Good morning, sir. Last week you sent us back to refine the operational and threat conditions, the decision points and assumptions associated with the deployment of three BCTs to Iraq. This brief is in response to guidance received during the previous SPM.
Purpose and Agenda

Purpose: Provide the Commander operational and threat conditions for employment of 5 additional BCTs

Agenda:
- Received Guidance
- Refined Threat SITEMP
- New Operational Conditions
- Commander's Mission and Intent
- Current Friendly Set
- Refined FFIR
- Decision Points, Unit Capabilities, Deployment Timeline and Employment Options
- Comments and Guidance

Sir, this is our purpose and the agenda we will follow.
Sir, this is our understanding of guidance we received from you last week. PAUSE Sir, the blue text is my addition. I would like to confirm my interpretation of task four. On the subsequent slide I will lay out the guidance I heard at the Intelligence Fusion brief last week.
Received Guidance
(Intel Fusion Brief)

- To secure Baghdad we have to secure the Support Zones
- I need a slide that shows threat strength in the Baghdad support zones overlaid with CF boundaries down to Battalion level
- I need a map with tribes overlaid on it

Sir, these are our take aways from the Intelligence Fusion briefing based on your guidance. Sir, what we would like to do now is frame the threat environment. I will be followed by (b)(3), (b)(6)
Page 5 redacted for the following reason:

1.4a
New Operational Conditions

- 5 BCTs (approximately 20K soldiers) and enablers are expected to deploy to the ITO to assist the ISF secure the population of Baghdad and set conditions for transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance
- Prime Minister Maliki’s recent political announcements and State of Emergency Directive demonstrate GoI willingness to make a sincere commitment to providing security for their own people
- The Baghdad Operational Command has stood up and is anticipated to be IOC by 5 Feb 07
- RFF for Division HQ has been forwarded to HQDA and is expected to arrive to alleviate command and control strain on MND-B
- Samarra mosque National Police Brigade is being formed
- A Medium Combat Aviation Brigade will deploy to Iraq

Sir, as we refined this briefing we identified some operational conditions had changed since this operation began. We show you these new operational conditions to allow you to reflect on your mission and intent, which follows this chart.
No Change

MNC-I Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with the ISF to secure Baghdad and its population in order to reduce sectarian violence and facilitate the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan [Operational Command] and the continued transition to Iraqi security self-reliance.

We began this planning effort with the problem of Baghdad’s sectarian violence in mind. The question we asked ourselves was “How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad – that is, how do we reduce the level of sectarian violence? – while helping the GOI gain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?”

This is the mission statement the MNC-I commander approved following our mission analysis. It identifies securing Baghdad and its population as our task and reducing sectarian violence as our immediate purpose for doing so. We also see the task of securing Baghdad leading to the implementation of an Iraqi-led unified security command in Baghdad and the continued transition to security self-reliance throughout the country.

It’s important to note that, while the focus is obviously on Baghdad, the corps sees this as a multi-divisional operation with outlying MNDs responsible for critical supporting efforts. The MNC-I commander has made this clear in his intent. We also recognize that this is much more than a military operation. It has economic and political components as well.
No Change
Commander’s Intent
(1 of 3)

- Purpose
  In order to break the current cycle of sectarian violence, we must set the conditions for the ISF to emerge as the dominant security force, able to protect the population and provide security in a fair and impartial manner. This operation will be Iraqi-led with Coalition support much more than a military operation alone. It must include a combination of military, economic, and political actions achieved through partnering with key agencies.

- Militarily, we must interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence emerging from southern Salah ad Din, Western Diyala, and Eastern Anbar, exploiting recent successes in these areas to continue the transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance and enhance the prospects for reconciliation. A key will be our ability to neutralize VBIED and EFP networks.

- Within Baghdad, we must move deliberately to maintain a permanent, combined presence in each security framework district until we have firmly established security mechanisms in place, such as joint security stations and combat outposts, manned by CFs alongside ISF that are loyal to the GOI and can provide adequate protection for the population. Our operations must be deliberate, our goals achievable and sustainable. We will only be decisive when security is sustained over time with Iraqis fully in charge.

