“First 100 Days” Decisions

8 February 2008

Purpose: Identify potential decisions occurring from 15 February to 1 June 2008 in order to provide continuity and situational awareness to LTG Austin
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1. Do we commit a BN to POE security at Sheeb and Shalamshah?

Facts:
- MNC-I will conduct "patrol operations" at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (MND-SE).
- MNC-I recently conducted "patrol operations" at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (intermittent inspections).
- MNC-I would like to internally source a battalion to provide 24 hour CF presence ISO DBE ops at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (approve or RTF).

Friendly Conditions:
- Requires construction of 2 COPs (1 at each POE); it will take approximately 10 days to train internally sourced battalion.

Enemy Conditions:
- Amarah and Bastah remain significant support areas for Shi'a extremists and terrorist hubs for lethal aid.
- Any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities, including many of the tribes in the area, will be met with resistance.

Assets Required:
- Establish ISO DBE Ops at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs to provide 24 hour CF presence.
- Construction of 2 COPs.

Risks:
- Less forces to conduct current missions.
- Attrition against COPs/FOBs.
- Probable that any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities will be met with resistance.

Options/Recommendations:
- Deploy a BN to Sheeb and Shalamshah when the conditions warrant.

Issue: There is currently no 24 hour CF oversight of daily DBE operations at the AI Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (MND-SE). MNC-I may be required to internally source a battalion to provide 24 hour CF presence ISO DBE ops at AI Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs NET 15 Mar 08. Purpose is to interdict lethal aid from 14b. Enemy conditions should explain this. Use bullets to cut down on the text; put the text into the notes. Two units are FA BNs: 2-25 or 4-10 if we choose to do so.

Conditions Required:
- Friendly: Requires construction of 2 COPs (1 at each LPOE). It will take 3 weeks to train internally sourced battalion.
- Enemy: Threat Assessment: Despite the significant decrease in attacks in MND-SE as a result of the JAM 'Freeze', ISF security initiatives and the recent PIC, Amarah and Bastah remain significant support areas for Shi'a extremists. Any perceived attempt by CF to encroach on these areas will likely be met with fierce backlash and a significant increase in attacks against COPs/FOBs, particularly those in which US Forces are perceived to be replacing British Forces. Thus risk exists that the proposed FOBs will be quite exposed. It is probable that any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities, including many of the tribes in the area, will be met with resistance and/or retaliation.

Risks associated with Assets Required to Execute:
- MND-N: Reduced CF presence to clear IVO W. Mosul and defeat AQI IVO of DRV; MND-C: Reduced CF presence to protect and overwatch pipeline and reduced capability to clear Arab Jbour and Salmon Pak and establish JSS/COPS IOT deny AQI and Shi'a Extremists sanctuary/staging area; MND-B: Security of Baghdad is impacted by loss of battalion size TF from the security belt.

End State:
2. Do we change the plan to RIP 2 SCR with 4/2?

FACTS:
- 2 SCR is currently operating throughout Baghdad. 2 SCR will RIP with 4/2 ID or 1 steps the Capital River Valley (CRV) and the 100 - June 07.
- 15 ARM 08: Planned 2 SCR & 4/2 SBCT T/R
- 22 JUN 08: 4/2 SBCT B/6

FREQUENT COLLECTIONS:
- 7/1 CAV (deployed Diyala) (1M-4) without backfill on 29 MCV 97
- MND-B will retire from 28 in 17 SMs between 1BEG-07 and 2JUN 08 (this number assumes that 4/2 leaves in May & in Baghdad but that all of 2 SCR deploy to Kandahar)

EVRH CONDITIONS:
- AG will continue attempts to re-establish MIED networks in and around Baghdad to conduct high profile attacks while using SU2/SU2 assets to target key and influential leaders
- AG & MND-B estimate will continue to exploit Baquba's tribal and sectarian divisions in attempts to establish support areas and staging areas for attacks

ASSETS REQUIRED:
- NIM and IM assets to support arrival of 2 SCR from VSC to SHF
- Hostile Couriers forces to rapidly in the security situation exist create instability and delay transition to operation in Baghdad
- Not deploying 2 SCR to SHF will loose MND-B with inadequate forces

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Full regiment departs for Diyala and releases 4/2 ID for 15 JUN 08 T/R
- (Current Plans)
- Regiment (s) departs for Diyala and releases 4/2 ID
Good afternoon Sir, $\text{b}_3, \text{b}_6$, C3 Plans.

The third topic for the 100 day decision briefing is the decision to redeploy 1-8 Infantry from MND-North to MND-Baghdad.

As part of Operation Phantom Phoenix, 1-8 Infantry was released from MND-Baghdad and OPCONNED to MND-North for a period of 60-90 days to conduct CLEAR – CONTROL – RETAIN operations in Mosul. Thus, according to plan, 1-8 Infantry would either redeploy to Baghdad some time between 15 March and 15 April 2008.

The decision to redeploy 1-8 Infantry centers around two sets of conditions: enemy activity in Mosul, and enemy activity in Baghdad. Enemy conditions that might warrant redeployment to Baghdad, from the Northern perspective, include indications of disrupted AQI lines of communication from Syria, indications of disrupted AQI staging areas, and reduction of high-profile attacks in Ninewa Province. SLIDE 40. Enemy conditions in Baghdad that might hasten redeployment of 1-8 Infantry include increase in high-profile attacks in Kadimiya, lifting of the “JAM FREEZE”, increase in planned operations in Sadr City, or increase in IED activity in Baghdad overall. SLIDE 41.
Sir, the staff recommendation is to continue current operations and stay on current plan; conduct a formal assessment of enemy conditions in both Baghdad and in Mosul on or about 1 March 2008, in preparation for the decision to either redeploy 1-8 Infantry to Baghdad or let it remain in Mosul.
The purpose of this decision is to determine the most effective command relationship for TF 1.4a.

TF 1.4a is a unique, Corps Level, asset funded by JIEDDO in response to theater requirements for additional ISR (FMV, MTE, and Change detection).

TF 1.4a is currently assigned to MNC-I and attached to the 1 CAB in MND-N. TF 1.4a assets are employed based on the MNC-I Commander’s Priorities and are apportioned or allocated to the MNDs based on the Corps Commander’s collection priorities. The assets are then pushed down to the BCT level for collection execution in support of operations.

