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INTERVIEW

OF

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH ANDERSON

CHIEF OF STAFF

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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PROCEEDINGS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

This is the Multinational Corps Iraq Historian.

Today is Wednesday, the 2nd of January 2008. We are here at the al Faw Palace at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and I am here interviewing Brigadier General Anderson.

Sir, could you introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, last name?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: B.G. Joe Anderson, Chief of Staff, Multinational Corps-Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Thank you, sir. Just for the listener's benefit, I wanted to make mention that there are two previous interviews on file. One was from the 23rd of March, conducted by myself, and the other was on 13 June, likewise conducted here at the al Far Palace.

Sir, I wanted to ask a big question, which was where do you see the center of gravity at this point in the campaign, especially since we spoke last six months ago?
BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The center of gravity remains the government of Iraq, the capability of, credibility of, focus of. That has not changed as strategic now operationally by the people of Iraq.

Yes, sir. One of the things that came up recently in General Odierno's discussions with regard to -- at the CG's conference was some of his concerns about some of the critical vulnerabilities at this point.

Can you speak to some of those, if you are familiar with them, and what the discussions have been about those critical vulnerabilities and that kind of stuff?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The vulnerabilities remain the Iraqi Security Forces. They have to continue to be trained, manned, equipped, led, but more importantly, reliable, loyal forces that are functional.

So the biggest vulnerability is the Commander's assessments of their capability to do their job on the street and, of course, that is heavily Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army.
The next one would probably be the whole Concerned Local Citizens Program, which has gone probably better than anybody expected, which is what has generated some direction, integration for reconciliation in terms of how Sunnis get in place at the table, both of the security apparatus and potentially in governance and other benefits gained and integrated. But the issues really become their long term capability to either be integrated into the Iraqi Security Force or to go on government contract in lieu of Coalition contract or how they roll into some form of economic employment via low tech or not, via public works battalions, civil service corps, whatever term you want to call it.

The last vulnerability that I think we all look at now is the whole displaced population piece and resettlement piece and how that all comes back together again.

Obviously, all of those three -- There is not a government plan. There is not an overall strategic plan. There is not a lot of nongovernmental organization, humanitarian assistance, U.N. or anybody
else, support to get those folks back into their homes and make sure they have employment, medical care, education, clothing, food, roof over their heads, etcetera, all of that in the context of the drawdown of Coalition forces.

That probably is the biggest vulnerability. Other dynamics will interfere, affect that or influence that, but the real issue is it will be drawdown forces here now. The capabilities, dynamics of all those things I just talked about at once, based on which number of ECTs we happen to be at, at any given time as that approaches the summer, a year from now, and potentially 18 months from now -- that's going to be a big critical component.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sir, I wanted to ask one follow-on relative to the Concerned Local Citizens Programs. I know that on the 2nd of December there was a key meeting between General Odierno and the Prime Minister. Were you present at that meeting?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No. I was in ministerial committee for national security. It's the standard MCNS on Sunday afternoons. The issue was to
present -- There's been lots of confusion, disruptive influences trying to affect the outcome of CLCs in terms of what they do, who they work for, how big they should or shouldn't be, etcetera, and that was a chance for General Odierno in front of the Government of Iraq leadership to lay out what exactly the program is, what it means.

Of course, it was always predicated -- They exist -- CLCs exist to cover the shortfalls of the Iraqi Security Forces. So as the Iraqi Security Forces grow in number, which has just occurred, all those components I just talked about, the manning, training, equipping, etcetera of those forces. CLCs are kind of the mitigator, fill a void, fill a vacuum.

I think once all that got laid out and had it under check and had it under the supervision, partnership of Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and a few other components, it kind of, at least officially, publicly, top-cover-wise, kind of gave some credence to the program.

Sir, I wanted to ask a little bit about the formulation of the Op Plan 08-01.
that was just published on the 20th of December.

Knowing that you have a pivotal role in
the planning process, working with staff, working with
the CG and his methodology for moving plans and
operational discussions forward, can you speak to me
from your perspective about the unfolding of 08-01?

When did it start? What were the most pivotal aspects
to it? Which issues engendered the most discussion?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think what
generated it was, obviously, a new year. So based on
time. Number two, transition: We are getting ready
to have a Corps transition, but really what predicated
it was the assessment done back in the fall; because
the timeline began based on a Joint Staff planning
order to take a look at courses of action.

