

SECRET//REL-MCFI

"First 100 Days" Decisions



8 February 2008

Purpose: Identify potential decisions occurring from 15 February to 1 June 2008 in order to provide continuity and situational awareness to LTG Austin

D3 Plans and Policies
(b)(3) (b)(6)
07/20/07/2008

The overall classification of this briefing is:
SECRET
REL to USA, MCFI
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL OW. X1


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 **SECRET//REL-MCFI** **"First 100 Day" Decisions** 

1. Do we commit a BN to POE security at Sheeb and Shalamshah?	C3 Plans
2. Do we change the plan to RIP 2 SCR with 4/2 SBCT?	C3 Plans
3. When does 1-8 IN return to Baghdad?	C3 Plans
4. Who should provide C ² for TF 1.4a?	C2 Plans
5. Does MND-C continue to provide 1 x BN to MND-B after 2/1 AD rips with 3/3 ID?	C3 Plans
6. Do we commit an MP Company to MND-CS for PTT support?	PMO
7. How are MRAP vehicles distributed?	FMD
8. When does MND-B align with new BOC boundaries (Baghdad Province)?	C3 FUOPS
9. How and when do we transition CLCs to GoI?	Reconciliation
10. Do we reposition Coalition Forces to Samarra?	C3 FUOPS
11. Where do ePRTs go when BCTs redeploy without backfill?	C9

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Issue: There is currently no 24 hour CF oversight of daily DBE operations at the Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (MND-SE). MNC-I may be required to internally source a battalion to provide 24 hour CF presence ISO DBE ops at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs NET 15 Mar 08. **Purpose is to interdict lethal aid from 1.4b** Enemy conditions should explain this. Use bullets to cut down on the text; put the text into the notes. Two units are FA BNs: 2-25 or 4-10 if we choose to do it.

Conditions Required:

Friendly: Requires construction of 2 COPs (1 at each LPOE). It will take 3 weeks to train internally sourced battalion.

Enemy: Threat Assessment: Despite the significant decrease in attacks in MND-SE as a result of the JAM 'Freeze', ISF security initiatives and the recent PIC, Amarah and Basrah remain significant support areas for Shi'a extremists. Any perceived attempt by CF to encroach on these areas will likely be met with fierce backlash and a significant increase in attacks against COPs/FOBs, particularly those in which US Forces are perceived to be replacing British Forces. Thus risk exists that the proposed FOBs will be quite exposed. It is probable that any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities, including many of the tribes in the area, will be met with resistance and/or retaliation.

Risks associated with Assets Required to Execute:

MND-N: Reduced CF presence to clear IVO W. Mosul and defeat AQI IVO of DRV; MND-C: Reduced CF presence to protect and overwatch pipeline and reduced capability to clear Arab Jabour and Salmon Pak and establish JSS/COPs IOT deny AQI and Shi'a Extremists sanctuary/ staging area; MND-B: Security of Baghdad is impacted by loss of battalion size TF from the security belt

End State:

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2. Do we change the plan to RIP 2 SCR with 4/2?

FACTS:

- 2 SCR is currently operating throughout Baghdad. 2 SCR will RIP with 4/2 ID as it departs the Diyala River Valley (DRV) and the ITO ~June 07
- 15 JUN 08: Planned 2 SCR & 4/2 SBCT TOA
- 25 JUN 08: 4/2 SBCT BOG

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:

- 3/1 CAV departed Diyala (MND-N) without backfill on 29 NOV 07
- MND-B will decrease from 28 to 17 BNs between DEC 07 and JUN 08. (This number assumes that 1-3 IN returns in MAY 08 to Baghdad and that all of 2 SCR deploy to Diyala)

ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- AQI will continue attempts to re-establish VBIED networks in and around Baghdad to conduct high profile attacks while using SVEST attacks to target key and influential leaders
- AQI and Shi'a extremists will continue to exploit Diyala's tribal and sectarian divisions in attempt to establish support zones and staging areas for attacks

ASSETS REQUIRED:

- Haul and lift assets to support move of 2SCR from VBC to DRV

RISKS:

- Reducing Coalition Forces too rapidly in the security districts could create instability and delay transition to overwatch in Baghdad
- Not deploying 2 SCR to DRV will leave MND-N with inadequate forces

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Full regiment departs for Diyala and relieves 4/2 ID for 15 JUN 08 TOA (Current Plan)
- Regiment (-) departs for Diyala and relieves 4/2 ID

Security Force Disposition July 2008

Total Coalition Units in DRV
Brigade Headquarters: 7
Battalion Sized Units: 6

OPR: C3 Plans
ACTO: (b)(3) (b)(6)

FEBRUARY 2008 MARCH 2008 APRIL 2008 MAY 2008

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3. When does 1-8 IN return to Baghdad?

FACTS:

- IAW Operation Phantom Phoenix, 1-8 IN released from MND-B, OPCON to MND-N to conduct operations in Mosul for a period of 60-90 days
- 1-8 IN began operations in Mosul on 15 Jan 08

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:

- 1-8 IN was scheduled to conduct operations in the Kadamiyah / Mansour security districts


ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- Though AQI will be significantly disrupted following Operation Phantom Phoenix, AQI will continue attempts to re-establish and maintain LOCs from Syria to Mosul
- AQI will continue attempts to re-establish staging areas and conduct high profile attacks in Baghdad
- MAS is most likely to extend the JAM 'freeze', currently scheduled to end late Feb, however non-compliant JAM SG will continue attacks against CF

RISK:

- MND-N unable to clear and control Mosul within 90 days
- MND-B has insufficient force to accomplish assigned tasks in Baghdad
- ISF adequate to maintain security in Mosul

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATION: Conduct assessment c/a 15 March 2008 on conditions in Mosul and conditions in Baghdad to determine way ahead, priority to MND-B



OPR: C3 Plans
ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)



Good afternoon Sir, [b 3, b 6], C3 Plans.

