Multi National Division-Baghdad

Commander’s Conference
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<td>Pegasus 6 Opening Remarks</td>
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<td>0730 – 0930</td>
<td>Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill</td>
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Room Orientation
Threat Assessment
Strength:
- Sunni Rejectionists comprise the majority of the Sunni AIF in Baghdad; approximately 1,000 total fighters operate within the Beladiyahs.
- Due to AQI's decentralized C2, estimate approximately 100 terrorists conduct the majority of Sunni AIF attacks within the Beladiyahs.

Capabilities:
- SVBIEDs, SVIETs, IEDs, kidnappings, assassinations; OPSEC savvy

Tactics:
- Primarily target Shia civilians; SF will attack CF targets of opportunity
- Coordinated high profile attacks
Jaysh Al Mahdi Estimate in MND-B

Assess JAM strength at approximately 15,000 active fighters and a support base of an additional 15,000 - 20,000 throughout MND-B AO Capabilities

- Demonstrations, Interdict LOCs, Ambush, IED, EFP and IED
- Capable of conducting simultaneous offensives in An Najaf, Karbala, Sadr City and Western Baghdad

Tactics
- Intimidation of the local populace and ISF through kidnappings, executions and propaganda
- Security operations conducted with Ministry of Interior units

Strength
MND-B Mission

MND-B, CONDUCTS KINETIC AND NON-KINETIC OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) TO SECURE BAGHDAD AND ITS POPULATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN AND THE CONTINUED TRANSITION TO IRAQI SECURITY SELF-RELIANCE.
Commander’s Intent

(2 of 2)

PURPOSE: ENSURE THE PROGRESSION TO PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL (PIC) AND PROMOTE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IRAQI POLITICAL SYSTEM AND SECURITY FORCES.

KEY TASKS:

1) SECURE BAGHDAD IN COOPERATION WITH THE ISF.
2) SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.
3) REDUCE SECTARIAN TENSIONS THROUGH SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT OF POLITICAL, SECURITY FORCES, TRIBAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS.
4) INFLUENCE INSURGENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
5) NEUTRALIZE TERRORISTS AND IRRECONCILABLE INSURGENTS.
6) PROTECT THE FORCE; DEFEAT THE IED NETWORKS.
7) ENABLE THE PRIMACY OF LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS BY SUPPORTING THE IA, IPS, NP, DBE, AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS.
END-STATE: BAGHDAD, AN NAJAF, KARBALA, AND BABIL ARE SECURE AND AT PIC. THE IPS OPERATE IN ALL AREAS OF MND-B (LARGELY OVERLAPPING THE IA) AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPRESSING OR CONTAINING VIOLENT ACTIVITY TO ALLOW GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES TO PROVIDE BASIC SERVICES TO ALL IRAQI CITIZENS. THE GAINS MADE IN PIC CONTINUE TO MARGINALIZE AQAM/MILITIAS/INSURGENTS AS THE GOV SECURITY AND SERVICES BEGIN TO OUTPERFORM THOSE PROVIDED BY THESE GROUPS. FINALLY, A COALITION FORCE IS IN OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH.
Joint Security Station
Joint Security Station Concept (Control Phase)

- JSS is a HQ building, not a FOB
- Center of gravity for continual IA, NP and IP patrol presence
- JSS manned 24/7

JSS will require:
- Force Protection
- 24/7 electricity
- Limited life support
- C2 architecture
- Detainee holding area

Tired System Threat
Tier 1 - IP Manned Only
Tier 2 - IP and IA/NP
Tier 3 - IP and IA/NP and CF
Tier 4 - CF Manned

Less More

December 2008

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Approved for Release
Joint Security Station

C2
- IA or NP in command of ISF
- IPs TACON to ISF CDR
- Partnered with CF, subordinate to US BDE CDR
- ISF remain ADCON to Iraqi Ministry

Physical Requirements

Communications
- SC/PT between ISF units
- ICOM radios
- Cell phones

Quality of Life
- Electricity (Generators)
- Water
- Sewer
- Bed down (QRF)

Force Protection
- Barriers
- Fighting positions (roof)
- ECPs
- Balanced with isolating the station from the population

Discussion
- ISF Implementation
- Task Org
- Interpreters

Motorpool
Detainee Holding Facility
Issues Discussion
Operational Law Update

The overall classification of this briefing is SECRET/REL TO USA, MGP.
Approved by: 1CD G2
Classified by: Multiple Sources
Reason: EO 12958 (as amended) – 1.4(a), (c) and (d)
Proposed State of Emergency Measures
Impact on MND-B Operations

- Draft measures are subject to modification and approval by Prime Minister
- Proposed State of Emergency measures do not impact MND-B legal authority to conduct operations
- CF continue to operate under authority outlined in UNSCR 1723
General Provisions