Any change to TF 1.4a C2 relationship would have no operational risk. Three COAs for the C2 of TF 1.4a are:

MNC-I BSB—Main advantages are that the BSB are already familiar with these types of assets, how the operate and the ISR mission. They currently have C2 of the AEB which has some of the same platforms and contractual agreements for maintenance etc. (Guardrail and ARMS are both C-12 and IGNAT and Warrior A are similar Aircraft).

MNC-I AVN BDE—Familiar with this unit as an Aviation unit. Maintain the current C2 relationship—Disadvantage is that the assets of this unit are controlled by MNC-I and constantly crosses MND-N’s battle space.

There is currently no timeline associated with this decision.
5. Does MND-C continue to provide 1xBN to MND-B after 2/1AD rips with 3/3ID?

FACTS:
- MND-C has provided a BN to MND-B since DAPRO 7. MND-C will be
  being 3/3BC in July and is likely to assume responsibility for MND-
  CS when the Polish forces leave in June.
- MND-B will be losing 1 BN (2/2 BN) in March 2016.
- MND-B is the Corps Main Effort.
- 1 BN will TOA with 2/1AD.

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:
- CLEC continues to model to provide security and CSS construction
  to integrate CLECs into Government institutions.
- Boundaries - change of alignment of MND-B/MND-C boundary requires
  additional review.
- Force Generation of 8 and 3P in Baghdad.

ENEMY CONDITIONS:
- Attacks in the Baghdad security districts will continue to decrease as
  ISF capabilities and overall security improve.
- AGR will continue attempting to re-establish staging areas for attacks
  on Baghdad in the southern belts.

OPTION / RECOMMENDATION:
- 2/69 AR returns to MND-C prior to BOG and Rips with 14 W
- 2/69 AR remains with MND-B.

1. 2/1 AD RIP with 3/3 ID begins
2. 2/1 AD TOA with 3/3 ID complete
3. 1 Jun – Polish Fce ceases Ops in MND-CS
4. 15 Jul 2/3 BCT departs MND-C
6. Do we commit an MP Company to MND-CS for PTT support?

FACTS:
- Operation Silver Lever was planned in November and December 2007 to assess the security situation of the province. Key findings include:
  - 8,854 total IPs authorized for Qadisiyah Province
  - 9,838 IPs on the payroll
  - 6,908 IPs physically on hand
  - Several thousand of the IPs are ghosts. Critical personnel are WIA/KIA, working as PSD for senior officials, or just collecting a paycheck and not reporting for work
  - The amount of PTT's currently assigned to the Province of Qadisiyah does not allow the teams to conduct their primary mission of issuing IPs in Fleming's stores.
  - IP Stations: 1 Provincial; 6 District, 27 Local stations

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:
- IPs will not develop without PTT support
- MND-CS unable to resource PTT internally

ENEMY CONDITIONS:
- Qadisiyah remains the centre of gravity for Qadisiyah Province and the Inherent slices, and the flow of initial set to Baghdad
- Criminal elements of JSIR often rely on intimidation of IPs and leadership to maintain POC
- Although recently formed out of Qadisiyah, following successful operations, criminal J/A/M/S elements are moving to influence the region

OPTION/RECOMMENDATION:
- Re-allocate the 51st IP Platoon back to the parent company in FOO Delhi
- Re-allocate a full IP company to Qadisiyah to conduct PTT operations

Issue: To provide the IAG CG information concerning PTT coverage in Qadisiyah Province and the capital city of Diwaniyah.

DISCUSSION POINTS:
- C3 Plans has included in its 100 days brief for 18th ABC the recommendation to move an MP company to Qadisiyah to conduct PTT operations.
- Operation Silver Lever was planned in November and December 07 to assess the security situation of the province. Key findings from FUOPS, PMO and C3 ISF which has been briefed to the MNC-I commander was the need for an MP company to conduct PTT operations with the Provincial IPs
  - IP Stations: 1 Provincial; 6 District, 27 Local stations
  - IP Numbers:
    - Total IPs authorized for the Province: 8,854
    - Total Payroll O/H number: 9,838
    - Estimate 6,908 are physically O/H (30% of the IPs are estimated ghosts)
    - Estimate 3500 IPs are in Dwiniyah (5000 on the payroll, minus the 30%)
    - Ghost personnel are WIA/KIA, working as PSD for senior officials, or just collecting a paycheck and not reporting for work.
- ORA/PSMR data was not collected for June through November due to the security situation in June and July; and the movement of the 984th MP company to FOB Delta from Aug-Nov 07.

- Assessments by the 984th MP Plt (3 PTT Tms) were started again for inclusion into the Dec 07 ORA report.
  -1 assessing the PHQ
  -1 assessing 2 LPS in Diwaniyah
  -1 conducting biometrics on current IP personnel

3. ASSESSMENT. The amount of PTTs currently assigned to the Province of Qadiissiyah does not allow the team to conduct their primary mission of training IPs in Policing skills.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Re-allocate the 984th Plt back to its parent company at FOB Delta.
- Re-allocate a full MP company to Qadiissiyah to conduct PTT operations
- Assign a field grade officer to the ISF Cell to be the Provincial liaison to the PDoP and MND-CS senior leadership.
FACTS:
- MRAP vehicles issued based on threat. Every two months, CS approves adjusted threat based distribution plan.
- TFE is OP-2 of the MRAP Plan; OP-2 published 9 Jan 2008

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:
- Contributions between SPEC-13 FMD and subordinate units.

ENEMY CONDITIONS:
- Underlying EOD threat analysis (C2015)

ASSETS REQUIRED:
- MRAP filling site positioned
- Predictable threat on MRAP deployment
- Need assets to move MRAP from APCO to some sites

RISK:
- Late decision by MNC-I will cause interruption of MRAP via Strategic AISR.
- Lack of real assets may influence fielding execution.

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:
- USA replaced by MRAP on one-for-one basis, currently moving toward 20 replacement.
BOC established in early 2007 with a unique AOR – MOA signed March 07

Working the last 7 Months to adjust BOC boundary to equal province

Dec 07 agreement between Mod, BOC, and IGFC for BOC to equal the province. BOC, Mod and IGFC with CF advice and assistance working the plan to facilitate the BOC having Command and control over the increased area.

