

Pet Ppr, Box 42

~~SECRET//REL~~ JA, MCFI



# *Detention Operations: Strategic Offensive in COIN*

*Brief to General Petraeus  
on the Way Ahead for Detention Operations*

1 JUN 2007

Approved for Release

15100

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~



## Agenda

- *Detainee Growth and Capacity: Filling the Gap at US and Iraqi Facilities*
- *Conceptual Overview*
- *Bucca: Controlling Detainee Population in a COIN Environment*
- *FOB Constitution: A New Way of Detention Operations*
- *Taji: Expanding What Works*
- *Al Asad and Q-West: Expeditionary TIFRICs*

### **Purpose:**


- 1) *To gain approval on Bucca upgrades*
- 2) *To gain approval on establishing a TIFRIC at FOB Constitution as proof of concept*
- 3) *To expand the TIFRIC concept to Taji, Al Asad, and Q-West*

~~SECRET//REL~~ JA, MCFI

# Detainee Releases in OIF




## Releases at Theater Internment Facilities by Calendar Year



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

# Detainee Population by Threat



*The high-risk population grows...  
 the proportion of "releasable candidates"  
 shrinks*

**Definitions:**

**LOW RISK**

**Examples:**

- LEVEL 1
- LEVEL 2

- possession of small arms/ammo
- captured at raid site
- fake ID
- resisting apprehension
- obstructing CF
- associating with AIF
- possession of propaganda

**Definitions:**

**MEDIUM RISK**

**Examples**

- LEVEL 3
- LEVEL 4

- possession of small arms weapons cache; large ammo store
- counterfeiting, smuggling, creating propaganda
- surveillance of CF; positive explosive test w/o explanation
- inciting ACF activity; communicating a threat
- accomplice/co-conspirator in minor ACF activity

**Definitions:**

**HIGH RISK**

**Examples**

- LEVEL 5
- LEVEL 6


- weapons dealer/trafficker
- attacking CF
- large weapons cache
- possession of explosives/IED
- foreign fighters/recruiters
- harboring foreign fighters
- illegal border crossing
- planning/financing attacks
- spying/corruption
- extortion/blackmail
- emplacing IEDs
- murder/kidnapping
- participating in suicide ops
- Involved in NBC ops

~~SECRET//REL~~ JA, MCFI

# Detainee Growth in OIF



### Detainee Growth: Intakes at Theater Internment Facilities by Calendar Year





~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

# Detainee Population by Threat



## Threat Rating:



## Total Rated and In Camp: 12,484

|         |       |       |
|---------|-------|-------|
| Low:    | 401   | 3.2%  |
| Medium: | 7,030 | 56.3% |
| High:   | 5,053 | 40.5% |

## Rating Breakdown:

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| 18,306 | Total In Camp (1 Apr 07)   |
| 12,484 | Rated  |
| 1,035  | CCCI (Not Rated)   |
| 4,787  | Not Rated  |
|        | (Less than 120 days since capture / pending release / blacklist / other) |


Current board: Of 13,000 records reviewed so far...  
 Only .001% are more than 1 point lower  
 14% are 1 point lower  
 84% are same or higher

As of 1 April 2007

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

## Transfer Criteria – More Detainees to TIF


### MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534 (Transfer Criteria to Theater Internment Facilities)



- MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534, dated 1 MAR 07, implemented less restrictive criteria for the transfer of detainees to TIFs
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake Prior to 1 Mar: 69.6%
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake After 1 Mar: 89.9%

~~SECRET//REL JA, MCFI~~

# Population Growth



**NOTES:**  
 1) Assumes growth of 1900 detainees/month;  
 Maintaining current linear growth (but w/ few or no releases)  
 2) Assumes sustained surge through Summer '08

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1.4a, 1.4g

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL SA, MCFI~~

# Iraqi Detention Facilities: Over Capacity

~~SECRET//REL MCFI~~

## REPORTED OVERCROWDED DETENTION FACILITIES

|                                       |
|---------------------------------------|
| <u>CID HQs Baghdad</u><br>150/416     |
| <u>CID 1 Baghdad</u><br>100/171       |
| <u>CID 2 Baghdad</u><br>30/224        |
| <u>Babil Provincial HQ</u><br>150/294 |
| <u>Balda DHQ</u><br>60/102            |
| <u>Mussayib DHQ</u><br>85/93          |
| <u>Iskandariyah DHQ</u><br>110/168    |
| <u>Al Kadhimiya LPS</u><br>52/53      |
| <u>Al Bour</u><br>20/25               |
| <u>Saliyah Local</u><br>40/151        |
| <u>Mussayib LPS</u><br>85/94          |
| <u>Al Wehda LPS</u><br>4/5            |

