INTERVIEW
OF
(b)(3), (b)(6)
C-2
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

JANUARY 24, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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PROCEEDINGS

This is the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian.

Today is Thursday, the 24th of January 2008 at approximately 1630. We are here at the Headquarters for Multinational Corps-Iraq at the al Faw Palace at Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

Also with me is --

the writing historian for 3 Corps and CMH.

And we are interviewing could you introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, last name?

Yes. I am

Thanks. I would just like to refer the listener to our previous interviews that are on hand with, the last one being on the 10th of October 2007.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) we have a previous release form on file. If that is acceptable, we will consider that to still be in effect.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Perfectly acceptable.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. I wanted to start with just sort of a big open-ended question, which I wanted to ask you if, as you look now in the last couple of weeks of 3 Corps' tenure as the Headquarters for Multinational Corps-Iraq, have the defining features of who the enemy is changed?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Not in the last two weeks, but -- But over time, if that is what your question is --

(b)(3), (b)(6) And in particular, since we spoke in October.

(b)(3), (b)(6) No. I don't believe that they have changed since we spoke in November as far as the groups go that we are dealing with. However, the viability and capacity of those groups have changed. Al Qaeda in Iraq has gotten less capable. Their operating areas have diminished considerably since then. The current operation that we have going
on, Phantom Phoenix, which is designed to go into those vestiges of AQI, is succeeding.

An example of that is, although we had some operations going on in Diyala Province in Baqubah at the time, those have intensified under Phantom Phoenix, and are going quite well.

So the enemy there has been diminished in capability and has moved, as it has in other places, Al Qaeda in Iraq; and they have moved to the north toward Mosul in the Nineveh Province, for the most part, although there are elements elsewhere in Iraq.

Seems that they found Mosul to be -- or the areas west of Mosul to be a better operating area for them right now because of operations, as well as local populace turning against them in other places. So that's a change with regard to AQI.

Now the other element we talked about in November was extremists Shia elements, JAM special groups, and again although their capacity, I would say, hasn't diminished, the threat from them has, because of Sadr -- Moqtada al Sadr imposing a freeze that is being, for the most part, by mainstream JAM
followed.

The exceptions to following that freeze are some noncompliant elements of what we call special groups of Jaish al Mahdi, but when you look at attacks overall, overall are done, and those are the two primary reasons or, rather, two of the primary reasons, friendly operations being successful against AQI, the freeze by Sadr, and then in terms of Shia extremists, also our operations against them. That is in addition to what I mentioned before about the fact the populace has turned against, actually, both of the violent elements of those groups, all of AQI, and then extremists JAM elements. The populace has turned against them.

So all those factors together, yes, the enemy has changed in capacity. The groups are still the same.

Great.

when we last interviewed you three months ago on the 10th of October, Phantom Thunder had progressed and appeared to be reversing the violence.
How would you assess -- This is a slightly different question than the one asked. How would you assess the threat today, and explain or highlight the changes over the last three months?

I know that we just launched another operation, I guess, at the beginning of this month, Phantom Phoenix. But if you look at November, December, and up to now in January, could you assess any changes or highlight any changes to the threat in those three months?

Although the question is different, the answer is very similar to what I gave. We had Phantom Thunder, and we talked about that last time. We had Phantom Strike, which are some very specific operations that followed that, and then now we have Phantom Phoenix going on.

So that three-month period of time covers those three operations. The threat is less overall than it was at the time, and those operations, I believe, are the primary reason for it to be less because of the effect that it had on the enemy, but
also the effect that it had on the populace.

I mentioned that a minute ago. Because security improved as a result of those operations, they felt more comfortable defending themselves, turning in the enemy themselves, forming Awakening movements and then joining Concerned Local Citizens groups as well.

So that the threat diminished, because we killed or captured some of it, but also because the local populace felt secure and took security into their own hands and furthered it.

Let me follow up with that just a minute. When Phantom Thunder kicked off in June, Diyala was a specific target.