The third topic for the 100 day decision briefing is the decision to redeploy 1-8 Infantry from MND-North to MND-Baghdad.

As part of Operation Phantom Phoenix, 1-8 Infantry was released from MND-Baghdad and OPCONNED to MND-North for a period of 60-90 days to conduct CLEAR – CONTROL – RETAIN operations in Mosul. Thus, according to plan, 1-8 Infantry would either redeploy to Baghdad some time between 15 March and 15 April 2008.

The decision to redeploy 1-8 Infantry centers around two sets of conditions: enemy activity in Mosul, and enemy activity in Baghdad. Enemy conditions that might warrant redeployment to Baghdad, from the Northern perspective, include indications of disrupted AQI lines of communication from Syria, indications of disrupted AQI staging areas, and reduction of high-profile attacks in Ninewa Province. SLIDE 40. Enemy conditions in Baghdad that might hasten redeployment of 1-8 Infantry include increase in high-profile attacks in Kadamiyah, lifting of the “JAM FREEZE”, increase in planned operations in Sadr City, or increase in IED activity in Baghdad overall. SLIDE 41.

Sir, the staff recommendation is to continue current operations and stay on current plan; conduct a formal assessment of enemy conditions in both Baghdad and in Mosul on or about 1 March 2008, in preparation for the decision to either redeploy 1-8 Infantry to Baghdad or let it remain in Mosul.

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4. Who Should Provide C² for Task Force 1.4a?



FACTS:

- TF 1.4a is a unique organization developed to support IED defeat operations; TF 1.4a assets are Corps level assets
- TF 1.4a is assigned to MNC-I; attached to 1 CAB, MND-N
- Several TF 1.4a assets are apportioned per MNC-I CG priorities to MNDs; some remain GS MNC-I to flex as necessary
- Dynamic re-tasking of TF 1.4a assets requires C3 (CHOPS) approval
- TF 1.4a is often dynamically re-tasked across MNDs
- TF 1.4a is currently deployed to COB Speicher

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:

- MNC-I CDR's priority for ISR support is MND-B and belts, MND-N, MND-C, CJSOTF, MNF-W, MND-SE, MND-CS, MND-NE
- MNC-I collection priorities are: Counter-IED/Cache, Target Development (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic), Sectarian Activity (includes Violence, institutional corruption or criminal activity), Infiltration routes (includes border crossing and routes within Iraq)

ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- IED attacks continue to remain constant or decline
- EFP attacks increase


RISK: Administrative impact to change C2 relationship

END STATE

- TF 1.4a employed best to support MNC-I operations

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATION:

- MNC-I (BFSB) controls TF 1.4a
- MNC-I (TF 49 CAB) controls TF 1.4a
- MND-N retains control of TF 1.4a



OPR: C2 Plans

ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)



The purpose of this decision is to determine the most effective command relationship for TF 1.4a

TF 1.4a is a unique, Corps Level, asset funded by JIEDDO in response to theater requirements for additional ISR (FMV, MTE, and Change detection). TF 1.4a is currently assigned to MNC-I and attached to the 1 CAB in MND-N. TF 1.4a assets are employed based on the MNC-I Commander's Priorities and are apportioned or allocated to the MNDs based on the Corps Commander's collection priorities. The assets are then pushed down to the BCT level for collection execution in support of operations.


Any change to TF 1.4a C2 relationship would have no operational risk. Three COAs for the C2 of TF 1.4a are:

MNC-I BsFB –Main advantages are that the BsFB are already familiar with these types of assets, how they operate and the ISR mission. They currently have C2 of the AEB which has some of the same platforms and contractual agreements for maintenance etc. (Guardrail and ARMS are both C-12 and IGNAT and Warrior A are similar Aircraft).

MNC-I AVN BDE-Familiar with this unit as an Aviation unit.

Maintain the current C2 relationship-Disadvantage is that the assets of this unit are controlled by MNC-I and constantly crosses MND-N's battle space.

There is currently no timeline associated with this decision.



1. 2/1 AD RIP with 3/3 ID begins
2. 2/1 AD TOA with 3/3 ID complete
3. 1 Jun – Polish Fce ceases Ops in MND-CS
4. 15 Jul 2/3 BCT departs MND-C

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6. Do we commit an MP Company to MND-CS for PTT support?



FACTS:

- Operation Silver Lever was planned in November and December 2007 to assess the security situation of the province. Key findings include:
 - 8,854 total IPs authorized for Qadisiyah Province
 - 9,838 IPs on the payroll
 - 6,908 IPs physically on hand
 - Several thousand of the IPs are ghosts. Ghost personnel are WIA/KIA, working as PSD for senior officials, or just collecting a paycheck and not reporting for work
 - The amount of PTTs currently assigned to the Province of Qadisiyah does not allow the team to conduct their primary mission of training IPs in Policing skills
 - IP Stations: 1 Provincial; 6 District; 27 Local stations

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:


- IPs will not develop without PTT support
- MND-CS unable to source PTT internally

ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- Diwaniyah remains the centre of gravity for Qadisiyah Province and a traditional hub for smuggling and the flow of lethal aid to Baghdad
- Criminal elements of JAM SGs rely on intimidation of IPs and leadership to maintain FOM
- Although recently forced out of Diwaniyah following successful operations, criminal JAM SG elements are anxious to return for reprisal

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Re-allocate the 511th MP Platoon back to its parent company at FOB Delta
- Re-allocate a full MP company to Qadisiyah to conduct PTT operations



OPR: PMO
ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)



Issue: To provide the IAG CG information concerning PTT coverage in Qadisiyah Province and the capital city of Diwaniyah.