As we continue forward in Iraq – many of the initiatives fall within provincial boundaries and have a provincial focus. Having CF boundaries align with provincial boundaries, facilitates operations across multiple Lines of Operations.

MND-B = BOC = Baghdad Province facilitates these operations with the MNC-I main effort. Facilitates partnership.

Security Loos
- IA and CF in the same AO
- NP AO contained in the province
IP districts provincially based

Governance

Detailed analysis red for CF force ratios for the area. However, MND-B = BOC = Province does make sense and additional planning should occur to timeline out when this should occur and the forces that will be stationed in the province.

4/9 IA (-) IOT control Tarmiyah and Mushahadah.

3/4/1 QRF located in Victory and Peace area.

3/5/4 located at Karkh WTP.

2/4/4 IA BN in Muthana (Samara BDE). Original MOD Order incorrectly listed two companies from 1/4/4.

Specified Tasks:

Send BN from 4/9 to Ninawa (Mosul) IOT enforce security and order.

2/2/1 NP will move out of current location in Al Bayjiya Camp to Rusafa Command. RAC will assume command of 2/2/1 NP. KAC interpreted this to mean that 2/2/1 Carabinieri training was cancelled. BOC OPS says 2/2/1 will attend Carabinieri Training.

NLT 030600FEB08 1/6/2 NP conduct Recon of 2/2/1 AOR (Muhalla 649) IOT prepare for battle handover of 2/2/1 NP AO to Commando Company 6/2 NP.

NLT 030600FEB08 Commando Company 6/2 NP will assume control of 2/2/1 AOR (Muhalla 649).

NLT 030600FEB08 2/2/1 NP will facilitate Recon conducted by replacement units.

NLT 080600FEB08 4/1/6 IA will assume control of Commando Company 6/2 NP, Al Ghazaliyah, Muhalla 649, Um Al Qura Mosque, its surrounding areas, and the expressway.

NLT 100600FEB08 2/1 NP will move out of current location in Al Bayjiya Camp to RAC. RAC assumes control of 2-1 NP.
9. How and when do we transition CLCs to Gog?

FACTORS:
- # of Concerned Local Citizens: approx. 50,000
- Security situation cannot be compromised during transition
- GOC must develop/executive capability to train and hire CLC
- GOC must resource and legitimize the transition programs

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- CLCs improve local security situation
- MIF+ needscrete programs immediately
- CSC pilot program ongoing

REFERENCES:
- Increase in memory activity; CLC (local security) still required in some areas

RESOURCES REQUIRED:
- Funding:
  - $US150M
  - MoF will match funds up to $126M
- GOC needs increased DoD capacity

NOTE:
- Transition to Gog could lead to an increase in violence

END STATE:
- CLCs transition to MoD, CSC, JTRP or other employment

RECOMMENDATION:
- Publish OPCOM-CLC Transition Order by 15 MAR 08
  - Guidance to:
    1. Ensure OPCOM continuity assess the security situation
    2. Accelerate the hiring process for:
       a. CLC
       b. CSC
       c. JTRP
       d. other employment

OPR: Reconciliation
ACTH(310) (b)(b)

[Diagram showing CLC Transition Framework and timeline]
Sir, the next decision we’ll cover concerns the repositioning of coalition forces to Samarra. As more attention is placed on the GOI commitment to reconstruct the Al-Asad airbase in the heart of Samarra, there will be increased emphasis placed on maintaining security in Samarra and the surrounding area.

Background: After UNESCO committed to sponsoring the reconstruction effort and hired a Turkish company to lead the reconstruction effort that will begin with a 10-month site survey of the shrine area when security permits. As a result, the PM took action in late December to authorize the formation of a National Police and Iraqi Army brigade. Their mission is to provide security in Samarra (not Bde) and along MSR Tampa between Baghdad and Samarra (IA Bde). Both brigades have completed training and are operating in Samarra and along MSR Tampa today. In Jun 07, following the second attack in the Golden Mosque, the PM authorized the establishment of the Samarra Ops Command to provide C2 over both brigades and local police in Samarra. He also directed an additional IA battalion (411/4 IA) to move to Samarra and provide security at the mosque and Dam in Samarra. This unit also falls under control of the SOC. Currently the SOC.

Security forces are currently deployed in Samarra as depicted on the slide, with the NP Bde and 411/4 IA making up the primary forces in the city. 411/4 IA is deployed out of three bases between Samarra and Baghdad and occupying 25 checkpoints along MSR Tampa between the two cities. 1 x CF Company, 2-327 IN operates out of PB Olsen in the northwest corner of the city.

Security in Samarra is currently stabilized with attacks and casualties remaining low, however the threat to the shrine and UNESCO sponsored workers is expected to increase when work begins. The importance of the Shrine to Shi’a Muslims and the significance of its destruction as a catalyst for violence in 2006 makes it a natural target for AQI.

Though they have made progress, the GOI is placing more emphasis on getting the reconstruction effort off the ground. A GOI-led trip is taking place today (6 Feb) in Samarra with GOI, UNESCO, and MNF-I leaders to discuss security with SOC leadership, support requirements for the reconstruction team, and the overall reconstruction timeline. The current estimate for the arrival of the Turkish reconstruction team and the beginning of the site survey is 1 March.

As this date approaches it is important to ensure the Samarra Ops Command is capable of controlling forces in Samarra. LTG Odorno recently approved a course of action to establish an advisory team in the SOC (SOCAT) taking from existing MCT and NPTs in the Samarra area. This SOCAT must be established immediately. Additionally, it may be necessary to look at repositioning additional CF assets in the Samarra area in order to allow the SOC and ISF in Samarra to focus inward on security of the shrine and city, while CF focus outwardly on security of the surrounding area focused on enemy safe havens and attack staging bases.
11. Where do ePRTs go when the BCTs redeploy without backfill?

FACTS:
- 2 BCTs redeploying without backfill (3rd ABN, 173rd)
- BCTs provide security, logistic and operational support to the ePRTs
- OPTIONS: remain in place, change physical hosting location or merge with another ePRT PRT. Decision is conditions-based

ASSETS REQUIRED:
- If ePRT is maintained or relocated, they require:
  - Sufficient force (per MND-I) for increased security
  - Sufficient Static Security Forces (contract or military)
  - Logistic support for ePRTs at proposed location
  - IT/Comm support for ePRT at proposed locations

RISK: Level of support can not decrease as BCTs reduce in members.
Reduction in interaction of ePRTs is possible and in this area with respect to the ability to effectively engage civil leaders and manage ongoing projects.

