENTCOM REQUIRED FORMAT
URRES DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)
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Pages 303 through 305 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(5)
(b)(5), (b)(3), (b)(6)
BACK-UP
SEP – DEC 2009 is the second window available to reduce overall force structure. Window allows the potential to place 3-5 Advisory BDEs into action while lowering overall strength by simultaneously removing 6-8 Combat BCTs. Placement of 5 Advisory BDEs would require the reduction of 8 Combat BCTs to achieve an end strength of 12 BCTs.

In 2009 assuming rotations will be only 12 months the window of transition remains in roughly the same location as a second opportunity to implement an advisory BDE.

The same decision cycle previously described remains in effect with the potential to again delay the decision until 2010.
Sir, these are the filters we considered when we were determining which models we used in each AO.

Basically these were an expansion on the same criteria used in 07-01.
Sir, I know [b)(6)] will brief a series of major tasks by phase and it addresses partnering as its own phase.

What we are trying to highlight here is that the level of oversight should not dictate partnering and we see partnering occurring across all phases and to list it as its own phase may be misleading.
Sir this final slide is simply an example of what 2-15 FA is using in their BN partnership model. We show this simply as an example of what an enhanced team could look like. Reality is the enhanced team would not be this rank heavy but this gives a feel for what one may look like. Sir, subject to you questions I will be followed by basing.
MNF-I Description: CF and ISF together plan, train and execute COIN operations to protect the population. Each force conducts some independent operations where and when necessary. CF continue to provide enablers while ISF develop its own capability, particularly in the area of sustainment.

CF transition from Leading to Partnering when the following conditions are met in a given area:
- Local ISF are able to conduct combined operations with CF
Conditions by Phase – Tactical Overwatch

MNF-I Description: CF provide a QRF and the majority of essential enablers for ISF units, which are capable of independently planning and executing COIN operations within their assigned AOs. Essential enablers include: mobility support, joint fires, ISR systems and intelligence linkage, air MEDEVAC, Level II/III medical, long range C2 communications and emergency sustainment.

CF transition from Partnering to Tactical Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:
• ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with Coalition enabler support
• ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population
• Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning
• Essential services are provided on an equitable basis

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MNF-I Description: CF provide an operational reserve to reinforce ISF QRFs in order to sustain ISF's ability to independently plan, execute and sustain COIN operations. CF may also provide specific enablers to assist ISF operations and ensure operational success, such as joint fires, air MEDEVAC, ISR systems and intelligence linkage.

CF transition from Tactical Overwatch to Operational Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:
- ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support
- ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable)
- Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability
- Essential services are provided on an equitable and consistent basis
- Sufficient sustainable employment opportunities are available
- Sustainable local economic development is ongoing
Conditions by Phase – Strategic Overwatch

**MNF-I Description:** CF position units to deter external threats, support CT operations and provide a strategic reserve to allow the ISF to provide security for the nation of Iraq as they focus on COIN, CT, routine policing and border security operations. CF will provide limited enabler support such as joint fires, ISR systems and intelligence linkage. Relationship becomes one of security assistance as part of an alliance described in a long term security agreement.

**CF transition from Operational Overwatch to Strategic Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:**

- ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with generally no Coalition enabler support
- ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable)
- Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability
- Essential services are provided on an equitable and consistent basis
- Sufficient sustainable employment opportunities are available
- Sustainable local economic development is ongoing
**Population Security**

**Sub-Tasks by Major Task (1 of 9)**

- Establish continuous presence in Iraqi neighborhoods
- Identify and remove local enemy leadership and infrastructure
- Implement population control measures
- Establish and man JSSs and COPs
- Conduct cordon-and-search operations
- Conduct cordon-and-knock operations
- Establish and man temporary checkpoints
- Conduct patrolling
- Conduct interdiction ambushes
## Infrastructure Security

### Sub-Tasks by Major Task (2 of 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading</th>
<th>Partnering</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔️ Perform fixed site security of critical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Harden critical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Secure infrastructure repair teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Neutralize local groups that interdict critical power infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of critical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Conduct show-of-force in the vicinity of critical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>✔️ Disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity</td>
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### Border Security

#### Sub-Tasks by Major Task (3 of 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading</th>
<th>Partnering</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
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**A** Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of likely infiltration routes

**A** Monitor POEs

14b, 14d
## Engagement

### Sub-Tasks by Major Task (5 of 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading</th>
<th>Partnering</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct engagement with local leaders (religious, tribal, government)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Promote dialogue across ethno-sectarian lines at local and provincial level</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Conduct engagement with potentially reconcilable enemy groups</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Support negotiations leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Facilitate the implementation of local ceasefires or political agreements</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Conduct engagement to improve horizontal and vertical linkages in Iraqi political and security institutions</strong></td>
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*SECRET//REL to USA and MCX//REL*
ISF Development and Support

Sub-Tasks by Major Task (6 of 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading</th>
<th>Partnering</th>
<th>Tactical Overwatch</th>
<th>Operational Overwatch</th>
<th>Strategic Overwatch</th>
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Strike Operations

Sub-Tasks by Major Task (7 of 9)

- Neutralize groups that attack security forces or intimidate the population
- Disrupt EJK networks
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize terrorist or extremist networks, such as AQAM
- Kill or capture HVIs
- Conduct show-of-force
Information Operations and Public Affairs

Sub-Tasks by Major Task (8 of 9)

- Conduct PSYOP
- Conduct electronic warfare
- Conduct computer network operations
- Conduct public affairs planning
- Facilitate media operations
- Maintain positive relations with local civilian communities
- Conduct combat camera operations
Sub-Tasks by Major Task (9 of 9)

- Neutralize IED, EFP, and IDF networks
- Conduct route reconnaissance and route security
- Conduct route clearance
- Provide convoy security
- Conduct base security
- Provide security for USM-I personnel
- Secure transition teams and PRTs
- Provide QRF for Coalition elements operating in AO
- Conduct personnel recovery
- Provide MEDEVAC
- Conduct counter-rocket and counter-mortar fire
- Provide joint fires
- Conduct bridge and route repair
- Provide security for UNAMI operations
Sir, 3/25 and 1/10 MTN will be the next Brigade to RIP/TOA. Two things to note on this RIP. First, as we laid out for you Monday night 1/10 MTN is a candidate for sourcing the TF 1-4 mission in January so long as we remain at 20 BCTs. If General Mixon decides to pull a battalion from 1/10 MTN that may preclude detaching a battalion from this Brigade to reinforce 3/1 CD in Diyala. The remaining battalions should replace 3/25 IDs battalions one-for-one.
Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.