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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW
OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH ANDERSON
CHIEF OF STAFF
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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JANUARY 2, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6) : This is (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) the Multinational Corps Iraq Historian.

Today is Wednesday, the 2nd of January 2008. We are here at the al Faw Palace at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and I am here interviewing Brigadier General Anderson.

Sir, could you introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, last name?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: B.G. Joe Anderson, Chief of Staff, Multinational Corps-Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Thank you, sir. Just for the listener's benefit, I wanted to make mention that there are two previous interviews on file. One was from the 23rd of ^{March} ~~April~~ conducted by (b)(6) and myself, and the other was on 13 June, likewise conducted here at the al Far Palace.

Sir, I wanted to ask a big question, which was where do you see the center of gravity at this point in the campaign, especially since we spoke last six months ago?

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1 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The center of
2 gravity remains the government of Iraq, the capability
3 of, credibility of, focus of. That has not changed as
4 strategic now operationally by the people of Iraq.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) E: Yes, sir. One of the
6 things that came up recently in General Odierno's
7 discussions with regard to -- at the CG's conference
8 was some of his concerns about some of the critical
9 vulnerabilities at this point.

10 Can you speak to some of those, if you are
11 familiar with them, and what the discussions have been
12 about those critical vulnerabilities and that kind of
13 stuff?

14 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The
15 vulnerabilities remain the Iraqi Security Forces.
16 They have to continue to be trained, manned, equipped,
17 led, but more importantly, reliable, loyal forces that
18 are functional.

19 So the biggest vulnerability is the
20 Commander's assessments of their capability to do
21 their job on the street and, of course, that is
22 heavily Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army.

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1 The next one would probably be the whole
2 Concerned Local Citizens Program, which has gone
3 probably better than anybody expected, which is what
4 has generated some direction, integration for
5 reconciliation in terms of how Sunnis get in place at
6 the table, both of the security apparatus and
7 potentially in governance and other benefits gained
8 and integrated. But the issues really become their
9 long term capability to either be integrated into the
10 Iraqi Security Force or to go on government contract
11 in lieu of Coalition contract or how they roll into
12 some form of economic employment via low tech or not,
13 via public works battalions, civil service corps,
14 whatever term you want to call it.

15 The last vulnerability that I think we all
16 look at now is the whole displaced population piece
17 and resettlement piece and how that all comes back
18 together again.

19 Obviously, all of those three -- There is
20 not a government plan. There is not an overall
21 strategic plan. There is not a lot of nongovernmental
22 organization, humanitarian assistance, U.N. or anybody

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1 else, support to get those folks back into their homes
2 and make sure they have employment, medical care,
3 education, clothing, food, roof over their heads,
4 etcetera, all of that in the context of the drawdown
5 of Coalition forces.

6 That probably is the biggest
7 vulnerability. Other dynamics will interfere, affect
8 that or influence that, but the real issue is it will
9 be drawdown forces here now. The capabilities,
10 dynamics of all those things I just talked about at
11 once, based on which number of BCTs we happen to be
12 at, at any given time as that approaches the summer,
13 a year from now, and potentially 18 months from now --
14 that's going to be a big critical component.

15 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I wanted to ask one
16 follow-on relative to the Concerned Local Citizens
17 Programs. I know that on the 2nd of December there
18 was a key meeting between General Odierno and the
19 Prime Minister. Were you present at that meeting?

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No. I was in
21 ministerial committee for national security. It's the
22 standard MCNS on Sunday afternoons. The issue was to

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1 present -- There's been lots of confusion, disruptive
2 influences trying to affect the outcome of CLCs in
3 terms of what they do, who they work for, how big they
4 should or shouldn't be, etcetera, and that was a
5 chance for General Odierno in front of the Government
6 of Iraq leadership to lay out what exactly the program
7 is, what it means.

8 Of course, it was always predicated --
9 They exist -- CLCs exist to cover the shortfalls of
10 the Iraqi Security Forces. So as the Iraqi Security
11 Forces grow in number, which has just occurred, all
12 those components I just talked about, the manning,
13 training, equipping, etcetera of those forces. CLCs
14 are kind of the mitigator, fill a void, fill a vacuum.

15 I think once all that got laid out and had
16 it under check and had it under the supervision,
17 partnership of Coalition forces, Iraqi Security
18 Forces, and a few other components, it kind of, at
19 least officially, publicly, top-cover-wise, kind of
20 gave some credence to the program.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I wanted to ask a
22 little bit about the formulation of the Op Plan 08-01

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1 that was just published on the 20th of December.

2 Knowing that you have a pivotal role in
3 the planning process, working with staff, working with
4 the CG and his methodology for moving plans and
5 operational discussions forward, can you speak to me
6 from your perspective about the unfolding of 08-01?
7 When did it start? What were the most pivotal aspects
8 to it? Which issues engendered the most discussion?

9 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think what
10 generated it was, obviously, a new year. So based on
11 time. Number two, transition: We are getting ready
12 to have a Corps transition, but really what predicated
13 it was the assessment done back in the fall; because
14 the timeline began based on a Joint Staff planning
15 order to take a look at courses of action.

16 That started in August, which all drove
17 General Petraeus' testimony in September, which
18 ultimately left us with, okay, now we've got this all
19 assessed; now how do we change, modify the plan,
20 primarily from the context of overwatch. You know,
21 how do we transition from the clear control, retain
22 methodology of Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic)?