DISCUSSION POINTS.

- C3 Plans has included in its 100 days brief for 18th ABC the recommendation to move an MP company to Qadisiyah to conduct PTT operations.
- Operation Silver Lever was planned in November and December 07 to assess the security situation of the province. Key findings from FUOPS, PMO and C3 ISF which has been briefed to the MNC-I commander was the need for an MP company to conduct PTT operations with the Provincial IPs
- IP Stations: 1 Provincial; 6 District; 27 Local stations
- IP Numbers:

Total IPs authorized for the Province: 8,854 Total Payroll O/H number: 9,838

Estimate 6,908 are physically O/H (30% of the IPs are estimated ghosts)

Estimate 3500 IPs are in Dwiniyah (5000 on the payroll, minus the 30%)

Ghost personnel are WIA/KIA, working as PSD for senior officials, or just collecting a paycheck and not reporting for work.

- ORA/PSMR data was not collected for June through November due to the security situation in June and July; and the movement of the 984th MP company to FOB Delta from Aug-Nov 07.

- Assessments by the 984th MP Plt (3 PTT Tms) were started again for inclusion into the Dec 07 ORA report.

 - 1 assessing the PHQ

 - 1 assessing 2 LPS in Diwaniyah

 - 1 conducting biometrics on current IP personnel

3. **ASSESSMENT.** The amount of PTTs currently assigned to the Province of Qadissiyah does not allow the team to conduct their primary mission of training IPs in Policing skills.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Re-allocate the 984th Plt back to its parent company at FOB Delta.

- Re-allocate a full MP company to Qadissiyah to conduct PTT operations

- Assign a field grade officer to the ISF Cell to be the Provincial liaison to the PDoP and MND-CS senior leadership.

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7. How are MRAP Vehicles Distributed?

FACTS:

- MRAP vehicles issued based on threat. Every two months, CG approves adjusted threat-based distribution plan
- This is DP 3 of the MRAP Plan. DP 2 published 9 Jan 2008

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:

- Coordination between MNC-I C3 FMD and subordinate staffs

ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- Underbelly IED threat analysis (COIC)

ASSETS REQUIRED:


- MRAP fielding site personnel
- Predictable flow on MRAP into theater
- Haul assets to move MRAP from APOD to some sites

RISK:

- Late decision by MNC-I will cause interruption of MRAP via Strategic Airlift
- Lack of haul assets may influence fielding execution

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:


- UAH replaced by MRAP on one-for-one basis, currently moving toward 2/3 replacement



OPR: C3 FMD
ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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BOC established in early 2007 with a unique AOR – MOA signed March 07

Working the last 7 Months to adjust BOC boundary to equal province

Dec 07 agreement between Mod, BOC, and IGFC for BOC to equal the province. BOC, MoD and IGFC with CF advice and assistance working the plan to facilitate the BOC having Command and control over the increased area.

As we continue forward in Iraq – many of the initiatives fall within provincial boundaries and have a provincial focus. Having CF boundaries align with provincial boundaries, facilitates operations across multiple Lines of Operations.

MND-B = BOC = Baghdad Province facilitates these operations with the MNC-I main effort. Facilitates partnership.

Security Loo

IA and CF in the same AO

NP AO contained in the province

IP districts provincially based

Governance

Detailed analysis red for CF force ratios for the area. However, MND-B = BOC = Province does make sense and additional planning should occur to timeline out when this should occur and the forces that will be stationed in the province.

4/9 IA (-) IOT control Tarmiyah and Mushahadah.

3/4/1 QRF located in Victory and Peace area.

3/5/4 located at Karkh WTP.

2/4/4 IA BN in Muthana (Samara BDE). Original MOD Order incorrectly listed two companies from 1/4/4.

Specified Tasks:

Send BN from 4/9 to Ninawa (Mosul) IOT enforce security and order.

2/2/1 NP will move out of current location in Al Bayjiya Camp to Rusafa Command. RAC will assume command of 2/2/1 NP. KAC interpreted this to mean that 2/2/1 Carabinieri training was cancelled. BOC OPS says 2/2/1 will attend Carabinieri Training.


NLT 030600FEB08 1/6/2 NP conduct Recon of 2/2/1 AOR (Muhalla 649) IOT prepare for battle handover of 2/2/1 NP AO to Commando Company 6/2 NP.

NLT 030600FEB08 Commando Company 6/2 NP will assume control of 2/2/1 AOR (Muhalla 649).

NLT 030600FEB08 2/2/1 NP will facilitate Recon conducted by replacement units.

NLT 080600FEB08 4/1/6 IA will assume control of Commando Company 6/2 NP, Al Ghazaliyah, Muhalla 649, Um Al Qura Mosque, its surrounding areas, and the expressway.

NLT 100600FEB08 2/1 NP will move out of current location in Al Bayjiya Camp to RAC. RAC assumes control of 2-1 NP.



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10. Do we reposition Coalition Forces to Samarra?



FACTS:

- Initial focus was force generation of SOC, Samarra NP Bde, and 4/4 IA.
- Focus has shifted to mosque reconstruction projected to begin early 2008 (Feb-Mar) with UNESCO sponsored site survey.
- Given the importance of this shrine, the project will generate media attention and will have a strategic impact on the overall mission.
- This project is a GOI initiative, partially funded by UNESCO, and coalition forces must maintain an active supporting role.

