IRON RESOLVE
Campaign Plan Backbrief
Agenda

- Situation
  - Task Organization
  - Area of Operation / Area of Interest
  - Enemy Situation Template (JAN 08)
  - Current Provincial Assessment (JAN 08)
- Mission
- Execution
  - Commander's Intent
- Concept of the Operation and Scheme of Maneuver
  - Operational Framework
  - Concept of Targeting and Effects
  - Concept of ISF and IP Development
  - Concept of PRT Partnership
  - Concept of CLC Transition
  - Concept of Detainee Reconciliation
- Logistics and Sustainment Challenges
- Predicted Provincial Assessment (AUG 08)
- Potential Future Threat (AUG 08)
- Final Thoughts
The backbrief on our plan to execute OPORD 08-01 should include, at a minimum:

1. An environmental assessment of our AO; both now and in August 2008.
2. How will we support and enable PRT/ePRTs to improve governance and economic development?
3. How our plan accomplishes key tasks listed in the MNC-I Commander’s Intent.
4. What is our plan to execute a deliberate, area-by-area transition to tactical and operational overwatch?
   Where? When? How?
5. How will we control, vet, monitor, and execute the CLC programs and then support the GOI as they transition CLCs to the ISF or the civil sector?
6. How will we support the MNC-I Information operations objectives in OPORD 08-01?
7. How will we continue to develop and assist the ISF and help build ISF capacity sustainable over time?
   - Partnership / TT Coverage
   - Equipping / Manning
   - Collective Training
   - Logistical Capacity
   - Leader Development
8. How will we fulfill requirements for detainee release operations to reinforce local Iraqi reconciliation initiatives?
Task Organization
Current

4-9 IN FOC at COB Speicher NLT 01 FEB 08
MND-North Current Situation

04 JAN 2008

(S//MCFI) In Ninewa, AQI continues to reorganize and re-supply in Mosul. Due to CF and ISF success in killing and capturing middle and high level leaders, the cells are in a state of confusion and disorganization over who has control of particular areas in the city. Reflections indicate fighters are conducting decentralized attacks against targets of opportunity rather than coordinated or high profile attacks. We assess AQI reorganization is intended to improve planning and deliberate targeting to increase the effectiveness of AQI attacks. It is likely that targeting will focus on IP in Mosul IOT to regain the freedom of movement necessary to conduct high profile attacks to disrupt GOI progress in Ninewa. Furthermore, AQI will continue to fight to enhance its operational effectiveness and retain its lines of communication to outlying villages, across the border to Syria, and south to Kirkuk and Bayji. CF/ISF operations in Mosul are forcing AQI C2 and fighters into the outlying villages, with the Western Jazeera desert becoming increasingly important to AQI as a support zone and key line of communication.

(S//MCFI) In Kirkuk province, the announced delay of the Article 140
referendum and expressed UN intention to apply focus by mounting a Task Force continue to influence the threat environment. Kurdish representatives will likely continue to seek independence via political means while Sunni insurgent groups will attempt to undermine KRG and GOI processes through violence. The Iraqi Turcoman Front organization will also likely be assertive in its efforts to be recognized. Insurgent groups are expected to continue to undermine the local government and security environment through attacks and intimidation against local nationals. As CF operations supporting Operation Iron Harvest continue in AO Courage, it is likely that IED cells will attempt to target CF traveling primary and secondary lines of communication. IED cells will likely continue to employ centerline IEDs with either pressure wire or command wire initiation systems, in conjunction with the use of an extensive early warning network that extends from built up urban areas out to the more remote areas where CF are currently operating. The recent volley of 107 mm rockets aimed at CF bases continues to be investigated; there is no substantive information at this time to identify a group or its motives. In the Za’ab region of western Kirkuk, expect AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups to continue their efforts to undermine the ISF and CLCs IVO Hawijah and Sharqat. CLCs in Hawijah continue to pressure cell leaders, disrupting their freedom on movement in the city. Recent reporting indicates AQI/ISI leadership is displacing from Hawijah into the surrounding villages.

S//MCFI In Salah al Din, recent attacks have focused on IEDs along routes heavily utilized by CF/ISF. Three new ISF checkpoints are being established in Bayji to improve security. Expect insurgents to target these checkpoints during their construction. Across the province, AQI is under continuous pressure in urban areas, forcing them into safe havens in surrounding desert regions. The capture of key IED facilitators such as Abu Bilal in Bayji and members of the Taha IED cell in Samarra, along with the large cache discovery west of Bayji will likely result in a short term decrease in attacks. Recent operations west of Bayji confirm enemy presence north of ASR Phoenix, corroborating assessments that the region constitutes an AQI support zone. As MSR Tampa is reopened to civilian traffic in Bayji, economic conditions should begin to improve with an ensuing increase in popular support to CF/ISF efforts to rid the area of insurgents. Attacks in Samarra are expected to rise after the official opening of the city on 03 JAN 08 as insurgents attempt to regain access to the city and undermine GOI efforts to improve security and economic conditions in the city. Expect and increase in Vehicle-borne IED attacks as insurgents attempt to target new
checkpoints in Bayji and Samarra.