That started in August, which all drove
General Petraeus' testimony in September, which
ultimately left us with, okay, now we've got this all
assessed; now how do we change, modify the plan,
primarily from the context of overwatch. You know,
how do we transition from the clear control, retain
methodology of Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic)?
As I talked about a little while ago, we do that with political direction. We do have a operational validation that we start off-ramping some BCTs. So how does that affect how we do operations here in Iraq? So everything from which level of overwatch are you in or not by geographic conditions based process, to the growth/development of the ISF, and how do you figure out where you go along that timeline. But to start, it's all about transitioning.

It could be not necessarily BCT by BCT. It may be battalion by battalion. So depending on, again, what level. Based on the battle space and the environment, the operational environment, and where you talking about, Sunni-Sunni, Shia-Shia, Shia-Sunni, and all the dynamic borders, where you're talking about, how you do all that. You know, the Kurdish piece, all those factors.

So that is what drove it. That is kind of what the issues are, and then the whole transition team advisor role based on PRTs, VPRTs, and then the military training teams, border transition teams, police transition teams, how all that changes really
between FY '08, FY '09. That's probably when the real change is going to come, and the TT (Phonetic) business is after '09. But all those factors, plus many more, (Inaudible) basing construct, logistics, structure, you know, lots of different components on it, which are all now up for grabs in terms of how do we start to consolidate bases, transfer bases, shrink bases, you know, share with the Iraqi Air Force, share with the Iraqi Army. You know, the future of JSS is in (Inaudible) security sites, stations, combat outposts.

What is the future of all those things?

Sir, one of the things mentioned in there is the idea of irreversible momentum. I just wanted to see, given that that is not a typical thing for an operational command -- it's a typical warfighting metric.

Can you talk to me about the discussions around irreversible momentum, and what --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: There are many trying to, again, figure out what the criteria metrics would be to define it, because you are right. It is
a nonstandard term, and the irreversible momentum has
shifted a couple of times.

It was originally, you know, the
wintertime. Then it became the summer, winter now,
what we just passed, December of '07. Then it moved
to the summer of '08, and now it is -- you know, there
is some debate whether you want to slip it to the
winter of '08.

It really kind of boiled back down to lose
-- is how it all kind of went full circle. What do we
mean by it, and how do you measure it? It boiled down
to security status. So when we say irreversible
moment, what are the security metrics, based again on
everything from IEDs to extra-judicial killings,
sectarian violence, all those types that we measure
all the time, KIAs, WIA's, civilian, ISF, Coalition.

Two ISF -- We talked about it a couple of
times. This is all about ISF capacity and transition
to their security. So how do you measure that in
terms of the same criteria I've talked about a couple
of times, all of the readiness data, plus loyalty,
effectiveness, you know, leadership, to governance, to
economics?

I think probably the most significant part for the Corps is we are about the provinces. We are all about provincial capacity, and I think -- I'm not so sure it is a point of contention or not, but you can argue again everything from the need/requirement to have provincial elections or not, which we believe in, but we firmly believe that if you build -- just like we have determined at the local level, the district, neighborhood, you know, muballah, all those areas -- As those grow, does that breed, motivate, inspire, make it contagious that governance will continue to develop as you go up the chain? Well, the same philosophy at the provincial level. In some provinces, you know, think or not, provincial Iraqi control or not, how do we ensure at the provincial level they can provide for all the essential services, infrastructure, quality of life, life support for their people, the budget, you know, run their infrastructure, have clinics, have schools, all of that?

What is more important, to develop that or
to wait for the central government to get their act together and do the same. Again, we are of the firm belief that we are just much better off at the provincial level developing that capacity. And that is the primary component of the economic governance piece of irreversible momentum, is making sure that the provinces are capable of doing all that and don't look back.

You know, don't regress back into some, again, we can't spend it, we can't account for the money and we can't plan for an operations and maintenance budget and a capital budget, for example. You know, how do you plan for the future development? How do you run day to day, everything from salaries to sustainment? How do you run that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) In that sense, was -- I just want to make sure I am capturing the thought process correctly, which is the idea that we can influence something from a bottom up approach?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes. (Several words inaudible) same approach used in the ISF, how can you pair off with provincial councils, you know,
district councils, district mayors, the city mayors, city councils, neighborhood advisory committees, district advisory committees, at whatever level you are talking about, and all the parties and tribes in between? You know, how do you pair off with those folks and help them understand at least an alternative way of doing it?

Of course, this is all about development, discovery, learning, because they are just not used -- When it comes to doing contracts and everything, all these businesses used to do is just produce goods, and the government bought it and distributed it. So there was no marketing. There was no competition for sales. There was no, you know, quality assurance and best price and, you know, that type of stuff. So this is all novel approaches to them.

So that applies to all walks of life in these respective areas. So how do you develop all that through the private, small business, stated owned enterprises, which were all government run, but how do you kind of get that turning again, because many of those factories and facilities can actually produce
pretty good goods, you know.