It was.

And Baqubah especially. When I come back in January, I see almost replicated another operation in Baqubah or in Diyala, and Phantom Phoenix to chase them out.

Now for an observer like myself coming back after a long absence, it seems like almost that we are doing the same operation that we did back in
June/July with 25th Division. Now we are doing it with the 1st Armored Division.

So on the surface, that would say, hey, something happened to allow those guys to go back in there, but we needed to go back in there and move them out.

The differences are Phantom Thunder succeeded in terms of within the city limits of Baqubah, but what happened was some elements of the enemy, AQI, went to the area surrounding Baqubah, Moqtadiyah specifically, up to the edge of the Hammerin Mountains and along the Hammerin Ridge. So in several spots around there, other small villages.

So we had the capacity to go into Baqubah and remain, but to do significant operations in these other places, we needed a combination of Coalition forces and Iraqi forces.

So the difference is we are in the areas outside of Baqubah, and we have far more Iraqi forces with us this time that will be able to remain in addition to Coalition forces in the area.

The reason we know we are having a good
effect right now is the fact that the enemy has,
besides being captured/killed some of them -- they
have gone over the Hammerin Ridge, and they have gone
through Mosul, as I said before. So they are moving
out of that area.

They can't go back in Baqubah. So they
have to go somewhere else or get killed/captured or,
if they are fence sitters who have been with AQI, give
up on the insurgency and become -- rejoin the populace
as normal citizens. So that's the effect that it has
had.

Could I ask one real
specific follow-up to that?

Do we have a definitive sense at this
point as to the strength of AQI?

I wouldn't want the numbers
on it. There are some that may. We did actually
before our last meeting, and I don't think I pulled
the numbers out at that time, and I wouldn't want to
use those numbers anymore, because, obviously, we have
had an effect on them.

The thing about whether you are talking
AQI or JAM is it can ebb and flow depending on local support. You know, people join or people quit, dependent on how things are going, is what happens. So I wouldn't want to give you the -- We have not redone the numbers.

The way we do it is a very specific methodology, that we go out to the MSEs to get their input, and we put some math to it as well, and we come up with the numbers, and we haven't gone through that for four or five months.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask a question about -- and you kind of alluded to it; so I wanted to as more, which is: I think by anyone's standard, we have had some success this year, when you look back at the start of 3 Corps' tour to where we are now.

I just wanted to ask: As you wind down to your last couple of weeks, how has our success in terms of things like the reconciliation initiative, the rise of the Concerned Local Citizens, our success in helping the populace turn away from extremist groups in general -- How has that changed the nature
of the intelligence collection process, or has it? Do you find different things are important now that weren't?

In other words, how do we -- What is our intelligence focus in the area where we are actually getting more into governance and economic development issues?

And I would say it hasn't changed a lot in the last three or four months, but it has changed over our 15 months since we have been here, because an example is what you just cited a minute ago, intelligence support to reconciliation and our involvement in it.

Before, we had to know, obviously, about people that key leaders were engaging with, but those were -- There were a lot of those, but there weren't nearly as many as there are right now.

So knowing the motivations of the people who are coming forward, some of whom would have been on a targeting list not long ago -- all that has developed in a kind of sophisticated way where we have -- in a specific cell in the case for us.
Coalition analysis and control element, our analysis section, that is what they do. We have an officer in the reconciliation cell that leverages them and makes sure he provides the right intel to those guys.

So the same is true for governance in making sure we understand what is going on with the key leaders in the government, how we can best support, for example, the legislation that is going through, those kinds of things.

So having insight into all of those non-enemy or nontraditional targets, our collection has definitely changed over this 15 months. Those are just a couple of examples.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Is the job harder or easier?

(b)(3), (b)(6) It's much harder. It's far more complex now than it was 15 months ago, and it's way more complex than it was the last tour we were here, because I mean, you still have all those other things that were there before.