C&S STATE: A stable Iraq with a fully functioning political and governmental structure, and a developing economy

OPTION/RECOMMENDATION:
Recommend that ePRTs remain in place and be supported by new US interagency teams – may need to pair ePRTs with Liaisons in some locations.
Multi-National Corps - Iraq

Battalion for 24 hr CF Presence at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah Land POEs
### Sheeb and Shalamshah POE Threat Assessment

**Summary**: The Muqtada Al-Sadr (MAS) “freeze”, General Mohan’s and General Jall’s security initiatives, PIC and British troop levels diminishing have all contributed to a dramatic decrease in attacks in MND-SE since Aug '07.

- **Shia Extremist Groups**
  - Current operations within IVO Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs are Medium.
  - The movement of certain JAM commanders from Al Sheeb and Shalamshah into Al Amarah and Basra City, along with the 90 IRGC members transferring into Basra City to support JAM Hizb in anticipation of an expected ISF offensive and establishment of some defensive positions in key JAM areas.

- **Sheeb**
  - Well-established facilitation networks and corruption among border enforcement officials allow traffickers to circumvent border security efforts.
  - Various reporting indicates weapons and oil are being smuggled across the border.
  - Several sources report HIZ and Iranian Intelligence members are utilizing the border in order to conduct operations in Iraq as well as to facilitate cross-border movement of personnel and weapons.

- **Shalamshah**
  - The Shalamshah POE is a heavily smuggled route and is a focal point for EFPI’s, weapons and foreign fighters coming from Iran into South East Iraq.

- **Maysan Marshes**
  - The Maysan Marshes continue to present a significant viable alternative route between the two POEs due to the rugged terrain and difficulty in surveillance.

**Assessment**: Despite the significant decrease in attacks in MND-SE as a result of the JAM “freeze”, ISF security initiatives and the recent PIC, Almarsh and Basrah remain significant support areas for Shia extremists. Any perceived attempt by CF to overreach these areas will likely be met with fierce backlash and a significant increase in attacks against COPsPGOs, particularly those in which US Forces are perceived to be replacing British forces. Furthermore exists the proposed POEs which will be quite exposed. It is probable that any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities, including many of the tribes in the area, will be met with resistance and/or retaliation.
Background

The security along the Iraq border is generally poor and, in some cases, non-existent. Formal border crossing posts are easily bypassed. Small boats easily make the crossing from one country to the other through waterways crossing the major and minor marshes straddling the border. The established border crossing posts for Ba’th and al-Amarah are ineffective and easily circumvented by smugglers, enabled by corruption, inefficiency, cross-border tribal ties and hundreds of years of smuggling tradition. The border crossing post for al-Amarah, known as Al Sheik, is one of the most important entry points into Iraq for illicit material, including lethal aid.

MNF-I and the GoI efforts are ongoing to accomplish the twelve major goals of the 2007 National Border Control Strategy (NBGS). The strategy to secure the Iraqi borders consists of four phases which overlap with one another as tasks in earlier phases are completed:

- Phase 1: Secure specified western land POEs (Iraq-Syria) and Baghdad International Airport
- Phase 2: Secure specified eastern land POEs (Iraq)
- Phase 3: Secure specified air and sea POEs
- Phase 4: Secure remaining POEs and continued upgrade of all POEs

Completion of Phase 2 is achieved when the land POEs are fully capable of disrupting the efforts of foreign terrorists and criminals and able to process travelers/passengers, inspect cargo, and efficiently collect revenues. Initial operating capability is reached by having fully functional PISCES, BAT/PHASE, Iraqi ANS, and Backscatter systems per the MTO&E as well as continuous ‘permanent presence’ CF manning and monitoring.

To date MND-SE has not conducted ‘Permanent Presence’ operations rather they have elected to conduct DEE Level J2 led ‘Pulse’ operations onto the border focusing on POEs and known crossing sites using man and ISR assets. Recent operations (Operation Certain Shield) have been executed with the intent to understand, demonstrate, interdict, deter, and ultimately disrupt.

To achieve MNF-I Command’s ‘Permanent Presence’ of CF is required.
1. Operations to Date:
   Operation Curtain Shield (Pulse Opn)
   a. 9-19 SEP - Understand/Demonstrate
   b. 19-21 SEP 07 - Deter/Degrade/Demonstrate
   c. 27 SEP - 04 OCT - Understand/Demonstrate
   d. 16-25 OCT 07 - Deter/Disrupt/Demonstrate

2. Forces to Implement CDR's Intent –
   "PRESENCE":
   a. BINTAC (-) S3 or XO
   (i) 1 x Rifle Company
   (ii) 1 x QRF
   (iii) Forward Log Element (FLE)
   (iv) 1 x Combat Outpost
   (v) 1 x JLENS
   (vi) 3 x 105 or 155 mm batteries
   (vii) Tactical 14c Team (-)
   (viii) PSYOP Team (-)
   (ix) EOD
   (x) 1 x VSAT

3. SOW pending approval from Mol to build
   a. Est. $3,700,000 to support 160 PAX COP
1. Operations to Date:
   a. OP Caitlin Shield
      (1) 03-07 NOV 07 - Understand/Demonstrate
      (2) 10-13 NOV 07 - Interdict/Demonstrate

2. Forces to Implement CDR's Intent - "PRESENCE"
   a. BN (-)
      (1) 1 x Q37
      (2) Forward Logistics Element (FLE)
      (3) 1 x Combat Outpost
      (4) 1 x JLENS
      (5) 1 x 105 or 155 mm BTRY
      (6) Dedicated MEDEVAC
          as "outside golden hour"
      (7) FWD Surgical Team (-) with doctor
      (8) Tactical (-)
      (9) PSYOP Team (-)
      (10) EOD
      (11) Engineer RTE Clearance
      (12) 1 x VSAT

3. SOW pending approval from Mol to build
   a. Est. $3,700,000 to support 180
      PAX CDP
Facts and Assumptions

(F) There is currently no 24 hour CF oversight of daily DBE operations at the Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (MND-SE)

(A) MNC-I will be required to internally source a battalion to provide 24 hour CF presence ISO DBE ops at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs NET 15 Mar 08.