So "Buy Iraqi First," like down in
Iskandariyah where they do everything from buses to
tractors. You know, there is as humongous capability
down there. So how do you capitalize on it?

Then, of course, there are still provinces
that don't have any security apparatus whatsoever,
primarily down in MND-Center. So that's the problem.
Who do you hand off to in this irreversible momentum
mosaic, and how do the Iraqi Security Forces handle it
when there really isn't. There aren't any there to
head up.

So it is very demographic region specific.

Sir, you have a unique
position here, because of your visibility of the
bigger picture, in particular, between the way MNCI
and Multi-National Force-Iraq interrelate.

I just wanted to see if you could speak to
me about how that relationship has continued to evolve
since we spoke last. In particular, just knowing that
the two commands, of course, MNCI based on 3 Corps
which comes and goes at specific times, but MNFI which
has two players rotating on an individual basis, can you talk me through what you have seen over the last six and seven months now as far as how that relationship has continued? Does it engender some debate or some discussion?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, since the last time we talked, you know, it's summertime. MNFI has turned over everything from the Chief of Staff down. So every key player, the strategic plans and assessment, strategic operations, strategic effects, the intel, the DSINT (Phonetic), you know, all the way from top to bottom has purged.

So every key player now -- R&S has just changed out the logistics side of the house, comptrollers, personnel -- they are leaving. So what I would say is, because of the rhythm of (Inaudible) reason and how the Corps is on a different cycle than the Force, that's probably a very healthy thing.

So they all changed over. We didn't. So the beauty of the Corps remains the fact that two-thirds of the Corps is a based COR, PS, is a base corps, and that is the core, c-o-r-e, and then there
is the "F." So that, I think, is healthy.

We know the challenges of what we deal with about a third of us rotating through here and being without a third or fourth person in some cases because of doing 15 months as well.

That all said, there's clear -- speaking of campaign plans, (Several words inaudible) and the Joint Campaign Plan, one of the other components, and we thought primarily from the Iraqi side of the house and the Coalition side of the house, this is going to be a year that a lot of battle station change, with a lot of the Coalition partners.

You know, the Koreans are now down to 639 people. They used to be 2500 people when we got here and, of course, that's probably the least significant of all. But MND-Southeast gone from 5500 to 2500, but we are maintaining a headquarters there through the year, and now the Poles are going to pull out October 31st. So MND-CS will go away almost at the end of the year.

So the command and control of all that, the battle space and the headquarters consolidation is
a huge piece of the upcoming year, and we have found
-- and again, we have testified this now in many --
Matter of fact, I just met the Force historian, by the
way. But in many areas we have already started this
process. Many of the supporting functions, surgeon,
chaplain, personnel, have been the mainstay. However,
we have already had some merging in the C-4,
transportation functions, engineering functions.

It is very clear that there is redundancy,
and there is economies and efficiencies to be gained,
and I think everybody -- we in the Corps have trimmed
about 400 slots alone that we say we can retask,
reorganize just in our own house, let alone MNFI which
the average person would tell you, even within MNFI --
and I briefed the new four staff officers in the last
Tuesday, I think it is, of every month.

You know, every month we have a room of
100-something people that change out, a lot of people.
But just within -- I mentioned a couple of the big
ones right up front: Strategic Plans and Assessment,
Strategic Effects, Strategic Ops.

There is confusion even at the Force level
who does what in each of those arenas, and then again
how do we gain synergy between the Corps that we are
sorting out now in this JCS plan order we have now for
the code we are developing and getting ready for the
next testimony on how many BCTs stay beyond the
summer, how long they stay, what the turnover rates
are based on maintaining the status quo. Things go
better than expected; things go worse than expected.

Who has the lead for that, and who should
feed who? So what I will you is that the Corps
position defends the same philosophy we use with
provincial governance.

We think the Corps as the operational
command should be driving most of those criteria,
metrics and processes, and then the Force can go ahead
and do all those other things they want to talk about
on top of that, funding, basing, whatever, which will
all be subsets of what's the plan -- you know,
supporting plans to the base plan. But what is really
going on is a major, major, major look at what -- by
a year from now, what do these two headquarters look
like if we get ready, you know? A year form now, the
next corps will be getting close to -- you know, they
will out of here, I guess, March/April. So they will
be about three months away at this point next year,
and trying to get things set for the follow-on corps
after that.

So that is a major effort this coming
year, is figuring out what that should be, how do you
affect MJD (Inaudible)? How do you influence man
documents? How do you figure out the (Several words
inaudible), the YAD system, you know, as you are
filling this, and man two headquarters, but merging,
consolidating two headquarters?