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS:

- 4/4 IA continues to operate 20+ checkpoints along MSR TAMPA from N. Baghdad to Samarra.
- 1/101 AASLT continues to operate in Salah ad Din.

ENEMY CONDITIONS:

- Reports of increased AQI presence in the area or credible threats to the shrine and contractors involved in reconstruction.

ASSETS REQUIRED:

- MND-N dedicates an advisory team to the Samarra Ops Command. Possibly need to increase permanent number of CF operating IVO Samarra (current strength is 1 x CF Company) to conduct area security and allow ISF to focus on security in Samarra.

RISK:


- Another attack on the shrine, especially during construction, would cause Iraqis to view the ISF as ineffective and generate sectarian violence.

END STATE

- GOI supported by CF, but fully in the lead; AQI prevented from disrupting project.

RECOMMENDATION

- Dedicate an advisory team to the Samarra Ops Command now. Based on the threat, increase permanent number of CF in the Samarra area when the mosque reconstruction site survey begins.



Sir, the next decision we'll cover concerns the repositioning of coalition forces to Samarra. As more attention is placed on the GOI commitment to reconstruct the Al-Askariya shrine in the heart of the Samarra, there will be increased emphasis placed on maintaining security in Samarra and the surrounding area.

Background: After UNESCO committed to sponsoring the reconstruction effort and hired a Turkish company to lead the reconstruction effort that will begin with a 10 month site survey of the shrine area when security permits. As a result, the PM took action in Dec 06 to authorize the formation of a National Police and Iraqi Army brigade. Their mission is to provide security in Samarra (NP Bde) and along MSR Tampa between Baghdad and Samarra (IA Bde). Both brigades have completed training and are operating in Samarra and along MSR Tampa today. In Jun 07, following the second attack in the Golden Mosque, the PM authorized the establishment of the Samarra Ops Command to provide C2 over both brigades and local police in Samarra. He also directed an additional IA battalion (4/1/4 IA) to move to Samarra and provide security at the mosque and Dam in Samarra. This unit also falls under control of the SOC. Currently the SOC

Security forces are currently deployed in Samarra as depicted on the slide, with the NP Bde and 4/1/4 IA making up the primary forces in the city. 4/4 IA is deployed out of three basing sites between Samarra and Baghdad and occupying 25 checkpoints along MSR Tampa between the two cities. 1 x CF Company, 2-327 IN operates out of PB Olsen in the northwest corner of the city.

Security in Samarra is currently stabilized with attacks and casualties remaining low, however the threat to the shrine and UNESCO-sponsored workers is expected to increase when work begins. The importance of the Shrine to Shi'a Muslims and the significance of its destruction as a catalyst for violence in 2006 makes it a natural target for AQI.

Though they have struggled making progress, the GOI is placing more emphasis on getting the reconstruction effort off the ground. A GOI-led trip is taking place today (6 Feb) in Samarra with GOI, UNESCO, and MNF-I leaders to discuss security with SOC leadership, support requirements for the reconstruction team, and the overall reconstruction timeline. The current estimate for the arrival of the Turkish reconstruction team and the beginning of the site survey is 1 March.

As this date approaches it is important to ensure the Samarra Ops Command is capable of controlling forces in Samarra. LTG Odierno recently approved a course of action to establish an advisory team in the SOC (SOCAT) taking from existing MiTT and NPPTs in the Samarra area. This SOCAT must be established immediately. Additionally, it may be necessary to look at repositioning additional CF assets in the Samarra area in order to allow the SOC and ISF in Samarra to focus inward on security of the shrine and city, while CF focus outwardly on security of the surrounding area focused on enemy safehavens and attack staging bases.

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11. Where do ePRTs go when the BCTs redeploy without backfill?

FACTS:

- 2 BCTs redeploying without backfill (2/82 ABN, 1/3 ID)
- BCTs provide security, logistic and operational support to the ePRTs
- **OPTIONS:** remain in place, change physical basing location or merge with another ePRT/ PRT. Decision is conditions based

ASSETS REQUIRED:

- If ePRT is maintained or relocated, they require:
 - Sufficient forces (per MOA) for movement security
 - Sufficient Static Security Forces (contract or military)
 - Logistic support to ePRTs at proposed location
 - IT/Comms support for ePRT at proposed locations

RISK: Level of support can not decrease as BCTs reduce in number. Relocation/elimination of ePRT leaves possible void in the area with respect to the ability to actively engage civil leaders and manage on-going projects. Isolated or separated teams

END STATE: A stable Iraq with a fully functioning political and governmental structures, and a developing economy

OPTIONS/RECOMMENDATION :

Recommend that ePRTs remain in place and be supported by new US battlespace owners – may need to pair ePRTs with Battalions in some locations

OPR: C8
ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Comments

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Multi-National Corps - Iraq



Battalion for 24 hr CF Presence at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah Land POEs

The overall classification of this briefing is:
SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI//MR
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL. ON: X1

16

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RC7
1544 (b)(3), b)(d)

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Sheeb and Shalamshah POE Threat Assessment

Overall threat IVO Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs is Medium

Summary: The Muqtada Al-Sadr (MAS) "freeze", General Mohan's and General Jalil's security initiatives, PIC and British troop levels diminishing have all contributed to a dramatic decrease in attacks in MND-SE since Aug '07.