(F) Requires construction of 2 COPs (1 at each POE)

(A) It will take 3 weeks to train internally sourced battalion

Constraints

Must source from forces in theater.

Embedded enablers will be limited to what the parent brigade can provide.
Risks

▲ Battalion from MND-N
- Reduced CF presence to clear IVO W. Mosul and defeat AQI IVO of DRV
- Reduced CF presence to protect and overwatch pipeline and associated infrastructure (Bayji / Kirkuk Corridor) coupled with less capability to develop ISF (train/ mentor, advise, partner)

▲ Battalion from MND-C
- Loss of a BN from MND-C reduces its capability to clear Arab Jabour and Salmon Pak and establish JSS/COPs IOT deny AQI and Shia Extremists sanctuary/ staging area

▲ Battalion from MND-B
- Security of Baghdad is impacted by loss of battalion size TF, from the security belt
- Slows continued operations to defeat VBIED networks IVO Baghdad
Recommendation

- Option 1: Battalion from 4/10 IBCT
- Option 2: Stryker Battalion from 2/25 SBCT
Attacks from 24 Nov – 24 Dec 2007

Karadah:
- Attacks still occurring weekly including IED, IDF, SAF and occasional kidnappings, with some assassinations
- Karadah provides access to SE Iraq via Salam Pak corridor, a traditional transit area for smuggling and an area of persistent concern for lethal aid, particularly for rogue JAM groups
- There is a low risk that OP Phantom Phoenix may increase the intensity of both rogue JAM and AQI activity through this area
- IA performing well in this area and close proximity of CF forces throughout Baghdad can offer response support
- Risk of decreasing forces in Karadah assessed as LOW

Tamlyah:
- Relatively low levels of violence, some AIF activity
- Tamlyah remains a key area due to AQI goal of re-establishing FOM in staging area around Baghdad
- Decrease in forces could increase opportunity for AQI to assert an M&I campaign and attempt to re-establish presence, particularly as OP Phantom Phoenix drives AQI out of Baqubah and DRV
- Tamlyah is relatively isolated from support forces
- Risk of decreasing forces in Tamlyah assessed as MEDIUM-LOW
Way Ahead

- **Completed Actions**
  - Letter of Justification
  - AT/FP Assessment
  - Independent Government Estimate
  - Statement of Work for construction
  - Contractor Cost Estimates (Al Shalamsha: $2.24)
  - Contractor Cost Estimates (Al Sheeb: $ 2.26)

- **Ongoing Actions**
  - Land Permit from Land Owner
  - Shalamsha packet is at Joint Facility Utilization Board since 28 Nov 07.
  - Al Sheeb packet will be forwarded to Theater Provided Equipment 4 Dec 07

- **Way Ahead**
  - Submit packets to JFUB: 4 to 14 days
  - Spend Plan on 21 DEC
  - Awarded funds on 5 JAN
  - Contract Office & Contractor site visit: approx. 14 days
  - Vendor awarded contractor: approx. 19 JAN - Drop Dead Date
  - EDC for entire Omni bus contract: 1 March
The Plan and Problem Statement

Given the operational importance of and threat assessments for both Baghdad and the Diyala River Valley (DRV), how does MNC-I allocate forces between Diyalah and Baghdad?
**Facts and Assumptions**

**Facts:**
- 3/1 CAV departed Diyala (MND-N) on 29 November 2007
- RIP/TOA between 4/2 IN (redeploying) and 2 SCR (currently in Baghdad) is scheduled for 15 June 2008
- While MND-B is the Corps main effort, activity in Diyala feeds enables IEDs, VBIEDS, EFPs, weapons and other accelerants of violence in Baghdad
- MND-B will decrease from 28 to 17 BNs between December 2007 and June 2008
- 2SCR is currently operating throughout Baghdad, in Rashid, Karkh, Adamiyah, Abu Ghraib, Taji, and Kadamiyah
- 3/2 SCR deployed to DRV 20 December 2007 as the OPRES and is currently performing clearing IVO Himbas and Sinai ISO Raider Harvest

**Assumptions:**
- Provinces outside Baghdad and Diyala will not require permanent reinforcement
- Security situation in Diyala will still require at least a BCT (-) following the departure of 4/2 IN in June/July 2008
- 1-B IN will return to MND-B following operation in Mosul ISO Operation Phantom Phoenix on or about May 2008 (conditions based)
Baghdad
JAN 08

Key Indicators of Regression:
- JAM and JAM-SG ceasefire ends; significant increase of attacks against CF/ISF
- Intra-Shia violence escalates
- CLC regresses and turn toward sectarian violence due to frustration over perceived GoI sectarianism
- Gradual increase of spectacular attacks; AQI capabilities within the Baghdad security districts increases

AGI Network Assessment:
- Baghdad networks in reorganization phase following dismantlement of CS node elements
- Attacks to increase following restructuring
- SV/VEED attacks likely to focus on Sunni LN crowds, primarily in eastern Baghdad
- AQI will attempt to reestablish themselves in East Rashid IDO to facilitate link into Arab Jabbar and Southern Iraq
- Continue attempts to conduct asymmetric attacks on IOT Autumn IC and maintain presence

Shia Assessment:
- Majority Shia JAM continue to resist
- Expect continued low attack levels as GoI directs restructuring of JAM to replace leaders not following its directives
- Increased attacks by non-compliant JAM-SG elements
- Continued low civilian levels through Ashura and Arbaeen

Trending is currently positive but still potentially reversible:
- Sectarian violence is reduced but tensions remain
- Sunni inclusion; Rejectionists more interested in negotiating inclusion than violent resistance
- AQI remains isolated as common enemy but still a credible threat

Approved for Release
**Key Indicators of Regression:**
- Populations perception of occupation and sectarianism regresses CLC who turn toward insurgents/extremist for security
- Intra-Shia violence escalates
- Sectarian violence increases as AQI regains its foothold in Baqubah
- Influx of lethal aid smuggled through northern POEs; EFPIED attacks increase