- Borders with Iran and Syria will be closed for an indefinite period of time
- Curfew from 2000 until 0600 daily
  - No civilian movement during that time period

This reflects the extremely sensitive nature of non-Muslims entering a mosque.
Notable Emergency Powers

- No judicial warrants required for operations
- ISF can search private and public property
  - CF still have reporting and approval requirements for mosques, government buildings and OMS buildings
- ISF may enforce checkpoints
- ISF can seize the assets of those who commit terrorist acts or those who cooperate with those committing terrorist acts
- ISF must bring detainees before an IJ

6 January 2007
Exhorting Violence

- ISF may detain and prosecute anyone who exhorts or encourages violence
  - Imams and other religious leaders are included in this prohibition
  - MNC-I ROE currently limits detention of imams or other religious leaders
    - MNC-I ROE requires MNC-I approval before preplanned detention of imams on mosque grounds
    - MNC-I ROE prohibits detention of imams on mosque grounds for making prohibited statements or inciting violence
Armed Groups

- Militias are illegal
  - MND-B cannot target an individual based on status as a JAM member
  - Can target JAM members for their individual actions
- ISF are authorized and ordered to conduct counter-terrorism operations
  - ISF do not need warrants to conduct these operations
  - State of Emergency measures provide legal authority necessary to confront illegal militias
Weapons

- No weapons carried in public except for ISF, CF, and authorized security contractors
- Valid weapons cards/permits do not permit public possession of weapon
- Public possession of weapon is significant evidence of hostile act/hostile intent (HA/HI), but not alone sufficient to establish HA/HI
- ISF can arrest, detain, and prosecute violators

6 January 2007
Rules of Engagement Change

- Mosque Entry
  - ISF Entry: Entry approval authority is delegated to BCT CDR for both planned entries and TIC scenarios
  - CF Entry: MND-B DCG(M) or CG approval required for either preplanned or TIC scenario mosque entry by U.S. forces

5 January 2007
QUESTIONS
SOE Provisions
As of 3 Jan 07
Border Closing

- Iraq's international borders with Iran and Syria are closed effective midnight 15 January 2007. The Government will reopen the borders when the security situation permits.
Curfew

- A curfew will apply commencing 8 PM 15 Jan 2007 and all civilian movement is prohibited between the hours of 8 PM and 6 AM.

6 January 2007
No Warrant Required

- Commanding General, Baghdad Security District and the military and security forces under his command are authorized, and MNF-I forces are requested, to conduct the following security tasks without the need to obtain a warrant.

6 January 2007
Search Private Property

- transit, cordon, entry on and in to and/or search of private and public property;
Enforce Checkpoints

- control movement of persons and vehicles by erecting and enforcing check points and vehicle control points;
Seize Assets

- seize the assets of persons accused of committing grand crimes, as defined in paragraph 8 below, or anyone who participates, cooperates with or harbors such persons;
Bring Detainees Before IJ

- Persons arrested, detained, or involved in the seizure of assets must be brought before an investigative judge.
Exhorting Violence

• Any person who encourages or exhorts violence or commits violent acts will be prosecuted and subject to the full force of the law.

6 January 2007
Imam ROE

- MNC-I ROE:
  - Clerics or imams may not be detained on mosque property if the only basis for detention is making prohibited statements, distributing prohibited material in violation of CPA Order 14, or making statements inciting violence. A preplanned action to detain a cleric or imam on mosque property requires prior approval of Commander, MNC-I and notification (through the operational chain of command) to MNC-I C3.

6 January 2007
Counter-Terrorism Operations

- conduct counter-terrorism operations.
- The Iraqi Armed Forces are assigned the mission of executing the Anti-terrorism Law of 2005 and to perform all necessary operations against illegal armed groups, terrorist gangs, or any person who practices acts of terrorism or does anything that threatens the security and safety of Iraq.
• MNC-I FRAGO 421 to MNC-I 06-01:
  – CG, MNF-I WILTHOLDS AUTHORITY TO DECLARE JAM AS A HOSTILE FORCE.
  – THIS ORDER PERMITS OPERATIONS TO CAPTURE JAM MEMBERS PLANNING OR COMMITTING ACTS AGAINST THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF IRAQ. IT PERMITS USE OF ALL NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE IN RESPONSE TO A HOSTILE ACT OR DEMONSTRATED HOSTILE INTENT BY JAM MEMBERS, OR THE USE OF NECESSARY FORCE (UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE) AGAINST JAM MEMBERS TO PROTECT DESIGNATED PERSONS AND PROPERTY ACCORDING TO PUBLISHED ROE.
Weapons Ban