They may be diminished and not as threatening, but they are still there, and you still
have to do the collection and the analysis on them, but then you have all of these additional angles that you have to follow, people that you have to support. It's more sophisticated, no doubt.

and in 07-01, you indicate in the intelligence part, Paragraph 1 and in the situation, that a portion of the population is anti-occupation. In fact, I've seen that going all the way back to '04 and '05.

Can you put a more precise measurement on how that anti-occupation feeling is generating insurgency is? I don't know whether I stated that right.

No, I get it. It depends on how the -- In fact, it sort of depends on how the insurgency is going. That particular -- It's really their information operations. That kind of a campaign is more successful when the insurgency is strong.

In other words, it's kind of got momentum. It gets momentum and gains momentum if the insurgency is strong and it diminishes, but there are some elements that retain it.
For example, Jaish al Mahdi, you know, the core of Jaish al Mahdi, even when they are being cooperative, Moqtada al Sadr and all -- they are anti-occupation and will always be that way. There is no doubt about it.

Clearly, al Qaeda in Iraq, the hard core al Qaeda in Iraq folks, are anti-Coalition. So both Sunni and Shia have those elements that have -- When they are strong and violent and they can convince the populace that we are having negative effects on them, that garners their support. There is no doubt about it.

There's a whole other element of them that doesn't work on, especially when we are protecting the population the way we are now, and that's a big difference from when we got here. Remember, it was all about transition when we got here, and now it's all about protecting the population.

So there's a whole lot of Sunnis that used to be anti-occupation, but they aren't anymore. They want us here. There is no doubt about it, and they've
changed their tune.

So, yes, you have those elements that are
going to always anti-occupation, but I would say the
vast majority of the Iraqi population is not. You
know, they are ambivalent in many ways. They are not
hard core anti-occupation. They will always join just
to get us out of here.

There are times when they will, but for
the most part, as long as we are protecting them and
they get some good out of it, they are not going to--

(b)(6) Diminished over the course of
this past year?

(b)(3), (b)(6) The last year. There is no
doubt in my mind. They usually -- Anbar, and that's
the easiest example. I mean, you remember what
happened. You know, you had (b)(3), (b)(6)
out there saying that -- you know, it will never be
good; it will always be an al Qaeda stronghold. We
talked to him a couple of weeks ago, and he said I
would have bet Fort Knox that this never would have
happened, you know. That's kind of what he says.

So that is an example of that sentiment

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changing, because they were definitely -- I mean, 
having been here for Fallujah 1 and Fallujah 2 and 
everything else, that was all anti-occupation 
throughout, and it's not anymore. They want us to 
stay, for the most part. So that's one example.

I wanted to ask about 
some of the interactions and interface with the 
Information Operations piece. In general, I just 
wanted to ask what sort of interaction is there 
between C-2 and IO, and just looking for some sense as 
an intelligence officer and the C-2 what your 
perspective is on how the messaging piece has played 
in, and do you get feedback through intelligence 
channels as to how we are sort of doing on that front 
of psychological ops and sort of getting people over 

to our way of thinking.

Yes. That's something 
that, speaking of getting back to Fort Hood, I want to 
spend a little on, figuring out what we did right and 
what we did wrong; because we did something right, 
because the IO effort over the last year has been 
great. General McDonald and his crew have done a
great job.

The intel support to him -- Intel support to IO was hard last time we were here, our last rotation, because the whole IO program was kind of in the beginning. Now they've got it to the point where it's easy to support them, because what they need to know is who to target and how to do it and get feedback on it.

We've got the systems, whether it's (Phonetic), (Phonetic) and everything else out there -- and it's mostly

But the systems are in place as long as you've got the right tasking out there and you are listening for the right thing, talking to the right people.

You can get them what they need to get the right message to the right people, see who is susceptible to the message and all, and then you get the feedback on how well it is working.

I'll give you an example of the feedback mechanism. You know, they used to have the
when we were here on our last rotation. In the intervening years it went away, and that's one of the first things that General Odierno himself and I noted when we got here.