(S//MCI) In Diyala, reporting indicates increased tension among CLC groups and ISF in Buhritz resulting from the detention of CLC leader Samir Al-Akash, a Jaysh Mujahadeen leader implicated in facilitating IED materials to insurgents in Baqubah. Unmet demands for Samir’s release may result in an increase in attacks against ISF as well as an increase in the ongoing inter-CLC violence in the struggle for power between Samir Al-Akash’s CLC and a rival CLC led by Hajji Uday. Expect AQI to take advantage of CLC rivalries to undermine their effectiveness. Recent reporting indicates that AQI leaders in Diyala met to define their way ahead, to include an increase in efforts targeting CF, ISF and CLC groups. In Khalis, expect JAM to leverage recent AQI attacks to recruitment additional militia members to assist in securing the populace from Sunni insurgents and further JAM influence in the city. In addition, expect AQI to respond to upcoming CF/ISF operations during IRON HARVEST with a campaign of high profile SVEST or VBIED attacks, assassinations and kidnappings in an attempt to intimidate the local populace from supporting CF and ISF to deny enduring security gains in areas where AQI is forced out. (MND-N G2 ACE, 04 JAN 08, 1.4a)
Here is the Current Situation in MND-N.

First, I want to highlight a change in the methodology of this slide. Note the legend in the lower right corner; the solid areas now represent attack zones, and the broken areas represent support zones.

There is no major change in our assessment of AQI and JAM attack zones and support zones from last week.

Beginning in the north, AQI continues to attack both Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces in East and West Mosul. Despite continuing CF success in disrupting AQI C2, we assess AQI will continue decentralized attacks. AQI will take advantage of available weapons using low level fighters or paid local nationals to attack targets of opportunity. Attacks will focus on IA/IP checkpoints and CF patrols. AQI continues to demonstrate the capability to conduct coordinated attacks. However, there are indications of financial trouble among the insurgent cells. Mosul remains the focal point for AQI operations, and they are encouraging more outside fighters to come into the city. The logistics situation for AQI is difficult as funding remains tight. Money shortages
are now a high priority for AQI, as the cells are unable to pay their members or bribe the IPs. AQI will increase both the tempo and effectiveness of their attacks in Mosul as they attempt to break ISF resolve and disrupt momentum toward reconciliation.

In Kirkuk province, AQI continues their campaign to undermine the effectiveness of ISF and the growing CLC movement. With recent CF/GoI success toward reconciliation, including the 4 December United and Strong Conference and the recent mass recruitment of CLC members, AQI is under increasing pressure to disrupt momentum toward reconciliation in Kirkuk province and MND-N. We expect AQI to continue efforts to conduct spectacular attacks within Kirkuk City as the Article 140 Referendum deadline approaches on 30 December. CLC and ISF presence in AQI support zones, such as the Hawijah area, will elicit a concerted effort by AQI to target CLC members and local leaders supportive of reconciliation efforts to regain control of these areas and retain the ability to attack into Kirkuk City in attempts to incite sectarian violence and deny Kurdish expansion.

In Salah al Din, AQI is under the same pressure as CF and ISF operations threaten their freedom of movement in the key cities along the Tigris River Valley. Combined with the emerging CLC efforts to rid their communities of AQI, the enemy is being forced into their support zones in the eastern and western deserts outside the cities where the terrain provides them sanctuary and advanced warning of approaching CF/ISF forces. Recent effective attacks against CF, notably in Bayji, show that AQI is making a concerted effort to limit CF/ISF operations into AQI support zones. Insurgents will continue efforts to use the Bayji Oil Refinery and local corruption as a source for operational funding. We assess these funds are made through illegal checkpoints where fuel trucks are held for ransom, the fuel is sold on the black market, and oil pipelines are tapped to siphon oil. In Samarra, we expect AQI to target the repaired berm and new checkpoints to disrupt economic development and undermine recent GoI and ISF progress. The AQI support zones in southern Salah al Din along ASR Golden, and to the north of Lake Thar Thar along ASR Phoenix, are assessed to be enemy Lines of Communication channeling AQI funds, weapons, and personnel from MNF-W into MND-N. We expect AQI to continue to use these
routes in an attempt to exploit the Divisional boundary.

In Diyala, AQI continues to focus on controlling the Iron Triangle and northern Diyala River Valley as support zones from which they can launch attacks to regain control of surrounding towns to undermine ISF and CLC success and position forces and supplies to eventually retake key cities, most notably Baqubah, Muqdadiyah and Tarmiyah. IVO Mansuriyah, north of Muqtadiyah, recent CF operations confirm previous assessments of C2 and logistics nodes and defensive positions in the Breadbasket bordering the city of Muqtadiyah. Operations also illuminate that the local national presence in Muqtadiyah is not completely supportive of AQI. Portions of the population are controlled by murder and intimidation. Elsewhere, AQI is infiltrating CLC movements in Diyala to undermine CLC effectiveness and resolve; to retain control of the local population; and to ensure their mobility throughout the Northern Baghdad Belt.

