Detention Operations:
Strategic Offensive in COIN

Brief to General Petraeus
on the Way Ahead for Detention Operations

1 JUN 2007
Agenda

- Detainee Growth and Capacity: Filling the Gap at US and Iraqi Facilities
- Conceptual Overview
- Bucca: Controlling Detainee Population in a COIN Environment
- FOB Constitution: A New Way of Detention Operations
- Taji: Expanding What Works
- Al Asad and Q-West: Expeditionary TIFRICs

Purpose:
1) To gain approval on Bucca upgrades
2) To gain approval on establishing a TIFRIC at FOB Constitution as proof of concept
3) To expand the TIFRIC concept to Taji, Al Asad, and Q-West
Releases at Theater Internment Facilities by Calendar Year

- **2003**: 9068
- **2004**: 10350
- **2005**: 10062
- **2006**: 14314
- **2007**: 6592

- Forecast at current rate
- If releases drop to 200 per month
- Projected to be lowest release year

Notes:
1) High risk population grows
2) No projected mass releases

Calendar Year:
- OUT

With only 41% of the calendar year complete

Approved for Release

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI

POC at TF 1-4d J3, (b)(3), (b)(6)

AS OF: 1 JUN 07 SLIDE 4
Detainee Population by Threat

**Definitions:**

**LOW RISK**
- possession of small arms/ammunition
- captured at raid site
- fake ID
- resisting apprehension
- obstructing CF
- associating with AIF
- possession of propaganda

**LEVEL 1**

**LEVEL 2**

57 = 0.5%  
5,468 = 43.8%  
4,611 = 36.9%  
442 = 3.5%

**MEDIUM RISK**
- possession of small arms weapons cache; large ammo store
- counterfeiting, smuggling, creating propaganda
- surveillance of CF; positive explosive test w/o explanation
- inciting ACF activity; communicating a threat
- accomplice/co-conspirator in minor ACF activity

**LEVEL 3**

**LEVEL 4**

**HIGH RISK**
- weapons dealer/trafficker
- attacking CF
- large weapons cache
- possession of explosives/IED
- foreign fighters/recruiters
- harboring foreign fighters
- illegal border crossing
- planning/financing attacks
- spying/corruption
- extortion/blackmail
- emplacing IEDs
- murder/kidnapping
- participating in suicide ops
- involved in NBC ops

**LEVEL 5**

**LEVEL 6**

The high-risk population grows... the proportion of "releasable candidates" shrinks.

**Retained:**
- 03: 16883
- 04: 11197
- 05: 18570
- 06: 14570
- 07: 7038
- Total: 65060

**Released:**
- 03: 9056
- 04: 10350
- 05: 10062
- 06: 13956
- 07: 1928
- Total: 45352

**As of: 1 Jun 07**

**Slide 5**

**POC at TF:** 14d J3 (b)(3), (b)(6)
Detainee Growth in OIF

Detainee Growth:
Intakes at Theater Internment Facilities
by Calendar Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Number of Detainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **22,553** If 10 more detainees x day
- **20,690** Forecast at current rate
- **With only 41% of the calendar year complete**

Projected to be highest intake year

POC at TF 1 4 3 1 (b)(3), (b)(8)
Detainee Population by Threat

**Threat Rating:**

- **Low** (16%)
  - 1 to 1.83
- **Medium** (84%)
  - 2 to 2.83
  - 3 to 3.83
  - 4 to 4.83
- **High**
  - 5 to 5.83
  - 6

**Total Rated and In Camp: 12,484**

- Low: 401 (3.2%)
- Medium: 7,030 (56.3%)
- High: 5,053 (40.5%)

As of 1 April 2007

**Rating Breakdown:**

- Total In Camp (1 Apr 07): 18,306
- Rated: 12,484
- Not Rated: 4,787
  - CCCI

**Current board:** Of 13,000 records reviewed so far...
- Only 0.01% are more than 1 point lower
- 14% are 1 point lower
- 84% are same or higher

POC at TF 1.4a J3, (b)(3), (b)(6)
MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534
(Transfer Criteria to Theater Internment Facilities)

Intakes DHA vs TIF: 1 Jan to Present
Start of Surge 1 Mar

- MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534, dated 1 MAR 07, implemented less restrictive criteria for the transfer of detainees to TIFs
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake Prior to 1 Mar: 69.6%
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake After 1 Mar: 89.9%
NOTES:
1) Assumes growth of 1900 detainees/month;
   Maintaining current linear growth (but w/ few or no releases)
2) Assumes sustained surge through Summer '08
Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4a, 1.4g
Iraqi Detention Facilities: Over Capacity

MNC-I Transition Team Inspections and Visits
Sample of Iraqi Detention Capacity
27 May 07

• NP – capacity: 675; on-hand: 1,321
• IA – capacity: 1,944; on-hand: 1,752
• IP – capacity: 5,796; on-hand: 4,856

8,415 7,929

Only 486 Available Spaces

Notes on Data: Capacity estimates are subject to significant missing data
-- Only facilities associated with a transition team are tracked
-- 360 IPS stations are not associated with PTTs
-- 78% of Transition Teams reported with a total of 7,929 detainees in pretrial
TIF Detainees by Capture Location and Iraqi Facilities Over Capacity

- **MND-N**: 5,409/26%
- **MND-B**: 6,654/33%
- **MND-CS**: 284/1%
- **MND-C**: 511/2%
- **MND-SE**: 36/0.001%

**Source**: MNC-I PM Report

**Note**: Proposed TIFRIC locations will assist with needed permanent facilities.

**KUWAIT**
The Baghdad Operations Center reports that in the next 90 days, Iraq will be more than 2,000 detainees over surge capacity and more than 3,000 detainees beyond normal capacity.

**Detainee Population in Theater Internment Facilities**

- June +/- 10%
  - 22,599
  - 22,400
  - 22,210

**Unknowns:**
- Extent of Iraqi surge?
- Extent of Iraqi overcrowding?
- Backlog of Iraqi courts?

**Forecast likely underestimated**

**NOTES:**
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2006-2007 cost to recover from four TIF fires: $2,579,471
What about ICOs?
The 1000 ICOs at Bucca could replace 2 US MP companies and control approximately four moderate compounds... less than ¼ the size of Bucca today. An assumed risk given the communal design.

Doctrinally and practically...
Bucca now too big for effective Iraqi or US control.
**Detention Operations in Counterinsurgency**

**COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE COMPOUNDS**

*Fight the war on our terms*

**TF**  
1.4a will attack vulnerabilities in compounds: Deny networking, recruitment, Sharia Courts, escapes, and violence

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**Extremist Detainee Vulnerabilities**

(source: FM 3-24)  
Secrecy  
Mobilization  
Base of operations  
Financial weakness  
Internal division  
Maintaining momentum  
Informants

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**Mobilization of Extremism in Detainees**

(source: FM 3-24)  
Persuasion  
Coercion  
Reaction to abuses  
Foreign support  
Apolitical reasons (e.g., money/crime)

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**TIFs** will cease to be "terrorist training camps":  
Empower TIF Commanders, isolate detainee leaders, restrict movement, maintain moral high ground, and GAIN CONTROL

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*AS OF: 1 JUN 07 SLIDE 17*