☐ (D(3)(B)(V)): Sir, kind of on a more
intangible aspect of the relationship is: Realizing as
the Chief of Staff you are the one who probably spends
some time at least making sure that the relationships
are harmonious, smoothing the waters when there is
friction. Also knowing that this is war and there are
things that we may see differently than Force, are
there -- have there been issues where there is a
difference in points of view where you have had to
play that role to help keep things moving ahead and,
if so, what have been the issues that tend to be the ones that have then caused the most --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Mostly operational. I have done a lot in the strategic plans and assessment, detainees. So the biggest one has been the vision of the future in terms of the off-ramping of BCTs and what everything looks like, and terminology: You know, what do we mean by overwatch? What tasks are we going to perform by each level of overwatch, you know, things like that.

So yesterday we were arguing over -- and I was mediating -- on who was going to do what in this planning, and we finally got it all settled out yesterday. So, yes, very heavily in that area.

Detainees will be the next one. Numerous issues between the Corps and Task Force [14a]. And again, [14a] has the mission. They have a charter, but again everything in life needs to be conditions based.

I think anybody that's been around the block a few times would say you really got to set conditions and make sure you just don't set timelines up and say, by this day, we are going to do this,
without really knowing what things are going to allow you to accomplish that or not.

So huge mediation with [1.4a] and Force and Corps. Those are the two biggest. And again, the good news story is, considering the volume, pace, magnitude of what we do around here, that is about -- That was one of the two main ones, and most they go fairly well.

There are occasionally issues in the logistics arena, projects. When people think how they want to tell the Corps to spend money, then I have to mediate this is how the Corps spends money and who decides how the Corps spends money and how we prioritize how we spend money. So that surfaces every now and then.

Once in a while, there's issues in the public affairs domain where things -- somebody wants to release something, somebody doesn't. Somebody releases it ahead of time. Somebody doesn't tell the story right, particularly if it deals with numbers, casualties, you know, major operations, those types of things.
Then a lot of Title 10 issues, you know, in terms of how we are resourcing and prioritizing everything from ISR assets to Coalition support, some of those arenas.

Those are probably four, five, six of the main -- But, yes, I am ultimately able to come here if there is a point of friction, and then I've got to be the referee, either deal with that primary staff officer directly, which I do quite frequently, or go I go with my counterpart, the Force Chief, which is a guy that I talk to three, four times a day over many things every day, everything from operational needs requirements to requests for forces to, you know, etcetera, lots of topics.

Sir, I would ask a little bit more. You spoke to it a little bit with regard to the planning, with regard to the downsizing of some of our Coalition partners, and you mentioned the absorption of MND-Central South into MNDC's area, and you talked about the reduction in MND-Southeast.

Could you tell me a little bit more about what the way ahead is for MND-Southeast as they
downsize? Do you see that being absorbed in another area? Do you see that being a larger American presence there, or is that still an issue that is being --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: It's still an issue, but it potentially means in both cases -- Southeast clearly may trigger a need for Coalition forces -- read American -- to go down there with the border piece. The biggest piece for MND-Southeast remains the ports of Shalof (Phonetic) and Cheed (Phonetic) -- are two of the biggest areas where Iranian stuff comes across the border, IED -- improvised explosive device, explosively formed projectiles, vehicle borne IED, improved explosive devices.

All the kit material that makes these things go boom come across that border, plus money, plus people, other resources.

So that is a decision point. The Brits are primarily on the contingency operating base, Basra. I think they will stay, because there is progress. There is things going, everything from the
Port of Um Qasr becoming a world class port someday, some way maybe, to political progress there.

So I think they will hang around, because things are going well. Indirect fire is down, etcetera. So I don't think they are going to pull out totally, but the question becomes what do they do physically in that battle space?

So I don't think we have to worry about absorbing that. I think we just have to worry about how do we get some bang for the buck out of them, but the real question becomes the border.

The other - The MND-CS piece is going to be a collapse of MND-CS, Camp Echo, Diwaniyah into Kotasiyah ( Phonetic) Province, into MND-Center. The question becomes do you have to actually put Coalition forces there? In their place, you can -- the Iraqi Security Forces just take over Camp Echo next fall, and that's the way of the future.

The good news is the Georgians are still staying around, and we have another rotation coming in here in February, and we are probably going to have another one come in the summer.
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Now their election is Saturday. So, hopefully, things are going to stay at the Corps. So as long as we maintain a 2000 man presence there in Wasit, that will help influence, to shape things for MND-C down the road.