That is helpful in a lot of other ways, too. I mean, that's helpful in governance. It's helpful in the economics, you know, the things that we are targeting, surf for and all those types of programs, but then again it helps with the IO program.
as well.

So as we are doing our regular intel work for these other lines of operation, we are able to support IO pretty well. So it will be interesting.

General McDonald, I think -- trust me, he would tell me if we weren't giving him what he needs. So I think he is happy with the support, but the bottom line is, it's not like you have this intense IO only focused effort for intelligence to support it.

It is kind of a natural component of the overall intel effort when you are supporting more than just the security line of operation, which I think we are doing fairly well now.

(b)(3), (b)(6): It almost sounds like you are saying it's almost just finding a new market for existing products. Is that --

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, and taking your existing collectors and making sure they are tasked to do the right things. So they are not -- You know, they are not just looking for HVIs and those guys,

or you are having a go ask about it.
They are out there asking the other questions as they do their collection. So you got them tuned into the right --

Is the mechanics of the interface that you have with IO this time something that should be noted? In other words, is there an ongoing meeting? How is that fusion achieved when you talk about it this time? Is someone embedded in your team? Do you have someone embedded in theirs?

We do not. In fact --

Well, (Phonetic) is the reconciliation guy and, as you know, IO and reconciliation are all located together. They are not all the same. He is up there with (Phonetic) who is the IO guy.

So if they need some adjustment, they just tell us, and we do it. So there is not a -- It's not like there is a IO targeting type board system where we are going through a process.

Fortunately, the other processes seem to support getting them what they need. So I'm not going
to say it's informal, because it's not. It's embedded
in every other process we do.

IO -- I don't think it can be standalone.
I think it's part of everything that you do. So
because it is, you know, whether it's those intel
products that the CG gets in the morning are inclusive
and kind of the same thing the IO guys need to know as
well. So that's a consideration in what we do, both
in terms of the question I talked about before and in
terms of the analysis and products that we give folks.

That's why I said I want to do an article
or something on it when I get back, because when you
prepare -- When we prepared for the exercise, when you
go through all the MRX process and all, it's very
structured.

Whether it is targeting or whether it is
IO, and they are very similar, there's this process
that is there. It's a debilitating process that sucks
away all your time, and we've gotten away from that.
We've been able to get away from it and still achieve
greater effects than some have, I think, without
having this -- It's not all about process. It's all
about product. It's all about output right now, and we achieved that in IO, I think, as well as targeting. 

Great.

in one of my first -- and actually, I think it was my first interview with you, you talked about the importance of the relationships -- of relationships in general, and the CT team that you brought over here, the experience of working together with G-2s in past rotations. You mentioned a couple of names.

Before I get to the actual question, I wondered if you know -- you probably do -- (b)(6) (Phonetic), 4th ID b 6.

Right now? (b)(6)

You know him. That's an example. But over the course of this deployment, can you talk a little bit about how the C-2 has evolved and if you think you kept that tight team that you brought here and trained with?

I know that the case has turned over, for example, and we discussed that, actually, I think, in
the last interview. But I know you had placed back in
March a lot of emphasis on the teamwork.

I wonder if you would reflect on that over
the past 15 months now at the end of this tour?

Well, that’s certainly the
key to my success, has been the people that we
assembled before we came, trained with, and then
brought over. So that has continued to pay off.
There is no doubt about it.

Without going into the exact people, but
essentially I’ve got the same team that was hand-
picked before I came here in C-2 proper as the core,
and I say c-o-r-e, of that team. So that’s what has
been helpful. But the people who joined us all along
have become just as valuable. But I attribute that to
the fact they joined a team that was pretty high
performing and pretty tight, but very willing to be
inclusive of new folks that came along.

So I think the legacy of that is that
those people who joined us as individual augmentees
have gotten up to a level where there will be good
continuity with (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) team when
he gets here with 18th Airborne Corps.