- Shi'a Extremist Groups**
 - Shi'a Extremist Groups present the main threat to CF in MND-SE. Reporting indicates the movement of senior JAM commanders from Najaf and Diwaniyah into Al Amarah and Basra City, along with the 80 IRGC members transferring into Basra City to support JAM militia in anticipation of an expected ISF offensive and establishment of some defensive positions in key JAM areas.
- Sheeb**
 - Well established facilitation networks and corruption among border enforcement officials allow smugglers to circumvent border security efforts.
 - Various reporting indicates weapons and oil are being smuggled across the border.
 - Several sources report IRGC and Iranian Intelligence members are infiltrating the border, in order to conduct operations in Iraq as well as to facilitate cross border movement of personnel and weapons.
- Shalamshah**
 - The Shalamshah POE is a heavily smuggled route and is a focal point for EFP's, weapons and foreign fighters coming from Iran into South East Iraq.
- Maysan Marshes**
 - The Maysan Marshes continue to present a significantly viable alternate route between the two POEs due to the rugged terrain and difficulty in surveillance.

MND-SE Attack Comparisons

Month	UK RET	COB	Ereze	FOBs
Jul 07	High	Low	Low	Low
Aug 07	High	Low	Low	Low
Sep 07	High	Low	Low	Low
Oct 07	High	Low	Low	Low
Present	Low	Low	Low	Low

MAJOR TRIBES

- Bani Malik
- Bubiyeet
- Bani Lami
- Garemaha & Saadin
- Suweid
- Abu Muhammed

Assessment: Despite the significant decrease in attacks in MND-SE as a result of the JAM 'freeze', ISF security initiatives and the recent PIC, Amarah and Basrah remain significant support areas for Shi'a extremists. Any perceived attempt by CF to encroach on these areas will likely be met with fierce backlash and a significant increase in attacks against COPs/FOBs, particularly those in which US Forces are perceived to be replacing British Forces. Thus risk exists that the proposed FOBs will be quite exposed. It is probable that any attempt to interdict or interrupt the activities of those engaged in smuggling activities, including many of the tribes in the area, will be met with resistance and/or retaliation.

TF 1.4a MND-SE Threat Assessment Sep 07, CACE Sep 07 Monthly Report, MND-SE

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 ~~SECRET//REL-MCFI~~ **Background** 

- ▲ The security along the 1.4b Iraq border is generally poor and, in some cases, non-existent. Formal border crossing posts are easily bypassed. Small boats easily make the crossing from one country to the other through waterways crossing the major and minor marshes straddling the border. **The established border crossing posts for Basrah and al-Amarrah are ineffective and easily circumvented by smugglers, enabled by corruption, inefficiency, cross-border tribal ties and hundreds of years of smuggling tradition. The border crossing post for al-Amarrah, known as Al Sheeb, is one of the most important entry points into Iraq for illicit material, including lethal aid.**
- ▲ MNF-I and the GoI efforts are ongoing to accomplish the twelve major goals of the 2007 National Border Control Strategy (NBCS.) The strategy to secure the Iraqi borders consists of four phases which overlap with one another as tasks in earlier phases are completed:
 - Phase 1: Secure specified western land POEs (Iraq-Syria) and Baghdad International Airport
 - **Phase 2: Secure specified eastern land POEs (Iraq)**
 - Phase 3: Secure specified air and sea POEs
 - Phase 4: Secure remaining POEs and continued upgrade of all POEs
- ▲ Completion of Phase 2 is achieved when the 1.4b land POEs are fully capable of disrupting the efforts of foreign terrorists and criminals and able to process travelers/passengers, inspect cargo, and efficiently collect revenues. Initial operating capability is reached by having fully functional PISCES, BAT/HIDE, Iraqi AFIS, and Backscatter systems per the MTO&E as well as continuous 'permanent presence' CF manning and monitoring.
- ▲ To date MND-SE has not conducted 'Permanent Presence' operations rather they have elected to conduct BDE Level J2 led 'Pulse' operations onto the Border focusing on POEs and known crossing sites using man and ISR assets. Recent operations (Operation Certain Shield) have been executed with the intent to understand, demonstrate, interdict, deter, and ultimately disrupt.
- ▲ **To achieve MNF-I Commanders 'Permanent Presence' of CF is required.**

18
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Shalamshah POE



1. Operations to Date:
Operation Certain Shield (Pulse Opns)
a. 9-19 SEP - Understand/Demonstrate
b. 19-21 SEP 07 - Deter/Disrupt/Demonstrate
c. 27 SEP - 04 OCT - Understand/Demonstrate
d. 16-25 OCT 07 - Deter/Disrupt/Demonstrate

**2. Forces to Implement CDR's Intent –
"PRESENCE":**

a. BNTAC (-) S3 or XO

- (1) 1 x Rifle Company
- (2) 1 x Q37
- (3) Forward Log Element (FLE)
- (4) 1 x Combat Outpost
- (5) 1 x JLENS
- (6) 3 x 105 or 155 mm batteries
- (7) Tactical 14c Team (-)
- (8) PSYOP Team (-)
- (9) EOD
- (10) 1 x VSAT

**3. SOW pending approval from Mol
to build**

a. Est. \$3,700,000 to support 180 PAX COP

Shalamshah COP

1.4a

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Al Sheeb POE 

1. Operations to Date:

- a. OP Certain Shield
 - (1) 03-07 NOV 07 - Understand/Demonstrate
 - (2) 10-13 NOV 07 - Interdict/Demonstrate

2. Forces to Implement CDR's Intent – "PRESENCE"

- a. BN (-)
 - (1) 1 x Q37
 - (2) Forward Logistics Element (FLE)
 - (3) 1 x Combat Outpost
 - (4) 1 x JLENS
 - (5) 1 x 105 or 155 mm BTRY
 - (6) Dedicated MEDEVAC as 'outside golden hour'
 - (7) FWD Surgical Team (-) with doctor
 - (8) Tactical 1.4c Team (-)
 - (9) PSYOP Team (-)
 - (10) EOD
 - (11) Engineer RTE Clearance section
 - (12) 1 x VSAT