- **Tactical Overwatch** is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by CF support. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

- **Operational Overwatch** is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by tailored CF support to critical, planned operations. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

- **Strategic Overwatch** ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support (generally by exception only).

- **Clear, Control, Retain** is characterized by combined operations – initially planned and led predominantly by CF but progressing to operations planned and led by both CF and ISF, with ISF taking the lead increasingly over time. CF encourage “Iraqi lead” whenever conditions permit. CF conduct independent operations as necessary.
MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat AQI and other extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and, as local conditions permit, transfer security responsibilities to the ISF in order to achieve irreversible momentum NLT summer 2008, leading to sustainable security and, in the longer term, Iraqi self-reliance.
MNC-I Commander’s Intent
Key Tasks

- Protect the population, with priority to Baghdad and then the nine key cites, implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and obtain the active support of the people, work to solidify these gains at the local level as security responsibilities transition deliberately to a more capable, credible ISF.

- Facilitate reconciliation among major ethnic, religious, and political factions vying for power in Iraq; use persuasive, cooperative, and creative means of engagement to separate reconcilable groups from the irreconcilable and to broker local ceasefires, political compromises, and agreements that integrate Concerned Local Citizens into formal GOI structures; combine local successes into broader opportunities and use these as a basis for bringing about longer lasting political and social stability.

- Defeat AQI and extremists; fail them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development.

- Develop ISF capacity through partnership, transition teams, and advisory assistance units; work to make the IA and NP more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders; promote police primacy through the development of sustainable, competent, non-sectarian local police forces.

- Transfer security responsibility to capable, credible ISF units as local conditions permit; manage the risk of regression through a deliberate, area-by-area transition that maintains appropriate Coalition force overwatch posture.

- Assist efforts to improve civil and governmental capacity, with a special focus on essential services, continue to build capacity that enables accountable local governance, rule of law, and sustainable economic development; promote legitimate, non-sectarian behavior among Iraqi officials, along these lines; support efforts to improve Iraqi port-of-entry operations through Coalition oversight and an emphasis on enforcing GOI regulations.

- Protect the force through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against IED and indirect fire networks; synchronize all available assets to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats.
### Key Tasks

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<tr>
<th>MNC-I</th>
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<tr>
<td>Protect the population</td>
<td>Identify specific security conditions that threaten GoI and provincial governance and economic development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate reconciliation</td>
<td>Conduct combined operations and training to further develop self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces; partnered with those forces, ensure the security of the Iraqi population and defeat AQI and other extremists</td>
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<td>Defeat AQI and extremists</td>
<td>Support the Government of Iraq as it represents the will of the Iraqi people</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continue to develop ISF capacity</td>
<td>Partnered with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Iraqi Provincial Governments, develop economic opportunities and improved governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve civil and governmental capacity</td>
<td>Defeat IED Networks</td>
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<td>Protect the Force</td>
<td>Protect the Force</td>
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Task Force (TF) Iron in partnership with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Northern Provincial Leaders, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), conducts counterinsurgency operations by supporting the security of the population and by assisting in the development of a legitimate GOI throughout MND-N in order to transition to a stable and self-reliant Iraq.
Commander’s Intent

**Purpose:** The purpose of this operation is to create the level of security necessary for local and provincial governance and economic growth. Our operations will continue to develop legitimate Iraqi governance and security forces that are capable of providing security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity with the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people.

**Key Tasks:**
- Identify specific security conditions that threaten GoI and provincial governance and economic development
- Conduct combined operations and training to further develop self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces; partnered with those forces, ensure the security of the Iraqi population and defeat AQI and other extremists
- Support the Government of Iraq as it represents the will of the Iraqi people
- Partnered with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Iraqi Provincial Governments, develop economic opportunities and improved governance
- Defeat IED Networks
- Protect the Force

**Endstate:** Iraqi Security Forces are in the lead throughout MND-N with Coalition Forces in Partnership. The Iraqi people are secure and have trust and confidence in the increasingly capable, unified Government of Iraq. The Government of Iraq is sustaining its momentum toward self-reliance and a growing economy. Coalition forces are protected.
- Our Mission and the Commanding General’s Key Tasks

- Our Framework for accomplishing the Mission has two lines of operation

- Our Main Effort within our campaign plan is to enhance governance at the local, provincial, and national levels. Our engagements with key leaders and communicators are designed to facilitate reconciliation and support governance locally. We also support the Provincial Reconstruction Teams as they facilitate reconstruction, improvement of basic services, economic development, governance, rule of law, and non-sectarian initiatives. When necessary, we also provide the Blackhawk Diplomacy to provide access communication, and resources between the provincial and national ministries.