Now one thing I have noticed is that after he did his PSS, saw what we did, he has worked very hard to assemble a team himself that, I think, will be real strong. He lost his deputy. She had medical issues, and he had to replace her, but with people that General Austin knew, a Lieutenant Colonel that he knew and, I think, that know, too.

So I think they sort of followed the same model. So I'm not unique in this, I don't think, now any longer. I think he has been successful in forming a team as well. But the answer to your question is, yes, it has continued to pay dividends. It has continued to get better as we have gone along.

I want to ask about a specific challenge, which is actually something that General Odierno pointed out that was picked up on in the open medial. It has to do with dissatisfaction in the grassroots of all the Shia population and the idea that, at least in the open source, that none of the Shia groups were really providing the sort of services and satisfaction that the Shia citizenry wanted.
Does our intelligence gathering -- have we focused any efforts on that, and have you seen any opportunities that we have exploited or just become more aware of?

Well, we've definitely focused the intelligence collection on that, because clearly, if the groups that are not helpful are providing those services as opposed to the government, then we got a problem.

So the answer is, yes, we have -- both have been focused. One of the things they focus on is exactly that. So the opportunities would be where to provide -- you know, urge the GOI, and back to what we talked about, governance, economics and all that -- We got to urge the government of Iraq to focus some of its efforts so that they are the provider of services, just like there should be security, rather than some of these other groups; because -- I mean, that is one of Jaish al Mahdi's strengths, is that in some areas, historically Sadr City, but there are others, they could become a grassroots movement, because they were
able to provide services that the government wasn't.

Now I think that is much less so now,

which is, I think, one of the reasons that, although

Moqtada al Sadr is not going to ever openly talk to us

probably -- at best, that we use interlocutors -- he

is willing to talk to the government of Iraq and

become more part of the mainstream, because their

capacity is improving, and it is no longer just him

and his movement that can offer those in certain

places, those services in certain places.

Yes, and that is back to -- I mean, that

is part of Intel operations in this environment, is

making sure you focus on collecting that and give the

decision makers that kind of information, which is far

different than the traditional security line of

operation support that we provide.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Just one more related

question that has actually has to do with a specific

situation. I'm just wondering how Intelligence has

played into the Commander's process for one of the

issues with the Concerned Local Citizens groups that

we have had a lot of success with.
By the same token, it seems at this moment we face two challenges. One is increasing tax on the leaders of those CLCs. The flip side of that is the risk of infiltration into those CLC groups.

How has intelligence coming into play to help the Commander sort of sort that out and figure out how to best deal with it?

We have a good window into most of the CLCs, because we infiltrate them, too, and that helps us know who the players are, who at least the leaders are. So if you get infiltrated by the individuals at the higher level, I think you know.

If you get groups that are purely -- and there have been a couple of suspected -- groups that were suspected of all. You know, being insurgents, they just tried to pick up the mantle and be a CLC and get in that way. Luckily, that wasn't the case, but we needed to do the intelligence collection on them.

So infiltration is a risk. They will be successful in some ways in some numbers, probably low numbers, but we have a pretty good window on them.

But they are self-policing, too. I mean, they know
their friends and neighbors pretty well, and they have
definitely policed themselves.

The other side of that is anybody
effective in this country is at risk, as long as
violence is going on, of being targeted. It happened
today in Mosul with the Provincial Director of Police
killed as he was inspecting the big glass site. You
probably heard about this today, killed by a suicide
vest bomber.

The same is going to be true -- We've got
some operations now that are being led -- initially
led by CLCs before the Iraqi Army goes into them.
There's a couple this upcoming week or so where that
is the case.

Well, you know, when you get CLCs that are
that effective, it's just like the P-Op in Mosul. I
mean, they are at risk of getting targeted by the
enemy in that area. So that is going to happen.

To me -- You know, we did a study, briefed
General Odierno about a week and a half ago, that said
when you look at the increase in number of people in
CLCs and the increase in number of attacks -- good
proportion.