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1 As I talked about a little while ago, we
2 do that with political direction. We do have a
3 operational validation that we start off-ramping some
4 BCTs. So how does that affect how we do operations
5 here in Iraq? So everything from which level of
6 overwatch are you in or not by geographic conditions
7 based process, to the growth/development of the ISF,
8 and how do you figure out where you go along that
9 timeline. But to start, it's all about transitioning.

10 It could be not necessarily BCT by BCT.
11 It may be battalion by battalion. So depending on,
12 again, what level. Based on the battle space and the
13 environment, the operational environment, and where
14 you talking about, Sunni-Sunni, Shia-Shia, Shia-Sunni,
15 and all the dynamic borders, 14b, 14d

16 14b, 14d where you're talking about, how you do all
17 that. You know, the Kurdish piece, all those factors.

18 So that is what drove it. That is kind of
19 what the issues are, and then the whole transition
20 team advisor role based on PRTs, VPRTs, and then the
21 military training teams, border transition teams,
22 police transition teams, how all that changes really

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1 between FY '08, FY'09. That's probably when the real
2 change is going to come, and the TT (Phonetic)
3 business is after '09. But all those factors, plus
4 many more, (Inaudible) basing construct, logistics,
5 structure, you know, lots of different components on
6 it, which are all now up for grabs in terms of how do
7 we start to consolidate bases, transfer bases, shrink
8 bases, you know, share with the Iraqi Air Force, share
9 with the Iraqi Army. You know, the future of JSS is
10 in (Inaudible) security sites, stations, combat
11 outposts.

12 What is the future of all those things?

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, one of the things
14 mentioned in there is the idea of irreversible
15 momentum. I just wanted to see, given that that is
16 not a typical thing for an operational command -- it's
17 a typical warfighting metric.

18 Can you talk to me about the discussions
19 around irreversible momentum, and what --

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: There are many
21 trying to, again, figure out what the criteria metrics
22 would be to define it, because you are right. It is

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1 a nonstandard term, and the irreversible momentum has
2 shifted a couple of times.

3 It was originally, you know, the
4 wintertime. Then it became the summer, winter now,
5 what we just passed, December of '07. Then it moved
6 to the summer of '08, and now it is -- you know, there
7 is some debate whether you want to slip it to the
8 winter of '08.

9 It really kind of boiled back down to lose
10 -- is how it all kind of went full circle. What do we
11 mean by it, and how do you measure it? It boiled down
12 to security status. So when we say irreversible
13 moment, what are the security metrics, based again on
14 everything from IEDs to extra-judicial killings,
15 sectarian violence, all those types that we measure
16 all the time, KIAs, WIAs, civilian, ISF, Coalition.

17 Two ISF -- We talked about it a couple of
18 times. This is all about ISF capacity and transition
19 to their security. So how do you measure that in
20 terms of the same criteria I've talked about a couple
21 of times, all of the readiness data, plus loyalty,
22 effectiveness, you know, leadership, to governance, to

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1 economics?

2 I think probably the most significant part
3 for the Corps is we are about the provinces. We are
4 all about provincial capacity, and I think -- I'm not
5 so sure it is a point of contention or not, but you
6 can argue again everything from the need/requirement
7 to have provincial elections or not, which we believe
8 in, but we firmly believe that if you build -- just
9 like we have determined at the local level, the
10 district, neighborhood, you know, muhallah, all those
11 areas -- As those grow, does that breed, motivate,
12 inspire, make it contagious that governance will
13 continue to develop as you go up the chain?

14 Well, the same philosophy at the
15 provincial level. In some provinces, you know, think
16 or not, provincial Iraqi control or not, how do we
17 ensure at the provincial level they can provide for
18 all the essential services, infrastructure, quality of
19 life, lief support for their people, the budget, you
20 know, run their infrastructure, have clinics, have
21 schools, all of that?

22 What is more important, to develop that or

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1 to wait for the central government to get their act
2 together and do the same. Again, we are of the firm
3 believe that we are just much better off at the
4 provincial level developing that capacity. And that
5 is the primary component of the economic governance
6 piece of irreversible momentum, is making sure that
7 the provinces are capable of doing all that and don't
8 look back.

9 You know, don't regress back into some,
10 again, we can't spend it, we can't account for the
11 money and we can't plan for an operations and
12 maintenance budget and a capital budget, for example.
13 You know, how do you plan for the future development?
14 How do you run day to day, everything from salaries to
15 sustainment? How do you run that?

16 (b)(3), (b)(6): In that sense, was -- I
17 just want to make sure I am capturing the thought
18 process correctly, which is the idea that we can
19 influence something from a bottom up approach?

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes. (Several
21 words inaudible) same approach used in the ISF, how
22 can you pair off with provincial councils, you know,

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1 district councils, district mayors, the city mayors,
2 city councils, neighborhood advisory committees,
3 district advisory committees, at whatever level you
4 are talking about, and all the parties and tribes in
5 between? You know, how do you pair off with those
6 folks and help them understand at least an alternative
7 way of doing it?

8 Of course, this is all about development,
9 discovery, learning, because they are just not used --
10 When it comes to doing contracts and everything, all
11 these businesses used to do is just produce goods, and
12 the government bought it and distributed it. So there
13 was no marketing. There was no competition for sales.
14 There was no, you know, quality assurance and best
15 price and, you know, that type of stuff. So this is
16 all novel approaches to them.

17 So that applies to all walks of life in
18 these respective areas. So how do you develop all
19 that through the private, small business, stated owned
20 enterprises, which were all government run, but how do
21 you kind of get that turning again, because many of
22 those factories and facilities can actually produce

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1 pretty good goods, you know.