1.4a

3. SOW pending approval from Mol to build

- a. Est. \$3,700,000 to support 180 PAX COP

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Facts and Assumptions

- ⚡ **(F) There is currently no 24 hour CF oversight of daily DBE operations at the Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs (MND-SE)**
- ⚡ **(A) MNC-I will be required to internally source a battalion to provide 24 hour CF presence ISO DBE ops at Al Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs NET 15 Mar 08.**
- ⚡ **(F) Requires construction of 2 COPs (1 at each POE)**
- ⚡ **(A) It will take 3 weeks to train internally sourced battalion**

Constraints

- ⚡ **Must source from forces in theater.**
- ⚡ **Embedded enablers will be limited to what the parent brigade can provide.**

21
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 ~~SECRET//REL//MCF~~ **Risks** 

- ✧ Battalion from MND-N
 - Reduced CF presence to clear IVO W. Mosul and defeat AQI IVO of DRV
 - Reduced CF presence to protect and overwatch pipeline and associated infrastructure (Bayji / Kirkuk Corridor) coupled with less capability to develop ISF (train/ mentor, advise, partner)
- ✧ Battalion from MND-C
 - Loss of a BN from MND-C reduces its capability to clear Arab Jabour and Salmon Pak and establish JSS/COPs IOT deny AQI and Shi'a Extremists sanctuary/ staging area
- ✧ Battalion from MND-B
 - Security of Baghdad is impacted by loss of battalion size TF from the security belt
 - Slows continued operations to defeat VBIED networks IVO Baghdad

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
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 ~~SECRET//REL-MCFI~~ **Recommendation** 


- Option 1: Battalion from 4/10 IBCT*
- Option 2: Stryker Battalion from 2/25 SBCT*

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
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Way Ahead

- * **Completed Actions**
 - Letter of Justification
 - AT/FP Assessment
 - Independent Government Estimate
 - Statement of Work for construction
 - Contractor Cost Estimates (Al Shalamsha: \$2.24)
 - Contractor Cost Estimates (Al Sheeb: \$ 2.26)

- * **Ongoing Actions**
 - Land Permit from Land Owner
 - Shalamsha packet is at Joint Facility Utilization Board since 28 NOV 07.
 - Al Sheeb packet will be forwarded to Theater Provided Equipment 4 DEC 07

- * **Way Ahead**
 - Submit packets to JFUB: 4 to 14 days
 - Spend Plan on 21 DEC
 - Awarded funds on 5 JAN
 - Contract Office & Contractor site visit: approx. 14 days
 - Vendor awarded contractor: approx. **19 JAN - Drop Dead Date**
 - EDC for entire Omni bus contract: 1 March

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The Plan and Problem Statement



✧ Given the operational importance of and threat assessments for both Baghdad and the Diyala River Valley (DRV), how does MNC-I allocate forces between Diyalah and Baghdad?

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Facts and Assumptions

✦ **Facts:**

- 3/1 CAV departed Diyala (MND-N) on 29 November 2007
- RIP/ TOA between 4/2 IN (redeploying) and 2 SCR (currently in Baghdad) is scheduled for 15 June 2008
- While MND - B is the Corps main effort, activity in Diyala feeds/ enables IEDs, VBIEDS, EFPs, weapons and other accelerants of violence in Baghdad
- MND-B will decrease from 28 to 17 BNs between December 2007 and June 2008
- 2SCR is currently operating throughout Baghdad, in Rashid, Karkh, Adamiyah, Abu Ghraib, Taji, and Kadamiyah
- 3/2 SCR deployed to DRV 20 December 2007 as the OPRES and is currently performing clearing IVO Himbis and Sinsil ISO Raider Harvest

✦ **Assumptions:**

- Provinces outside Baghdad and Diyala will not require permanent reinforcement
- Security situation in Diyala will still require at least a BCT (-) following the departure of 4/2 IN in June/ July 2008
- 1-8 IN will return to MND-B following operation in Mosul ISO Operation Phantom Phoenix on or about May 2008 (conditions based)

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
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Baghdad
JAN 08



Key Indicators of Regression:

- JAM and JAM-SG ceasefire ends; significant increase of attacks against CF/ISF
- Intra-Shia violence escalates
- CLC regress and turn toward sectarian violence due to frustration over perceived Gol sectarianism
- Gradual increase of spectacular attacks; AQI capabilities within the Baghdad security districts increases



AQI Network Assessment:

- Baghdad networks in reorganization phase following detainment of C2 node elements
- Attacks to increase following restructuring
- SV/BIED attacks likely to focus on large Shia LN crowds; primarily in eastern Baghdad
- AQI will attempt to reestablish themselves in East Rashid IOT facilitate a link into Arab Jabour and Southern belt
- Continue attempts to conduct catastrophic attacks IOT further IO and maintain presence

Shia Assessment:


- Mainstream JAM continue freeze
- Expect continued low attack levels as Sadr directs restructuring of JAM to replace leaders not following his directives
- Increased attacks by non-compliant JAM SG elements
- Continued low attack levels through Ashura and Arbbaeen

Trending is currently positive but still potentially reversible:


- + Sectarian violence is reduced but tensions remain
- + Sunni inclusion; Rejectionists more interested in negotiating inclusion than violent resistance
- + AQI remains isolated as common enemy but still a credible threat

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
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
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Comments