So in other words, it's not like suddenly you have a whole bunch more attacks on a set or finite number of people. It's the number of people has gone up and, therefore, the number of those type of people that have been attacked has gone up. So it's kind of proportional.

So, therefore -- But the issue is their leaders are getting targeted more, too, and I think that is back to the fact that they are effective. So it's a risk.

Great.

I would like to show you a slide from General Odierno's 17 January briefing, Pentagon press briefing in which he showed this map here, and he said that that had been captured in Baghdad in December of '06 during the press conference.

Are you familiar with this map?

Yes.

And can you tell me how much or if it did play a part in your development of the
Baghdad Belt analysis? Where I put it is February-March. That's when I see the Baghdad Belt analysis slides, but maybe you can be more specific.

Well, even before we deployed, we looked at Saddam's Baghdad Belt strategy, and he put divisions around Baghdad, because he believed Baghdad was the center of gravity.

That helped us figure out, frankly, where the vestiges of the enemy probably were, because of where Saddam Fedahine (Phonetic) or Republican Guards units had been and all of that. But it also told us where al Qaeda in Iraq probably wanted to be in terms of Baghdad itself, because that's just the mindset they had.

So what -- This map was discovered in the documents after that incident in December. It sort of solidified what we thought, which is that they thought the Baghdad Belts were important, and they intended to use them to their advantage as well.

That all drove the decision making. That component of the enemy analysis is what helped drive the decision making on where units were.
Right. The surge units.

Absolutely. So instead of putting them all in Baghdad proper, which I think was the thought in Washington when the surge came, you know, the decision was to -- We created Multinational Division-Center as a result to deal with the southern Belts, essentially, of Baghdad, and then, you know, we put one brigade in Diyala, and then we put the rest either in Baghdad or in the Belts.

So all of that analysis that you are talking about that occurred drove where the surge units went and how we employed those units, how we fought the Battle of Baghdad, basically, is what it is, which became, obviously, (Phonetic) and into the further operations.

So it just brought home the fact that not only is Baghdad the center of gravity, but the Belts around Baghdad are very important.

Can you -- I'm a little bit --

The documents are a little bit non-specific or unspecific in the dates when you did the Baghdad Belt analysis or at least when I see the slides of the
Baghdad Belts. It seems to be February-March, but is that correct?

It is. I have to look at the --

So it is correct? Okay.

It is, and I can go back in there and look and tell you exactly. The day we planned it, we took a picture.

I have that picture.

You have that picture. And if I look in my e-mail, I can see what the date is on it.

It was done by [b3 b4].

It was [b3 b6] (Phonetic).

Did [b3 b4] take it?

He's the one who gave me the picture.

Actually, I think -- I'm almost positive that General Devlin took the picture himself.

Yes, he mentioned it was General Devlin. It must be the same one I'm
thinking of.

(b)(3), (b)(6) So whenever that picture was taken, that's when we did it, and I can find out.

b 6 Okay, thank you. That helps.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask another interface question with another incident and see how that's evolved over time. I wanted to ask about combined Joint Special Operations Task Force with Multinational Corps-Iraq, and if you can speak to me about what that relationship has been along with C-2 lines with them, and has the relationship changed over the last 15 months as the battle has evolved and as we have had things like reconciliation come into play?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. It started out real strong, and it was far stronger when we got here this time than the last rotation. It's back to personalities as well as General McCrystal (Phonetic) and General Odierno are great friends, classmates from West Point, and Brigadier General Mike Flynn (Phonetic) who was the J-2, Colonel Mike Flynn when we got here was the J-2 of JSOC (Phonetic) and,
therefore, the task force, were good friends, go way back.

The mindset, though -- It was already in place when we got here. That just made it all the stronger, but the mindset had been one of cooperation. No more, you know, black world group, you know, typical of knowing what they are doing and a very cooperative relationship, both in terms of operations and in terms of intel.