2 So "Buy Iraqi First," like down in
3 Iskandariyah where they do everything from buses to
4 tractors. You know, there is as humongous capability
5 down there. So how do you capitalize on it?

6 Then, of course, there are still provinces
7 that don't have any security apparatus whatsoever,
8 primarily down in MND-Center. So that's the problem.
9 Who do you hand off to in this irreversible momentum
10 mosaic, and how do the Iraqi Security Forces handle it
11 when there really isn't -- there aren't any there to
12 head up.

13 So it is very demographic region specific.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, you have a unique
15 position here, because of your visibility of the
16 bigger picture, in particular, between the way MNCI
17 and Multi-National Force-Iraq interrelate.

18 I just wanted to see if you could speak to
19 me about how that relationship has continued to evolve
20 since we spoke last. In particular, just knowing that
21 the two commands, of course, MNCI based on 3 Corps
22 which comes and goes at specific times, but MNFI which

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1 has two players rotating on an individual basis, can
2 you talk me through what you have seen over the last
3 six and seven months now as far as how that
4 relationship has continued? Does it engender some
5 debate or some discussion?

6 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, since the
7 last time we talked, you know, it's summertime. MNFI
8 has turned over everything from the Chief of Staff
9 down. So every key player, the strategic plans and
10 assessment, strategic operations, strategic effects,
11 the intel, the DSINT (Phonetic), you know, all the way
12 from top to bottom has purged.

13 So every key player now -- R&S has just
14 changed out, the logistics side of the house,
15 comptrollers, personnel -- they are leaving. So what
16 I would say is, because of the rhythm of (Inaudible)
17 season and how the Corps is on a different cycle than
18 the Force, that's probably a very healthy thing.

19 So they all changed over. We didn't. So
20 the beauty of the Corps remains the fact that two-
21 thirds of the Corps is a based COR, PS, is a base
22 corps, and that is the core, c-o-r-e, and then there

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1 is the "F." So that, I think, is healthy.

2 We know the challenges of what we deal
3 with about a third of us rotating through here and
4 being without a third or fourth person in some cases
5 because of doing 15 months as well.

6 That all said, there's clear -- speaking
7 of campaign plans, (Several words inaudible) and the
8 Joint Campaign Plan, one of the other components, and
9 we thought primarily from the Iraqi side of the house
10 and the Coalition side of the house, this is going to
11 be a year that a lot of battle station change, with a
12 lot of the Coalition partners.

13 You know, the Koreans are now down to 639
14 people. They used to be 2500 people when we got here
15 and, of course, that's probably the least significant
16 of all. But MND-Southeast gone from 5500 to 2500, but
17 we are maintaining a headquarters there through the
18 year, and now the Poles are going to pull out October
19 31st. So MND-CS will go away almost at the end of the
20 year.

21 So the command and control of all that,
22 the battle space and the headquarters consolidation is

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1 a huge piece of the upcoming year, and we have found
2 -- and again, we have testified this now in many --
3 Matter of fact, I just met the Force historian, by the
4 way. But in many areas we have already started this
5 process. Many of the supporting functions, surgeon,
6 chaplain, personnel, have been the mainstay. However,
7 we have already had some merging in the C-4,
8 transportation functions, engineering functions.

9 It is very clear that there is redundancy,
10 and there is economies and efficiencies to be gained,
11 and I think everybody -- we in the Corps have trimmed
12 about 400 slots alone that we say we can retask,
13 reorganize just in our own house, let alone MNFI which
14 the average person would tell you, even within MNFI --
15 and I briefed the new four staff officers in the last
16 Tuesday, I think it is, of every month.

17 You know, every month we have a room of
18 100-something people that change out, a lot of people.
19 But just within -- I mentioned a couple of the big
20 ones right up front: Strategic Plans and Assessment,
21 Strategic Effects, Strategic Ops.

22 There is confusion even at the Force level

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1 who does what in each of those arenas, and then again
2 how do we gain synergy between the Corps that we are
3 sorting out now in this JCS plan order we have now for
4 the code we are developing and getting ready for the
5 next testimony on how many BCTs stay beyond the
6 summer, how long they stay, what the turnover rates
7 are based on maintaining the status quo. Things go
8 better than expected; things go worse than expected.

9 Who has the lead for that, and who should
10 feed who? So what I will ^{tell} you is that the Corps
11 position defends the same philosophy we use with
12 provincial governance.

13 We think the Corps as the operational
14 command should be driving most of those criteria,
15 metrics and processes, and then the Force can go ahead
16 and do all those other things they want to talk about
17 on top of that, funding, basing, whatever, which will
18 all be subsets of what's the plan -- you know,
19 supporting plans to the base plan. But what is really
20 going on is a major, major, major look at what -- by
21 a year from now, what do these two headquarters look
22 like if we get ready, you know? A year from now, the

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1 next corps will be getting close to -- you know, they
2 will out of here, I guess, March/April. So they will
3 be about three months away at this point next year,
4 and trying to get things set for the follow-on corps
5 after that.

6 So that is a major effort this coming
7 year, is figuring out what that should be, how do you
8 affect MJD (Inaudible)? How do you influence man
9 documents? How do you figure out the (Several words
10 inaudible), the YAD system, you know, as you are
11 filling this, and man two headquarters, but merging,
12 consolidating two headquarters?