So probably in good shape down there, but the question is going to be how do you ensure the lines of communication and all the things that feed Baghdad are kept in check, all the forces are reducing in Baghdad and the belts, the belt area, which is a ring around Baghdad, you know, referred to everything from Balad to Baqubah to (inaudible) to the "diyas," you know, a lot of "diyas," Moqmodiyah, you know, Iskandariyah, all that part down south of us here all the way back up to Fallujah.

That ring is called the Belt, which is where a lot of this stuff used to -- all these attacks were staged from and resourced from. How do you keep that ring clean so Baghdad stays clean, and all the area you're talking about down there feed that Belt from the south and all the way up into Diyala Province, into Baqubah, Moqmodiyah and Baqubah, how
they need things in and it works its way into Baghdad.

\( \text{(b)(3), (b)(6)} \) I want to switch gears, sir, and ask a little bit about some of the non-kinetic things that have happened since we spoke last, and just kind of span a number of different areas.

The first thing I would ask about is that one of the things has been -- on the public affairs side, has been the senior leader engagement initiative. Just as a historian looking from the outside view in, so to speak, seems as if we have been a lot more effective about getting the story out, so to speak, about what our soldiers are doing, what progress we are making.

Can you give your comments on how you would see that change, if you have? May my assumption is wrong, but what is your perspective, and --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think public affairs -- I think what has probably changed, is the story. Public affairs has been a very active component. Our FAO plan has been a very active component of everything we have done.

I think 5500 releases for the year, I
believe, is the number, and the RIVITS (Phonetic) --
that acronym I can't -- That's that remote visual tee
that allows you to broadcast from here. I can't
remember the acronym.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Defense Video

Information?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Defense System
Display System or something?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Remote Vice Imagery

Distribution System.

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That system has
been a big winner, because that allows from remote
locations to tap in and get that broadcast to the
world. So everything from the technology, that has
allowed a lot more stuff to go across the airwaves,
because what has not been as encouraging, from what I
have seen here before, is the embedded media piece,
for a couple of reasons.

In the beginning everybody was afraid.
The press was all banned from going out because of
what happened to Woodward and what happened to
Kimberly Dozer and all the fear that they can't go out
there, they are going to get blown up.

Now, frankly, it appears to be just a sheer lack of interest, because the news -- there isn't that much news of stuff blowing up and people getting-- You know, obviously, we had a suicide bus yesterday. But the sensational, catastrophic, big news -- "you know, we've lost X number of service members today" -- those days and, of course, the press release did come out yesterday that December was the lowest total number of casualties ever. So combined battle, non-battle, some pretty phenomenal stuff.

Of course, we still have lost a lot of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines over here. So it's still not necessarily a good news story. A lot of guys and gals have been killed here and are seriously wounded, you know.

So interest level, embedded media, the capability. But I think the story has been told fairly accurately. The issue is understanding. It's hard to tell the story here without people having a lot of firsthand accounts and information about what is going on. The only way you are going to get that
is to go out, not to hang around in the (Inaudible)
down in Baghdad, but to go out and see it.

I think getting that story told has been
very, very, very hard. But they have done a -- On the
PA front, they have done a phenomenal job. I assume
you mean the IO.

The IO piece, I would say, ditto. Now
what I would say, with the IO we were very weak and
not very good, but I would say from last January all
the way through the summertime, the change of events,
because of knowledge, experience, effects, trying to
figure out in the non-lethal world -- you know,
again, who is winning the IO war, al Qaeda or the
Coalition? Well, I think al Qaeda was winning it
pretty clearly, very clearly up through mid to late-
summer.

I think we've seen a shift now in the last
-- this is my opinion -- in the last three or four
months, that we are now winning. We are finally
figuring out how to get things out, how to show what
al Qaeda is doing to the people of Iraq versus what
the Coalition is doing to the people or for the people
of Iraq, very, very clearly.

I think now you see much more desperation on their part, and the believability, credibility of folks like that, AQI, has really, really, really gone down.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Given the -- I'm sorry.

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Go ahead.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Given that that has been something that has been such a turnaround, what do you see as the key things that we did differently that helped turn that around? What are mechanisms that helped us?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think it's 12 getting that function integrated. It's always in
sharing, that they know the guys that work the IO arena, the non-lethal effects, understand what we are trying to accomplish and how they can shape -- depending on which audience you are talking about, external, internal, how they can help shape that by the products they produce. But with the growth of television here, and again we are talking satellite and how do you get to the satellite world, more than
just the non-satellite world?

How do you engage in a population now that
information awareness is so much readily available now
with all the -- everything from the Internet, which is
another component of this, to television, much beyond
print media and normal television, local TV stations,
and al Alaby (Phonetic), al Ariqi (Phonetic), al
Jeezira (Phonetic), you know. All the PanArab
networks are the same. How do you engage them and
deal with that?