So there wasn't anything to overcome when we got here. It was just a matter of strengthening a good relationship that already existed. They were perfectly willing to share everything they got. We are doing the same thing.

So you know, the mission is different, though. I mean, their mission is very focused on high value individual targeting, manhunting, and people forget that sometimes. But we've got the whole broad spectrum of every mission, and a subset of that now, though, is exactly those operations.

So a brigade combat team commander has to be able to do those kind of operations, manhunting,
you know, persistent ISR on a target to do a capture or kill operation, all the way out to, you know, tracking the Prime Minister's convoy if he is going through your battle space or, you know, chemical munition coming from Tawatha (Phonetic) to BIOP (Phonetic) to be thrown away -- actually, that was radioactive material about a week and a half ago, where you have -- I mean, the whole gamut of ISR.

The close relationship with JSOC allows to share intel for similar targets or even shared targets, but also get their -- we learned their teaching, too. You know, we learned their procedures by working so closely with them.

So that's why BCTs are able to do these things just as well as they are, because they learned from them, and they've got a good cooperative relationship with them, and they operate in the same battle space. They go around and, obviously, do their high end operations within each of these brigades' battle spaces. So they have a cooperative relationship, too. But in terms of intel, very close.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Let me ask you this,
if I could. Realizing this is a year that probably people are going to pick apart in great detail as time goes on, but one of the questions in general that will probably be asked is: To what degree was that special operations role key to the success?

From an intelligence officer's seat, seeing what you see in terms of intelligence feedback, how has that manhunting piece -- Any sense for how much of a contribution that was or wasn't?

I think it's significant, because it started out being al Qaeda only. So we'll talk about that for a minute -- from al Qaeda in Iraq, taking out key individuals, key leaders in the networks, clearly always caused setbacks, and then it always caused people who were considering joining that effort to think twice and just waited some, because they are so effective.

When they started getting the mission to do extremist targets and set up Task Force 14a that had the same effect. I mean, the most extremist elements of Jaish al Mahdi who were attacking, for the most part, Coalition forces were taken out, many of
them, and then others were very much dissuaded from --
became very fearful.

Of course, what we were doing in Sadr City
-- that really had an effect. Much more reluctant to
do that now that there are cooperative elements of
JAM, but -- So I think what has been successful over
this past 15 months is the combination of all the
things that are going on.

That is back to what I said before. But
I do not specify their contribution, but yes, their
contribution at the high end, condition forces
operations across the battle space, the populace being
protected and turning against the extremist elements
on both sides, leaders on the JAM side or the Shia
side becoming compliant and cooperative with GOI and
the Awakening movements and Concerned Local Citizens
-- you put all that together, and a key component,
that high end targeting. But all these other things
with it become very effective.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's a big answer to a
small question.
I have two real quick questions. One is: Looking at Op Ord 08-0801, I read your -- in the operations order, your Paragraph 1, estimate of the enemy, and I compared it with 07-01, and then I went to your intel estimate, and I couldn't find your intel estimate.

When I clicked on the link, it linked me to an '06 -- I think it was 06-03 intel estimate. Did you --

As far as I know, we had a new one.

You do have a new one?

Right.

Okay. It's the new computer.

Okay, that's solved.

Then I just had one final question. I'd like you to, if you could, reflect on, probably in your mind, the most important contribution the C-2 made over the last 14 months, 15 months. If you could tie it to something very specific, that would be helpful, but just a reflection on your part as the C-2.
I think I want to be a maverick and tell you that I think the -- I'm going to give you a general answer. Generally, I think we gave the Commander good insight into what was going on in terms of the very, very diverse threat, and the populace, I guess I would say, the Iraqi people and what they were thinking. So, yes, the threat. So we got some insight into that.

The specific thing, I think -- and there's been lots. So I'm on the spot. So I'm going to give you what I can come up with now. But the thing that comes to mind is that it was very obvious to us that the Awakening movements were real and that the Concerned Local Citizen program, if we stood it up, would work.