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, kind of on a more
14 intangible aspect of the relationship is: Realizing as
15 the Chief of Staff you are the one who probably spends
16 some time at least making sure that the relationships
17 are harmonious, smoothing the waters when there is
18 friction. Also knowing that this is war and there are
19 things that we may see differently than Force, are
20 there -- have there been issues where there is a
21 difference in points of view where you have had to
22 play that role to help keep things moving ahead and,

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1 if so, what have been the issues that tend to be the
2 ones that have then caused the most --

3 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Mostly
4 operational. I have done a lot in the strategic plans
5 and assessment, detainees. So the biggest one has
6 been the vision of the future in terms of the off-
7 ramping of BCTs and what everything looks like, and
8 terminology: You know, what do we mean by overwatch?
9 What tasks are we going to perform by each level of
10 overwatch, you know, things like that.

11 So yesterday we were arguing over -- and
12 I was mediating -- on who was going to do what in this
13 planning, and we finally got it all settled out
14 yesterday. So, yes, very heavily in that area.

15 Detainees will be the next one. Numerous
16 issues between the Corps and Task Force [1.4a]. And
17 again, [1.4a] has the mission. They have a charter, but
18 again everything in life needs to be conditions based.

19 I think anybody that's been around the
20 block a few times would say you really got to set
21 conditions and make sure you just don't set timelines
22 up and say, by this day, we are going to do this,

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1 without really knowing what things are going to allow
2 you to accomplish that or not.

3 So huge mediation with 1.4a and Force and
4 Corps. Those are the two biggest. And again, the
5 good news story is, considering the volume, pace,
6 magnitude of what we do around here, that is about --
7 That was one of the two main ones, and most they go
8 fairly well.

9 There are occasionally issues in the
10 logistics arena, projects. When people think how they
11 want to tell the Corps to spend money, then I have to
12 mediate this is how the Corps spends money and who
13 decides how the Corps spends money and how we
14 prioritize how we spend money. So that surfaces every
15 now and then.

16 Once in a while, there's issues in the
17 public affairs domain where things -- somebody wants
18 to release something, somebody doesn't. Somebody
19 releases it ahead of time. Somebody doesn't tell the
20 story right, particularly if it deals with numbers,
21 casualties, you know, major operations, those types of
22 things.

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1 Then a lot of Title 10 issues, you know,
2 in terms of how we are resourcing and prioritizing
3 everything from ISR assets to Coalition support, some
4 of those arenas.

5 Those are probably four, five, six of the
6 main -- But, yes, I am ultimately able to come here if
7 there is a point of friction, and then I've got to be
8 the referee, either deal with that primary staff
9 officer directly, which I do quite frequently, or go
10 I go with my counterpart, the Force Chief, which is a
11 guy that I talk to three, four times a day over many
12 things every day, everything from operational needs
13 requirements to requests for forces to, you know,
14 etcetera, lots of topics.

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sir, I would ask a little
16 bit more. You spoke to it a little bit with regard to
17 the planning, with regard to the downsizing of some of
18 our Coalition partners, and you mentioned the
19 absorption of MND-Central South into MNDC's area, and
20 you talked about the reduction in MND-Southeast.

21 Could you tell me a little bit more about
22 what the way ahead is for MND-Southeast as they

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1 downsize? Do you see that being absorbed in another
2 area? Do you see that being a larger American
3 presence there, or is that still an issue that is
4 being --

5 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: It's still an
6 issue, but it potentially means in both cases --
7 Southeast clearly may trigger a need for Coalition
8 forces -- read American -- to go down there with the
9 border piece. The biggest piece for MND-Southeast
10 remains the ports of Shalof (Phonetic) and Cheed
11 (Phonetic) -- are two of the biggest areas where
12 Iranian stuff comes across the border, IED --
13 improvised explosive device, explosively formed
14 projectiles, vehicle borne IED, improved explosive
15 devices.

16 All the kit material that makes these
17 things go boom come across that border, plus money,
18 plus people, other resources.

19 So that is a decision point. The Brits
20 are primarily on the contingency operating base,
21 Basra. I think they will stay, because there is
22 progress. There is things going, everything from the

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1 Port of Um Qasr becoming a world class port someday,
2 some way maybe, to political progress there.

3 So I think they will hang around, because
4 things are going well. Indirect fire is down,
5 etcetera. So I don't think they are going to pull out
6 totally, but the question becomes what do they do
7 physically in that battle space?

8 So I don't think we have to worry about
9 absorbing that. I think we just have to worry about
10 how do we get some bang for the buck out of them, but
11 the real question becomes the border.

12 The other -- The MND-CS piece is going to
13 be a collapse of MND-CS, Camp Echo, Diwaniyah into
14 Kotasiyah (Phonetic) Province, into MND-Center. The
15 question becomes do you have to actually put
16 Coalition forces there? In their place, you can --
17 the Iraqi Security Forces just take over Camp Echo
18 next fall, and that's the way of the future.

19 The good news is the Georgians are still
20 staying around, and we have another rotation coming in
21 here in February, and we are probably going to have
22 another one come in the summer.

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1 Now their election is Saturday. So,
2 hopefully, things are going to stay at the Corps. So
3 as long as we maintain a 2000 man presence there in
4 Wasit, that will help influence, to shape things for
5 MND-C down the road.

6 So probably in good shape down there, but
7 the question is going to be how do you ensure the
8 lines of communication and all the things that feed
9 Baghdad are kept in check, all the forces are reducing
10 in Baghdad and the belts, the belt area, which is a
11 ring around Baghdad, you know, referred to everything
12 from Balad to Baqubah to (Inaudible) to the "diyas,"
13 you know, a lot of "diyas," Moqmudiyah, you know,
14 Iskandariyah, all that part down south of us here all
15 the way back up to Fallujah.