**Trending is currently neutral:**
- Diyala provincial government actively engaged working with the central government
- Sunni inclusion; Rejectionists more interested in negotiating inclusion than violent resistance
- AQI forced from AQI strong points, to include Baqubah, Muqadiya and Bread Basket; Anti-AQI sentiment increasing
- Outside influences, AQI and Non-compliant JAM-SGs, continue to conduct attacks, and capitalize on Diyala tribal and sectarian divisions
Branches

1. 2SCR is set to RIP/TOA with 4/2 SBCT 15 June 2008

- Risks of reducing 2SCR elements in Baghdad are:
  - 4/2 SCR in Kirkuk: Low risk of security issues as CF 2SCR reduce presence in area. Unit had moderate level of engagement in area.
  - 2 SCR in Tikrit: Moderate risk of increased attacks entering Baghdad from DRV and areas to the north of Baghdad as CF and CF presence.
  - 1 SCR in Balad: Moderate risk of reduced CF presence in and around Balad, may also suffer from disruption. Possible low-risk area.
  - 2 SCR in Ramadi: High risk of security issues based on CF presence in Ramadi.

- Risks of not deploying 2SCR elements to Diyala are:
  - 2nd Squadrons in Baghdad: Substantial risk as no capability to conduct support from 32 SCR (conduits for IED/IED Breach and other IED operations)
  - 2nd Squadrons in Balad: Likely to suffer from lack of security operations.
  - 2nd Squadrons in Tikrit: Likely to suffer from lack of security operations.
  - 2nd Squadrons in Ramadi: Likely to suffer from lack of security operations.

2SCR Deployment to Diyala

Does a Significant change in the OE require 2SCR to remain in MND-B vice backfilling 4/2 SBCT in Baghdad?

November December January February March April May June July August

Backfill 4/2 SBCT

SCI LOPR 21-21

SCI LOPR 21-21
Note: 1-68 IN (3/4 ID) (Not shown) Operating north of Baghdad in Husseinyya.
3/3 ID TOA 15 May 08;
4/1 ID TOA 15 Apr 08
SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI
THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO
PROTECT IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISPOSITION OF THE
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE
EXECUTIVE ORDER(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING
REGULATION(S)

(The cover sheet is unclassified.)
**Ninawa Environmental Assessment (Summer 2008)**

### Threat
- AQI and Sunni insurgent groups continue to exploit Arab-Kurd tensions over Kurdish expansion to incite violence.
- Continued attacks in Mosul and contested areas as AQI leadership attempt to reorganize and reconstitute.
- AQI will continue to attempt to re-establish FOM in Mosul due to it being a hub for LOC to Syrian border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Governance
- Governor and vice governor continue to be partners in improving security and all issues related to development of a stable government that serves the citizens of the province.
- Provincial leadership does not represent constituents.
- Little initiative without oversight.

### ISF
- New Ops CMD positive influence.
- IA and IP ORA 2 average.
- IA under resourced and manned.
- 3IA progressing, 2IA stagnant.
- IP takes fight to insurgents.

### Economics
- Small private business growth.
- Reconstruction slow due complex balances of power.
- Repetitive Micro grants.
- Continued high unemployment, lack of VOTECH opportunities.
- Infrastructure is 'sufficient'.
- Sanitation only at 40%.
- Hospitals under-resourced.

### Reconciliation
- Tension about Kurdish expansion overshadows overall reconciliation effort.
- Article 94 remains key issue.
- CID's in IFJ will mature along with Zahib Triangle.
- Likely expansion in western Kirkuk by Gel authorized TSOs.

---

**Overall Assessment**: AQI and insurgent groups continue to exploit tensions over Kurdish expansion. Attacks continue in Mosul and contested areas as AQI leadership attempt to reorganize and reconstitute.
Baghdad Environmental Assessment (Summer 2008)

Threat
- AQI will continue to target Gel in Baghdad for HP attacks
- Rogue JAM will continue use of IED and IDT to obstruct CF/ISF FOM
- Some increased intra-Shia violence as JAM reorganizes
- Funding through criminal activity
- Some sectarian violence as Shi'as continue some expansion into Sunni areas
- Corruption in Gel/ISF will persist
- Corridors to Baghdad Delta will remain critical LCCs to both AQI and JAM SG

ISF
- Baghdad Ops CMD ADR expanded to provincial boundaries
- New IA units will improve and be more effective than rotational units
- IA ORA 2; NP ORA 2.5; IP ORA 3
- Good community and tribal relations will continue to improve
- Negative JAM influence reduced

Governance
- Government working with CF
- Administration satisfactory
- Executing Budget well

Economics
- Disparate unemployment (20-60%)
- Great potential CSC/VOTECH
- Under resourced schools
- Concerns remain over basic services (i.e. power and sanitation)
- Hospitals poorly staffed and equipped

Reconciliation
- Significant challenges North and South Bets
- Key themes are essential services and ISF over-watch
- CLE transition to non-security employment may set conditions
- Reconciliation depends Gel efforts and increased return of IDPs

Overall Assessment: Violence reduced; Mixed areas continue to be the focus of violence.
1-8 IN Re-integration

Control- A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy. (FM 1-02)

Interdict- A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route. (FM 1-02)

Disrupt- A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 1-02)

Isolate- A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 1-02)
Falcon Command and Control

BCT
1-2 SCR is OPCON to 2nd BCT
Upon return, 1-8 IN will be attached to 3/4 ID

MITT & NPTT
NPTT #6143 for 3/4/1 NP (CALLAHAN) is attached
MITT #1130 for 3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OIH from 4-10 MTN)
MITT #1131 for 1/3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OIH from 4-10 MTN)
MITT #1133 3/3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OIH from 4-10 MTN)
NPTT #6131 for 1/3/1 NP (Numaniyah) is attached

PTT
2/106th MP are PTTs for Shaab Stations, cross functional team partner
132nd MP are PTTs for Sadr City station, cross functional team partner

ISF Partnership
3/4/1 NP partnered with 1-8 IN
3/11 IA and subordinates are partnered with 1-2 SCR
**COP/JSS Span of Influence in FALCON OE**

**Key Sites**
- COP: GALLANAN (COP 357)
  - Main HQ site with boys for up to 750 PAX
  - Supportive site for NIW and Support
- COP: FORO (COP 321)
  - Platoons for up to 750 PAX
- JSS Shabab
  - Non-resident site with full ISF participation at NIW/Grades