- Our supporting effort is the security line of operation. While we continue the relentless pursuit of AQI and other extremists, we are dedicated to developing the Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement forces. Our embedded transition teams work to improve ISF capability and reliability.

- We conduct combined operations with Iraqi Security Forces, and we support independent ISF operations with critical enablers, intelligence, and Joint Fires.

- Reaching our Objectives sets the Conditions for our End State of an
increasingly Stable and Self Reliant Iraq supported by the trust and confidence of its people.
Methods

1. Identify the threats to Economy and Governance.
   - Extremists
   - Sectarian violence
   - Organized crime
   - Corrupt officials
   - Environment
2. Identify Economic capacity (in partnership with the PRT).
   - Employment
   - Industry
3. Assist the Government with providing the atmosphere for the economy to flourish.
   - Essential services
   - Legitimate Elections
   - Rule of Law
   - Regulations
   - Infrastructure

4. Clear the Threat (SHAPING)
   - Shape (Intelligence and IO)
   - Clear AQI and Other Extremists

5. Hold to Transition (DECISIVE)
   - Local Government
   - Local Key Leaders
   - ISF and IP
   - Concerned Citizens
   - IRCN (Named Operations)

6. Build to Develop (SUSTAINING)
   - Improve Basic Services
   - Assist with Opportunities for Economic Development

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Approved for Release
Proposed TF Iron Full Spectrum Targeting Objectives & Effects

1. Suppressing Effect: Asymmetric threat groups no longer pose an imminent threat within MNF-I, but remain viewed as an aggressive threat to the people.
2. Enforcing Effect: ISF is capable of securing and defending key nodes, critical infrastructure, and national borders.
3. Enforcing Effect: Provincial governments across MNF-I are linked with the central government, and ISF is capable of operating with full regard for human rights and basic needs, and have the trust and confidence of the people.

EETs:
1. Protect civilian population
2. Defeat AOI in AO
3. Devalue AOI IO campaign
4. Isolate AOI from sympathizers
5. Neutralize insurgent element in AO
6. Neutralize state extensiveness in AO
7. Defeat IED networks in AO
8. Enhance ISF capability across MNF-I
9. Transition Operational Environment to ISF
10. ISF controls borders
11. Enable transition to PEO
12. Promote Provincial Government support and legitimacy
13. Enhance Provincial Government capability to target & spend funds
14. Support civil & criminal services through Rule of Law
15. Prevent failure of critical infrastructure
16. Enhance essential services
17. Neutralize organized crime
18. Promote economic development
19. Isolate and neutralize insurgency funding
20. Leverage recognizable groups
21. Conduct aggressive perception management campaign
22. Protect Lines of Communication (LOCs)
23. Protect the Force

TF IRON FULL SPECTRUM TARGETING OBJECTIVES
1. Retain a Secure Environment in MNF-I
2. Transition ISF capability across MNF-I
3. Enhance Provincial Government Control in MNF-I
4. Set Conditions for a Stable Economic Environment in MNF-I

SECURITY OPERATIONS  ENHANCE GOVERNANCE
By JUL 08, MND-N will be short 33 Transition Teams, for IA, DBE and NP units, with no new teams expected.

Adding to this challenge are over 158 District HQ and Local Police stations that are uncovered (with PTTs covering DRDs at a 1:3 ratio).

To offset this gap, MND-N must establish active unit partnerships that enable ISF to effectively plan, execute and assess operations.

Endstate: ISF in operational lead, CF focuses on non-lethal tasks and precision targeting.

This slide depicts the current and future sets with regards to establishing partnerships.

Current state:
- Transition Team centric
- Little focus on units below BN level
- BCTs primary focus on COIN operations
- Provide some internal teams and loose partnerships, but this is not standardized across MND-N.

Future Set: In order to encourage the ISF to take the operational lead, we must rethink the way we do business.

We will do this by establishing active and habitual partnerships between CF/ISF.

TTs major focus on BDE and above organizations, includes tailoring special TTs to meet Operational Command requirements.

BCTs: Key to this way-ahead is shifting the main effort for ISF development to the BCTs, who will

- Support ISF operations of both IA and IPs
- Augment Transition Teams
- And provide “TT like” coverage for and conduct operations with BN and below.

This will reduce the amount of “uncovered ISF units” and promote training and development at the small unit level.

Most importantly, establishing partnerships will be key to effectively transitioning from tactical to operational overwatch.