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


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1-8 IN Re-integration



Control- A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy. (FM 1-02)

Interdict- A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy's use of an area or route. (FM 1-02)

Disrupt- A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 1-02)

Isolate- A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 1-02)

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 **Falcon Command and Control** 

BCT
1-2 SCR is OPCON to 2nd BCT
Upon return, 1-8 IN will be attached to 3/4 ID


MiTT & NPTT
NPTT #6143 for 3/4/1 NP (CALLAHAN) is attached
MiTT #1130 for 3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OOH from 4-10 MTN)
MiTT #1131 for 1/3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OOH from 4-10 MTN)
MiTT #1133 3/3/11 IA (HOPE) is attached (OOH from 4-10 MTN)
NPTT #6131 for 1/3/1 NP (Numaniyah) is attached

PTT
2/108th MP are PTTs for Shaab Stations, cross functional team partner
132nd MP are PTTs for Sadr City station, cross functional team partner

ISF Partnership
3/4/1 NP partnered with 1-8 IN
3/11 IA and subordinates are partnered with 1-2 SCR

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4. Who Should Provide C² for Task Force 1.4a

BACK UP

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Pages 49 through 51 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4a, 1.4g

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Slides with Additional Detail

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Elements remaining with MND-C	Elements allocated to MND-B: Bn (-)
<p>A Coy – Task: Infantry role. Attached to 1-76 FA route security along MSR Tampa.</p> <p>B Coy – Task: Infantry role. Attached to 1-187</p>	<p>HQ – C2 for Bn patrolling within 4/10 Mtn Bde AO on East side of river.</p> <p>C Coy – Task: full spectrum COIN. Composition: Mix M1 & Bradley. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</p> <p>D Coy – Task: full spectrum COIN. Composition: Mix M1 & Bradley. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</p> <p>Engr Coy – Task: route clearance. Operating as part of 4/10 Mtn</p> <p>Scouts & Mortars – scouts part of ORF, mortars JSS/COP security</p>

5/1 of 504th (Light Inf) is attached to MND-B alms of 2/69AR to form a TF within 4/10 Mtn Bde.

51

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Troop to Task Overview 2-69 AR within MND-B

Tasks to 4/10 MTN

- 10. In partnership with RPF, Control the Revolta, Kinshasa, and New-Belgium Security Districts to protect the population and set conditions for Iraq Control
- 16. In partnership with RPF and through reconciliation, assist the AQI and Shia extremists moving through BCT security districts to Deny AQI and Shia Extremist freedom of movement, and Reduce flow of resources in Baghdad
- 304. In partnership with ICF and through reconciliation, Eliminate Shia Extremists to Prevent the resurgence of sectarian violence and Deny extremist's ability to co-opt the reconciliation population
- 306. Train, advise, and enable 101 IA, 471 IA, and 471 XP to improve their capacity to conduct COIN operations
- 308. Resurface 1 x GDC MOTT (011 IA) and 3 x BN MOTT (011 IA, 1011 IA, and 3011 IA); RPT resurface 1 x BDE MOTT and 1 x BN MOTT for Presidential Brigade as it completes Force Generation
- 309. Provide Soldiers to augment Transition Teams operating within OE (02 ID currently providing 51 Soldiers)
- 310. Influence reconciliation through engagement of key governmental, tribal, and religious leaders to enable political compromise, unite opposing factions, and reject AQI and Iranian influence
- 311. Secure FOB Riverton, FOB Loyalty, and CP-occupied COP and JSS
- 312. Secure and operate OHAU located on FOB Riverton
- 313. Protect key LOCs within OE, priority is to Routes Pisto, Predators, and Bhowra
- 314. Determine ICF protection of key infrastructure within OE
- 315. Synchronize CPT and CMO efforts to improve the capacity of local government and municipalities
- 316. Advance security improvements, increase municipal capability, and stimulate local economic growth utilizing a variety of funding sources in conjunction with other governmental agencies
- 317. Conduct information operations to reinforce reconciliation efforts and degrade popular support of violent activities


Troop To Task

- SCT/2-69 AR – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33% QRF
- MTR/2-69 AR – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33%
- JSS/COP Security
- 4 Armor Plts and 1 Mech Plt – 66% Clear/Control/Retain, 33% JSS/COP Security
- 1 Mech Plt – 100% JSS/COP Security
- This unit represents 12% of 4/10's current combat power.
- After March, when 2/82 departs, 2-69 AR is about 15% of 4/10's combat power.


4/10 MTN Operational Environment (Security District Transition)

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
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
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
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
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PTTs Assigned to each Non-PIC Province

<i>Province</i>	<i>MND</i>	<i>PTTs Assigned</i>	<i>Total Stations</i>	<i>PTT to Station Ratio</i>	<i>IPs Authorized</i>	<i>IPs Assigned</i>
Anbar	MNF-W	71	128	1:1.8	24,000	22,116
Baghdad	MND-B	101	140	1:1.4	39,393	33,797
Babil	MND-C	8	57	1:7	11,836	9,265
Wasit	MND-C	4	39	1:10	10,315	10,376
Ninewah	MND-N	18	100	1:5.5	24,387	21,822
Salah ah Din	MND-N	31	77	1:2.5	15,650	14,350
Tamim	MND-N	11	36	1:3	11,939	8,749
Diyala	MND-N	19	56	1:3	19,361	15,813
Qadissiyah	MND-CS	3	34	1:10	8,854	9,838
TOTAL		266	667	1:2.5	165,735	146,126

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
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
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
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
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


Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.