The other component: How do you get
everything from local to national to international to
figure this out?

So... But that's back to the PA side.
Back on the IO side is making sure you have a way of
showing what militias, al Qaeda do to your kids, your
loved ones, your neighborhoods and your government,
etcetera?

(b)(3), (b)(6): To go to the Arab media,
and switching back over to that PA piece to this, one
of the things that General Odierno had directed was
more of an Arab media outreach. Has that come into
play yet or is it still --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: That is -- We at this level have done it, because you go down to the CPIC (Phonetic), all of us go down there, and you have that. It used to be on. I think it still it still is on Sundays. You go down there and engage the Arab media on Sunday afternoons.

I went down to Al Arabi (Phonetic) in Dubai and spent time with them in the afternoon, did a live show with them. So it takes effort.

What has not panned out is the local. Getting a band of, you know, media, a little pool, if you will, who goes around to each of the MNDs, DCPs and kind of spends a day a week, a day per week in each of these areas kind of covering the local things going on, you know, in each of these areas -- that has not been embraced all that much, I don't think, by the MNDs, and it just hasn't -- But again, trying to get the Arab media and get them on a schedule and then make -- You know, it takes resources. It takes coordination and, you know, that has not gone as well as we would like it to.
(b)(3),(b)(6): Sir, I wanted to ask about intelligence in general at the command level, just because knowing that that is a constant stream that helps in the decision making process.

Have you seen any changes in the quality, nature or the channels of intelligence that have been more important to yourself, to the Commanding General, to the other key leaders in the command? That is to say, given that we have the human SIGINT (Phonetic), all these types of sources, and the quality of the analysis, has that remained pretty constant? Have you seen that change during the course of the tour here, as you look back?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: I think, by and large, it stays fairly constant. I think it's always been good. It's always fed the Ops piece, and it's been a very good partnership.

The case changed out, obviously, in the early fall here. There was a dip, and you are bringing a whole new team in. There was a dip, and there is always a dip.

Just like any TOA out there on the
battlefield, there is a dip in performance, but the
good news is the case is off-cycle with the Corps. So the case is going to be on board now a good two, three -- three, four months under us. So when the new corps gets here, they will be up and running full speed. I would say they are about there now.

(Inaudible), of course, is a great backdrop for all that. It certainly leads you down many a path and kind of confirma/denies sometimes what people are thinking, you know, doing, based on what they are saying. That helps, but a very good (Inaudible) and good cross-talk between all levels, to include the Special Ops community.

That is not a partnership there, but it is sharing dialogue between us and them, who knows, what
happened; and a better synergy, I think, under the --
There are a lot of things (Several words inaudible).

Back to IO, very strong changeover in personality and leadership of who our IO Chief was, a very good change there. In the Intel arena between Force and Corps, a very happy change in terms of who took over the SYOP and everything over at the Force, and that's had a much better manner, if you will, between the Corps and Force, for example.

So it does (Inaudible) personality, individual sometimes, you know. I shouldn't say sometimes: most of the time.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, I wanted to ask about a particular segment of the command that was unique to 3 Corps coming in, and that was the stand-up of the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center. I just wanted to capture your perspective on what the original intent was and how that has panned out and what role the COIC has played in shaping the --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Probably one the more -- In my personal opinion, probably one of the most frustrating components in what we try to do.
The driving impetus behind that was the Commanding General's desire to -- IEDs have been the number one killer, remain the number killer, but was to get that -- to attack that threat head on, and by forming a -- You know, oftentimes when you form a cell, and we talk about so far cells and how you have a fusion, if you will, fusion cell, and that is obviously very heavy in the intelligence world. It's been heavy in the energy world. It's been heavy in the corruption world here. It is getting ready to be used in the employment world and, obviously, intel.

So all those functions have proven time and time again to be very effective in getting people focused on a problem and solving the problem.

Well, that mentality, methodology is what the intent was of the COIC. The problem with the COIC is that it had to be taken out of (inaudible). Oftentimes fusion cells have to be taken out of (inaudible).

So this concept got developed during our MRX. We debated this very long and hard on our MRX back in the summer of '06: How do we defeat this IED?
And it really was, about the network, not -- It wasn't to compete with although there has been unit lines of communication in terms of what does in terms of their counter-exploitation cell, their cell, their weapons integration teams with, you know -- and they had their own intel team and their own biometrics over there, etcetera.

So how do you -- You know, how do you focus on the network without getting in the nitty-gritty of what they do and what our clearance teams do and all that, but then again have an organization overall that kind of focuses all those players.