Details of this transition will be covered on the following slides.
• 3 Phased Operation:

  • Phase 1: Set the stage by executing key TT remissions and enhancing ISF capability through a focus on manning/equipping IA, DBE, NP units
    - Remissions result of threat based analysis and need (Example: BDE MITT in Sulaymaniya, low threat, to FORCENGBDE in Diyala, high threat)
    - Fill immediate shortfalls, primarily at BDE level
    - Address FORCENGBDE priorities
    - Begin partnership planning: conduct TT Conference with BCTs
  
  • Phase 2: Establishment of partnerships
    - Begins with enhancing TTs at higher levels (BDE and DIV)
    - Assigning partners: CF partners support IA BNs/BDEs
    - Includes active log partnerships to enhance capability
    - Plan and execute joint training and operations which stress the offensive mindset – moves IA from “static nature” and sets the stage for Phase 3.
  
  • Phase 3: IA in the Lead
    - Partnerships fully established
    - CF support ISF driven operations
    - TTs and partners focus on developing systems/capability that effectively match capacity (Example: CF Log units partner with IA Log units)
    - Training: Establish long-term plan which integrates refresher training with ongoing operations (Remove/Train/Reinsert)
### Expand IPS Development Through Continued Partnership

**Goal**
- Establish partnerships that enable the ISF to effectively plan, execute, and assess operations.

**Enduring Effects Tasks**
- Enhance ISF capability across MNF-IN
- Transition operational environment to ISF

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<td><strong>Phase 1</strong> - Promote police primary to achieve enduring capability</td>
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<td>- Expand PTT operations to new and unpartnered stations</td>
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<td>- Facilitate IPS FORCEGEN</td>
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<td>- Focus on Iraqi Rule of Law</td>
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<td>- TNG: Supplement MOI IP BRT Capacity w/Regional Training Academy</td>
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<td>- LDR DEVELOPMENT: IP Officer Training Priority (Baghdad Police College)</td>
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| Phase 2 - Shift focus from the Station/Shurta to PDoP/District |
| - LPS: Non-IP PTTs provide overwatch at ORA 1 and 2 stations |
| - BDC: Focus on systems, processes, and SOPs |
| - RHQ: TF CDR partnership w/PTTs and SMEs |
| - TNG: Advanced law enforcement training |

| Phase 3 - IPS Development and Expansion |
| - SAVs focused on Police Operations Assessments |
| - Full integration with Operational Commands |
| - LOC: Logistical SAVs at the IP Provincial and District Headquarters |
| - Validate stations and districts |
| - END STATE: Operational Overwatch |

**CG AUTH VALIDATION PROCESS**

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**Phase I - 512 Recruits**

**Phase IV - 2,048 Recruits**

**Current Academy capacities:**

- MPSA - 500
- Tikrit - 350
- Kirkuk - 800
- Sulymaniyah - 500
- TOTAL - 2,150
Enabling PRTs to Assume Main Effort

Governance: Assist in the capacity of provincial and local governments to serve the needs of the citizens.
- Public Distribution System – engage GoI to address shortages
- Budget Execution – support training programs to develop budget skills
- "United & Strong" – conference/engagement series

Economics: Support provincial and local governments to promote economic development.
- Infrastructure & Private Sector Development – support GoI/Provincial visits
- Support TFBSO visits to each Province
- Task Force Iron’s Top Four Projects:
  - Balad Canning Factory (SaD)
  - Organic Cotton Factory (Kirkuk)
  - Dairy Farm (Nineveh)
  - Diyala Electric Industries (Diyala)
- Employment – CLCs to CSC with GoI oversight
- "United & Prosperous" – conference/engagement series

Rule of Law: Enhance the capability of the criminal justice system.
- Traveling Judge Program – Chief Judge Medhat on (JAN 05 meeting)
- MCC Circuit Judges – facilitate movement to Provinces
- On-Site Judges – support PRT RoL section with the support & security
Transitoning Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) to Contribute to the Main Effort

8,446 CLCs currently in MND-N
(12,219 - 22.3% - enrolled in BATS)

Security-Related Jobs (~20%)

Security Forces
Arm

Disparity in Pay
$422 - IA
$411 - MND-N CLC
$405 - IP
$350 - MNC-I Cap
(FRAGO 42)
$150-$200 – CSC

Transition Programs (~80%)

Community Stabilization Program (CSP)
Short-Term Employment

Civil Service Corps (CSC)
Apprenticeships

Joint Technical Education and Reintegration (JTERP)
Education and Training

- Government Employee
- Private Sector
- State Owned Enterprise
- Micro Grants

How will you control, vet, monitor, and execute the CLC programs and then support the GOI as they transition CLCs to the ISF or the civil sector?

CLCs continue to contribute to improved security throughout MND-North. As the security situation continues to improve, CLCs will transition to programs that support the Division's main effort of governance and economics. Approximately 20% will transition to Iraqi Security Forces, and the remaining 80% will be in non-security employment programs as shown. The control, vetting, and monitoring processes for CLCs are codified in Appendix 5 to Annex P to the MND-N Campaign Plan.