16 That ring is called the Belt, which is
17 where a lot of this stuff used to -- all these attacks
18 were staged from and resourced from. How do you keep
19 that ring clean so Baghdad stays clean, and all the
20 area you're talking about down there feed that Belt
21 from the south and all the way up into Diyala
22 Province, into Baqubah, Moqmudiyah and Baqubah, how

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1 they need things in and it works its way into Baghdad.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6): I want to switch gears,
3 sir, and ask a little bit about some of the non-
4 kinetic things that have happened since we spoke last,
5 and just kind of span a number of different areas.

6 The first thing I would ask about is that
7 one of the things has been -- on the public affairs
8 side, has been the senior leader engagement
9 initiative. Just as a historian looking from the
10 outside view in, so to speak, seems as if we have been
11 a lot more effective about getting the story out, so
12 to speak, about what our soldiers are doing, what
13 progress we are making.

14 Can you give your comments on how you
15 would see that change, if you have? May my assumption
16 is wrong, but what is your perspective, and --

17 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think public
18 affairs -- I think what has probably changed, (b)(3), (b)(6) is
19 the story. Public affairs has been a very active
20 component. Our PAO plan has been a very active
21 component of everything we have done.

22 I think 5500 releases for the year, I

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1 believe, is the number, and the RIVITS (Phonetic) --
2 that acronym I can't -- That's that remote visual tee
3 that allows you to broadcast from here. I can't
4 remember the acronym.

5 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Defense Video
6 Information?

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Defense System
8 Display System or something?

9 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Remote Vice Imagery
10 Distribution System.

11 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That system has
12 been a big winner, because that allows from remote
13 locations to tap in and get that broadcast to the
14 world. So everything from the technology, that has
15 allowed a lot more stuff to go across the airwaves,
16 because what has not been as encouraging, from what I
17 have seen here before, is the embedded media piece,
18 for a couple of reasons.

19 In the beginning everybody was afraid.
20 The press was all banned from going out because of
21 what happened to Woodward and what happened to
22 Kimberly Dozer and all the fear that they can't go out

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1 there, they are going to get blown up.

2 Now, frankly, it appears to be just a
3 sheer lack of interest, because the news -- there
4 isn't that much news of stuff blowing up and people
5 getting-- You know, obviously, we had a suicide bus
6 yesterday. But the sensational, catastrophic, big
7 news -- "you know, we've lost X number of service
8 members today" -- those days and, of course, the press
9 release did come out yesterday that December was the
10 lowest total number of casualties ever. So combined
11 battle, non-battle, some pretty phenomenal stuff.

12 Of course, we still have lost a lot of
13 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines over here. So it's
14 still not necessarily a good news story. A lot of
15 guys and gals have been killed here and are seriously
16 wounded, you know.

17 So interest level, embedded media, the
18 capability. But I think the story has been told
19 fairly accurately. The issue is understanding. It's
20 hard to tell the story here without people having a
21 lot of firsthand accounts and information about what
22 is going on. The only way you are going to get that

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1 is to go out, not to hang around in the (Inaudible)
2 down in Baghdad, but to go out and see it.

3 I think getting that story told has been
4 very, very, very hard. But they have done a -- On the
5 PA front, they have done a phenomenal job. I assume
6 you mean the IO.

7 The IO piece, I would say, ditto. Now
8 what I would say, with the IO we were very weak and
9 not very good, but I would say from last January all
10 the way through the summertime, the change of events,
11 because of knowledge, experience, effects, trying to
12 figure out in the non-lethal world -- you know,
13 again, who is winning the IO war, al Qaeda or the
14 Coalition? Well, I think al Qaeda was winning it
15 pretty clearly, very clearly up through mid to late-
16 summer.

17 I think we've seen a shift now in the last
18 -- this is my opinion -- in the last three or four
19 months, that we are now winning. We are finally
20 figuring out how to get things out, how to show what
21 al Qaeda is doing to the people of Iraq versus what
22 the Coalition is doing to the people or for the people

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1 of Iraq, very, very clearly.

2 I think now you see much more desperation
3 on their part, and the believability, credibility of
4 folks like that, AQI, has really, really, really gone
5 down.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Given the -- I'm sorry.
7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Go ahead.

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Given that that has been
9 something that has been such a turnaround, what do you
10 see as the key things that we did differently that
11 helped turn that around? What are mechanisms that
12 helped us?

13 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think it's
14 getting that function integrated. It's always in
15 sharing, that they know the guys that work the IO
16 arena, the non-lethal effects, understand what we are
17 trying to accomplish and how they can shape --
18 depending on which audience you are talking about,
19 external, internal, how they can help shape that by
20 the products they produce. But with the growth of
21 television here, and again we are talking satellite
22 and how do you get to the satellite world, more than

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1 just the non-satellite world?

2 How do you engage in a population now that
3 information awareness is so much readily available now
4 with all the -- everything from the Internet, which is
5 another component of this, to television, much beyond
6 print media and normal television, local TV stations,
7 and al Alaby (Phonetic), al Ariqi (Phonetic), al
8 Jeezira (Phonetic), you know. All the PanArab
9 networks are the same. How do you engage them and
10 deal with that?