The problem over here is that there's so many people that get involved with the counter-IED fight, but there was not a synchronizing component of that, which would really fall under the 3 as an Ops function, because these are all assets on the battlefield that had to be coordinated, synchronized to produce results.

So we played with it, played with it, played with it. What's this thing going to look like? How do we man it? What should it consist of? How do
you have, you know, everything from intel analysts to weapons experts, you know, to get the bang for the buck out of this fight that we can reduce the number, improve found and cleared, reduce the number of exploded and, obviously, reduce the number of casualties to the number one killer on the battlefield.

That is, again, a combination of all, personal borne, suicide vests, vehicle borne, you know, truck borne, house borne -- you know, all those categories, all the above. How do you reduce that problem?

I think what we have found out is the root of success of that process still is at the lower level than we are. I think what you will find, and you need to -- As you go around your MNDs, and I hope you have already found out, you know, the average one will tell you the COIC does not give them any tools to help make them more successful in this fight.

What makes them more successful in this fight is how they employ the assets that are available to them.
to our 14c you know, where caches are, where somebody has put something on the side of the road, etcetera, under the road, alongside the road, you know, on top of the road. How do you work all that, because the real key piece becomes threat finding, if there is a threat finding cell here in Iraq.

How do you figure out who is paying, you know, and it is all about getting everything left -- before this thing blows up, left of the boom? How do you figure out who are the trainers, resources, resourcers, financiers, etcetera?

How do you disrupt all that, which we have done in the vehicle borne arena, but I would say that's because we put more boots on the ground, and between ISR and Coalition forces, we have found these factories and things.

So that is getting into the network. So who is providing this stuff to these facilities where these things get put together? You know, who pays for it, you know, through kidnapping, oil revenues or whatever? How do you figure all that out, which is a pretty high level piece, and I won't say we've had all
that much success in figuring that out. We have just figured it out again by sheer operations in the battle space.

I think what the MNDs will tell you -- they will tell you that the COIC is a great data collector, but it really just takes the data from the MNDs, collates it, and produces it and turns it into all these humongous presentations, but in the end it doesn't necessarily change anything on the street.

JIEDDO, the Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization -- I think it's Defense Defeat, JIEDDO, which is based in Virginia. They have resourced lots of people over here, technocrats, intel experts, and now all these teams are going down to the MNDs, kind of like the asymmetric warfare group that are going down to MNDs to help them be more successful in their own battle space with all the most current technologies, TTPs, etcetera.

I think the way -- and this may be blasphemy, at least for the boss, but I think the way that 18th Airborne Corps is going to approach this is they are going to roll the counter-IED fight into
FUOPS, future ops, just like what I said at the very beginning. It's got to be an operational role.

So they are going to downsize the cell.

It is not going to be resourced as much, but they are going to roll that function under that planning horizon as part of the 3 arena, and that's how they are going to manage the counter-IED fight.

I think that is probably -- The cell has worth. The question becomes again roles and functions, at what level. What can you provide and not provide -- Besides just getting requests for information or whatever, what can you provide to MNDs in the fight, value added or not value added?

You know, everything from (Inaudible) BCTs to products. But what really helps (Inaudible) -- But if a (Inaudible) BCT just regurgitates everything the division passed up to you, and all you've done is consolidate it and put it on a graph that can spit it right back out again, I don't think you are doing much for MNDs.

(b3),(b6): Thank you, sir. Looking to a future operational issue, which is the
development of Operation Phantom Phoenix, can you speak to me a little bit about the evolution of that operation and what the focus is?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: The focus is kind of a -- It's a pursuit -- I think the best way to categorize Phantom Phoenix is it's a pursuit of AQI. We've got them on the run. We've got them pretty well beaten. There's a few pockets left that we know of, and it's kind of a routing of that, and it is a classic pursuit.

So it is. You know, before we (Inaudible), before we change over here, it's to put everything on a little bit more of an offensive in Diyala, up in some of the hot spots, Nineveh, Diyala, a little bit down in centers. Got some pockets and, of course, you've got some of the special groups. So you've got the splinter groups, special groups of JAM or other militia type, which is the other target, in some of the areas where there's some gaps.

So it's to go to some areas that we haven't been. It's to pursue the enemy where they are and kind of clean things up a little bit more as the
winter approaches here and transition season comes into effect.

(b)(3), (b)(6) One of the operations that has been mentioned is Operation Hydra. Is that a subset of Operation Phantom Phoenix or a stand-alone operation?

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Hydra -- That's the anti-corruption piece up in Beji (Phonetic). It's been evolving for a long time. So it predates Phantom Phoenix, but it goes back to that fusion -- JIATF is another term, Joint Interagency Task Force, the same methodology we are talking about in the other arena as a cell, if you will. They are going to focus on this corruption effort.