- Control: CF-controlled Critical Infrastructure Security (CIS) contracts are managed by CF land-owning Battalion Commander; performance is assessed monthly.
- Monitoring: CIS contract is monitored by CF and ISF; CLCs are required to coordinate through JSS/JCC to ensure CF/ISF are aware of where CLCs are operating (defensively only).
- Transition: As the security situation allows, CF will transition responsibility for paying CLCs to GOI but will retain oversight of GOI's execution of the program. CF will retain control of CF-controlled groups until transition. Priority for transition is to CSC and JTERP in order.

CSC and JTERP are currently in development at Corps/Force IOT to integrate GOI support and funding. Potential test cases for each:

- CSC – Haviya-area canal improvements (o/a 15 Mar) – first Corps test case begins mid-Jan in West Rashid
- JTERP – Tikrit Industrial High School (next planning meeting 04 Feb)

Go Transition: IGFC has put out guidance regarding CLCs (referred to as "13 points," which is very similar to our guidance), but lacks the details of a full plan (i.e., how they are controlled, paid, coordinated with CF, etc.).

BLUF for transition is that it is conditions-based (P4: "maintain Sunni contribution to security")

ADDITIONAL NOTES

10-Directed Questions:

1. How many are employable? – Almost all of the CLCs who have completed the CLC-IP vetting and hiring process (from MND-B/C) have received hiring orders; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that all CLCs are employable in one of the programs.
2. What jobs will be available?

Security: ISF (IP, IA, NP, Department of Border Enforcement - DBE, Facility Protective Services - FPS)
Non-Security: Community Stabilization Program - CSP, Civil Service Corps - CSC, Joint Technical Education and Reintegration Program – JTERP

*Note: CLCs requesting ISF hire is a subset of contracted CLCs, NOT a separate group.*

References:

- Annex C (JTERP and CSC Concept Papers) to MNF-I FRAGO XXX (Strategy and Guidance wrt CLCs)
- FRAGO 001 to MNC-I OPORD 08-01
- Appendix 5 (Reconciliation) to Annex P (IO) to MND-N OPORD 08-01
Reconciliation & Detainee Releases

OP Lion's Return - Leverage Directed Detainee Releases as a Reconciliation Tool to:

- Gain the support of CLC and/or tribal leaders to participate as guarantors.
- Capitalize on the success of CSC/JTERP initiatives (~June).
- Use the existing Local Coordination Committee (LCC) process to help vet releases.

MND-N TIP Population (28 Dec 07): 6,352 detainees
- Kirkuk Province: 737 detainees
- Salah ad Din Province: 2,319 detainees
- Nineveh Province: 1,543 detainees
- Diyala Province: 1,543 detainees

Projected Release Goals:
- Phase I (Jan 31 May): 2,185 detainees
- Phase II (by 31 Dec 08): 5,153 total detainees

Special Detainee Release Process:

- Command Group review and decision; forward to MNC-I if approved.
- Staff Review by SJA, Reconciliation, Targeting, G2X, PMO, and FECC Chief for recommendation.
- MND-N SJA DETOPS reviews and posts special release request and detainee packet for staff review/ vetsing.
- BCT identifies reconciliation opportunities and submits special release request to MND-N SJA Detainee Operations (DETOPS).

How will you fulfill requirements for detainee release operations to reinforce local Iraqi reconciliation initiatives?

Currently, MND-N uses the special detainee release process, shown to the right of the slide, to support their use as a tool to facilitate reconciliation. As a result of increased releases due to Operation Lion's Return, MND-N establishes a process to set the conditions of accelerated releases to leverage a reconciliation benefit and mitigate risks. MND-N will maximize the use of the guarantor program where possible, and synchronize releases around operational constraints and available employment programs.

- The special release process (currently in use) is designed as a commander's tool to facilitate reconciliation (linked to the process on the right).
- As a result of increased releases due to Operation Lion's return, MND-N establishes a process to set the conditions of accelerated releases to leverage a reconciliation benefit and mitigate risks.
  - Identify number of expected releases by quarter to give maximum flexibility around operations. [note: also need to establish maximum "safe" number.]
  - Division receives list (one month out) from TF 1.4a
  - Send to BCTs for threat assessment and recommendations
  - Release criteria (who, when, how many) is dependent on the security situation and operational constraints.
  - G2X reviews "medium" threats for recommendation
  - Determine release groups and timeline (coordinate with ISF)
  - Identify CLC/CLC leaders as guarantors [note: this will not be possible in areas where there are no CLCs...]
  - Release ceremony, pledge signing, etc.

- There were 2 special release requests in MND-N since TOA. The first (from Raider) was disapproved; the second (from Bastogne) was approved by the MND-N CG.

- Note: TIP population breakdown by province does NOT include projected monthly intake (210).

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Current - Use Special Detainee Releases as a Reconciliation Tool to:
- Enhance engagements ISO outreach efforts to cooperative key leaders/communicators.
- Strengthen agreements between CF and key Iraqi leaders/communicators.
- Exercise influence over key leaders/communicators while permitting these key leaders/communicators to build credibility among their
following.