**Back-Up Site**
- JSS: SH (City #1)
  - Non-resident site with full ISF participation at NIW/Grades
- COP 329
- Planned combined residential site for CI & ISF
- SH/SH (City #2)
- Future combined site for CI & ISF at IP stations
- SHB/TAMURA 9
  - Future combined residential site for CI & ISF

**Supporting Sites**
- COP 114
  - Combined with 117th LRC HQ and CI 56th HQ with boys for up to 580 PAX

Projected impact with addition of new COPs/JSSs will initially spike the areas that can be influenced temporarily. Over time, the increase of presence will be reduced by reduced range and effects of enemy actions against the COP/JSS.
BACK UP
Pages 49 through 51 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------------------
1.4a, 1.4g
Slides with Additional Detail
### Summary of 2/69 AR tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements remaining with MND-C</th>
<th>Elements allocated to MND-B: Bn (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Coy</strong> - Task: Infantry role. Attached to 1-187</td>
<td><strong>C Coy</strong> - Task: full spectrum COM. Composition: Mix IR &amp; MLRS. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>D Coy</strong> - Task: full spectrum CD. Composition: Mix M1A1. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Engr Coy</strong> - Task: route clearance. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Scouts &amp; Mortars</strong> - Scout part of C/155th, mortars JSS/501st security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5/1/69 501st LHR is attached to MND-B units of 2/69AR to form a TF within 4/10 Mtn Bde.
Troop to Task Overview
2-69 AR within MND-B

Troop To Table

SCT/2-69 AR – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33% OOP
- MTR/2-69 AR – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33% JSS/JIOC Security
- A Armor/PAK and 1 Mech BN – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33% JSS/JIOC Security
- 1 Mech BN – 16% JSS/JIOC Security
- This unit represents 12% of 410th current combat power.
- After March, when 282 departs, 2-69 AR is about 15% of 410th’s combat power.
MND-B 17Dec07-17Jan08 Attacks

Threat Assessment – SE Baghdad:
- The threat in Rusafa is characterized by JAM SG activity through the use of IEDs to disrupt CF operations.
- A VBIED threat remains in Rusafa targeting civilians through HT attacks.
- A crowds/motivational threat for the targeting of the IZ with IDPs by JAM SG.
- The threat in Kerbala is characterized by timed JAM SG activity aimed at disrupting CF operations along MSR:ASR, primarily due to the area access to key LOCs SE of Baghdad.
- Prisoner relocation violence continues to decrease.
Threat Assessment – MND-C:
- The predominant threat in MND-C is the anti-CF/ISF activity and inter-extremist competition for control of key LOCs to Baghdad in the Arab Jbour and Salim Pak areas of the Southern Baghdad Belts.
- Traditional smuggling routes continue to facilitate lethal aid into Baghdad with Al Kuf being a significant smuggling hub.

Threat Assessment – MND-C (cont.):
- The predominant threat in MND-C is the anti-CF/ISF activity and inter-extremist competition for control of key LOCs to Baghdad in the Arab Jbour and Salim Pak areas of the Southern Baghdad Belts.
- Traditional smuggling routes continue to facilitate lethal aid into Baghdad with Al Kuf being a significant smuggling hub.
BOC's Current and Proposed Boundaries

1. North of Baghdad:
   Current borders stretch to south of Taji. Suggested borders to include the northern part of Taji, Altemiyah and Almusaibahadah. (add 20 Km to the North)

2. Eastern borders: Current borders stretch to Diyala and Madin. Suggested borders will be east of Madii and 20 Km to the east.

3. Southern borders: Current borders to Huri Rajaq and Madii. Suggested borders to include the Alaibah, and south of Alarwah, and 20 Km south.

4. Western borders:
   Current borders to Altemiyah. Suggested will stretch west to Victory and Peace. (add 17 Km to the west)
1. AOR (1): North of Baghdad and includes:
   A. Al-Mushahada and Tarmiya
   B. Taji
   C. Husseiniyah and Rashidiya
   D. Sadr City North
2. AOR (2): East of Baghdad and includes:
   A. Nahrwan
   B. South of Mada'in
3. AOR (3): South of Baghdad and includes:
   A. Hor Rajab and Arba'ah
   B. Sway, Ar-Rajaa, and a small area west of Latifiya
4. AOR (4): West of Baghdad and includes:
   A. North of Abu Ghraib, North of the Abu Ghraib - Ramadi Expressway, and Al-Nasr Walsalam area.
   B. South of Abu Ghraib and Abu Ghrab – Ramadi Expressway.
Qadisiyah Environmental Assessment (Summer 2008)

- Threat
  - Rogue JAM will continue use of IED and IEDF to obstruct CF/JSF POM
  - Greater intra-Shi’a violence
  - Criminals and Militia increasingly isolated as security improves
  - Traditional tribal smuggling enables initial aid

- Governance
  - Govt stiffing PC and constituents
  - Governor consolidating leadership
  - Increased use of ISF to control province
  - Provincial Provincial Council
  - Ineffective management of budget and resources — some corruption
  - Expect increase focus on economy following improved security, though favored to personal benefit within PC

- ISF
  - Real influence to increase security
  - Strong IA leadership
  - Needs an additional BN garrisoned
  - IP leadership improving capability
  - Assassination threat to leaders
  - IP abide judicial orders
  - IP feared 'no go' areas remain

- Economics
  - 60% unemployment
  - Predominantly small business
  - Energy supply improving
  - Transport demand increasing despite fuel shortages
  - Severely lacking basic services; access board (food, water, medical)
  - Need for economic reform

- Reconciliation
  - Despite positive results, pressure from the Govt against PLCs and awakening movements
  - IA support of Shia Govt denounces
  - Shia political parties stalling forward progress