- Economically, we must create a combination of near-term and long-term employment opportunities and improve basic services in order to generate economic growth in all neighborhoods.

- Politically, we must set benchmarks to address the dismantling of Shia militias, deal with de-Baathification, and move towards provincial and local elections.

1st of 3 slides outlining the MNC-I commander’s intent
(Pause)
Key to the purpose is the reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and placing the Iraqis in the lead as we transition.
This is a combined operation, with the Iraqi lead increasing over time.
The operation has multiple components – it is not simply a military operation but one that is complemented by economic and political dimensions.
(Pause)
---------------------------------
Near-term economic opportunities: use of CERP funds, USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP), high employment projects / low tech
Building toward long-term: micro-finance, VOTECH education, state-owned enterprise improvement
Commander's Intent (2 of 3)

Key Tasks
- In conjunction with the ISF, secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad; as a minimum:
  - Maintain robust forward presence – 24/7 CF coverage in clear, control, and retain areas until CF shift to the periphery
  - Be deliberate – resist the urge to surge as the operation progresses, give priority to the retention and control of cleared areas; ensure the right amount of security forces are controlling the districts
  - Achievable – demonstrate real and perceived success, early-on and throughout the operation
  - Sustainable – as ISF and CF control expands, avoid overstretch and prevent re-infiltration; carefully consider the risks of committing to new clearing operations
- Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJks, IED and IDF attacks
- balanced operations targeting groups on both sides of the sectarian divide
- 14b, 14d
- Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- In coordination with embedded PRTs and interagency partners, implement economic development initiatives and tribal engagements

The commander’s key tasks

(pause)

Economic development initiatives: engagement with select state-owned enterprises (SOEs), vocational education improvements, and better access to credit for small businesses
Commander’s Intent
(3 of 3)

- Endstate
  - Baghdad secure and considered so by Sunni and Shia alike; violence in Baghdad reduced to a manageable level
  - ISF viewed by Iraqis as the dominant security force in Baghdad
  - Iraqi Baghdad Operational Command fully functioning, responsive to the GOI and integrated into the Iraqi Security apparatus
  - GOI perceived as taking the issue of sectarian violence seriously and seen as acting to reduce it
  - Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance initiated IAW the Bridging Strategy and making steady progress throughout Iraq
  - Enhanced capacity of GOI to provide essential services and infrastructure development and maintenance
  - Foundation laid for self-sustaining economic growth
  - CF positioned on the periphery of urban areas; enhanced transition teams and dedicated QRF to execute Time-Sensitive Targeting in place

Sir, we have highlighted some text we believe needs to be amplified or revised. We believe reduction of violence to a manageable level deserves some further quantification. Some of these might include but are limited to the ISF ability to control cleared districts coupled with a decrease in the number of EJK related incidences and improved quality of life. Further we believe the development of the new Baghdad Operations Command make warrant amplification of the highlighted text to reflect the capability of the BOC at the completion of Phase II. Third we believe the term strike force has been superceded by the Operational Reserve and should be changed to reflect this new name. Sir, before we move into the employment options we also wanted to revisit the friendly forces operating in the support zones.

The endstate envisioned by the commander, addressing the state of security in Baghdad, how the GOI and ISF are perceived by Iraqis, transition (with respect to capability and C2 arrangements in Baghdad), and Coalition Force posture.

(Pause)
- Economic growth to occur in state-owned enterprises and private sector
Sir, a quick study of this map reveals that two of the affected threat areas the C2 has highlighted as places where the potential exists to apply force are not under CF control. These areas, first in the south are the Yusifiyah, Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah triad, which is under operational control of 4/6 IA. In the north the other area is western approach to Taji and it is under the operational control of 2/9 IA.