You saw the bullet this morning, how oil exports and revenues have grown again, and (Inaudible) at the beginning of the year it was not better than '06, and in the second half of the year it's better than '06, and they came out ahead better than '06 in the end for '07.

So how do you ensure corruption does not impede the wealth to be gained, the profits to be
gained, the revenue to be gained by oil here in-
country to help this country move along and reinvest
in its future infrastructure, you know, quality of
life, etcetera?

So Hydra has been an ongoing -- How do we
clean out Beji as the main hub of oil here for
economic purposes?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Here is a really simple
question, but it's the kind historians will want to
know.

The naming for Phantom Phoenix -- any
particular --

BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, the crew came
up with it, just -- You know, Phantom Hammer, Phantom
Strike -- you know, Phantom something, but Phoenix is
from the -- Not sure of the analogy quite as well with
Iraqis, but from the ashes is your rebuilding.

We kind of think that we are now, based on
all the successes of the offensive ops that started
in June, August -- June was the beginning of the
surge. That's the wrong way to say it. The surge
began in January, which was Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic),
but Phantom Hammer is when all the surge BCTs were on the ground, 15 June, and then Phantom Strike, which was 15 August, which was pre-Lebanon, pre-Petraeus' testimony, kick in the pants offensive to make sure that, when he did testify, everything wasn't blowing up over here.

All those have been very successful. So Phoenix was kind of now picking everything up from the remnants of all that and rebuilding. It's a rebuilding, re-start, as I said, the pursuit, clean-out, finalization and get the CLC, ISF, all those things that have been moving along on their own standing up, and starting to get ready for transition.

So that's the genesis of it.

(b)(3),(b)(6) All right, sir. Sir, in a broad sense, looking now at the last six weeks or so of the tour here, as you look back from your level and given that this has been a very significant year, as you look back, what are the key things that are going to stick in your mind as far as what this tour has meant to you personally or in the broader sense of how we all look back on this?
BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, me personally, I kind of wanted -- I was here for OPF-1 (Phonetic) and throughout the war from the beginning and all the -- Back at that time, the rudiments of stability and security, actually, is what it was. Coming back this time, thinking it was going to maybe be the end.

So I was kind of excited about being here and saying, well, I came when it started, and given where we thought we were going to be by this fall, I was going to see the end. Well, obviously, it's not the end. But everyone debates and negotiates and figures out the period they were here, how valuable that period was.

Was it elections? You know, what milestones were achieved? But I think for the Corps, I think history will show that -- and I think you and I talked about this a while ago, but history will show what this has all meant to Iraq much later than now, but the turnaround -- It clearly was a turnaround year.

Things were clearly (Inaudible) when we
got here. Things were not good. I mean, casualties.
I mean quality of life, functionality, all that stuff
was clearly in the toilet last November/December. I
mean, it was not -- Everything was a race to go to
PIC, provincial Iraqi control, Iraqi Army in the lead.
It was this race. Here's a calendar, and this month
we are going to hand over this division, this month
this province is going to go Click.

You know, everything was addressed like
that, boom, boom, boom, and by this date we will high
five, and it will all be over. Well, it was clear the
conditions weren't matching those milestones.

So the real test will be: Will 2008 --
Will the security apparatus that's been put in place
allow 2008 to now prosper economically and in
governance?

Those two areas are clearly the knuckle
draggers, and we've got to now make sure that the
conditions remain at least as good as now, if not
better. Now again, "if not better" is the preferable
outcome, but that security is at least maintained to
the level it is today.
That allows everything we talked about earlier, economic, governance, capacity building, that
next year this time everything is run by the government at a much more capable level than it is now, and everything we talked about, the industries and private business and the economy, is flourishing, everything from oil, you know, to small businesses, to state owned, to finance and all the different things that have to come.

That's still asking a lot, but that the conditions remain set for that prosperity to continue this coming year. I think that is what we will all look upon -- You know, obviously, Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic), protecting the populace, securing the populace, was a major milestone this year, and it is irrefutable it has taken effect and worked.

Now the question becomes to capacity build in the key billets to benefit, prosper, move along based on those conditions they establish.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, is there anything I haven't asked you about that deserves comment in this type of historical interview at the back half?
BRIG. GENERAL ANDERSON: No, I think you hit a lot. I mean, you can talk about a kazillion things, but I mean, the key thing is moving this progress along.

I think the question becomes the capability of the people in power to do that. But I think we hit all the main things.

(d)(3),(d)(6): All right, I think I'm out of time. So that's all good timing.

That concludes this interview.