Contents of Special Release Request Packet:
• Signed Guarantor Letter (English/Arabic)
• Request Memorandum (Signed by BCT Commander)
• Supporting Intelligence Reports
• CG Endorsement Memo (prepared by MND N SJA DETOPS)

References:
MNF-I: FRAGO XXX (Lion’s Return)
MNC-I: TAB B [DETAINEE RELEASE] TO APPENDIX 4 [RECONCILIATION AND ENGAGEMENT] TO ANNEX C [OPERATIONS] TO OPORD 08-01
MND-N: TAB J (DETAINEE RELEASE) TO APPENDIX 5 (RECONCILIATION) TO ANNEX P (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 08-01 (IRON RESOLVE)
Here is the Current Situation in MND-N.

First, I want to highlight a change in the methodology of this slide. Note the legend in the lower right corner; the solid areas now represent attack zones, and the broken areas represent support zones.

There is no major change in our assessment of AQI and JAM attack zones and support zones from last week.

Beginning in the north, AQI continues to attack both Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces in East and West Mosul. Despite continuing CF success in disrupting AQI C2, we assess AQI will continue decentralized attacks. AQI will take advantage of available weapons using low level fighters or paid local nationals to attack targets of opportunity. Attacks will focus on IA/IP checkpoints and CF patrols. AQI continues to demonstrate the capability to conduct coordinated attacks. However, there are indications of financial trouble among the insurgent cells. Mosul remains the focal point for AQI operations, and they are encouraging more outside fighters to come into the city. The logistics situation for AQI is difficult as funding remains tight. Money shortages
are now a high priority for AQI, as the cells are unable to pay their members or bribe the IPs. AQI will increase both the tempo and effectiveness of their attacks in Mosul as they attempt to break ISF resolve and disrupt momentum toward reconciliation.

In Kirkuk province, AQI continues their campaign to undermine the effectiveness of ISF and the growing CLC movement. With recent CF/Gol success toward reconciliation, including the 4 December United and Strong Conference and the recent mass recruitment of CLC members, AQI is under increasing pressure to disrupt momentum toward reconciliation in Kirkuk province and MND-N. We expect AQI to continue efforts to conduct spectacular attacks within Kirkuk City as the Article 140 Referendum deadline approaches on 30 December. CLC and ISF presence in AQI support zones, such as the Hawijah area, will elicit a concerted effort by AQI to target CLC members and local leaders supportive of reconciliation efforts to regain control of these areas and retain the ability to attack into Kirkuk City in attempts to incite sectarian violence and deny Kurdish expansion.

In Salah al Din, AQI is under the same pressure as CF and ISF operations threaten their freedom of movement in the key cities along the Tigris River Valley. Combined with the emerging CLC efforts to rid their communities of AQI, the enemy is being forced into their support zones in the eastern and western deserts outside the cities where the terrain provides them sanctuary and advanced warning of approaching CF/ISF forces. Recent effective attacks against CF, notably in Bayji, show that AQI is making a concerted effort to limit CF/ISF operations into AQI support zones.

In Samarra, we expect AQI to target the repaired berm and new checkpoints to disrupt economic development and undermine recent Gol and ISF progress. The AQI support zones in southern Salah al Din along ASR Golden, and to the north of Lake Thar Thar along ASR Phoenix, are assessed to be enemy Lines of Communication channeling AQI funds, weapons, and personnel from MNF-W into MND-N. We expect AQI to continue to use these
routes in an attempt to exploit the Divisional boundary.

In Diyala, AQI continues to focus on controlling the Iron Triangle and northern Diyala River Valley as support zones from which they can launch attacks to regain control of surrounding towns to undermine ISF and CLC success and position forces and supplies to eventually retake key cities, most notably Baqubah, Muqdadiyah and Tarmiyah. IVO Mansuriyah, north of Muqtadiyah, recent CF operations confirm previous assessments of C2 and logistics nodes and defensive positions in the Breadbasket bordering the city of Muqtadiyah. Operations also illuminate that the local national presence in Muqtadiyah is not completely supportive of AQI. Portions of the population are controlled by murder and intimidation. Elsewhere, AQI is infiltrating CLC movements in Diyala to undermine CLC effectiveness and resolve; to retain control of the local population; and to ensure their mobility throughout the Northern Baghdad Belt.

- **Tactical Overwatch** is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by CF support. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

- **Operational Overwatch** is characterized by independent Iraqi operations, enabled by tailored CF support to critical, planned operations. As necessary, CF conduct unilateral strike operations against terrorist and extremist organizations.

- **Strategic Overwatch** ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support (generally by exception only).