- No weapons may be carried in public and all weapons permits are suspended and will remain suspended as long as the State of Emergency exists. Only MNF-I forces, Iraqi Security Forces and MNF-I approved security contractors are permitted to carry weapons. Any person found to be carrying a weapon outside their home or business will be in violation of this measure and liable to arrest, detention and prosecution before the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court Iraq. Individuals carrying weapons in public may be fired upon.
Authorized Militias

- Badr Organization
- Da'wa Party Militia
- Iraqi Communist Party
- Iraqi Hizballah
- Iraqi Islamic Party
- Iraqi National Accord
- Iraqi National Congress
- KDP Peshmerga
- PUK Peshmerga
Annex B – Armed Groups

CPA 91 Militias (1/5)

- **Badr Organization** – Iranian-trained wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest Shia party in Iraq, in 2003 the 10,000-strong militia changed its name from the Badr Corps to the Badr Organization... pledged to disarm... reportedly remained armed... increasing political role... today operates mainly in Shia-controlled southern Iraq... number of southern regional governments dominated by SCIRI representatives... recent offshoot: a feared elite commando unit linked to the Iraqi Interior Ministry called the Wolf Brigade. Sunni leaders accuse Badr of revenge killings against Sunni clerics and unlawful kidnappings.

- **Da’wa Party Militia** – Small, seemingly disbanded armed wing of Prime Minister Maliki’s and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari Da’wa faction.

Annex B – Armed Groups

CPA 91 Militias (2/5)

- **Iraqi Hizballah** – Acts as local police force in many southern cities, such as Nasiriya and Ummara, where the official ban on militias widely ignored. Chief spokesman Mohammed Al-Alawi insisted in 2003 the group had no connection with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

- **Iraqi Islamic Party** – Militia appears disbanded...IIP political party headquarters in Ar Ramadi; holds 34 provincial council seats in Al Anbar...14 seats in Diyala...2 seats in Ninawa...IIP candidates ran with the Tawafuq Sunni coalition in the national elections in December 2005...IIP appears to have followed CPA agreement for demobilization and integration by January 2005, if so approximately 200 members retain arms as private security guards...Mosten Abd al-Hameed...founded IIP movement during the 1960s...party appeals to a wide spectrum of Iraqi Sunnis...IIP General Secretary and Iraqi Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi...Assistant General Secretary Ayad al-Samarrai.
Annex B – Armed Groups

CPA 91 Militias (3/5)

- **Iraqi National Accord** – Militia appears disbanded...Ayad Allawi split his INA from the UIA Shia alliance before the national elections in December 2005...INA won 44 seats...former militia members now serve as personal security service for political party. Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Janabi in June 2004 asserted during meetings with the CPA that INA did not maintain a militia and would not need to submit a formal transition and reintegration plan.

- **Iraqi National Congress (INC)** – Former deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi's 700-member Free Iraqi Forces militia operated with U.S. military approval until the Coalition in May 2003 dismantled it... members accused of burglary, harassment, and unauthorized detention of Iraqi citizens...pre OIF was main umbrella organization for groups opposed to Saddam...was active in both the northern regions and southern Marsh area... in the wake of the 2003 attempted assassination of Ahmad Chalabi his militia was reportedly active...appears disbanded.
Annex B – Armed Groups

CPA 91 Militias (4/5)

- KDP Peshmerga – Peshmerga literally means "those who face death"... existed since the Kurdish independence movement in the early 1920s, following the collapse of the Ottoman and Qajar empires which had jointly ruled over the area always known as Kurdistan ... KDP founded in 1946 under Mullah Mustalafa-al-Barzani ... since OIF, Peshmerga forces assumed security role in Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq with small arms and light artillery ... KDP intelligence-gathering arm known as the Parastin... in recent years active against Turkish separatist group the Kurdistan Workers Party (now KGK, then PKK) ... may receive both financial and military aid from Turkey... a number of Kurdish battalions of former Peshmerga in the Iraqi Army serve in Northern Iraq ... estimates in January 2005 as high as 80,000 Peshmerga fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan... Massoud Barzani says he wants to retain the Peshmerga forces.
Annex B – Armed Groups

CPA 91 Militias (5/5)

- **PUK Peshmerga** – Peshmerga literally means "those who face death" ... existed since the Kurdish independence movement in the early 1920s, following the collapse of the Ottoman and Qajar empires which had jointly ruled over the area always known as Kurdistan ... since OIF, Peshmerga forces assumed security role in Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq ... like the KDP Peshmerga, the PUK equipped with small arms and light artillery ... provided by the United States and Iran ... Jalal Talabani claims he can mobilize approximately 15,000 militia men during times of conflict ... PUK is centered in the area surrounding Sulaymaniya ... a number of Kurdish battalions of former Peshmerga in the Iraqi Army serve in Northern Iraq.
Multi National Division-Baghdad

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