|                                       |
|---------------------------------------|
| <u>3/6IA DIV Baghdad</u><br>102/441   |
| <u>4/6IA DIV Baghdad</u><br>360/361   |
| <u>9IA DIV Baghdad</u><br>320/330     |
| <u>Tway IPS</u><br>60/63              |
| <u>Fallujah DHQ</u><br>100/738        |
| <u>Al Kut Central Jail</u><br>300/312 |
| <u>Taheer LPS</u><br>85/96            |
| <u>Site4</u><br>25/30                 |
| <u>FOB Justice</u><br>300/769         |
| <u>Baladiat</u><br>200/378            |



|   |
|---|
| <u>Bayji Main</u><br>5/8                |
| <u>Khalis IPS</u><br>35/48              |
| <u>Tikrit Transitory Jail</u><br>30/87  |
| <u>Tikrit Community Crimes</u><br>30/98 |
| <u>Kirkuk PJCC</u><br>200/248           |
| <u>Attica Prison</u><br>200/342         |
| <u>Al Kilud IPS</u><br>10/15            |

|                                     |
|-------------------------------------|
| <u>5IA DIV Muqadiyah</u><br>190/233 |
| <u>2/5IA DIV Muqadiyah</u><br>60/64 |
| <u>2IA DIV Mosul</u><br>40/63       |
| <u>2/2/2IA DIV Q-West</u><br>10/11  |
| <u>Al Izza IPS</u><br>10/25         |
| <u>Al Hartha LPS</u><br>8/12        |

**LEGEND**

- NP
- IA
- IP

**#s by Facility**  
Capacity/Population

**Total #s**  
3566/6548

|                          |
|--------------------------|
| <u>NP</u><br>525/1,177   |
| <u>IA</u><br>1,082/1,503 |
| <u>IP</u><br>1,959/3,868 |

~~SECRET//REL MCFI~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

## *Iraqi Detention Facilities: Over Capacity*



### *MNC-I Transition Team Inspections and Visits Sample of Iraqi Detention Capacity*

*27 May 07*

- NP – capacity: 675; on-hand: 1,321
  - IA – capacity: 1,944; on-hand: 1,752
  - IP – capacity: 5,796; on-hand: 4,856
- 8,415                      7,929

*Only 486 Available Spaces*


Notes on Data: Capacity estimates are subject to significant missing data

- Only facilities associated with a transition team are tracked
- 360 IPS stations are not associated with PTTs
- 78% of Transition Teams reported with a total of 7,929 detainees in pretrial



~~SECRET//REL SA, MCFI~~

# Population Growth – The Unknowns



**NOTES:**

- 1) Assumes growth of 1900 detainees/month;  
Maintaining current linear growth (but w/ few or no releases)
- 2) Assumes sustained surge through Summer '08

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MGFI~~



## Agenda

- *Detainee Growth and Capacity: Filling the Gap at US and Iraqi Facilities*
- *Conceptual Overview*
- **Bucca: Controlling Detainee Population in a COIN Environment**
- *FOB Constitution: A New Way of Detention Operations*
- *Taji: Expanding What Works*
- *Al Asad and Q-West: Expeditionary TIFRICs*

### **Purpose:**

**1) To gain approval on Bucca upgrades**

2) To gain approval on establishing a TIFRIC at FOB Constitution as proof of concept

3) To expand the TIFRIC concept to Taji, Al Asad, and Q-West

~~SECRET//REL~~ SA, MCFI

# Bucca: Losing Control



2006-2007  
cost to  
recover  
from four  
TIF fires:  
\$2,579,471




~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

# Bucca: How Big is Too Big?



Bucca and R2 - Capacity Projections thru December '07



### What about ICOs?

The 1000 ICOs at Bucca could replace 2 US MP companies and control approximately four moderate compounds... less than 1/4 the size of Bucca today. An assumed risk given the communal design

*Doctrinally and practically...  
Bucca now too big for effective Iraqi or US control*

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI~~

~~SECRET//REL SA, MCFI~~

# Detention Operations in Counterinsurgency



## COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE COMPOUNDS

*FIGHT THE WAR ON OUR TERMS*

**TF 1.4a will attack vulnerabilities in compounds:**  
**Deny networking, recruitment, Sharia Courts, escapes, and violence**



### Extremist Detainee Vulnerabilities

(source: FM 3-24)

Secrecy  
Mobilization  
Base of operations  
Financial weakness  
Internal division  
Maintaining momentum  
Informants

**TIFs will cease to be "terrorist training camps":**  
**Empower TIF Commanders, isolate detainee leaders, restrict movement, maintain moral high ground, and GAIN CONTROL**



### Mobilization of Extremism in Detainees

(source: FM 3-24)

Persuasion  
Coercion  
Reaction to abuses  
Foreign support  
Apolitical reasons  
(e.g., money/crime)