11 The other component: How do you get
12 everything from local to national to international to
13 figure this out?

14 So -- But that's back to the PA side.
15 Back on the IO side is making sure you have a way of
16 showing what militias, al Qaeda do to your kids, your
17 loved ones, your neighborhoods and your government,
18 etcetera?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6): To go to the Arab media,
20 and switching back over to that PA piece to this, one
21 of the things that General Odierno had directed was
22 more of an Arab media outreach. Has that come into

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1 play yet or is it still --

2 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That is -- We at
3 this level have done it, because you go down to the
4 CPIC (Phonetic), all of us go down there, and you have
5 that. It used to be on. I think it still it still is
6 on Sundays. You go down there and engage the Arab
7 media on Sunday afternoons.

8 I went down to Al Arabi (Phonetic) in
9 Dubai and spent time with them in the afternoon, did
10 a live show with them. So it takes effort.

11 What has not panned out is the local.
12 Getting a band of, you know, media, a little pool, if
13 you will, who goes around to each of the MNDs, DCPs
14 and kind of spends a day a week, a day per week in
15 each of these areas kind of covering the local things
16 going on, you know, in each of these areas -- that has
17 not been embraced all that much, I don't think, by
18 the MNDs, and it just hasn't -- But again, trying to
19 get the Arab media and get them on a schedule and then
20 make -- You know, it takes resources. It takes
21 coordination and, you know, that has not gone as well
22 as we would like it to.

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1 [b)(3), (b)(6)]: Sir, I wanted to ask
2 about intelligence in general at the command level,
3 just because knowing that that is a constant stream
4 that helps in the decision making process.

5 Have you seen any changes in the quality,
6 nature or the channels of intelligence that have been
7 more important to yourself, to the Commanding General,
8 to the other key leaders in the command? That is to
9 say, given that we have the human SIGIT (Phonetic),
10 all these types of sources, and the quality of the
11 analysis, has that remained pretty constant? Have you
12 seen that change during the course of the tour here,
13 as you look back?

14 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think, by and
15 large, it stays fairly constant. I think it's always
16 been good. It's always fed the Ops piece, and it's
17 been a very good partnership.

18 The case changed out, obviously, in the
19 early fall here. There was a dip, and you are
20 bringing a whole new team in. There was a dip, and
21 there is always a dip.

22 Just like any TOA out there on the

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1 battlefield, there is a dip in performance, but the
2 good news is the ^{CACE}~~case~~ is off-cycle with the Corps. So
3 the ^{CACE}~~case~~ is going to be on board now a good two, three
4 -- three, four months under us. So when the new corps
5 gets here, they will be up and running full speed. I
6 would say they are about there now.



14 (Inaudible), of course, is a great
15 backdrop for all that. It certainly leads you down
16 many a path and kind of confirms/denies sometimes what
17 people are thinking, you know, doing, based on what
18 they are saying. That helps, but a very good
19 (Inaudible) and good cross-talk between all levels, to
20 include the Special Ops community.

21 That is not a partnership there, but it is
22 sharing dialogue between us and them, who knows, what

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1 happened; and a better synergy, I think, under the --
2 There are a lot of things (Several words inaudible).

3 Back to IO, very strong changeover in
4 personality and leadership of who our IO Chief was, a
5 very good change there. In the Intel arena between
6 Force and Corps, a very happy change in terms of who
7 took over the SYOP and everything over at the Force,
8 and that's had a much better manner, if you will,
9 between the Corps and Force, for example.

10 So it does (Inaudible) personality,
11 individual sometimes, you know. I shouldn't say
12 sometimes; most of the time.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I wanted to ask
14 about a particular segment of the command that was
15 unique to 3 Corps coming in, and that was the stand-up
16 of the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center. I
17 just wanted to capture your perspective on what the
18 original intent was and how that has panned out and
19 what role the COIC has played in shaping the --

20 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Probably one the
21 more -- In my personal opinion, probably one of the
22 most frustrating components in what we try to do.

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1 The driving impetus behind that was the
2 Commanding General's desire to -- IEDs have been the
3 number one killer, remain the number killer, but was
4 to get that -- to attack that threat head on, and by
5 forming a -- You know, oftentimes when you form a
6 cell, and we talk about so far cells and how you have
7 a fusion, if you will, fusion cell, and that is
8 obviously very heavy in the intelligence world. It's
9 been heavy in the energy world. It's been heavy in
10 the corruption world here. It is getting ready to be
11 used in the employment world and, obviously, intel.

12 So all those functions have proven time
13 and time again to be very effective in getting people
14 focused on a problem and solving the problem.

15 Well, that mentality, methodology is what
16 the intent was of the COIC. The problem with the COIC
17 is that it had to be taken out of ^{wide} (Inaudible).
18 Oftentimes fusion cells have to be taken out of
19 ^{wide} (Inaudible).

20 So this concept got developed during our
21 MRX. We debated this very long and hard on our MRX
22 back in the summer of '06: How do we defeat this IED?

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1 And it really was, (b)(3), (b)(6) about the network, not -- It
2 wasn't to compete with 1.4a although there has been
3 unit lines of communication in terms of what 1.4a does
4 in terms of their counter-exploitation cell, their
5 1.4a, 1.4g cell, their weapons integration teams with, you
6 know -- and they had their own little intel team and
7 their own biometrics over there, etcetera.

8 So how do you -- You know, how do you
9 focus on the network without getting in the nitty-
10 gritty of what they do and what our clearance teams do
11 and all that, but then again have an organization
12 overall that kind of focuses all those players.