Sir, what I am going to do now is walk you through the employment options. I will first review each of your decisions associated with the appropriate BCT. Then I will lay out the timeline associated with each BCTs movement of equipment and personal and the recommended latest time you can decide where you want to employ them. This will be accompanied by, for your information, BCT capabilities. Finally, using the map you see now walk around the potential areas of employment and lay out the conditions for employment.
**Confirmation**

**Decision Point 8**

*(4/1 ID)*

**Decision:** Request BCT #17 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

**Desired Effects:**
1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
2C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized
3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
4A: IED Network Neutralized

**SIR**
1. What is the current level of violence in Baghdad?
2. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJF, VBIEEDs) present in Baghdad?
3. What is the status of militias in Baghdad?
4. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
5. What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad?
6. What is the current level of violence in the Baghdad Security Belts?
7. What is the status of key infrastructure?

**FFIR**
1. Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad’s nine Security Framework Districts?
2. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Security Belt?
3. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIEED’s and EFPs into Baghdad?
4. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
5. Do we have enough forces to oversee SiBs and I or protect key infrastructure?

Sir, this is your decision point, the desired effects, SIR and FFIR associated with the employment of 4/1 ID.
Sir, 4/1 ID has requested 535 Up-armored HMMWVs, however we expect they will only be filled to approximately 400. This represents
Sir, with this chart I am going to walk you around the threat areas and provide you a summary of the operational conditions and threat conditions when you deploy 4/1 ID to Baghdad. I will begin with Baghdad and then transition to Anbar, the Sunni Support Zone, Diyala and Baqubah/Balad and finally the southern belts. On this chart the task and purpose will appear for 4/1 ID alongside the threat and operational conditions. However, as subsequent areas are show the task and purpose will no longer appear. The threat conditions will appear in red and the operational conditions in blue. With that said, let me begin with Baghdad.

DO NOT MENTION UNLESS ASKED

Sir, Baqubah/Balaqubah and Diyala will appear together. The reason I have not combined Diyala and Baqubah/Balad is because they are both cities are sectarian violence is prevalent.
## Confirmation

### Decision Point 9a

**(3/3 ID)**

**Decision:** Request BCT #18 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

**Desired Effects:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure</th>
<th>3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized</td>
<td>4A: IED Network Neutralized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIR**

1. What is the state of the AQI threat in Al Anbar Province?
2. What is the current level of violence in Baghdad/Buqubah?
3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (JEI, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Buqubah?
4. What is the level of violence in Baghdad?
5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
6. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?
7. How effective are AQI insurgents in Baghdad's Support Zones?
8. What is the current level of violence in Sadr City?
9. What is the status of key infrastructure?

**FFIM**

1. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad security belt?
2. Do we have enough forces to interdict/neutralize TEFs along the TRV and ERV?
3. Do we have enough forces to clear, control, and retain Baghdad's nine Security Framework Districts?
4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBID's and EFP's into Baghdad?
5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
6. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Support Zones?
7. Do we have enough forces to oversee SBIs and/or protect key infrastructure?

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Sir, your decision point for 3/3 ID.
Sir, at the bottom of the slide is the refined deployment timeline associated with 3/3ID. Above the timeline and for your information are the capabilities the HBCT brings. We anticipate 3/3ID will draw APS-5 and receive as many as 400 UAHs. Moving to the timeline at the bottom of the chart. The star indicates our assessment of the latest time we recommend you can change the BCTs assignment.
Sir, on 31 Mar an HBCT will be available for deployment into the area of operations. The differences from the 4/1 ID is this chart will not only provide threat and operational conditions, but recommended task and purpose associated with the BCT for each of the areas displayed on the previous chart similar to this one. Sir, in a dark blue color I have highlighted the new operational conditions and this will remain the same throughout the remaining two charts like this one. As before let me begin with Baghdad. You will notice at the bottom of the conditions box the two events we believe will be different at the time you have to decide where to employ this Brigade.
**Decision Point 9b**

**Decision:** Request BCT #19 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

**Desired Effects:**
- 1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
- 3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized
- 3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
- 4A: IED Network Neutralized

**SIR:**
1. What is the current state of the AQI threat in Al Anbar?
2. What is the current level of violence in the 9+1 key cities?
3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Baqubah?
4. What is the status of militias in Baghdad/Baqubah?
5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
6. What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad?
7. How effective are Aqil insurgents in the Baghdad Security Belt?
8. What is the level of violence in Sadr City?
9. What is the status of key infrastructure?