Overall Assessment: Extremist leaders deterred by strong IA leadership; Friction between Political/Religious Parties and ISF working with tribes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>MND</th>
<th>PTTs Assigned</th>
<th>Total Stations</th>
<th>PTT to Station Ratio</th>
<th>IPs Authorized</th>
<th>IPs Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>MNF-W</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1:1.8</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>22,116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>MND-B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1:1.4</td>
<td>39,393</td>
<td>33,797</td>
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<td>Babil</td>
<td>MND-C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1:7</td>
<td>11,836</td>
<td>9,265</td>
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<td>Wasit</td>
<td>MND-C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>10,315</td>
<td>10,315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ninewah</td>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1:5.5</td>
<td>24,387</td>
<td>21,922</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salah ah Din</td>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1:2.5</td>
<td>15,650</td>
<td>14,380</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamim</td>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>11,936</td>
<td>8,749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>MND-N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>19,361</td>
<td>15,813</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qadissiyah</td>
<td>MND-CS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>8,854</td>
<td>9,838</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>266</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1:2.5</td>
<td>165,735</td>
<td>146,126</td>
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</table>
Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.
This slide shows the forecast disposition of the IA on 31 Jul 08. By then the IA will comprise 12 Divisions, 47 Brigades and 153 Battalions at FOC or better. The 1st Presidential Brigade will have been generated and plans for the integration of 2 Peshmerga Divisions will have become a reality. This total includes 9 of the former SIBs that will have completed training and will have transitioned to the IA as IAIB, leaving 8 to train and transition. Finally, the new EOD Regiment and the Infrastructure Repair Battalion will be in place.

Further equipment will have been fielded: Badger fielding will be complete by end 07, 110 BMP 1 will have been purchased to equip 3 IA BNs (probably in 5, 8 and 11 Divisions) and 251 ECM sets will be issued in early 08. M16/M4 fielding to 3, 6, 8, 9 DIV and 3/1 BDE will be complete and fielding of 80mm mortar could be achieved. Finally MRAP delivery may make HWMMV/UH available for the IA and ~320 x 120mm mortars could be available.

This equipment delivery is not without implications – greater tactical mobility will result in greater demand for fuel; additional BMP battalions may result in a demand for operational mobility that is beyond the IA and 120mm mortars bring obvious requirements for FDC, tactical communications, interoperability and air-space control.

The ML and MDCOA briefed earlier highlighted the implications of sectarianism and militia influence and these will remain the greatest threat to IA acceptability.

Finally, the identified systemic issues (the lack of NCOs and officers and logistic support) will continue to hamper IA development and effectiveness.
1. 1/5 CAV relinquishes battlespace in the 2/101 AA OE and begins redeployment.
2. 4 JAN 08 4/9 CAV and 3-82 FA conduct TOA as part of 2/1 CDs redeployment timeline.
Force generation issues remain:
- SOC resourcing (MOD/MOI)
- Officer recruiting for AA Bde and 4/4 IA
- LOG support for 2/4/4 IA in Muthanna

AA Bde to Samarra

4/4 IA pulled from training 6/2 NP sent to Samarra 4/1/4 IA sent to Samarra

Dec 2006
PM authorizes reconstruction
Names LTG Adnan Thalib commander
Authorizes 1 NP BDE, 1 IA BDE for security

1st Bombing of the Golden Mosque
Escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq

Focus in 2008 is on beginning reconstruction of the shrine and maintaining security

2007
Dec 2007
MSR CP construction
Tribal unity on reconstruction
IP recruiting increases
Aug 2007
MG Rasheed continues improvements
ISF conducting combined ops
Security stabilizes in Samarra

Feb 2008
SOC const. complete
Reconstruction starts?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNC-I Concept</th>
<th>OPERATION BLACK SHAMROCK</th>
<th>Cross-LOO Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Concept of the Operation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support IIEU in engaging key informants and</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. MNC-I partners with the IIEU,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding local leadership and</td>
<td></td>
<td>assessing the potential for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engaging local leadership and key</td>
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<td>providing suitable</td>
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<td>stakeholders and dispute</td>
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<td>advice to</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>improve security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support MNC-I in delivering</td>
<td></td>
<td>conditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>support to key partners in</td>
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<td>facilitating the delivery of</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Assess IIEU's</td>
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<tr>
<td>a comprehensive, coordinated</td>
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<td>capability and the</td>
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<tr>
<td>strategy to the local</td>
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<td>relations and increase in</td>
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<td>confidence.</td>
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<td>financial resource</td>
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</table>

**Key Tasks:**

2. Support IIEU in facilitating the delivery of a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to the local leadership to enhance relations and increase confidence.

3. Improve security conditions.

4. Assess IIEU's capability and the potential for enhancing the capability and financial resource.
MSR Tampa Security – 4/4 IA

4/4 IA Update:
- BNs completed retraining at K1 in Fall '07.
- 1/4/4 IA relocated from Al Muthanna to PB north of Samarra.
- 2/4/4 IA relocated to Al Muthanna in Baghdad
- 4/4 IA still working officer shortages.

MSR Tampa CPs:
- Funded contract for 25 total hardened CPs.
- $2.2M awarded.
- Work began late Oct 07 and completed in early Jan.
- Initial 13 completed early (were due in Dec 07).
- Next 12 completed in Jan.
### Samarra Operations Command

**Significant Issues**
- Not recognized or resourced by MOD or MOI.
- No operating budget.
- Comms package installation complete by mid-Feb.
- No TT established yet, but COA approved by CG.
Weekly Attacks in Samarra

Source: SIGACTS III

- PBIED
- IED
- Indirect Fire/Mortars
- Small Arms
- VBIED
- Other

Attacks


76
In the last 30 days there have been 2 x IDF, 12 x DF, 6 x IEDs FIC, and 10 x IED ctes.

These attacks resulted in 18x CF targeted and 3x ISF targeted as well as 3x ISF WIA and 2x CF WIA.

The closest attacks to the area in question were an effective IED on 28DEC07 wounding 1x IP and an IDF attack (4x rounds) on the Golden Mosque on 27DEC07 resulting in 2x IA WIA. There was also 1x IED found and cleared near PB Olsen.
KEY TERMINOLOGY:

PRT is an advisory body that provides guidance and oversight to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as it develops and implements a comprehensive strategy for reconstruction and development. PRTs are led by a military officer and consist of a team of civilian experts, military personnel, and local officials.

PRTs at a Glance:

- Total PRT: 31
- US PRT: 9
- Coalition-led PRT: 13
- PRTs: 6

PRT's Location:

- Location where PST resides

Coalition-led PRT

- ePRT with BCT
- PST

BCT's mission is to support PRTs in their efforts to build capacity and support local government structures.