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This slide shows the forecast disposition of the IA on 31 Jul 08. By then the IA will comprise 12 Divisions, 47 Brigades and 153 Battalions at FOC or better. The 1st Presidential Brigade will have been generated and plans for the integration of 2 Peshmerga Divisions will have become a reality. This total includes 9 of the former SIBs that will have completed training and will have transitioned to the IA as IAIB, leaving 8 to train and transition. Finally, the new EOD Regiment and the Infrastructure Repair Battalion will be in place.

Further equipment will have been fielded: Badger fielding will be complete by end 07, 110 BMP 1 will have been purchased to equip 3 IA BNs (probably in 5, 6 and 11 Divisions) and 251 ECM sets will be issued in early 08. M16/M4 fielding to 3, 6, 8, 9 DIV and 3/1 BDE will be complete and fielding of 60mm mortar could be achieved. Finally MRAP delivery may make HWMMV/UAH available for the IA and ~320 x 120mm mortars could be available.


This equipment delivery is not without implications – greater tactical mobility will result in greater demand for fuel; additional BMP battalions may result in a demand for operational mobility that is beyond the IA and 120mm mortars bring obvious requirements for FDC, tactical communications, interoperability and air-space control.

The ML and MDCOA briefed earlier highlighted the implications of sectarianism and militia influence and these will remain the greatest threat to IA acceptability.

Finally, the identified systemic issues (the lack of NCOs and officers and logistic support) will continue to hamper IA development and effectiveness.

UNITS NOT AT FOC AUG 08

Unit	FOC	Future Location
4/2/2 IA	TBD	Mosul?
4/3 IA	TBD	Ninewah
4/3/2 IA	TBD	TBD (IAIB)
4/4/2 IA	TBD	Mosul?
4/3/4 IA	TBD	Sulayminiyah
12 IA	TBD	Tikrit
1/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Hijil (IAIB)
4/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Bakara (IAIB)
5/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Ryath (IAIB)
2/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Hathir (IAIB)
3/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Asmida (IAIB)
5/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Synia (IAIB)
5/3/6 IA	TBD	Mahmudiyah (IAIB)
4/14 IA	TBD	Basrah



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
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


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
MNC-I Concept	OPERATION BLACK SHAMROCK Concept of the Operation	Cross-LOO Support
<p>Purpose: Support ISF in securing key sites and infrastructure in Samarra and routes leading into the city, support GOI efforts to revitalize Samarra including the reconstruction of the Golden Mosque, and facilitate the reduction of sectarian tensions through reconciliation.</p> <p>Key Tasks:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support ISF in securing the Golden Mosque, Samarra Dam, and key locations and routes in the city. 2. Support ISF in securing MBR Tampa between Baghdad and Samarra and construction convoys hauling material to rebuild the mosque. 3. Assist IGFC in establishing the Samarra Operations Command (SOC). 4. Facilitate the unification of key groups (VO Samarra) through engagement and support through security, essential services, and economic revitalization. 5. ICW SaD PRT and StratEff Econ, track and support the implementation of planned reconstruction and revitalization projects in Samarra. <p>Endstate: ISF is capable of the command and control of ISF in Samarra and along key routes leading to the city. ISF provides adequate security to begin economic revitalization and reconstruction. Mosque reconstruction begins and continues without disruption.</p> <p>Concept of the Operation: PHASE 1: UNESCO Site Survey Estimated: Feb 08 – Nov 08 PHASE 2: Pre-Construction Period Estimated: Nov 08 – Feb 09 PHASE 3: Construction Period Estimated: Feb 09 – approx. 2012</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">1.4a</p> <p>MISSION: MNC-I partners with ISF to conduct combined security operations with ISF in the lead (VO Samarra IOT) improve security in the region, support GOI efforts to revitalize the city, rebuild the Golden Dome Mosque, and reduce sectarian tensions in the area.</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: red;">SECRET//REL US, IRQ, MOE//IR</p>	<p>Security:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MNC-I partners with the SOC, assists with security plan (SO) rebuilding of the Golden Mosque and revitalizing the city. 2. Assist ISF in establishing the SOC, capable of coordinating the employment of CF and ISF and maintaining communication with local security forces. 3. Designate air and ground ORF (SO) ISF security operations in Samarra during phases 1 and 3. 4. BPT provide enabler support to ISF. <p>Economics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ICW PRT, implement planned reconstruction and revitalization projects in Samarra IOT stimulates economic development, provide for needs of the populace, and promotes reconciliation. 2. Track and assess progress in the implementation of reconstruction and revitalization projects in Samarra. <p>Reconciliation/Engagement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capitalize on operational engagement opportunities to facilitate reconciliation in Samarra and greater SaD area. 2. Engage tribal, local, and provincial leaders to support ISF providing security and revitalization projects in Samarra. <p>IO/PAG:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Emphasize the message of Iraqis in the lead and reconciliation through IO messaging. (See IO Antex to FRAGIO) 2. Coordinate with Iraqi public affairs officers and assist in developing a media strategy. 3. Develop PAG covering reconstruction and integration issues related to reconciliation and the revitalization of Samarra.

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




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Samarra Enemy Activity – Last 30 Days



Samarra

In the last 30 days there have been 2 x IDF, 12 x DF, 6 x IEDs F/C, and 10 x IED dets.

These attacks resulted in 18x CF targeted and 3x ISF targeted as well as 3x ISF WIA and 2xCF WIA.

The closest attacks to the area in question were an effective IED on 28DEC07 wounding 1x IP and an IDF attack(4x rounds) on the Golden Mosque on 27DEC07 resulting in 2x IA WIA. There was also 1x IED found and cleared near PB Olsen.

1.4a

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
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
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
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
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