**FPFR:**
1. Do the Iraqi Security Forces have enough combat power to continue Clear Control? Retain operations in Baghdad?
2. Do we have enough forces to prevent the spread of violence in the 9+1 key cities?
3. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of illegal contraband across the Iraqi border?
4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED’s and EFP’s into Baghdad?
5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
6. Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar?
7. Do we have enough forces to secure the Support Zones?
8. Do we have enough forces committed to the Operational Reserve to retain flexibility?
9. Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and IED protection infrastructure?

**Sir, this is your decision point for 4/2 SBCT.**
SBCT Capabilities
What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?

- 3800 soldiers
- Core capabilities
  - 3 Stryker Battalions; 9 Stryker Companies; 9 MGS Platoons; 8 Mortar Sections; 3 Scout Platoons
  - 1 RSTA Squadron; 3 Recon Troops; Mortar Platoon
  - 1 Fire Battalion; 3 Firing Batteries; 5 JTACs; Target Acquisition Platoon
  - Anti-Tank Company
  - Engineer Company
  - Signal Company
  - Military Intelligence Company; Multi-sensor unit;
  - UAV Platoon
  - Military Police C2 Cell
  - Support Battalion; Maintenance, Distribution, Medical Companies; 120 UAHs

And sir, here are the capabilities of the BCT for your information. 4/2 SBCT due to its Strykers will only require 120 UAHs largely for its sustainment element. That said, I would draw your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the star which indicates what we believe to be the latest possible time you could decide where to employ the BCT.
01 May 2007

Baghdad Operational Conditions:
- 6 of the 9 districts in Transition Phase
- Violence remains isolated

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the northern belts
Purpose: To allow CP/CF to secure the population of Baghdad

Northern Belt Operational Conditions:
- 111 CD ICW 2/1A continues to conduct combined operations to interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in Tikrit/Alquayyarah

Baqubah/Saladin Operational Conditions:
- 51 CD ICW 5 IA continues to conduct operations to neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct IED, MEU and IDP attacks
- Continues to conduct operations to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence
- 2/3 ABN continues operating in a COA via Saladin

Diyala Operational Conditions:
- 5 IA continues OPCON to KG
- 3/1 CD continues operating in CG
- 3/1 CD continues to assist the BIT at POE
- DIYALA at KG

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the southern belts
Purpose: To allow CP/CF to secure the population of Baghdad

Southern Belt Operational Conditions:
- 4/3 IA OPCON to BDC on 1 May
- 4/25 and 2/16 continue to conduct operations ICW 4/8 IA to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence and neutralize VBIED network
- 2/35 and 2/16 continue operations to the southern belts

Bahtil and Yezidi Rif, May 07

Anbar Operational Conditions:
- 2 Marine Rifle Battalions continue operating in support of 1 MEF in the Fallujah and Haditha Triad

Task: Defeat AQI & Sunni extremists
Purpose: To fully exploit success in Anbar

Baghdad

Sir, on this chart the threat conditions are not shown. However, at your request (b)(3), (b)(6) is prepared to provide the threat conditions. However, her threat conditions are driven by where you decided to employ 3/3 ID and the same will true with the 4/2 SBCT when we advance to 31 May when the 2/3 ID BCT is available for employment. Let me begin with Baghdad.
**Confirmation**

**Decision Point 9c**

(2/3 ID)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision: Request BCT #20 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desired Effects:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized</td>
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<td>3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops</td>
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<td>4A: IED Network Neutralized</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>3. What is the status of militias in Baghdad?</td>
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<td>4. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?</td>
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<td>5. What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad?</td>
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<td>6. What is the status of key infrastructure?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>FFIR</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad security belt?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do we have enough forces to enhance MDFs and dedicated TST forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does MNG-1 possess the ability to Clear, Control, Retain Sadr City?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do we have enough forces to secure Iraq’s borders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and protect key infrastructure?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sir, this is your decision point for 2/3 ID.
Sir, there are no sustentative changes to the BCT organization that we are aware of. As opposed to 535 HMMWVs that should read 390-400. Sir, I direct your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the
And finally, sir on 31 May you will have the final BCT of the five additional available for employment. (b)(3), (b)(6) is prepared to provide the threat conditions as required.