- **Clear, Control, Retain** is characterized by combined operations – initially planned and led predominantly by CF but progressing to operations planned and led by both CF and ISF, with ISF taking the lead increasingly over time. CF encourage “Iraqi lead” whenever conditions permit. CF conduct independent operations as necessary
CLCs, Detainee Releases, and Future Employment Opportunities

- 14,846 CLCs
- 5,653 Releases

**Note**: assumes no additional CLCs

\[14,846 + 5,653 = 20,499\] Jobs

**ISF Hire**: 2,969

*(Note: 25% of current CLCs [Pave MNC] transition projection)*

- (SaD) Balad Canning Factory: 1100
- Kirkuk Organic Cotton Factory: 500
- Ninewa Dairy Farm: 400
- Diyala Electric Industries: 1000

**Economic**

**Security**

**BOTTOM LINE**: 14,530 Jobs Required!

- CLCs and detainee releases are byproducts of the “clear” phase of operations. As we transition to the “hold” and “build” phases, we must establish enough employment programs to account for these additional citizens entering the workforce.

- The CURRENT number of CLCs and projected number of detainee releases through 31 December 08 will require at least 20,074 jobs to be created, primarily in the non-security sector.

  *(The assumption that there will be no further growth in CLCs was made for the purposes of assessment; we expect CLCs to continue to grow through the short-term.)*

- The planning factor for security-related jobs (for current CLCs only) is 20% (based on the CLC transition plan).

- Economic projects, which is the main effort for CLC transition, includes the CSC and JTERP programs that are currently in development. The four projects identified are the key economic initiatives in each province, with projected (approximate) employment numbers.

- This means that at least 14,000 additional jobs must be created through CSC, JTERP, or private sector employment.
Logistics and Sustainment Challenges

Priority of Support
1. Surge for named operation for security operations
2. Quality of Life of Hold-Build Phases
3. Footprint Reduction (Iron Reclamation)

Challenges
- MRAP / Low-Density Equipment
- Quality of Life
  - 54 COP/PB versus 15 FOB/COB
- Footprint Reduction
  - Collapse battle space IAW MNC-I directives
- Transitioning to MOD / MOI
- Resetting our Army
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MND-N Threat (AUG 08)

Western Desert
- Reinforcement of Rabiyah POE disrupting T&M flow
- Isolated AQI FOB north of Sinjar

Hossan
- AQI defeated pockets of resistance on outskirts of city, with continued "commuter attacks"
- Sunni/Kurd tension increasing

S. Ninawa (Zab Triangle)
- ACOMS1 feed causing limited harassing attacks

Bayji
- Reduced corruption, but MRI problematic
- Potential for AQI attacks against oil infrastructure

Samarra
- Early stages of Golden Dome reconstruction requires extensive security; Sunni insurgents continue attacks
- Support zones pushed further into Jazira and Jalalab desert

Southern Salah al Din Province
- Successful MND-N Ops could potentially push AQI back into Anbar

Kirkuk Province
- Arab/Kurd/Turkmen tensions continue

Diyala
- AQI safe havens eliminated
- Preliminary for JAW resurgence
Final Thoughts

• If all Goes Well...
  – Partnering with five Iraqi Divisions and 3 Operational Commands
  – Improving POEs
  – Shifting focus to Iraqi Police
  – Achieving Task Force Iron Four Key Projects and building on others
  – Reducing Unemployment while employing CLCs and Released Detainees

• Way Ahead, Questions...
  – Military Element in Irbil?
  – Refinement on base closure and realignment?
  – Meaning of operational overwatch for ISF?
  – How to support PRTs in the lead?
Operation Focus:
IRON HARVEST

Priority of Support:
1. 4/2 ID, 1/101 ABN, 1/10 MTN, 3ACR
2. 3ACR, 1/101 ABN, 4/2 ID, 1/10 MTN

Collection Priorities:
1. Ground Operations
2. CIED/IDP/Caches
3. Target Development
4. Sectarian Activity (Violence, Corruption)
5. Infiltration Routes
Approved Apportionment FMV ISR

1.4a, 1.4g, 1.4c
Concept of ISR
Iron Harvest Phase II Planned

Phase I: Decide
RCo: CMO assessment
RCo: ID locs of NAs, caches, safehouses
RCo: ID pop, supporting AGRW
RCo: ID AO/MEO LOCs to AO-West

Phase II: Build
RCo: ID waypoints
RCo: ID cache sites
RCo: ID FTR in S/S Model
RCo: ID ED targets
RCo: ID loc of NAs, caches, safehouses
RCo: CMD assessment
RCo: ID pop, supporting AGRW
RCo: ID AO/MEO LOCs

Phase III: Execute Operations
RCo: FTR locations
RCo: LOCs
RCo: AO/ME ingress/egress

Phase IV: Read and Assess
RCo: Assess effects of FTR Operations
RCo: ID 3 in LOCs, back-downs sites
RCo: ID & in western LOCs, vectors

Assets Requested:
- Constant Hawk (A)
- Highlifter (A)
- Night Eagle (P)
- Predator (A)
- AFSAS (A)
- JSTARS (A)
- Global Hawk (P)