I think that counsel to the Commander, reinforcing what he thought, and this is all on Odierno. The recognition of Awakening Councils and seizing on the opportunity to do Concerned Local Citizens in response to that, that's all General Odierno with our insights: The Awakening is real; CLCs are working.
So that would be the one specific thing that came to mind. There is a very specific intel
system out there, and everything else, that gave us that, with some real good analysis, I
would tell you.

Secondarily, another example, maybe equally important -- I don't now -- that contributed
to that is that the surge has worked. In other words, that 30,000 troops would make a difference in terms of
two things, combat power to do the things we talked about earlier, but the signal that it would send to
both the enemy in terms of our resolve and it will have an effect on the enemy in terms of combat
operations, and the reassurance to the population they would be protected, securing the population being the
theme instead of transition for a while.

So those are two examples. I think -- and I don't want to speak for him, but I think General
Odierno has incredible intuition as a commander, and one of the things that is helpful, I think, is to be
able to take that intuition, that informed intuition, and confirm or deny it. Usually, it was confirming,
because he is usually right, but you know,
occasionally it was denying.

Those are two examples when I think we
were able to feel good about his intuition, which he
went with. In one case, politically sensitive to do
it, in the case of the surge; and in another
operationally risky to go with Awakening movements,
trust them, and seize on them with CLCs.

(b)(6)  Sure. Thank you.

(b)(3), (b)(6)  One recent thing was
an uptick in the infrastructure attacks, in particular
on some of the electricity sites. Any reason from
intelligence that that was organized --

(b)(3), (b)(6)  I am not convinced there
was an uptick. If you go back and do the analysis,
I'm convinced that -- Well, let me back up and tell
you.

If you do the analysis, there are periods
when -- from 2003 all the way to now, where there are
spikes and, yes, there have been spikes. What
happened, though, was that General Petraeus -- He
resolved to do something about the infrastructure, you
know, make things happen, made them even more significant.

So in other words, used to be -- I don't want to indict anybody, but we would just let the process work as far as repair and those kinds of things, but now we are making such progress in getting this infrastructure up that what used to be viewed as minor are now majors. You can't get the 46-inch pipeline, you can't get the right power line up and all -- it's a big deal to General Petraeus.

So I think that heightened the awareness that these infrastructure attacks were happening. They have always happened, and many times for locals.

Do I think there is a concerned effort? No, I do not. If they really wanted to go do something debilitating, they can do it, and they really haven't. You know, it's potshots at the infrastructure when you get right down to it.

So I don't think it's concerning, but I think it has been -- It has hampered the progress they have made, the other side of that being that General Petraeus and General Odierno as the guy who's got to
send forces out to help them and very proactive in
repairing them, securing them, repairing them, and
improving the infrastructure as well. So heightened
awareness as opposed to more attacks or any kind of
coordinated effort, in my opinion.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Can I get one more in
here before we break? Task Force [14a] and detainee
releases: I'm just wondering about what your thoughts
are from an intelligence standpoint on the release of
these detainees and how that impacts the fight, and
are we actually seeing vigilante type action out there
when they are released in areas where there is a
strong CLC presence, for instance, or a strong
community presence that didn't want them released?

(b)(3), (b)(6) There has been some
recidivism, you know, but not as bad yet as some
people have feared. We'll see how these increased
releases go. However, the detainee release program
has been good in some aspects when targeted. In other
words, when we release detainees that will do good for
us, we have guarantors and their intent is to go back
and assist -- those very specific detainees have been
helpful.

So you can make the detainee program work for you. I'm not saying every one of those was a good idea, but some were, and some are helpful. Some are not. So that's been -- You know, it has assisted in some ways with reconciliation. It has assisted in garnering support from the local populace, if you do certain detainees or sometimes certain numbers of detainees and those kinds of things.

There has been recidivism where you've had guys who have done significant attacks, who you go back and find have been released previously. So there's two sides to the coin.

Thanks very much.

That concludes this interview.