What I would like to do now is lay out the timelines of employment side-by-side.
Comments and Guidance
Back-up
Prime Minister’s Directive

- All Iraq’s international borders will be closed DTG TBD
- Appointment of the Baghdad Operational Commander—all MoD and MoI forces assigned report to the BOC
- BOC defined as 9 admin districts and the battlespace controlled by the 6th (Yusafiyah, Latifiyah and Marmudiyah) and 9th IA (south and west of Taji)
- SoE measures include:
  - Curfew in the BOC 8 PM to 6 AM except competent authorities and humanitarian emergencies
  - No weapons carried in public and weapons, ammunition and dangerous materials permits suspended. PSDs can only carry weapons when they are with their principal
  - With the assistance of MNF-I forces the BOC are authorized to question, search and detain, any person necessary IAW Iraqi law
  - Cordons, enter and search private and public property
  - Seize contraband
  - Control movement of persons and vehicles to include MoI and MoD convoys
  - Conduct route security clearance operations
  - Apply preventative measures to all mail and wireless communications means and equipment
  - Impose restrictions on public places as necessary for safety and good order
- Persons who violate these measures or instigates, provides support or encourages such acts will be subject to serious penalty IAW Anti-Terrorism Law
- All offenders will be dealt with before the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
- MoD and MoI forces authorized to enforce Anti-Terrorism Law against illegal armed groups, terrorists, gangs, or any person who practices criminal and terrorists acts
- Houses of worship will be respected. Houses of worship used by terrorists forfeit its protected status
- No citizen is to be displaced from his home. Illegal occupiers of IDPs house will be subject to legal proceedings, liable for damages, vacate the house and return contents to the owner
- Drivers and passengers must display valid license and vehicle registration—vehicles with tinted windows will be subject to legal proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Law
- Legal action will be taken against anyone who keeps a government vehicle at his house without official approval
- MoD and MoI forces shall respect human rights when conducting security measures listed the PM Directive
- The BOC is to provide weekly briefings on operations to the PM Crisis Cell
**Operation Together Forward**

**In-depth interdiction**

- Additionally provided combat power will be arrayed along the CERV and Fallujah-Ramadi corridor.

- At Korean Village, Recon Bn TF RPs w/MEU and continues to disrupt AIF movement at the POEs, Isolate Rutbah, and interdict AIF movement along MSR Mobile.

- Upon its arrival, a surge BN reinforces RCT-2. This allows RCT-2 to continue exploiting success in the CERV and WERV (clearing/retaining key cities and introducing ISF). Additionally, RCT-2 will interdict AIF movement along MSR Bronze/Phoenix.

- 1-1 AD will be relieved by 1-3 ID. 1-3 ID (as MNF-W ME) continues to clear / retain Ramadi.

- Upon its arrival, a surge BN (-) reinforces RCT-6. RCT-6 will interdict AIF movement along MSRs Michigan, Mobile, Lincoln, and Chicago.

- Reserve: 1 x Company from one of the surge Battalions.

- Bottom Line: All actions are designed to either directly or indirectly interdict accelerant movement towards and into Baghdad.

- Basing Concept of Support: Currently COA’s for the exact lay down of
the two surge battalions in AO Raleigh and Denver are being completed. Both RCTs are conducting RIPs. Expect a decision and employment plan by next week. In the meantime, we have identified temporary billeting space at Al Asad for the surge Bn that will reinforce RCT-2 in AO Denver. The area is split into two tent LSA's.

-We have identified temporary billeting space for the surge Bn that will reinforce RCT-6 in AO Raleigh on Camp Fallujah. This battalion will also be in a tent camp.

-We are anticipating that both battalions will forward deploy companies into designated AOR. Therefore we have developed a bill of material for a company sized expeditionary camp that is estimated to cost approximately $450K and take 4-5 days to build.
Page 33 redacted for the following reason:

1.4c