13 The problem over here is that there's so
14 many people that get involved with the counter-IED
15 fight, but there was not a synchronizing component of
16 that, which would really fall under the 3 as an Ops
17 function, because these are all assets on the
18 battlefield that had to be coordinated, synchronized
19 to produce results.

20 So we played with it, played with it,
21 played with it. What's this thing going to look like?
22 How do we man it? What should it consist of? How do

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1 you have, you know, everything from intel analysts to
2 weapons experts, you know, to get the bang for the
3 buck out of this fight that we can reduce the number,
4 improve found and cleared, reduce the number of
5 exploded and, obviously, reduce the number of
6 casualties to the number one killer on the
7 battlefield.

8 That is, again, a combination of all,
9 personal borne, suicide vests, vehicle borne, you
10 know, truck borne, house borne -- you know, all those
11 categories, all the above. How do you reduce that
12 problem?

13 I think what we have found out is the root
14 of success of that process still is at the lower level
15 than we are. I think what you will find, and you need
16 to -- As you go around your MNDs, and I hope you have
17 already found out, you know, the average one will tell
18 you the COIC does not give them any tools to help make
19 them more successful in this fight.

20 What makes them more successful in this
21 fight is how they employ the assets that are available
22 to them, 1.4a, 1.4g to route clearance teams,

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1 to our 1.4c you know, where caches are, where
2 somebody has put something on the side of the road,
3 etcetera, under the road, alongside the road, you
4 know, on top of the road. How do you work all that,
5 because the real key piece becomes threat finding, if
6 there is a threat finding cell here in Iraq.

7 How do you figure out who is paying, you
8 know, and it is all about getting everything left --
9 before this thing blows up, left of the boom? How do
10 you figure out who are the trainers, resources,
11 resourcers, financiers, etcetera?

12 How do you disrupt all that, which we have
13 done in the vehicle borne arena, but I would say
14 that's because we put more boots on the ground, and
15 between ISF and Coalition forces, we have found these
16 factories and things.

17 So that is getting into the network. So
18 who is providing this stuff to these facilities where
19 these things get put together? You know, who pays for
20 it, you know, through kidnapping, oil revenues or
21 whatever? How do you figure all that out, which is a
22 pretty high level piece, and I won't say we've had all

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1 that much success in figuring that out. We have just
2 figured it out again by sheer operations in the battle
3 space.

4 I think what the MNDs will tell you --
5 they will tell you that the COIC is a great data
6 collector, but it really just takes the data from the
7 MNDs, collates it, and produces it and turns it into
8 all these humongous presentations, but in the end it
9 doesn't necessarily change anything on the street.

10 JIEDDO, the Joint Improvised Explosive
11 Defeat Organization -- I think it's Defense Defeat,
12 JIEDDO, which is based in Virginia. They have
13 resourced lots of people over here, technocrats, intel
14 experts, and now all these teams are going down to the
15 MNDs, kind of like the asymmetric warfare group that
16 are going down to MNDs to help them be more successful
17 in their own battle space with all the most current
18 technologies, TTPs, etcetera.

19 I think the way -- and this may be
20 blasphemy, at least for the boss, but I think the way
21 that 18th Airborne Corps is going to approach this is
22 they are going to roll the counter-IED fight into

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1 FUOPS, future ops, just like what I said at the very
2 beginning. It's got to be an operational role.

3 So they are going to downsize the cell.
4 It is not going to be resourced as much, but they are
5 going to roll that function under that planning
6 horizon as part of the 3 arena, and that's how they
7 are going to manage the counter-IED fight.

8 I think that is probably -- The cell has
9 worth. The question becomes again roles and
10 functions, at what level. What can you provide and
11 not provide -- Besides just getting requests for
12 information or whatever, what can you provide to MNDs
13 in the fight, value added or not value added?

14 You know, everything from (Inaudible) BCTs
15 to products. But what really helps (Inaudible) -- But
16 if a (Inaudible) BCT just regurgitates everything the
17 division passed up to you, and all you've done is
18 consolidate it and put it on a graph that can spit it
19 right back out again, I don't think you are doing much
20 for MNDs.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6): Thank you, sir. Looking
22 to a future operational issue, which is the

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1 development of Operation Phantom Phoenix, can you
2 speak to me a little bit about the evolution of that
3 operation and what the focus is?

4 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The focus is kind
5 of a -- It's a pursuit -- I think the best way to
6 categorize Phantom Phoenix is it's a pursuit of AQI.
7 We've got them on the run. We've got them pretty well
8 beaten. There's a few pockets left that we know of,
9 and it's kind of a routing of that, and it is a
10 classic pursuit.

11 So it is -- You know, before we
12 (Inaudible), before we change over here, it's to put
13 everything on a little bit more of an offensive in
14 Diyala, up in some of the hot spots, Nineveh, Diyala,
15 a little bit down in centers. Got some pockets and,
16 of course, you've got some of the special groups. So
17 you've got the splinter groups, special groups of JAM
18 or other militia type, which is the other target, in
19 some of the areas where there's some gaps.

20 So it's to go to some areas that we
21 haven't been. It's to pursue the enemy where they are
22 and kind of clean things up a little bit more as the

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1 winter approaches here and transition season comes
2 into effect.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6): One of the operations
4 that has been mentioned is Operation Hydra. Is that
5 a subset of Operation Phantom Phoenix or a stand-alone
6 operation?

7 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Hydra -- That's
8 the anti-corruption piece up in Beji (Phonetic). It's
9 been evolving for a long time. So it predates Phantom
10 Phoenix, but it goes back to that fusion -- JIATF is
11 another term, Joint Interagency Task Force, the same
12 methodology we are talking about in the other arena as
13 a cell, if you will. They are going to focus on this
14 corruption effort.

15 You saw the bullet this morning, how oil
16 exports and revenues have grown again, and (Inaudible)
17 at the beginning of the year it was not better than
18 '06, and in the second half of the year it's better
19 than '06, and they came out ahead better than '06 in
20 the end for '07.

21 So how do you ensure corruption does not
22 impede the wealth to be gained, the profits to be

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1 gained, the revenue to be gained by oil here in-
2 country to help this country move along and reinvest
3 in its future infrastructure, you know, quality of
4 life, etcetera?

5 So Hydra has been an ongoing -- How do we
6 clean out Beji as the main hub of oil here for
7 economic purposes?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6): Here is a really simple
9 question, but it's the kind historians will want to
10 know.

11 The naming for Phantom Phoenix -- any
12 particular --

13 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, the crew came
14 up with it, just -- You know, Phantom Hammer, Phantom
15 Strike -- you know, Phantom something, but Phoenix is
16 from the -- Not sure of the analogy quite as well with
17 Iragis, but from the ashes is your rebuilding.

18 We kind of think that we are now, based on
19 all the successes of the offensive ops that started
20 in June, August -- June was the beginning of the
21 surge. That's the wrong way to say it. The surge
22 began in January, which was Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic),

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Thunder

1 but Phantom ~~Hammer~~ is when all the surge BCTs were on
2 the ground, 15 June, and then Phantom Strike, which
3 was 15 August, which was pre-Lebanon, pre-Petraeus'
4 testimony, kick in the pants offensive to make sure
5 that, when he did testify, everything wasn't blowing
6 up over here.

7 All those have been very successful. So
8 Phoenix was kind of now picking everything up from the
9 remnants of all that and rebuilding. It's a
10 rebuilding, re-start, as I said, the pursuit, clean-
11 out, finalization and get the CLC, ISF, all those
12 things that have been moving along on their own
13 standing up, and starting to get ready for transition.

14 So that's the genesis of it.

15 (b)(3), (b)(6): All right, sir. Sir, in
16 a broad sense, looking now at the last six weeks or so
17 of the tour here, as you look back from your level and
18 given that this has been a very significant year, as
19 you look back, what are the key things that are going
20 to stick in your mind as far as what this tour has
21 meant to you personally or in the broader sense of how
22 we all look back on this?

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1 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, me
2 personally, I kind of wanted -- I was here for OF-1
3 (Phonetic) and throughout the war from the beginning
4 and all the -- Back at that time, the rudiments of
5 stability and security, actually, is what it was.
6 Coming back this time, thinking it was going to maybe
7 be the end.

8 So I was kind of excited about being here
9 and saying, well, I came when it started, and given
10 where we thought we were going to be by this fall, I
11 was going to see the end. Well, obviously, it's not
12 the end. But everyone debates and negotiates and
13 figures out the period they were here, how valuable
14 that period was.

15 Was it elections? You know, what
16 milestones were achieved? But I think for the Corps,
17 I think history will show that -- and I think you and
18 I talked about this a while ago, but history will show
19 what this has all meant to Iraq much later than now,
20 but the turnaround -- It clearly was a turnaround
21 year.

22 Things were clearly (Inaudible) when we

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1 got here. Things were not good. I mean, casualties.
2 I mean quality of life, functionality, all that stuff
3 was clearly in the toilet last November/December. I
4 mean, it was not -- Everything was a race to go to
5 PIC, provincial Iraqi control, Iraqi Army in the lead.
6 It was this race. Here's a calendar, and this month
7 we are going to hand over this division, this month
8 this province is going to go Click.

9 You know, everything was addressed like
10 that, boom, boom, boom, and by this date we will high
11 five, and it will all be over. Well, it was clear the
12 conditions weren't matching those milestones.

13 So the real test will be: Will 2008 --
14 Will the security apparatus that's been put in place
15 allow 2008 to now prosper economically and in
16 governance?

17 Those two areas are clearly the knuckle
18 draggers, and we've got to now make sure that the
19 conditions remain at least as good as now, if not
20 better. Now again, "if not better" is the preferable
21 outcome, but that security is at least maintained to
22 the level it is today.

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1 That allows everything we talked about
2 earlier, economic, governance, capacity building, that
3 next year this time everything is run by the
4 government at a much more capable level than it is
5 now, and everything we talked about, the industries
6 and private business and the economy, is flourishing,
7 everything from oil, you know, to small businesses, to
8 state owned, to finance and all the different things
9 that have to come.

10 That's still asking a lot, but that the
11 conditions remain set for that prosperity to continue
12 this coming year. I think that is what we will all
13 look upon -- You know, obviously, Fardel Kanoun
14 (Phonetic), protecting the populace, securing the
15 populace, was a major milestone this year, and it is
16 irrefutable it has taken effect and worked.

17 Now the question becomes to capacity build
18 in the key billets to benefit, prosper, move along
19 based on those conditions they establish.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, is there anything I
21 haven't asked you about that deserves comment in this
22 type of historical interview at the back half?

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1 BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, I think you
2 hit a lot. I mean, you can talk about a kazillion
3 things, but I mean, the key thing is moving this
4 progress along.

5 I think the question becomes the
6 capability of the people in power to do that. But I
7 think we hit all the main things.

8 (b)(3), (b)(6): All right. I think I'm
9 out of time. So that's all good timing.

10 That concludes this interview.
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